Wolfgang Spohn
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697502
- eISBN:
- 9780191739323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697502.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
Conditional ranks also allow explicating a subjective notion of (deductive or non-deductive) reason, i.e., positive relevance, which is at the base of all current notions of (theoretical) reasons. ...
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Conditional ranks also allow explicating a subjective notion of (deductive or non-deductive) reason, i.e., positive relevance, which is at the base of all current notions of (theoretical) reasons. The chapter introduces and defends this explication; it distinguishes sufficient, necessary, insufficient, and supererogatory reasons (in an unconditional and a conditional version); it states the formal behavior of reasons thus explicated; it explains how such reasons can be weighed; and it shows that it is reasons precisely in this sense that drive the dynamics of belief. Moreover, it explains what maximal certainty and unrevisability mean in ranking-theoretic terms and thus provides a dynamic approach to two notions of apriority: (traditional) unrevisable apriority and so-called defeasible apriority.Less
Conditional ranks also allow explicating a subjective notion of (deductive or non-deductive) reason, i.e., positive relevance, which is at the base of all current notions of (theoretical) reasons. The chapter introduces and defends this explication; it distinguishes sufficient, necessary, insufficient, and supererogatory reasons (in an unconditional and a conditional version); it states the formal behavior of reasons thus explicated; it explains how such reasons can be weighed; and it shows that it is reasons precisely in this sense that drive the dynamics of belief. Moreover, it explains what maximal certainty and unrevisability mean in ranking-theoretic terms and thus provides a dynamic approach to two notions of apriority: (traditional) unrevisable apriority and so-called defeasible apriority.
Paul Weithman
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195393033
- eISBN:
- 9780199894901
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195393033.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Rawls's congruence arguments attempt to show that in the well-ordered society, the reasons citizens have for maintaining a sense of justice are decisive. This chapter develops an interpretation of ...
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Rawls's congruence arguments attempt to show that in the well-ordered society, the reasons citizens have for maintaining a sense of justice are decisive. This chapter develops an interpretation of ‘decisiveness’. It then reconstructs the first of Rawls's two main arguments for congruence, referred to here as “the Argument from Love and Justice”. That argument, when properly reconstructed, sheds light on Rawls's enigmatic claim that justice is continuous with the love of mankind. It also shows that descriptions of Rawls's theory as individualistic badly misunderstand his view.Less
Rawls's congruence arguments attempt to show that in the well-ordered society, the reasons citizens have for maintaining a sense of justice are decisive. This chapter develops an interpretation of ‘decisiveness’. It then reconstructs the first of Rawls's two main arguments for congruence, referred to here as “the Argument from Love and Justice”. That argument, when properly reconstructed, sheds light on Rawls's enigmatic claim that justice is continuous with the love of mankind. It also shows that descriptions of Rawls's theory as individualistic badly misunderstand his view.
Joshua Gert
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199315192
- eISBN:
- 9780190245580
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199315192.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter collects a number of arguments for a robust distinction between the justifying weight and requiring weight of a given normative practical reason. It then presents a new form of argument ...
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This chapter collects a number of arguments for a robust distinction between the justifying weight and requiring weight of a given normative practical reason. It then presents a new form of argument for such a distinction: a demonstration that it is already latent in the very different accounts of such reasons supported by Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star, T. M. Scanlon, and Joseph Raz. That the justifying/requiring distinction shows up in views that are so different in other ways—views that, moreover, did not set out explicitly set out to capture or even allow for it—suggests that it is a genuine feature of the practical normative domain. The chapter also shows how a more explicit recognition of a robust justifying/requiring distinction would provide important benefits for proponents of all three views. This too provides some reason to accept it.Less
This chapter collects a number of arguments for a robust distinction between the justifying weight and requiring weight of a given normative practical reason. It then presents a new form of argument for such a distinction: a demonstration that it is already latent in the very different accounts of such reasons supported by Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star, T. M. Scanlon, and Joseph Raz. That the justifying/requiring distinction shows up in views that are so different in other ways—views that, moreover, did not set out explicitly set out to capture or even allow for it—suggests that it is a genuine feature of the practical normative domain. The chapter also shows how a more explicit recognition of a robust justifying/requiring distinction would provide important benefits for proponents of all three views. This too provides some reason to accept it.
