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How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions

Berent Enç

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199256020
eISBN:
9780191602238
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199256020.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Attempts to answer the question of whether it is possible to understand agency as realized within a world construed ‘naturalistically’, that is, in terms of causal relations among events and states ... More


Disjunctive Theories of Perception and Action

David‐Hillel Ruben

in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199231546
eISBN:
9780191716126
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

In order to state a disjunctive theory of action, one needs two terms of art: ‘intrinsic event’ and ‘mere event’. One also needs two senses of ‘event’: a wide sense and a narrow sense. In the wide ... More


Poverty and Human Development

Sabina Alkire

in Valuing Freedoms: Sen's Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
April 2004
ISBN:
9780199245796
eISBN:
9780191600838
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199245797.003.0002
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

Each of the four chapters of Part I of the book synthesizes one aspect that must be specified in the operationalization of the capability approach, then proposes a framework for doing so. The issue ... More


On the Passivity of the Passions (2001)

Robert C. Solomon

in Not Passion's Slave: Emotions and Choice

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195145496
eISBN:
9780199833726
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195145496.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

It is commonly supposed that passions are passive, or, rather, that we are passive with regard to them. They happen to us. I argue that we are active with regard to our passions, and the notion of ... More


Intentional Action

Joshua Shepherd

in The Shape of Agency: Control, Action, Skill, Knowledge

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
January 2021
ISBN:
9780198866411
eISBN:
9780191898556
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198866411.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The project of analyzing intentional action has been out of favor for some time. In part this is due to exhaustion over details—accounts are usually subject to very technical problems or elaborate ... More


Actions and Abstractions

Shaun Gallagher

in Action and Interaction

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
May 2020
ISBN:
9780198846345
eISBN:
9780191881503
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198846345.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, General

The philosophical analysis of action often leads to abstractions. I argue that we can avoid some of these abstractions by keeping in mind that actions are defined and individuated by their ... More


Actions as Artifacts

Simon J. Evnine

in Making Objects and Events: A Hylomorphic Theory of Artifacts, Actions, and Organisms

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
August 2016
ISBN:
9780198779674
eISBN:
9780191825989
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198779674.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The final chapter argues that intentional actions are themselves artifacts—artifactual events rather than artifactual objects. After some discussion of hylomorphic treatments of actions and events in ... More


The Intentionality of Actions: Basic and Non-Basic

Ingmar Persson

in Reasons in Action: A Reductionist Account of Intentional Action

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
October 2019
ISBN:
9780198845034
eISBN:
9780191880391
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198845034.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, General

According to the definition proposed by this chapter you intentionally perform the basic bodily action of causing p now if you now have an occurrent decisive desire to cause p directly—that is, ... More


Minimal Event-Causal Libertarianism

Christopher Evan Franklin

in A Minimal Libertarianism: Free Will and the Promise of Reduction

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
February 2018
ISBN:
9780190682781
eISBN:
9780190682811
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190682781.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter explains the differences between agency reductionism and nonreductionism, explains the varieties of libertarianism, and sets out the main contours of minimal event-causal libertarianism, ... More


What is it to be the Agent of an Event or State?

Kirk Ludwig

in From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action I

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
October 2016
ISBN:
9780198755623
eISBN:
9780191816765
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755623.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Political Philosophy

This chapter analyzes the agency relation. One is an agent of an event if one is a primitive agent of it, that is, brings it about but not by bringing about something else, or it is an event that is ... More


The Standard Story of Action : An Exchange (1)

Smith Michael

in Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262014564
eISBN:
9780262289139
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262014564.003.0026
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter begins by identifying putative action that an agent performed by tracing its effects back to some bodily movement. This bodily movement has to be one that can be considered a basic ... More


Intentional Action and Judgment

Ernest Sosa

in Judgment and Agency

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
April 2015
ISBN:
9780198719694
eISBN:
9780191788765
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719694.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter turns to a topic broached already in Chapter 1: the nature of intentional action and the conditions for its aptness. In the end not even a weak subcredal form of knowledge turns out to ... More


Perceptual Levels and Their Action-Theoretic Counterparts

Robert Audi

in Seeing, Knowing, and Doing: A Perceptualist Account

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
April 2020
ISBN:
9780197503508
eISBN:
9780197503539
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197503508.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 3 explains how perceptions are like actions in that some are, for a given perceiver at a given time, basic and others not. In neither case are the relevant by-relations—seeing x by seeing y ... More


Structure of Intentions and Action

Geeta Ramana

in Human Action, Consciousness, and Problems of Representation

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
June 2014
ISBN:
9780198097266
eISBN:
9780199082766
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198097266.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter discusses the logic of intentions and intentionality and their explanatory role in human action. Intentions function in a variety of ways and it is a significant exercise to lay bare the ... More


Action, Treatment, and Conduct

Robert Audi

in Means, Ends, and Persons: The Meaning and Psychological Dimensions of Kant's Humanity Formula

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
October 2015
ISBN:
9780190251550
eISBN:
9780190251574
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190251550.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

Given that others are quite properly our means to perfectly acceptable ends, one might wonder why treating them merely as means is morally objectionable. This chapter shows why, and in particular, ... More


Prichard on Causing a Change

Jonathan Dancy

in Practical Thought: Essays on Reason, Intuition, and Action

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
August 2021
ISBN:
9780198865605
eISBN:
9780191897955
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0025
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This paper starts by considering an interesting argument of H. A. Prichard’s against the view that to act is to cause a change; the argument is that causing is not an activity. The argument is ... More


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