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This chapter by Ebbinghaus and Gronwald provides a comparative historical analysis mapping the cross-national institutional diversity in the evolution of pension systems in ten European countries. Analysing the long-term development, it describes the way in which institutional arrangements in private pensions evolved over time and interact with public pension reforms. The process of institutional change is examined by analysing critical junctures in the public–private pension mix. First, the early legacy and path-dependent post-war dynamics in public pension development are sketched, contrasting Bismarckian social insurance and Beveridge basic pension traditions. The second juncture compares successful versus belated or even failed expansion of public pensions to secure living standards in old age, and its consequences for crowding out private pensions. Finally, the more recent pension reforms led towards a multipillar pension system, in some cases retrenchment of public pensions and privatization efforts are crowding in funded private pensions.

This comparative chapter by Ebbinghaus and Neugschwender discusses the institutional differences in the public–private mix, distinguishing mature from emerging multipillar systems and hybrid from dominantly public pension systems. It focuses on exploring the interaction between income inequalities in working life and pension system features for old age income. In particular, it considers the first tier of minimum income support, the public and private second-tier earnings-related pensions, and the particularities of private pensions. The empirical analysis compares poverty rates over time and across countries, discussing the impact of public pensions. The further analysis reveals variations in the recipient rate and income share of private supplementary pensions among the elderly. The importance of mandatory or negotiated occupational pensions in order to reduce inequality in multipillar pension systems is evident in addition to the role of public minimum income protection for poverty reduction.

Denmark developed a multipillar pension system, adding private pensions to its universal flat-rate, tax-financed ‘people's pension’. Following the failure to introduce a public earnings-related supplementary pension, fully funded ‘labour market’ pensions were added through collective agreements between employers and trade unions, extending these occupational pensions to nearly all employment groups since the early 1990s. Comprehensive institutional change took place almost without any legislation by non-state actors, except for the reform of the public basic pension which became increasingly means-tested. Private pension governance is typically left to pension funds or to special life insurance companies jointly owned and controlled by unions and employers. Strict rules protect pension funds against financial shocks, but these were eased during the financial crisis to improve returns on these defined-contribution (DC) pensions. Nevertheless, the Danish pension system looks quite satisfactory from both an economic and social policy perspective.

The Swedish pension system developed through different stages from the establishment of the first statutory basic pension, the introduction of an earnings-related supplementary pension, and collectively negotiated occupational pensions to the most recent institutional change. A comprehensive pension reform was finally decided in 1994 which led to a switch to an earnings-related insurance with notional defined-contribution (NDC) and a mandatory funded personal pension component (premium pension). In the second pillar, occupational pensions negotiated by employers and trade unions came under financial pressures due to the decline of industrial employment, which led to some restructuring such as the gradual switch from defined-benefit (DB) to defined-contribution (DC) pensions. The chapter also examines the governance and design of these occupational schemes as well as personal pensions.

The British pension system with a meagre basic pension in the Beveridge tradition and coexisting private pensions that have increasingly been transformed from defined-benefit (DB) to defined-contribution (DC) pensions has generally been viewed as consistent with the liberal welfare and production regime types. While this classification is appropriate for some elements, from the 1950s onwards a strong statist side was expressed through the role of the state as employer and as regulator, with important consequences for the scale of state provision and the coverage and governance of occupational provision. The dynamics set in place by these arrangements lie behind recent pension reforms. These serve to enhance the hybrid pension system, moving it in a clearly more social democratic direction. However, the financial crisis and the change of government in 2010 mean that this movement might now be halted even before it had really begun.

Pensions have been constructed by men in full-time work for other men in full-time work; but most pensioners are women. The basic state pension (BSP) still assumes that women will derive their state pensions as dependants of their husbands. And modern occupational pensions (OP) still assume that women will derive private pensions from full-time work and full-time saving continued without interruption over forty years. Neither the model of the BSP nor of the OP fits the world women inhabit. Women are so at risk of poverty in retirement due to three main factors: fluid family forms, flexible labour markets, and increased longevity. Barely 20 per cent of women enter retirement with a full national insurance pension in their own right.

The pension reforms proposed by Lord Turner's Pensions Commission were certainly radical, although perhaps not as radical as they might have been. How well did the government of Britain rise to the challenge posed by the Pensions Commission? In the months leading up to the white paper, a major battle raged in Whitehall. Although interpreted through the prism of conflict between Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, in fact a very familiar and traditional pattern of British pension policy-making was unfolding, with the Treasury fighting to contain spending commitments on pensions over the long term. It was arguably only the potentially expensive prospect of over 70 per cent of pensioners being able to claim means-tested Pension Credit by the middle of the century that has forced a recalibration of the present system. A few details demonstrate how the Commission's recommendations have been modified to secure this end. The most heavily trailed of the white paper's proposals is the relinking of the basic state pension to average earnings rather than prices.

This chapter sets out a series of recommendations to strengthen the pension system of China in ways compatible with China's capacity to implement reforms effectively. It first discusses overall structure and administration. It then considers options for the basic pension, individual accounts, and voluntary pensions, respectively. The chapter also discusses issues connected with the age of retirement, and finally it considers ways of extending coverage to more of the population.

This chapter describes the pension system in China, including the basic pension and funded individual accounts. The chapter offers a brief discussion the pension system's antecedents, and assesses its strengths and weaknesses, including fragmentation, system deficits and problems with individual accounts.

In 2005, Chile's newly-elected president appointed an advisory council to consider pension changes, whose analysis and recommendations are the basis for reforms enacted in 2008. This chapter first describes and assesses the funded individual accounts created in 1981 and reformed over the years, including reforms in 2008. It then discusses the council's reasoning and its central recommendation—the introduction of a universal pension. The next section touches briefly on coverage. Since 1997, China has moved from an enterprise-based system of defined-benefit pensions based on final salary toward a unified system for urban workers with three elements: a defined-benefit, PAYG, first-tier pension (the social pool); a mandatory, funded, defined-contribution pension; and voluntary, enterprise-based pensions. This section describes the pension system in China, and sets out proposals for reform developed by a panel on which we both served. Finally, the basic pension, individual accounts, and issues of coverage are discussed.

In 1979, Labour's Election Manifesto placed an emphasis on the party's long-standing objective of achieving a state pension of one third adult average earnings for single people and half average earnings for couples. However, in 1981, the Conservative government broke the link between pensions and earnings. When the Labour party rose to power, it restored the link between pensions and earnings and the basic state pension (BSP). It had promised to deliver more automatic help to the poorest of the pensioners. Fulfilling this promise, Labour put up systematic reviews of both pensions and long-term care provisions were established, in particular it introduced Opportunity for All, which served as the government's blueprint in its approach to poverty and social exclusion. This policy drew three priorities for older people: tackling the problems of low income and social exclusion among today's pensioners; improving opportunities for older people to live secure, fulfilling, and active lives; and ensuring that more of tomorrow's pensioners can retire on a decent income. This chapter examines the policy changes introduced to achieve the three priorities set by the New Labour government. It also assesses the success of these policies in terms of measurable outcomes, using both of the government's own monitoring data and other sources.