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Here the threads of the previous chapters are pulled together, and problems posed in the putative relationship between ontology and axiology are considered. A serious problem with ecocentric argument is its attempt to eliminate political contingency from arguments for nature preservation, such contingency cannot be overcome by appeals to the existence of natural values. The argument is made that the ‘strong irreplaceability’ of natural entities provides sound (but not incontrovertible) grounds for nature preservation, and does so irrespective of any position with respect to the ecocentric‐anthropocentric divide in axiology.

This chapter construes the term ‘classic’ as a decision regarding the canonicity of a text based on a particular interpretation. A semiotic approach reveals translation to be a second-order sign system that is at once metalinguistic and axiological, interpretive, and evaluative. A translation inscribes meaning and value in the foreign text through the translator's application of interpretants, both formal and thematic. The inscription gives translation the force of a performative, a veritable act of creating a relatively autonomous text in a different language and culture. Translation contributes to canon formation by inscribing the foreign text with an interpretation that has achieved dominance in academic or other cultural institutions. A translation that inscribes an academic interpretation is not necessarily judged acceptable by every academic specialist because academic institutions are sites where different constituencies advance different, competing interpretations. The translation of a canonical text can itself acquire canonicity when the translator's inscription of a dominant interpretation is so transparent as to seem true or adequate to the foreign text.

In this chapter, the focus is on the importance of self‐interest for axiological aspects of morality and justice. According to the theory about self‐interest defended in chapter 4, the Prudential View, self‐interests are functions of both welfare and Relation M. However, in order not to introduce too many complicating factors all at once, the discussion of the importance of Relation M for outcome value is postponed until Chapter 10. Having set aside the issue of Relation M, an account of person‐affecting welfarism is developed, according to which outcome value is an increasing person‐affecting function only of individual welfare. This function is person‐affecting in the sense that, of two outcomes, one can be better (worse) than the other, only if there is someone for whom it is better (worse), or someone for whom the other outcome is worse (better).

This chapter is devoted to a detailed analysis of Ṣadrā's theory of knowledge. As Ṣadrā insists on the principiality of existence in all philosophical problems, it begins with a survey of his elaborate vocabulary of existence. Ṣadrā revises many of the erstwhile discussions of existence and rejects essence or quiddity (māhiyyah) as having no reality of its own. Instead, he proposes the “gradation” (tashkīk), “primacy”, and unity of existence as the main terms of his analysis. The chapter then turns to the relationship between existence and intelligibility. Ṣadrā holds that existence is intrinsically intelligible and does not need an outside agent such as a knower to be predicated of meaning-properties. Furthermore, existence is value-laden in that it is the source of such axiological qualities as goodness, perfection, and plenitude. His analysis thus ties together the three aspects of classical philosophy: ontology, epistemology and axiology.

According to the ‘value problem’ in epistemology, any plausible analysis of knowledge must imply that knowledge is always more valuable than mere true belief. In this chapter it is argued that the problem thus conceived is not a genuine problem. It is widely held that the value problem is motivated by a certain intuition about the added value of knowledge compared with mere true belief. It is argued here that the intuition in question is neither sufficiently general nor sufficiently formal to play the suggested motivating role. The chapter concludes with a sketch of a very different and more plausible conception of the value problem.

What is the role of equality in the evaluation of populations of different sizes in respect to their goodness? The field of population ethics has been riddled with paradoxes which purport to show that our considered beliefs are inconsistent in cases where the number of people and their welfare varies. Parfit's well-known Mere Addition Paradox is a case in point. These paradoxes challenge at a fundamental level the existence of a satisfactory theory of our duties to future generations and intergenerational justice. This chapter discusses whether egalitarian concerns can help us solve these paradoxes. It is claimed that whereas egalitarian considerations are applicable in different number cases and can help us solve the Mere Addition Paradox, such considerations are not of much help in another paradox. The implications of the Priority View in different number cases are also examined.

Aristotle’s cosmos consists of natural substances, each with its own proper functions, motions, and ends. To this extent, his cosmos is teleological. But there is no overall or cosmic teleology in a stronger sense, above and beyond the applicability of teleological explanations to each of the natural things. For the universe (or nature as a whole) does not have a proper function, or motions, goods or ends. The stars, elements, plants, animals and humans do, and nature is the principle of motion and the end for each of these. In the final chapter of Metaphysics XII (Lambda), Aristotle discusses an aporia about how the good exists in “the nature of the whole”. He ends not with a positive account, but with a criticism of his predecessors who have advanced an account of an extrinsic cause of the cosmos.

Aristotle’s teleological explanations are most successful in the domain of living things, and there is good reason to think that organisms are the objects of his most important teleological remarks. The attempts to apply teleological explanations to less complex entities (such as the elements) and more complex entities (such as cities) have been judged by history a failure. His explanations of organisms, on the other hand, have been celebrated by molecular biologists, embryologists and developmental biologists, and advocates of adaptationism in evolutionary biology. Teleology as a scientific proposition seems to require a sufficient level of complexity, but to break down at levels of too much complexity (at the level of human behavior, or of society, for example) or too little complexity (at the level of inanimate entities, for example). But whatever the scientific verdict on Aristotle’s teleology, it is clear that his conception of intrinsic ends has important implications for axiology (the theory of value). For he has shown how it is possible to identify objective goods, independent of human minds, and to avoid the dilemma between radical egalitarianism on the one hand and arbitrary or self-serving hierarchy on the other.

The key term of Aristotle’s teleology is “the cause for the sake of which”. Aristotle discusses in several key texts (Physics, On the Soul, Metaphysics, Eudemian Ethics) the fact that this has two different senses: aim and beneficiary. The aim of a knife is cutting, but the beneficiary is the person who does, or orders, the cutting. Aristotle uses this distinction to show how natural things have both aims and are beneficiaries of their functions. He also shows how non-natural things, such as god, can operate as causes for the sake of which, but not as beneficiaries. Eternal things (like the unmoved mover, forms of living things, the universe itself, nature, and so forth) cannot be beneficiaries, because they cannot undergo change. Thus, the beneficiaries of Aristotle’s teleology are the elements, plants, and animals that can both undergo change and have functional aims. A survey of other terms of Aristotle’s teleology, such as “nature does nothing in vain”, the terms “complete” or “perfect”, as well as “end” and “entelechy” further show the specific orientation of Aristotle’s teleology, as do his use of axiological terms such as “better” and “fine”.

Weakness of will violates practical rationality; but may also be viewed as an epistemic failing. Conflicts between strategic and epistemic rationality suggest that we need a superordinate standard to arbitrate between them. Contends that such a standard is to be found at the axiological level, apprehended by emotions. Axiological rationality is sui generis, reducible to neither the strategic nor the epistemic. But, emotions are themselves capable of raising paradoxes and antinomies, particularly when the principles they embody involve temporality. They constitute an ultimate court of appeal, yet their biological origin allows little hope that these antinomies can be resolved.

Methodological realism accepts the axiological view that truth is one of the essential aims of science. Following Popper and Levi, truthlikeness as the aim of science, combines the goals of truth and information. This chapter discusses the relations between truthlikeness and other epistemic utilities like explanatory power (Hempel), problem‐solving capacity (Laudan), and simplicity (Reichenbach). While rationality in science can be defined relative to the goals accepted within scientific communities at different times, a critical realist defines scientific progress in terms of increasing truthlikeness. It is argued that progress in this sense can be assessed, relative to empirical evidence, by the notion of expected verisimilitude. An abductive argument is formulated to defend realism as the best (and even the only) explanation of the empirical and practical success of science.

This chapter considers how far what one ought to do when facing a decision of life and death is determined by the goodness of the distribution that will result. It defines, examines and assesses the principles of teleology and consequentialism in ethics. It compares normative theory with axiology. It considers how far a person’s lifetime wellbeing depends on all the wellbeing that comes to the person at times within her life, and how far the goodness of the world depends on the wellbeing of the people. It introduces the idea of pattern goods such as equality and longevity.

Welfarism is a general view about value and the foundations of morality: it is the view that only well-being is intrinsically valuable, and nothing but well-being matters, basically or ultimately, for ethics. This chapter argues that the best normative theory of this type is a kind of caring ideal observer theory. Its inspiration is not nostalgia for the benevolent spectators of early proto-utilitarian history, but Elizabeth Anderson, Steven Darwall, and David Velleman's insight that there is a difference between valuing well-being and valuing well-being for the sake of those to whom it accrues. Valuing well-being in this second way is valuing it out of “sympathetic concern” or care for those to whom it accrues. The chapter explains how reflection about when and why well-being matters reveals that we value well-being in this second way. Welfarists, it is argued, should conclude that though well-being remains the only intrinsic good it is only conditionally good; specifically, it is worth promoting only insofar as it is worth promoting for the sake of individuals who merit care. Recognizing this fact about well-being's value allows welfarists to finally address their deepest challenge: developing an axiology that can avoid Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion and Non-Identity Problem while retaining the transitivity of the better-than relation. This axiology uses the preferences of an idealized carer to rank states of affairs. Furthermore, it is argued that welfarists should appeal to the idealized carer not just at the axiological level but also in accounting for different categories of moral assessment, including the right, the permissible, the optimal, and the supererogatory. Finally, appealing to the dispositions of an ideal carer offers unique epistemic advantages; it does not require independent knowledge of what well-being consists in or how to measure it intra- or inter-personally. The chapter closes with a discussion of how epistemic access to the responses of the idealized carer is possible.

Contains the author's replies to the last remaining objections to hedonism—Moore's objection concerning ‘the heap of filth’ and Ross's objection concerning worlds in which pleasure is enjoyed by the undeserving. Points out that, strictly speaking, these objections do not bear on the forms of hedonism already discussed in the book. Extends the theories so as to make the objections apply and then tweaks the forms of hedonism so that they evade the objections.

Contains a review of the main themes of the book and a description of my vision of the Good Life. It also contains an admission of some of the puzzles left unsolved here. Among the main themes are: the importance of being clear about what an axiological theory is supposed to tell us; the importance of formulating one's proposed axiological theory (hedonistic or not) in a coherent way; the importance of recognizing the distinction between forms of sensory hedonism and forms of attitudinal hedonism; the advantages of attitudinal hedonism and its capacity (especially in desert‐adjusted forms) to avoid classic objections; the plasticity of attitudinal hedonism; the importance and interest (and difficulty) of determining precisely what makes it correct to categorize an axiological theory as ‘hedonism’.

Curious readers might wonder if some of the axiological theories discussed in this book have been stretched so far that it is no longer appropriate to categorize them as forms of hedonism. This raises a deeper question: what in general makes it correct to categorize an axiological theory as a form of hedonism? Attempts to answer this question. Also attempts to answer it in such a way as to justify the classification of the alleged hedonisms in this book. This turns out to be a trickier problem than might at first be expected.

Grounded on the reading of Timeus, book X of The Laws, and book V of The Republic, this chapter analyses the process of invention of idealism, which consists first and foremost in the subordination of the material principle of the atomists to a higher divine principle. Through this process, Plato is able to shape the idea of a hierarchy of perfection in the universe which, as on a scale, relies but also distinguishes superior and inferior things. Monstrosity thus becomes the feature of the lower parts of the universe, the material and necessary parts, recalcitrant to their ordering by the superior and divine ones. This chpapter’s thesis is that, in Plato, the threatening character of monstrosity becomes a dangerous threat for the order and harmony of the universe. Monstrosity is the inferior other of divinity. Plato also reinforces Socrates’s teleology and opposes the realm of ideal truth to that of aimless, rumbling and chaotic causality that monstrously characterises the lower reality.