Masahiro Okuno‐Fujiwara
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198294917
- eISBN:
- 9780191715501
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198294917.003.0013
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, South and East Asia
This chapter presents an abstract model of the government-business relationship and identifies institutional structures that determine the nature and outcome of this relationship in different ...
More
This chapter presents an abstract model of the government-business relationship and identifies institutional structures that determine the nature and outcome of this relationship in different societies. The importance ofex antepolicy rules versusex postnegotiation is discussed. The relative merits and demerits of different types of government are assessed, and the results are used to evaluate the development performance of the relation-based Japanese system contrasted with the rule-based United States system.Less
This chapter presents an abstract model of the government-business relationship and identifies institutional structures that determine the nature and outcome of this relationship in different societies. The importance ofex antepolicy rules versusex postnegotiation is discussed. The relative merits and demerits of different types of government are assessed, and the results are used to evaluate the development performance of the relation-based Japanese system contrasted with the rule-based United States system.
Roger Undy
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199544943
- eISBN:
- 9780191719936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199544943.003.0008
- Subject:
- Business and Management, HRM / IR
Dominant‐partner amalgamations are briefly discussed before focusing on balanced‐partner amalgamations. The outcomes of dominant‐partner amalgamations are similar to those generated by transfers. In ...
More
Dominant‐partner amalgamations are briefly discussed before focusing on balanced‐partner amalgamations. The outcomes of dominant‐partner amalgamations are similar to those generated by transfers. In contrast, balanced‐partner amalgamations generally have a more marked effect on both the new unions' external relations with employers and its internal organization. However, the context may limit the amalgamated unions' abilities to exercise any increase gained in latent collective bargaining power. Internally, the balanced‐partner amalgamations vary considerably in their reforming effects: some have positive outcomes, while others generate unintended and politically destabilizing consequences.Less
Dominant‐partner amalgamations are briefly discussed before focusing on balanced‐partner amalgamations. The outcomes of dominant‐partner amalgamations are similar to those generated by transfers. In contrast, balanced‐partner amalgamations generally have a more marked effect on both the new unions' external relations with employers and its internal organization. However, the context may limit the amalgamated unions' abilities to exercise any increase gained in latent collective bargaining power. Internally, the balanced‐partner amalgamations vary considerably in their reforming effects: some have positive outcomes, while others generate unintended and politically destabilizing consequences.
Martin Behrens, Kerstin Hamann, and Richard Hurd
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199270149
- eISBN:
- 9780191710353
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199270149.003.0002
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Political Economy
The chapter argues that union strength, decline, and revitalization are best understood as multi-faceted processes and furthermore, that these processes are best understood in a comparative context. ...
More
The chapter argues that union strength, decline, and revitalization are best understood as multi-faceted processes and furthermore, that these processes are best understood in a comparative context. The chapter offers an overview of existing comparative scholarship on union revitalization and examines the claim that unions continue to have an important function in national economies, societies, and politics. Using empirical data, conventional indicators of union strength and decline are compared in the five cases examined in the book. This chapter then develops a four-dimensional approach to study union revitalization comprising membership density, political power, bargaining power, and institutional vitality. The chapter concludes by pointing to the importance of context in analysing comparative union revitalization since the importance of each of the dimensions is likely to vary across countries given different economic, institutional, and political configurations. Furthermore, the chapter argues that union leaders retain an element of choice in deciding on revitalizing strategies.Less
The chapter argues that union strength, decline, and revitalization are best understood as multi-faceted processes and furthermore, that these processes are best understood in a comparative context. The chapter offers an overview of existing comparative scholarship on union revitalization and examines the claim that unions continue to have an important function in national economies, societies, and politics. Using empirical data, conventional indicators of union strength and decline are compared in the five cases examined in the book. This chapter then develops a four-dimensional approach to study union revitalization comprising membership density, political power, bargaining power, and institutional vitality. The chapter concludes by pointing to the importance of context in analysing comparative union revitalization since the importance of each of the dimensions is likely to vary across countries given different economic, institutional, and political configurations. Furthermore, the chapter argues that union leaders retain an element of choice in deciding on revitalizing strategies.
Tito Boeri, Agar Brugiavini, Lars Calmfors, Alison Booth, Michael Burda, Daniele Checchi, Bernhard Ebbinghaus, Richard Freeman, Pietro Garibaldi, Bertil Holmlund, Robin Naylor, Martin Schludi, Thierry Verdier, and Jelle Visser
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246588
- eISBN:
- 9780191596001
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246580.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics
Examines the determinants of union influence over wages. After a brief review of the existing literature on union wage effects, it describes the major factors conditioning the extent to which unions ...
More
Examines the determinants of union influence over wages. After a brief review of the existing literature on union wage effects, it describes the major factors conditioning the extent to which unions will be able to exert an influence on bargained wage outcomes. The likely impact of trade, economic integration, and FDI on union bargaining power are analysed in the following section.Less
Examines the determinants of union influence over wages. After a brief review of the existing literature on union wage effects, it describes the major factors conditioning the extent to which unions will be able to exert an influence on bargained wage outcomes. The likely impact of trade, economic integration, and FDI on union bargaining power are analysed in the following section.
David Miller
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198278641
- eISBN:
- 9780191599903
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198278640.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
How can exploitation—in the sense of taking advantage of other people—occur in market settings? Marx understood exploitation in terms of unilateral transfers of value. Steiner and Roemer understand ...
More
How can exploitation—in the sense of taking advantage of other people—occur in market settings? Marx understood exploitation in terms of unilateral transfers of value. Steiner and Roemer understand it in terms of exchanges made against the background of an unjust distribution of resources. In opposition to these views, it is argued that exploitative transactions are exchanges made at non‐equilibrium prices, due to asymmetries of information or of bargaining power. This view of exploitation allows us to understand why capitalism is inherently exploitative, whereas under market socialism, exploitation would only occur in specific circumstances.Less
How can exploitation—in the sense of taking advantage of other people—occur in market settings? Marx understood exploitation in terms of unilateral transfers of value. Steiner and Roemer understand it in terms of exchanges made against the background of an unjust distribution of resources. In opposition to these views, it is argued that exploitative transactions are exchanges made at non‐equilibrium prices, due to asymmetries of information or of bargaining power. This view of exploitation allows us to understand why capitalism is inherently exploitative, whereas under market socialism, exploitation would only occur in specific circumstances.
Erin Ryan
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199737987
- eISBN:
- 9780199918652
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737987.003.0009
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
Chapter Nine explores the structural safeguards of bilateral balancing through the bargaining norms and media of exchange that accompany the trade in federalism entitlements. Federalism bargaining ...
More
Chapter Nine explores the structural safeguards of bilateral balancing through the bargaining norms and media of exchange that accompany the trade in federalism entitlements. Federalism bargaining operates where each party wants something from the other, and negotiators trade on various aspects of the governing capacity available to them. These include legal authority, financing, resources and expertise to accomplish specific regulatory goals, release from inhibiting legal obligations that one side may hold over the other, and credit. Notably, the normative power of federalism itself forms important leverage at the bargaining table—often by clever statutory design—further constraining the results of negotiations in which participants are also motivated by other concerns. Chapter Nine includes compelling anecdotal testimony by primary source practitioners about participation, initiation, mechanics, leverage, relationships and consultation, underlying legal uncertainty, and available sources of trade in federalism bargaining. It carefully analyzes bargaining under the federal power of the purse, in spending power deals such as No Child Left Behind. Negotiated federalism is a project of bilateral balancing—incorporating wisdom from all levels of government about how to prioritize competing federalism values and exogenous considerations in each individual circumstance. Understanding the dynamics in federalism bargaining helps demonstrate the structural safeguards that bilateral balancing affords. Federalism bargaining ensures the active engagement of federalism goals through its very design—regardless of the competing policy concerns or the subjective considerations of participants—by balancing local and national interests in the substance of actual governance. Bilateral balancing thus affords protection for federalism on a structural level that surpasses the political safeguards available at a purely unilateral level. Like other federalism safeguards, however, the structural encouragement of federalism values is not infallible. Leverage dynamics, failed relationships, competitions for credit, and bargaining abuses can overcome them in some cases.Less
Chapter Nine explores the structural safeguards of bilateral balancing through the bargaining norms and media of exchange that accompany the trade in federalism entitlements. Federalism bargaining operates where each party wants something from the other, and negotiators trade on various aspects of the governing capacity available to them. These include legal authority, financing, resources and expertise to accomplish specific regulatory goals, release from inhibiting legal obligations that one side may hold over the other, and credit. Notably, the normative power of federalism itself forms important leverage at the bargaining table—often by clever statutory design—further constraining the results of negotiations in which participants are also motivated by other concerns. Chapter Nine includes compelling anecdotal testimony by primary source practitioners about participation, initiation, mechanics, leverage, relationships and consultation, underlying legal uncertainty, and available sources of trade in federalism bargaining. It carefully analyzes bargaining under the federal power of the purse, in spending power deals such as No Child Left Behind. Negotiated federalism is a project of bilateral balancing—incorporating wisdom from all levels of government about how to prioritize competing federalism values and exogenous considerations in each individual circumstance. Understanding the dynamics in federalism bargaining helps demonstrate the structural safeguards that bilateral balancing affords. Federalism bargaining ensures the active engagement of federalism goals through its very design—regardless of the competing policy concerns or the subjective considerations of participants—by balancing local and national interests in the substance of actual governance. Bilateral balancing thus affords protection for federalism on a structural level that surpasses the political safeguards available at a purely unilateral level. Like other federalism safeguards, however, the structural encouragement of federalism values is not infallible. Leverage dynamics, failed relationships, competitions for credit, and bargaining abuses can overcome them in some cases.
Kent Jones
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195378825
- eISBN:
- 9780199852598
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195378825.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic Systems
The WTO introduced a new set of rules for membership that attempted to promote and improve the discipline among members since this was needed to accomplish market access obligations. Also, WTO ...
More
The WTO introduced a new set of rules for membership that attempted to promote and improve the discipline among members since this was needed to accomplish market access obligations. Also, WTO intended to attain universal membership. Working on these two goals brought about a lot of tension, thus this chapter aims to look into the political economy of the WTO accession process, especially on the first twenty-five new members to accede, and on their accession terms. The chapter compares the trends in membership of both the GATT and the WTO while also identifying the benefits attributed to members of these organizations. The chapter also looks into the GATT rules of accession and why these were modified in the WTO. The chapter also investigates on how long it takes to finish an accession agreement through a set of regression analyses while discussing the impact of WTO members' activity and bargaining power.Less
The WTO introduced a new set of rules for membership that attempted to promote and improve the discipline among members since this was needed to accomplish market access obligations. Also, WTO intended to attain universal membership. Working on these two goals brought about a lot of tension, thus this chapter aims to look into the political economy of the WTO accession process, especially on the first twenty-five new members to accede, and on their accession terms. The chapter compares the trends in membership of both the GATT and the WTO while also identifying the benefits attributed to members of these organizations. The chapter also looks into the GATT rules of accession and why these were modified in the WTO. The chapter also investigates on how long it takes to finish an accession agreement through a set of regression analyses while discussing the impact of WTO members' activity and bargaining power.
Andrew C. Inkpen
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199241828
- eISBN:
- 9780191596834
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199241821.003.0015
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, International
There has been an enormous increase in the formation of international strategic alliances and in the research efforts devoted to understanding alliances over the last few decades. The chapter begins ...
More
There has been an enormous increase in the formation of international strategic alliances and in the research efforts devoted to understanding alliances over the last few decades. The chapter begins with a brief overview of alliance forms and then moves on to consider alliance formation and governance structures, alliance performance, control issues, bargaining power, the role of trust, evolutionary processes, and alliance networks. Within each section, key research areas and questions are identified and the major supporting research and associated findings are discussed.Less
There has been an enormous increase in the formation of international strategic alliances and in the research efforts devoted to understanding alliances over the last few decades. The chapter begins with a brief overview of alliance forms and then moves on to consider alliance formation and governance structures, alliance performance, control issues, bargaining power, the role of trust, evolutionary processes, and alliance networks. Within each section, key research areas and questions are identified and the major supporting research and associated findings are discussed.
Rolph van der Hoeven and Catherine Saget
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199271412
- eISBN:
- 9780191601255
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199271410.003.0008
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
Looks at some of the labour market outcomes of recent economic reforms. The extent to which labour market institutions affect the relationship between reform policies and income inequality remains ...
More
Looks at some of the labour market outcomes of recent economic reforms. The extent to which labour market institutions affect the relationship between reform policies and income inequality remains controversial. Some see labour market institutions as a hindrance to more efficient development and growth, while others argue that without proper labour market institutions an economy cannot progress. Labour market policies, regulations, and institutions have at least three goals: improving allocative efficiency (matching supply and demand); improving dynamic efficiency (increasing the quality of the labour force); and improving or maintaining a sense of equity and social justice among labour force participants. These different goals inform the discussion throughout the chapter, which is organized as follows: after an introduction, the second section touches briefly on some theoretical aspects of labour markets and reform policies; the third reviews trends in labour market changes in terms of informalization of employment, wage shares in national income, and wage inequality; the fourth reviews some general trends in labour market policies that have typically been implemented under the Washington Consensus, namely, a decline in minimum wages, shifts in the bargaining power of unions, and a reduction in employment protection; the final section offers conclusions on whether or not labour market policies reduce income inequality.Less
Looks at some of the labour market outcomes of recent economic reforms. The extent to which labour market institutions affect the relationship between reform policies and income inequality remains controversial. Some see labour market institutions as a hindrance to more efficient development and growth, while others argue that without proper labour market institutions an economy cannot progress. Labour market policies, regulations, and institutions have at least three goals: improving allocative efficiency (matching supply and demand); improving dynamic efficiency (increasing the quality of the labour force); and improving or maintaining a sense of equity and social justice among labour force participants. These different goals inform the discussion throughout the chapter, which is organized as follows: after an introduction, the second section touches briefly on some theoretical aspects of labour markets and reform policies; the third reviews trends in labour market changes in terms of informalization of employment, wage shares in national income, and wage inequality; the fourth reviews some general trends in labour market policies that have typically been implemented under the Washington Consensus, namely, a decline in minimum wages, shifts in the bargaining power of unions, and a reduction in employment protection; the final section offers conclusions on whether or not labour market policies reduce income inequality.
Oliver Hart
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198288817
- eISBN:
- 9780191596353
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198288816.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
The neoclassical, principal‐agent and transaction costs theories cannot by themselves explain firm boundaries. This chapter describes a theory—the incomplete contracting or property rights ...
More
The neoclassical, principal‐agent and transaction costs theories cannot by themselves explain firm boundaries. This chapter describes a theory—the incomplete contracting or property rights approach—based on the idea that power and control matter when contracts are incomplete. If the terms of a transaction can always be renegotiated, the incentives of a party to undertake relationship‐specific investments will depend crucially on the ability to control the use of productive assets when renegotiation takes place (the hold‐up problem). In this context, asset ownership becomes an essential source of power and different ownership structures will affect the severity of the hold‐up problem. The author presents a model that illustrates the benefits and costs of integration. In the absence of wealth constraints, firm boundaries are chosen to allocate power optimally among the parties to a transaction. An implication of the theory is that, ceteris paribus, a party is more likely to own an asset if he or she has an important investment decision. The theory also predicts that complementarities make integration more likely and, conversely, that independent assets should be owned separately. Finally, the author considers whether the theory's predictions actually match up with observed organizational arrangements.Less
The neoclassical, principal‐agent and transaction costs theories cannot by themselves explain firm boundaries. This chapter describes a theory—the incomplete contracting or property rights approach—based on the idea that power and control matter when contracts are incomplete. If the terms of a transaction can always be renegotiated, the incentives of a party to undertake relationship‐specific investments will depend crucially on the ability to control the use of productive assets when renegotiation takes place (the hold‐up problem). In this context, asset ownership becomes an essential source of power and different ownership structures will affect the severity of the hold‐up problem. The author presents a model that illustrates the benefits and costs of integration. In the absence of wealth constraints, firm boundaries are chosen to allocate power optimally among the parties to a transaction. An implication of the theory is that, ceteris paribus, a party is more likely to own an asset if he or she has an important investment decision. The theory also predicts that complementarities make integration more likely and, conversely, that independent assets should be owned separately. Finally, the author considers whether the theory's predictions actually match up with observed organizational arrangements.
Pamela Chasek and Lavanya Rajamani
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195157406
- eISBN:
- 9780199832965
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195157400.003.0011
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
An important problem in the management of global public goods lies with the imbalance of bargaining power as between developed and developing countries in the multilateral negotiations involved. ...
More
An important problem in the management of global public goods lies with the imbalance of bargaining power as between developed and developing countries in the multilateral negotiations involved. Looks at characteristics of the negotiation process; the composition and strength of developing country negotiation teams; and tactics and methods for improving their bargaining position. Current constraints on negotiating capacity often reflect a lack of national policy analysis, design, and management capacity. One of this chapter's main recommendations is to increase national policy‐making capacity.Less
An important problem in the management of global public goods lies with the imbalance of bargaining power as between developed and developing countries in the multilateral negotiations involved. Looks at characteristics of the negotiation process; the composition and strength of developing country negotiation teams; and tactics and methods for improving their bargaining position. Current constraints on negotiating capacity often reflect a lack of national policy analysis, design, and management capacity. One of this chapter's main recommendations is to increase national policy‐making capacity.
Tongfi Kim
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780804796965
- eISBN:
- 9780804798594
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804796965.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
In this chapter, the author conducts a “structured, focused comparison” of the US alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Spain with respect to domestic opposition to alliance cooperation, the ...
More
In this chapter, the author conducts a “structured, focused comparison” of the US alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Spain with respect to domestic opposition to alliance cooperation, the leader’s attitude toward the alliance, the leader’s vulnerability, and intra-alliance bargaining. The case studies explain why a leader matters in intra-alliance bargaining and why it is important to analyze the leader’s attitude and vulnerability in combination. The chapter also shows that a state tends to receive less benefit from its alliance as its state resources increase, even though its influence in the alliance tends to grow with its capability. The final section discusses the implications of the findings as well as future research agendas.Less
In this chapter, the author conducts a “structured, focused comparison” of the US alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Spain with respect to domestic opposition to alliance cooperation, the leader’s attitude toward the alliance, the leader’s vulnerability, and intra-alliance bargaining. The case studies explain why a leader matters in intra-alliance bargaining and why it is important to analyze the leader’s attitude and vulnerability in combination. The chapter also shows that a state tends to receive less benefit from its alliance as its state resources increase, even though its influence in the alliance tends to grow with its capability. The final section discusses the implications of the findings as well as future research agendas.
Adrienne Héritier, Catherine Moury, Carina Bischoff, and Carl-Fredrik Bergström
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199653621
- eISBN:
- 9780191751349
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653621.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
In the theoretical chapter, different from the principal-agent literature which focuses on why principals delegate and how they seek to control the agent, this book analyzes delegation from the angle ...
More
In the theoretical chapter, different from the principal-agent literature which focuses on why principals delegate and how they seek to control the agent, this book analyzes delegation from the angle of power distribution among the involved actors, the Council, the Commission and the Parliament. The authors base their argument on institutionalist power-based bargaining theory and argue that all actors seek to establish a mode of decision-making that maximizes their institutional power. And if – dissatisfied with a formal distribution of competence distribution – they will seek to alter them through a re-bargaining of these during the application of the rules. The focus rests in particular on the rising power of the Parliament. The chapter shows how the Parliament has changed the parameters of the contest for power, thereby transforming the governance of comitology over the years.Less
In the theoretical chapter, different from the principal-agent literature which focuses on why principals delegate and how they seek to control the agent, this book analyzes delegation from the angle of power distribution among the involved actors, the Council, the Commission and the Parliament. The authors base their argument on institutionalist power-based bargaining theory and argue that all actors seek to establish a mode of decision-making that maximizes their institutional power. And if – dissatisfied with a formal distribution of competence distribution – they will seek to alter them through a re-bargaining of these during the application of the rules. The focus rests in particular on the rising power of the Parliament. The chapter shows how the Parliament has changed the parameters of the contest for power, thereby transforming the governance of comitology over the years.
Tongfi Kim
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780804796965
- eISBN:
- 9780804798594
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804796965.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter explains the effects of three domestic variables on a state’s intra-alliance bargaining power. As the existing theories of international relations argue, the presence of effective ...
More
This chapter explains the effects of three domestic variables on a state’s intra-alliance bargaining power. As the existing theories of international relations argue, the presence of effective domestic opposition to cooperation increases a state’s bargaining power in an alliance. The chapter advances our understanding of the domestic sources of bargaining power by further explaining disordinal interaction effects of a leader’s attitude toward an alliance and his or her vulnerability. The effects of a leader’s attitude and vulnerability vary, depending on the value of each variable; vulnerable pro-cooperation leaders and non-vulnerable anti-cooperation leaders have bargaining advantages in intra-alliance bargaining.Less
This chapter explains the effects of three domestic variables on a state’s intra-alliance bargaining power. As the existing theories of international relations argue, the presence of effective domestic opposition to cooperation increases a state’s bargaining power in an alliance. The chapter advances our understanding of the domestic sources of bargaining power by further explaining disordinal interaction effects of a leader’s attitude toward an alliance and his or her vulnerability. The effects of a leader’s attitude and vulnerability vary, depending on the value of each variable; vulnerable pro-cooperation leaders and non-vulnerable anti-cooperation leaders have bargaining advantages in intra-alliance bargaining.
Tonia Novitz
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198298540
- eISBN:
- 9780191685484
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198298540.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Company and Commercial Law
This chapter examines the grounds for legal protection of strikes. They may be socio-economic in nature, may draw upon a particular understanding of rights to political participation, and may be ...
More
This chapter examines the grounds for legal protection of strikes. They may be socio-economic in nature, may draw upon a particular understanding of rights to political participation, and may be derived from the application of recognised civil liberties. The most common justification offered for legal protection of a right to strike is its role in the conclusion of collective agreements relating to terms and conditions of employment. In that context, it provides workers with the threat of an economic sanction to counter the often superior bargaining power of an employer.Less
This chapter examines the grounds for legal protection of strikes. They may be socio-economic in nature, may draw upon a particular understanding of rights to political participation, and may be derived from the application of recognised civil liberties. The most common justification offered for legal protection of a right to strike is its role in the conclusion of collective agreements relating to terms and conditions of employment. In that context, it provides workers with the threat of an economic sanction to counter the often superior bargaining power of an employer.
Hartley Dean
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9781847420763
- eISBN:
- 9781447303473
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Policy Press
- DOI:
- 10.1332/policypress/9781847420763.003.0007
- Subject:
- Sociology, Social Research and Statistics
‘Work-life balance’ is a contested notion, involving conflicting interpretations of ‘flexibility’ in relation to employment and family commitments. It may be justified on the basis of social care, a ...
More
‘Work-life balance’ is a contested notion, involving conflicting interpretations of ‘flexibility’ in relation to employment and family commitments. It may be justified on the basis of social care, a business case or the contemporary public policy compromise. In practice however, people's capacity as employee and family members to achieve the kind of flexibility they want rests on their bargaining power. This chapter draws on findings from a small-scale qualitative investigation of work-life balance in low income neighbourhoods in the UK. It discusses different perspectives on the relationship between the worlds of paid employment and family life; the social welfare perspective, the liberal/business perspective and the ‘Third Way’ public policy perspective. It also discusses bargaining power in relation to employer practices, income maintenance and childcare arrangements. The chapter ends by integrating the analysis of various perspectives on work-life balance with the experiences of households, most of whom were identified as having very limited bargaining power.Less
‘Work-life balance’ is a contested notion, involving conflicting interpretations of ‘flexibility’ in relation to employment and family commitments. It may be justified on the basis of social care, a business case or the contemporary public policy compromise. In practice however, people's capacity as employee and family members to achieve the kind of flexibility they want rests on their bargaining power. This chapter draws on findings from a small-scale qualitative investigation of work-life balance in low income neighbourhoods in the UK. It discusses different perspectives on the relationship between the worlds of paid employment and family life; the social welfare perspective, the liberal/business perspective and the ‘Third Way’ public policy perspective. It also discusses bargaining power in relation to employer practices, income maintenance and childcare arrangements. The chapter ends by integrating the analysis of various perspectives on work-life balance with the experiences of households, most of whom were identified as having very limited bargaining power.
Henry Farrell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262042512
- eISBN:
- 9780262271936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262042512.003.0296
- Subject:
- Information Science, Communications
This chapter examines global governance mechanisms designed to protect citizens’ privacy rights, with special emphasis on the relationship between the United States and the European Union (EU) and ...
More
This chapter examines global governance mechanisms designed to protect citizens’ privacy rights, with special emphasis on the relationship between the United States and the European Union (EU) and their very different approaches to the issue. It argues that power relations are central to the transatlantic accommodation that has been reached, and to the EU’s efforts to push third-party countries toward higher levels of privacy protection. It also suggests that privacy regulation has always had a strong international component, but that the causal impact of international factors is likely to depend on two key intervening variables: existing national institutional traditions and state bargaining power. It then offers policy recommendations on how to protect privacy, such as extending privacy protections internationally, strengthening international mechanisms of privacy protection, and hybrid arrangements which involve increasing accountability requirements for public-private actor relationships.Less
This chapter examines global governance mechanisms designed to protect citizens’ privacy rights, with special emphasis on the relationship between the United States and the European Union (EU) and their very different approaches to the issue. It argues that power relations are central to the transatlantic accommodation that has been reached, and to the EU’s efforts to push third-party countries toward higher levels of privacy protection. It also suggests that privacy regulation has always had a strong international component, but that the causal impact of international factors is likely to depend on two key intervening variables: existing national institutional traditions and state bargaining power. It then offers policy recommendations on how to protect privacy, such as extending privacy protections internationally, strengthening international mechanisms of privacy protection, and hybrid arrangements which involve increasing accountability requirements for public-private actor relationships.
John Child, David Faulkner, Stephen Tallman, and Linda Hsieh
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198814634
- eISBN:
- 9780191852374
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198814634.003.0003
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Strategy
Chapter 3 describes the contributions of managerial and organizational perspectives, namely strategic management theory, game theory, bargaining power theory, organization theory, and stakeholder ...
More
Chapter 3 describes the contributions of managerial and organizational perspectives, namely strategic management theory, game theory, bargaining power theory, organization theory, and stakeholder theory, to the understanding of cooperative strategy. Strategic management theory draws attention to the need for prospective partners to achieve a fit between their respective strategies so as to achieve each party’s objectives. Game theory provides valuable insights into the possible attitudes of one’s partner in cooperation. Bargaining power models provide expectations for how the relative contributions of partners determine the structure and strategic direction of cooperative ventures. Organization theory’s contribution comes through its consideration of resource dependency in relation to partner power and control, learning, and how to organize alliances. Stakeholder theory suggests that when firms seek cooperative solutions to joint needs, they become stakeholders in each other’s organization and thus incur an interest in the success of their partners as well as themselves.Less
Chapter 3 describes the contributions of managerial and organizational perspectives, namely strategic management theory, game theory, bargaining power theory, organization theory, and stakeholder theory, to the understanding of cooperative strategy. Strategic management theory draws attention to the need for prospective partners to achieve a fit between their respective strategies so as to achieve each party’s objectives. Game theory provides valuable insights into the possible attitudes of one’s partner in cooperation. Bargaining power models provide expectations for how the relative contributions of partners determine the structure and strategic direction of cooperative ventures. Organization theory’s contribution comes through its consideration of resource dependency in relation to partner power and control, learning, and how to organize alliances. Stakeholder theory suggests that when firms seek cooperative solutions to joint needs, they become stakeholders in each other’s organization and thus incur an interest in the success of their partners as well as themselves.
Tongfi Kim
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780804796965
- eISBN:
- 9780804798594
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804796965.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter empirically tests the argument presented in Chapter 3. In addition to intra-alliance bargaining power, it also examines the theory’s implications for the patterns of termination, ...
More
This chapter empirically tests the argument presented in Chapter 3. In addition to intra-alliance bargaining power, it also examines the theory’s implications for the patterns of termination, duration, and formation of alliances in different systems. The chapter explains how much the structural shift from bipolarity to unipolarity has pushed American allies in favor of the superpower. The decline in the demand and supply of security in many parts of the world changed not only who forms alliances but also the goods exchanged within such alliances. The final section of this chapter discusses the theoretical implications of the systemic theory and offers some predictions about US alliances in the long and short terms.Less
This chapter empirically tests the argument presented in Chapter 3. In addition to intra-alliance bargaining power, it also examines the theory’s implications for the patterns of termination, duration, and formation of alliances in different systems. The chapter explains how much the structural shift from bipolarity to unipolarity has pushed American allies in favor of the superpower. The decline in the demand and supply of security in many parts of the world changed not only who forms alliances but also the goods exchanged within such alliances. The final section of this chapter discusses the theoretical implications of the systemic theory and offers some predictions about US alliances in the long and short terms.
Guy Davidov
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198759034
- eISBN:
- 9780191818790
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198759034.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Employment Law
This chapter articulates the unique characteristics of employment relations. It explains in what sense employer–employee relations are different from client–independent contractor relations. ...
More
This chapter articulates the unique characteristics of employment relations. It explains in what sense employer–employee relations are different from client–independent contractor relations. Employment is characterized by two inherent vulnerabilities: democratic deficits (subordination, broadly conceived) and dependency (for economic as well as social-psychological needs). These vulnerabilities explain the need for labour laws. The chapter proceeds to consider two additional ideas that share a similar structure, i.e. seeing labour law as a response to a ‘labour problem’. One is the prevalence of market failures and the other is inequality of bargaining power. It is argued that both concepts are useful as well, but only to a limited extent.Less
This chapter articulates the unique characteristics of employment relations. It explains in what sense employer–employee relations are different from client–independent contractor relations. Employment is characterized by two inherent vulnerabilities: democratic deficits (subordination, broadly conceived) and dependency (for economic as well as social-psychological needs). These vulnerabilities explain the need for labour laws. The chapter proceeds to consider two additional ideas that share a similar structure, i.e. seeing labour law as a response to a ‘labour problem’. One is the prevalence of market failures and the other is inequality of bargaining power. It is argued that both concepts are useful as well, but only to a limited extent.
