Nita A. Farahany
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780814771228
- eISBN:
- 9780814737828
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9780814771228.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter discusses a new brand of moral philosophy called behavioral morality, particularly as it relates to the criminal law. Behavioral morality is a form of moral reasoning that focuses on the ...
More
This chapter discusses a new brand of moral philosophy called behavioral morality, particularly as it relates to the criminal law. Behavioral morality is a form of moral reasoning that focuses on the internal proximate causes of deviant behavior to determine whether the actor is morally blameworthy for that conduct. It concludes that as science progresses to reveal the causes of human behavior, a criminal justice system based on retributivism will no longer align with moral intuitions about responsibility. The chapter then suggests that behavioral moralism may gain more traction by embracing the fundamental underpinnings of the criminal justice system, while still working to integrate scientific evidence. Finally, it opens the debate on the question of stigmatization of individuals who have scientific accounts of their behavior.Less
This chapter discusses a new brand of moral philosophy called behavioral morality, particularly as it relates to the criminal law. Behavioral morality is a form of moral reasoning that focuses on the internal proximate causes of deviant behavior to determine whether the actor is morally blameworthy for that conduct. It concludes that as science progresses to reveal the causes of human behavior, a criminal justice system based on retributivism will no longer align with moral intuitions about responsibility. The chapter then suggests that behavioral moralism may gain more traction by embracing the fundamental underpinnings of the criminal justice system, while still working to integrate scientific evidence. Finally, it opens the debate on the question of stigmatization of individuals who have scientific accounts of their behavior.
Amanda C. Pustilnik
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780814771228
- eISBN:
- 9780814737828
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9780814771228.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter supports the conclusion of Professor Nita A. Farahany in the previous chapter that brain-based individuation of criminal justice is neither scientifically possible nor normatively ...
More
This chapter supports the conclusion of Professor Nita A. Farahany in the previous chapter that brain-based individuation of criminal justice is neither scientifically possible nor normatively desirable. Accordingly, Farahany suggests that the right target of analysis for scholars in behavioral morality is the typical community member, not the transgressor. Picking up from Farahany's work, this chapter speculates as to whether behavioral moralists could develop an intermediate position that focuses neither on the individual disordered offender nor on the aggregate typical person but on aggregate kinds of abnormalcy—or “unreasonableness.” Finally, it proposes that behavioral moralists will have to identify differences in morally salient perception, affect, or cognition that are stable, atypical, severe, and relevant to the particular offense a person committed.Less
This chapter supports the conclusion of Professor Nita A. Farahany in the previous chapter that brain-based individuation of criminal justice is neither scientifically possible nor normatively desirable. Accordingly, Farahany suggests that the right target of analysis for scholars in behavioral morality is the typical community member, not the transgressor. Picking up from Farahany's work, this chapter speculates as to whether behavioral moralists could develop an intermediate position that focuses neither on the individual disordered offender nor on the aggregate typical person but on aggregate kinds of abnormalcy—or “unreasonableness.” Finally, it proposes that behavioral moralists will have to identify differences in morally salient perception, affect, or cognition that are stable, atypical, severe, and relevant to the particular offense a person committed.
James E. Fleming and Sanford Levinson (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780814771228
- eISBN:
- 9780814737828
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9780814771228.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Can theories of evolution explain the development of our capacity for moral judgment and the content of morality itself? If bad behavior punished by the criminal law is attributable to physical ...
More
Can theories of evolution explain the development of our capacity for moral judgment and the content of morality itself? If bad behavior punished by the criminal law is attributable to physical causes, rather than being intentional or voluntary as traditionally assumed, what are the implications for rethinking the criminal justice system? Is evolutionary theory and “nature talk,” at least as practiced to date, inherently conservative and resistant to progressive and feminist proposals for social changes to counter subordination and secure equality? This book addresses many of the philosophical, legal, and political issues raised by such questions. It examines the possibilities of a naturalistic ethics, the implications of behavioral morality for reform of the criminal law, the prospects for a biopolitical science, and the relationship between nature, culture, and social engineering.Less
Can theories of evolution explain the development of our capacity for moral judgment and the content of morality itself? If bad behavior punished by the criminal law is attributable to physical causes, rather than being intentional or voluntary as traditionally assumed, what are the implications for rethinking the criminal justice system? Is evolutionary theory and “nature talk,” at least as practiced to date, inherently conservative and resistant to progressive and feminist proposals for social changes to counter subordination and secure equality? This book addresses many of the philosophical, legal, and political issues raised by such questions. It examines the possibilities of a naturalistic ethics, the implications of behavioral morality for reform of the criminal law, the prospects for a biopolitical science, and the relationship between nature, culture, and social engineering.
