Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199269679
- eISBN:
- 9780191604096
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926967X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
The traditional understandings that structure the relationships between public servants and the wider political system are said to have undergone considerable change. But what are these formalized ...
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The traditional understandings that structure the relationships between public servants and the wider political system are said to have undergone considerable change. But what are these formalized and implicit understandings? What are the key dimensions of such bargains? In what conditions do bargains rise and fall? And has there been a universal and uniform change in these bargains? This book offers a distinct perspective to answer these questions. It develops a unique analytical perspective to account for diverse bargains within systems of executive government. Drawing on comparative experiences from different state traditions, it examines ideas and contemporary developments along three key dimensions of any Public Service Bargain: reward, competency, and loyalty and responsibility. The book points to diverse and differentiated developments across national systems of executive government, and suggests how different ‘bargains’ are prone to cheating by their constituent parties. It explores the context in which managerial bargains — widely seen to be at the heart of contemporary administrative reform movements — are likely to catch on and considers how cheating is likely to destabilize such bargains.Less
The traditional understandings that structure the relationships between public servants and the wider political system are said to have undergone considerable change. But what are these formalized and implicit understandings? What are the key dimensions of such bargains? In what conditions do bargains rise and fall? And has there been a universal and uniform change in these bargains? This book offers a distinct perspective to answer these questions. It develops a unique analytical perspective to account for diverse bargains within systems of executive government. Drawing on comparative experiences from different state traditions, it examines ideas and contemporary developments along three key dimensions of any Public Service Bargain: reward, competency, and loyalty and responsibility. The book points to diverse and differentiated developments across national systems of executive government, and suggests how different ‘bargains’ are prone to cheating by their constituent parties. It explores the context in which managerial bargains — widely seen to be at the heart of contemporary administrative reform movements — are likely to catch on and considers how cheating is likely to destabilize such bargains.
Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199269679
- eISBN:
- 9780191604096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926967X.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter introduces the notion of Public Service Bargain (PSB) and points to variations in its three dimensions: reward, competency, and loyalty and responsibility. Based on these variations, it ...
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This chapter introduces the notion of Public Service Bargain (PSB) and points to variations in its three dimensions: reward, competency, and loyalty and responsibility. Based on these variations, it discusses the centrality of PSBs for politics and points to the intellectual origins of the idea. The distinction between trustee- and agency-bargains is introduced.Less
This chapter introduces the notion of Public Service Bargain (PSB) and points to variations in its three dimensions: reward, competency, and loyalty and responsibility. Based on these variations, it discusses the centrality of PSBs for politics and points to the intellectual origins of the idea. The distinction between trustee- and agency-bargains is introduced.
Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199269679
- eISBN:
- 9780191604096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926967X.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter discusses ‘trustee’ bargains, in particular, it explores the background to the notion of government as a ‘trust’ and considers the puzzle why ‘trustee’ type PSBs emerge and persist in ...
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This chapter discusses ‘trustee’ bargains, in particular, it explores the background to the notion of government as a ‘trust’ and considers the puzzle why ‘trustee’ type PSBs emerge and persist in the democratic age. It draws a distinction between representative and tutelary forms of trustee bargains, and discusses empirical examples of such variants.Less
This chapter discusses ‘trustee’ bargains, in particular, it explores the background to the notion of government as a ‘trust’ and considers the puzzle why ‘trustee’ type PSBs emerge and persist in the democratic age. It draws a distinction between representative and tutelary forms of trustee bargains, and discusses empirical examples of such variants.
Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199269679
- eISBN:
- 9780191604096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926967X.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter discusses the way in which ‘agency’ bargains need to be understood in their rather specific meaning under the law of agency. It then discusses under what circumstances democratic ...
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This chapter discusses the way in which ‘agency’ bargains need to be understood in their rather specific meaning under the law of agency. It then discusses under what circumstances democratic political systems favour agency-type bargains. Agency bargains vary on two key dimensions: on the extent of specific direction under which public servants operate, and on whether delegated agency bargains are single- or multiple-principle. Four variants of agency bargains are explored, namely serial and personal loyalist variants of agency bargains, and simple and complex forms of delegated agency bargains.Less
This chapter discusses the way in which ‘agency’ bargains need to be understood in their rather specific meaning under the law of agency. It then discusses under what circumstances democratic political systems favour agency-type bargains. Agency bargains vary on two key dimensions: on the extent of specific direction under which public servants operate, and on whether delegated agency bargains are single- or multiple-principle. Four variants of agency bargains are explored, namely serial and personal loyalist variants of agency bargains, and simple and complex forms of delegated agency bargains.
Partha Dasgupta
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198288350
- eISBN:
- 9780191596094
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198288352.003.0016
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
The main part of this chapter discusses the household as an allocation mechanism. It has eight sections; (1) gender differentials among adults; (2) allocations among girls and boys; (3) bridewealth ...
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The main part of this chapter discusses the household as an allocation mechanism. It has eight sections; (1) gender differentials among adults; (2) allocations among girls and boys; (3) bridewealth and dowry; (4) regional patterns of household allocations: the case of India; (5) marriage and inheritance in India; (6) bargaining theory as a framework for household choice; (7) the Nash programme: a formalization; and (8) bargaining versus maximization of well‐being within the household. An extra and separate section (designated Chapter *11) gives theoretical presentations on two aspects of the axiomatic bargaining theory: (1) the Nash bargaining solution; and (2) the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution.Less
The main part of this chapter discusses the household as an allocation mechanism. It has eight sections; (1) gender differentials among adults; (2) allocations among girls and boys; (3) bridewealth and dowry; (4) regional patterns of household allocations: the case of India; (5) marriage and inheritance in India; (6) bargaining theory as a framework for household choice; (7) the Nash programme: a formalization; and (8) bargaining versus maximization of well‐being within the household. An extra and separate section (designated Chapter *11) gives theoretical presentations on two aspects of the axiomatic bargaining theory: (1) the Nash bargaining solution; and (2) the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution.
James Bergin
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199280292
- eISBN:
- 9780191602498
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199280290.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
Covers a standard range of topics in microeconomics theory. These include decision theory, strategic and extensive form games, the economics of information, bargaining, principal agent problems, ...
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Covers a standard range of topics in microeconomics theory. These include decision theory, strategic and extensive form games, the economics of information, bargaining, principal agent problems, cooperative games, and evolutionary game theory. Coverage is at the level of a graduate course in microeconomic theory.Less
Covers a standard range of topics in microeconomics theory. These include decision theory, strategic and extensive form games, the economics of information, bargaining, principal agent problems, cooperative games, and evolutionary game theory. Coverage is at the level of a graduate course in microeconomic theory.
Debraj Ray
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199207954
- eISBN:
- 9780191709104
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list of examples of this phenomenon is long and varied: production cartels, ...
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The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list of examples of this phenomenon is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. This book looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? The book brings together developments in both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. It concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.Less
The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list of examples of this phenomenon is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. This book looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? The book brings together developments in both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. It concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.
Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199269679
- eISBN:
- 9780191604096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926967X.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter explores the reward dimension of public service bargains. It analyzes different forms and aspects of reward and then explores four specific types of reward bargains: pyramids and ...
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This chapter explores the reward dimension of public service bargains. It analyzes different forms and aspects of reward and then explores four specific types of reward bargains: pyramids and escalators, noblesse oblige, turkey race, and lottery of life. Each of these bargains is discussed, indicating potential difficulties and highlighting empirical examples. Mixes and matches as well as trends and tendencies are discussed, with some forms of reward bargain apparently in decline and others increasing in importance.Less
This chapter explores the reward dimension of public service bargains. It analyzes different forms and aspects of reward and then explores four specific types of reward bargains: pyramids and escalators, noblesse oblige, turkey race, and lottery of life. Each of these bargains is discussed, indicating potential difficulties and highlighting empirical examples. Mixes and matches as well as trends and tendencies are discussed, with some forms of reward bargain apparently in decline and others increasing in importance.
Robert E. Goodin
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256174
- eISBN:
- 9780191599354
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256179.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This is the first of four chapters on belief democracy, and discusses democratic bargaining in relation to beliefs. Disputes over beliefs sometimes get resolved through persuasion, but in the real ...
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This is the first of four chapters on belief democracy, and discusses democratic bargaining in relation to beliefs. Disputes over beliefs sometimes get resolved through persuasion, but in the real world of democratic politics, more are resolved through negotiation; each person still believes the truth of the proposition they originally advocated, but each sees the need to ‘get on with it’, so all agree to treat certain propositions ‘as if true’, for the particular purposes at hand. The latter process is what is called here ‘bargaining over beliefs’, and the aim in this chapter is to show that that is a form of bargaining, on a par with any other, in ways that economists and democratic theorists inspired by them can and should take on board. Ordinarily, many different modes of bargaining are intertwined, and the presence of the more familiar forms (‘bargaining over distributions’ or ‘over values’) blinds us to the presence of less familiar ones (‘bargaining over beliefs’); in the different cases analysed in this chapter, in order to bracket out these confounding factors, the focus is on situations in which familiar forms of bargaining seem necessarily absent. Even there, however, it is shown that bargaining of a sort might still occur; moreover, the sort of ‘bargaining over beliefs’ identified in those atypical situations is not confined to them alone, since elements of it can also be perceived to be at work in more common sorts of social and political bargaining.Less
This is the first of four chapters on belief democracy, and discusses democratic bargaining in relation to beliefs. Disputes over beliefs sometimes get resolved through persuasion, but in the real world of democratic politics, more are resolved through negotiation; each person still believes the truth of the proposition they originally advocated, but each sees the need to ‘get on with it’, so all agree to treat certain propositions ‘as if true’, for the particular purposes at hand. The latter process is what is called here ‘bargaining over beliefs’, and the aim in this chapter is to show that that is a form of bargaining, on a par with any other, in ways that economists and democratic theorists inspired by them can and should take on board. Ordinarily, many different modes of bargaining are intertwined, and the presence of the more familiar forms (‘bargaining over distributions’ or ‘over values’) blinds us to the presence of less familiar ones (‘bargaining over beliefs’); in the different cases analysed in this chapter, in order to bracket out these confounding factors, the focus is on situations in which familiar forms of bargaining seem necessarily absent. Even there, however, it is shown that bargaining of a sort might still occur; moreover, the sort of ‘bargaining over beliefs’ identified in those atypical situations is not confined to them alone, since elements of it can also be perceived to be at work in more common sorts of social and political bargaining.
Ken Binmore
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195178111
- eISBN:
- 9780199783670
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178111.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter surveys the relevant bargaining theory, namely the Nash bargaining solution, the utilitarian bargaining solution, and the egalitarian bargaining solution. The importance of how ...
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This chapter surveys the relevant bargaining theory, namely the Nash bargaining solution, the utilitarian bargaining solution, and the egalitarian bargaining solution. The importance of how interpersonal comparisons of utility are made is emphasized.Less
This chapter surveys the relevant bargaining theory, namely the Nash bargaining solution, the utilitarian bargaining solution, and the egalitarian bargaining solution. The importance of how interpersonal comparisons of utility are made is emphasized.
Samuel Walker
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195078206
- eISBN:
- 9780199854202
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195078206.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
Since the American Bar Foundation Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice (1953–69) “discovered” the phenomenon of discretion in criminal justice, it has become something of a truism that ...
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Since the American Bar Foundation Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice (1953–69) “discovered” the phenomenon of discretion in criminal justice, it has become something of a truism that the administration of criminal justice in the United States consists of a series of discretionary decisions by officials in regard to police discretion, bail, plea bargaining, and sentencing. This book is a history of the attempts over the past forty years to control these discretionary powers in the criminal justice system. In a field which largely produces short-ranged “evaluation research”, this study, in taking a wider approach, distinguishes between the role of the courts and the role of administrative bodies (the police) and evaluates the longer-term trends and the successful reforms in criminal justice history. It focuses on four critical decision points in the criminal justice system: police discretion, bail setting, plea bargaining, and sentencing. It examines the various reforms that have been proposed, the major ones implemented, and the impact of those reforms.Less
Since the American Bar Foundation Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice (1953–69) “discovered” the phenomenon of discretion in criminal justice, it has become something of a truism that the administration of criminal justice in the United States consists of a series of discretionary decisions by officials in regard to police discretion, bail, plea bargaining, and sentencing. This book is a history of the attempts over the past forty years to control these discretionary powers in the criminal justice system. In a field which largely produces short-ranged “evaluation research”, this study, in taking a wider approach, distinguishes between the role of the courts and the role of administrative bodies (the police) and evaluates the longer-term trends and the successful reforms in criminal justice history. It focuses on four critical decision points in the criminal justice system: police discretion, bail setting, plea bargaining, and sentencing. It examines the various reforms that have been proposed, the major ones implemented, and the impact of those reforms.
Ken Binmore
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300574
- eISBN:
- 9780199783748
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0016
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter introduces cooperative game theory by examining the axiomatic theory of two-person bargaining problems. The link between cooperative and noncooperative game theory is first explained in ...
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This chapter introduces cooperative game theory by examining the axiomatic theory of two-person bargaining problems. The link between cooperative and noncooperative game theory is first explained in terms of the Nash program. The idea of a cooperative payoff region is then developed for use in applied contexts. The Coase theorem is explained for the case of a Nash bargaining problem. A variant of the Nash bargaining solution with both a breakdown point and a deadlock point is described. A proof of Nash's axiomatic bargaining theorem is offered. The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution and the Walrasian bargaining solution are offered as alternatives to Nash's solution.Less
This chapter introduces cooperative game theory by examining the axiomatic theory of two-person bargaining problems. The link between cooperative and noncooperative game theory is first explained in terms of the Nash program. The idea of a cooperative payoff region is then developed for use in applied contexts. The Coase theorem is explained for the case of a Nash bargaining problem. A variant of the Nash bargaining solution with both a breakdown point and a deadlock point is described. A proof of Nash's axiomatic bargaining theorem is offered. The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution and the Walrasian bargaining solution are offered as alternatives to Nash's solution.
Wolfgang Streeck
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199573981
- eISBN:
- 9780191702136
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573981.003.0002
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Political Economy, International Business
This chapter introduces Part I of the book, which contains a comprehensive summary of the main results of up-to-date research brought about by looking at five accounts of sectoral processes, namely: ...
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This chapter introduces Part I of the book, which contains a comprehensive summary of the main results of up-to-date research brought about by looking at five accounts of sectoral processes, namely: collective bargaining, organizations that serve as intermediaries for both capital and labor, social policy, the evolution of governing institutions of the state, and the state of corporate governance and financial markets in Germany before and after unification. The five accounts focus on the institutional structures that affect the outcomes of public policy and the endeavors of attaining collective and individual interests. Structural properties of the institutional settings for the five accounts are discussed. The discussion points out how sectors are experiencing disorganization through decentralization, individualization, ‘segmentalism’, competitive pluralism, and other such processes where market forces replace political decisions.Less
This chapter introduces Part I of the book, which contains a comprehensive summary of the main results of up-to-date research brought about by looking at five accounts of sectoral processes, namely: collective bargaining, organizations that serve as intermediaries for both capital and labor, social policy, the evolution of governing institutions of the state, and the state of corporate governance and financial markets in Germany before and after unification. The five accounts focus on the institutional structures that affect the outcomes of public policy and the endeavors of attaining collective and individual interests. Structural properties of the institutional settings for the five accounts are discussed. The discussion points out how sectors are experiencing disorganization through decentralization, individualization, ‘segmentalism’, competitive pluralism, and other such processes where market forces replace political decisions.
Roger Undy
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199544943
- eISBN:
- 9780191719936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199544943.003.0008
- Subject:
- Business and Management, HRM / IR
Dominant‐partner amalgamations are briefly discussed before focusing on balanced‐partner amalgamations. The outcomes of dominant‐partner amalgamations are similar to those generated by transfers. In ...
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Dominant‐partner amalgamations are briefly discussed before focusing on balanced‐partner amalgamations. The outcomes of dominant‐partner amalgamations are similar to those generated by transfers. In contrast, balanced‐partner amalgamations generally have a more marked effect on both the new unions' external relations with employers and its internal organization. However, the context may limit the amalgamated unions' abilities to exercise any increase gained in latent collective bargaining power. Internally, the balanced‐partner amalgamations vary considerably in their reforming effects: some have positive outcomes, while others generate unintended and politically destabilizing consequences.Less
Dominant‐partner amalgamations are briefly discussed before focusing on balanced‐partner amalgamations. The outcomes of dominant‐partner amalgamations are similar to those generated by transfers. In contrast, balanced‐partner amalgamations generally have a more marked effect on both the new unions' external relations with employers and its internal organization. However, the context may limit the amalgamated unions' abilities to exercise any increase gained in latent collective bargaining power. Internally, the balanced‐partner amalgamations vary considerably in their reforming effects: some have positive outcomes, while others generate unintended and politically destabilizing consequences.
Franz Traxler, Sabine Blaschke, and Bernhard Kittel
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198295549
- eISBN:
- 9780191685132
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198295549.003.0019
- Subject:
- Business and Management, HRM / IR, Political Economy
Because employers have pre-associational powers and restrictions on the strategies of their associations, employers are likely to prefer individual relations to engaging in collective exchange with ...
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Because employers have pre-associational powers and restrictions on the strategies of their associations, employers are likely to prefer individual relations to engaging in collective exchange with labour. The desirability of collective exchange challenged thus their ability to associate and the need to do so must be differentiated. Employers played a key role in shaping the bargaining process as they have an individual and collective option. Also, market-led opportunism posed an unintentional threat from the shift to self-interested ‘short-terminism’ and a deliberate threat from employer disorganization. Unions and employer associations underwent reforms to economize resources and activities and to adapt to the interdependencies of issues and interests.Less
Because employers have pre-associational powers and restrictions on the strategies of their associations, employers are likely to prefer individual relations to engaging in collective exchange with labour. The desirability of collective exchange challenged thus their ability to associate and the need to do so must be differentiated. Employers played a key role in shaping the bargaining process as they have an individual and collective option. Also, market-led opportunism posed an unintentional threat from the shift to self-interested ‘short-terminism’ and a deliberate threat from employer disorganization. Unions and employer associations underwent reforms to economize resources and activities and to adapt to the interdependencies of issues and interests.
Milada Anna Vachudova
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199241194
- eISBN:
- 9780191602382
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199241198.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Ten new members, eight of them post-communist states, joined the EU on 1 May 2004. This chapter takes up three issues that will shape the future of an enlarged EU. First, the EU’s active leverage has ...
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Ten new members, eight of them post-communist states, joined the EU on 1 May 2004. This chapter takes up three issues that will shape the future of an enlarged EU. First, the EU’s active leverage has had a substantial impact on the political and economic institutions of the new members: has it promoted robust democratic institutions and a vigorous economy, as I have argued, or did it in fact undermine them? Second, the endgame of the negotiations forced unfavourable terms of accession onto the new members: will these unfavourable terms translate into a permanent second-class status? Or will the new members, bargaining hard to improve their position and importing diversity, bring European integration to a standstill? I argue that both concerns are overblown. Third, why did the EU decide to enlarge to these eight post-communist states, and how much further it is likely to go? The EU’s active leverage has been working in parts of the Western Balkans and in Turkey, and it could work elsewhere. The costs of foreclosing future membership for countries such as Turkey, Ukraine, or Belarus could be substantial, yet EU elites and publics are far from reconciled to further enlargements.Less
Ten new members, eight of them post-communist states, joined the EU on 1 May 2004. This chapter takes up three issues that will shape the future of an enlarged EU. First, the EU’s active leverage has had a substantial impact on the political and economic institutions of the new members: has it promoted robust democratic institutions and a vigorous economy, as I have argued, or did it in fact undermine them? Second, the endgame of the negotiations forced unfavourable terms of accession onto the new members: will these unfavourable terms translate into a permanent second-class status? Or will the new members, bargaining hard to improve their position and importing diversity, bring European integration to a standstill? I argue that both concerns are overblown. Third, why did the EU decide to enlarge to these eight post-communist states, and how much further it is likely to go? The EU’s active leverage has been working in parts of the Western Balkans and in Turkey, and it could work elsewhere. The costs of foreclosing future membership for countries such as Turkey, Ukraine, or Belarus could be substantial, yet EU elites and publics are far from reconciled to further enlargements.
Richard L. Lippke
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199641468
- eISBN:
- 9780191732195
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199641468.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
The Ethics of Plea Bargaining offers a sustained argument for restrained forms of plea bargaining and against the freewheeling kinds of it that predominate in the United States. Rewards ...
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The Ethics of Plea Bargaining offers a sustained argument for restrained forms of plea bargaining and against the freewheeling kinds of it that predominate in the United States. Rewards for admitting guilt are distinguished from penalties for exercising the right to trial. The latter appear in numerous guises and are shown to be indefensible. Modest and fixed sentence reductions for defendants who admit their guilt are urged. Deliberate overcharging by prosecutors and charge bargaining, it is argued, should be discouraged. Claims that large and variable charge and sentence reductions are needed to expand deserved punishment, reward remorseful offenders, encourage cooperation from defendants in implicating others suspected of crimes, enhance the deterrent profile of the criminal justice system, or salvage convictions when the evidence against accused individuals is weak are all shown to lack credibility. The contention that such reductions in punishment are justified because they are freely agreed by state officials and criminal defendants is likewise shown to be unconvincing, given the ways in and extent to which criminal justice practices ought to be structured by desert or crime reduction norms. Forms of overcriminalization are noted throughout the book and shown to complicate the analysis of plea bargaining practices.Less
The Ethics of Plea Bargaining offers a sustained argument for restrained forms of plea bargaining and against the freewheeling kinds of it that predominate in the United States. Rewards for admitting guilt are distinguished from penalties for exercising the right to trial. The latter appear in numerous guises and are shown to be indefensible. Modest and fixed sentence reductions for defendants who admit their guilt are urged. Deliberate overcharging by prosecutors and charge bargaining, it is argued, should be discouraged. Claims that large and variable charge and sentence reductions are needed to expand deserved punishment, reward remorseful offenders, encourage cooperation from defendants in implicating others suspected of crimes, enhance the deterrent profile of the criminal justice system, or salvage convictions when the evidence against accused individuals is weak are all shown to lack credibility. The contention that such reductions in punishment are justified because they are freely agreed by state officials and criminal defendants is likewise shown to be unconvincing, given the ways in and extent to which criminal justice practices ought to be structured by desert or crime reduction norms. Forms of overcriminalization are noted throughout the book and shown to complicate the analysis of plea bargaining practices.
Tim Mulgan
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199282203
- eISBN:
- 9780191603624
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019928220X.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
One subsidiary aim of this book is to motivate a return to Consequentialism in political philosophy by highlighting its comparative advantage over its main contemporary liberal rival in the area of ...
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One subsidiary aim of this book is to motivate a return to Consequentialism in political philosophy by highlighting its comparative advantage over its main contemporary liberal rival in the area of intergenerational justice: the Contract Theory. It explores both the contractarianism of David Gauthier and the liberal egalitarianism of John Rawls, who represent two general alternatives to the strategy of building political theory on a Consequentialist account of individual morality. This chapter presents new objections to both Gauthier and Rawls, based on their inability to do justice to basic needs in an intergenerational context.Less
One subsidiary aim of this book is to motivate a return to Consequentialism in political philosophy by highlighting its comparative advantage over its main contemporary liberal rival in the area of intergenerational justice: the Contract Theory. It explores both the contractarianism of David Gauthier and the liberal egalitarianism of John Rawls, who represent two general alternatives to the strategy of building political theory on a Consequentialist account of individual morality. This chapter presents new objections to both Gauthier and Rawls, based on their inability to do justice to basic needs in an intergenerational context.
Ken Binmore
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300574
- eISBN:
- 9780199783748
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0018
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter offers a brief survey of the theory of coalition formation introduced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern. The coalitional form of a game is defined and discussed. The idea of the core of a ...
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This chapter offers a brief survey of the theory of coalition formation introduced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern. The coalitional form of a game is defined and discussed. The idea of the core of a game is explained, together with its application to Walrasian equilibria. The Condorcet paradox is used in the game Odd-Man-Out to illustrate the myopia attributed to players by the core concept. This serves as an introduction to the idea of a Von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set. The Three-Cake Game is used to illustrate both the core, stable sets, and the Shapley value. The progress made in applying the Nash program in this area — for example, to the case of one seller and several buyers — is reviewed.Less
This chapter offers a brief survey of the theory of coalition formation introduced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern. The coalitional form of a game is defined and discussed. The idea of the core of a game is explained, together with its application to Walrasian equilibria. The Condorcet paradox is used in the game Odd-Man-Out to illustrate the myopia attributed to players by the core concept. This serves as an introduction to the idea of a Von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set. The Three-Cake Game is used to illustrate both the core, stable sets, and the Shapley value. The progress made in applying the Nash program in this area — for example, to the case of one seller and several buyers — is reviewed.
Ken Binmore
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300574
- eISBN:
- 9780199783748
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0019
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter offers an approach to applying game theory to David Hume's ideas on moral philosophy. It begins by explaining how the Humean approach allows a different interpretation of experimental ...
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This chapter offers an approach to applying game theory to David Hume's ideas on moral philosophy. It begins by explaining how the Humean approach allows a different interpretation of experimental results in games like the Ultimatum Game compared to that taken for granted in classical economics. It then briefly reviews ideas from orthodox social choice theory as a preliminary to arguing that making interpersonal comparisons of utility is necessary for a full analysis of fairness norms. Harsanyi's theory of interpersonal comparison is then introduced. Harsanyi's utilitarian theory and Rawls' egalitarian theory are discussed. The chapter ends with an account of an experiment that is intended to illustrate how fairness norms may evolve over time.Less
This chapter offers an approach to applying game theory to David Hume's ideas on moral philosophy. It begins by explaining how the Humean approach allows a different interpretation of experimental results in games like the Ultimatum Game compared to that taken for granted in classical economics. It then briefly reviews ideas from orthodox social choice theory as a preliminary to arguing that making interpersonal comparisons of utility is necessary for a full analysis of fairness norms. Harsanyi's theory of interpersonal comparison is then introduced. Harsanyi's utilitarian theory and Rawls' egalitarian theory are discussed. The chapter ends with an account of an experiment that is intended to illustrate how fairness norms may evolve over time.
