Michael Bergmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275748
- eISBN:
- 9780191603907
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275742.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, ...
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Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, or perhaps there is some other ‘good-making’ features it must have. But does a belief’s justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists insist that such awareness is required for justification whereas externalists insist that it is not. The first part of this book argues that internalism faces an inescapable dilemma: either it leads to vicious regress problems and, ultimately, radical skepticism or it is entirely unmotivated. The second part of the book begins by developing the author’s own externalist theory of justification, one imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement. It concludes by demonstrating the failure of two prominent critiques of externalism: that it is infected with epistemic circularity and that it cannot respond adequately to skepticism. Together, the two parts of the book provide a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism.Less
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, or perhaps there is some other ‘good-making’ features it must have. But does a belief’s justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists insist that such awareness is required for justification whereas externalists insist that it is not. The first part of this book argues that internalism faces an inescapable dilemma: either it leads to vicious regress problems and, ultimately, radical skepticism or it is entirely unmotivated. The second part of the book begins by developing the author’s own externalist theory of justification, one imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement. It concludes by demonstrating the failure of two prominent critiques of externalism: that it is infected with epistemic circularity and that it cannot respond adequately to skepticism. Together, the two parts of the book provide a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism.
Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199281701
- eISBN:
- 9780191713088
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199281701.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This book focuses on Plotinus' notion of Intellect. Intellect comes second in Plotinus' hierarchical model of reality, after the One, which is an unknowable first cause of everything. Intellect is ...
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This book focuses on Plotinus' notion of Intellect. Intellect comes second in Plotinus' hierarchical model of reality, after the One, which is an unknowable first cause of everything. Intellect is also the sphere of being, the Platonic Ideas, which exist as its thoughts. Plotinus' doctrine of Intellect raises a host of questions that the book seeks to answer: Intellect's thought is described as an attempt to grasp the One and at the same time as self-thought. How are these two claims related? How are they compatible? What lies in Plotinus' insistence that Intellect's thought is a thought of itself? The minimal requirements thought must satisfy according to Plotinus is that it must involve a distinction between thinker and object of thought, and the object itself must be varied. How are these two claims which amount to holding that Intellect is plural in two different ways related? What is the relation between Intellect as a thinker and Intellect as an object of thought? Plotinus' position here seems to amount to a form of idealism, a claim that is explored in the book. As opposed to ordinary human discursive thinking, Intellect's thought is all-at-once, timeless, truthful, and a direct intuition into ‘the things themselves’; it is presumably not even propositional. This strong notion of non-discursive thought is discussed and explained as well as Plotinus' claim that this must be the primary form of thought. The main conclusion of the book is that though clearly dependent on the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, Plotinus' theory of Intellect contains very significant innovations.Less
This book focuses on Plotinus' notion of Intellect. Intellect comes second in Plotinus' hierarchical model of reality, after the One, which is an unknowable first cause of everything. Intellect is also the sphere of being, the Platonic Ideas, which exist as its thoughts. Plotinus' doctrine of Intellect raises a host of questions that the book seeks to answer: Intellect's thought is described as an attempt to grasp the One and at the same time as self-thought. How are these two claims related? How are they compatible? What lies in Plotinus' insistence that Intellect's thought is a thought of itself? The minimal requirements thought must satisfy according to Plotinus is that it must involve a distinction between thinker and object of thought, and the object itself must be varied. How are these two claims which amount to holding that Intellect is plural in two different ways related? What is the relation between Intellect as a thinker and Intellect as an object of thought? Plotinus' position here seems to amount to a form of idealism, a claim that is explored in the book. As opposed to ordinary human discursive thinking, Intellect's thought is all-at-once, timeless, truthful, and a direct intuition into ‘the things themselves’; it is presumably not even propositional. This strong notion of non-discursive thought is discussed and explained as well as Plotinus' claim that this must be the primary form of thought. The main conclusion of the book is that though clearly dependent on the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, Plotinus' theory of Intellect contains very significant innovations.
Mark R. Leary
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195172423
- eISBN:
- 9780199786756
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195172423.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Human beings are unique in their ability to think consciously about themselves. Because they have a capacity for self-awareness not shared by other animals, people can imagine themselves in the ...
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Human beings are unique in their ability to think consciously about themselves. Because they have a capacity for self-awareness not shared by other animals, people can imagine themselves in the future, anticipate consequences, plan ahead, improve themselves, and perform many other behaviors that are uniquely characteristic of human beings. Yet, despite the obvious advantages of self-reflection, the capacity for self-thought comes at a high price as people's lives are adversely affected and their inner chatter interferes with their success, pollutes their relationships, and undermines their happiness. Indeed, self-relevant thought is responsible for most of the personal and social difficulties that human beings face as individuals and as a species. Among other things, the capacity for self-reflection distorts people's perceptions, leading them to make bad decisions based on faulty information. The self conjures up a great deal of personal suffering in the form of depression, anxiety, anger, envy, and other negative emotions by allowing people to ruminate about the past or imagine the future. Egocentrism and egotism blind people to their own shortcomings, promote self-serving biases, and undermine their relationships with others. The ability to self-reflect also underlies social conflict by leading people to separate themselves into ingroups and outgroups. Ironically, many sources of personal unhappiness — such as addictions, overeating, unsafe sex, infidelity, and domestic violence — are due to people's inability to exert self-control. For those inclined toward religion and spirituality, visionaries throughout history have proclaimed that the egoic self stymies the quest for spiritual fulfillment and leads to immoral behavior.Less
Human beings are unique in their ability to think consciously about themselves. Because they have a capacity for self-awareness not shared by other animals, people can imagine themselves in the future, anticipate consequences, plan ahead, improve themselves, and perform many other behaviors that are uniquely characteristic of human beings. Yet, despite the obvious advantages of self-reflection, the capacity for self-thought comes at a high price as people's lives are adversely affected and their inner chatter interferes with their success, pollutes their relationships, and undermines their happiness. Indeed, self-relevant thought is responsible for most of the personal and social difficulties that human beings face as individuals and as a species. Among other things, the capacity for self-reflection distorts people's perceptions, leading them to make bad decisions based on faulty information. The self conjures up a great deal of personal suffering in the form of depression, anxiety, anger, envy, and other negative emotions by allowing people to ruminate about the past or imagine the future. Egocentrism and egotism blind people to their own shortcomings, promote self-serving biases, and undermine their relationships with others. The ability to self-reflect also underlies social conflict by leading people to separate themselves into ingroups and outgroups. Ironically, many sources of personal unhappiness — such as addictions, overeating, unsafe sex, infidelity, and domestic violence — are due to people's inability to exert self-control. For those inclined toward religion and spirituality, visionaries throughout history have proclaimed that the egoic self stymies the quest for spiritual fulfillment and leads to immoral behavior.
Valerie Tiberius
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199202867
- eISBN:
- 9780191707988
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199202867.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
How should you live? Should you devote yourself to perfecting a single talent or try to live a balanced life? Should you lighten up and have more fun, or buckle down and try to achieve greatness? ...
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How should you live? Should you devote yourself to perfecting a single talent or try to live a balanced life? Should you lighten up and have more fun, or buckle down and try to achieve greatness? Should you try to be a better friend? Should you be self-critical or self-accepting? And how should you decide among the possibilities open to you? Should you consult experts, listen to your parents, or should you do lots of research? Should you make lists of pros and cons, or go with your gut? These are not questions that can be answered in general or in the abstract. Rather, these questions are addressed to the first person point of view, to the perspective each of us occupies when we reflect on how to live without knowing exactly what we're aiming for. To answer them, this book focuses on the process of living one's life from the inside, rather than on defining goals from the outside. Drawing on traditional philosophical sources as well as literature and recent work in social psychology, this book argues that to live well, we need to develop reflective wisdom: to care about things that will sustain us and give us good experiences, to have perspective on our successes and failures, and to be moderately self-aware and cautiously optimistic about human nature. Further, we need to know when to think about our values, character, and choices, and when not to. A crucial part of wisdom, the book maintains, is being able to shift perspectives: to be self-critical; to be realistic; to examine life when reflection is appropriate, but not when we should lose ourselves in experience.Less
How should you live? Should you devote yourself to perfecting a single talent or try to live a balanced life? Should you lighten up and have more fun, or buckle down and try to achieve greatness? Should you try to be a better friend? Should you be self-critical or self-accepting? And how should you decide among the possibilities open to you? Should you consult experts, listen to your parents, or should you do lots of research? Should you make lists of pros and cons, or go with your gut? These are not questions that can be answered in general or in the abstract. Rather, these questions are addressed to the first person point of view, to the perspective each of us occupies when we reflect on how to live without knowing exactly what we're aiming for. To answer them, this book focuses on the process of living one's life from the inside, rather than on defining goals from the outside. Drawing on traditional philosophical sources as well as literature and recent work in social psychology, this book argues that to live well, we need to develop reflective wisdom: to care about things that will sustain us and give us good experiences, to have perspective on our successes and failures, and to be moderately self-aware and cautiously optimistic about human nature. Further, we need to know when to think about our values, character, and choices, and when not to. A crucial part of wisdom, the book maintains, is being able to shift perspectives: to be self-critical; to be realistic; to examine life when reflection is appropriate, but not when we should lose ourselves in experience.
George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195389197
- eISBN:
- 9780199866724
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389197.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
To be responsible for their acts, agents must both act voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the ...
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To be responsible for their acts, agents must both act voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the epistemic condition has received far less attention. This book seeks to remedy that imbalance: it first criticizes a popular but inadequate way of understanding the epistemic condition and then seeks to develop a more adequate alternative. The popular but inadequate view asserts that agents are responsible only for what they are consciously aware of doing or bringing about. (Because this view takes an agent's responsibility to extend only as far as the searchlight of his consciousness, the book refers to it as the searchlight view.) By contrast, on the proposed alternative, even agents who unwittingly act wrongly or foolishly can be responsible if (1) they have information that supports the conclusion that their acts are wrong or foolish, and (2) their failure to draw that conclusion on the basis of that information falls short of meeting some appropriate standard, and (3) the failure is caused by the constellation of psychological and/or physical features that makes them the persons they are. Because it integrates first- and third-personal elements, this alternative account is well suited to capture the complexity of responsible agents, who at once have their own private perspectives and live in a public world.Less
To be responsible for their acts, agents must both act voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the epistemic condition has received far less attention. This book seeks to remedy that imbalance: it first criticizes a popular but inadequate way of understanding the epistemic condition and then seeks to develop a more adequate alternative. The popular but inadequate view asserts that agents are responsible only for what they are consciously aware of doing or bringing about. (Because this view takes an agent's responsibility to extend only as far as the searchlight of his consciousness, the book refers to it as the searchlight view.) By contrast, on the proposed alternative, even agents who unwittingly act wrongly or foolishly can be responsible if (1) they have information that supports the conclusion that their acts are wrong or foolish, and (2) their failure to draw that conclusion on the basis of that information falls short of meeting some appropriate standard, and (3) the failure is caused by the constellation of psychological and/or physical features that makes them the persons they are. Because it integrates first- and third-personal elements, this alternative account is well suited to capture the complexity of responsible agents, who at once have their own private perspectives and live in a public world.
Quassim Cassam
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238959
- eISBN:
- 9780191597176
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238959.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The thesis of this book is that it is a necessary condition of self‐consciousness that one is intuitively aware of oneself, qua subject, as a physical object. Intuitive awareness of oneself as a ...
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The thesis of this book is that it is a necessary condition of self‐consciousness that one is intuitively aware of oneself, qua subject, as a physical object. Intuitive awareness of oneself as a physical object involves various forms of bodily awareness in which one is presented to oneself, qua subject, as shaped, solid, and located. These forms of bodily self‐awareness are required for self‐consciousness because they are necessary for consciousness of one's own identity as the subject of different representations, and for consciousness of these representations as representations of an objective world. This account of self‐consciousness helps undermine various forms of idealism and reductionism about the self.Less
The thesis of this book is that it is a necessary condition of self‐consciousness that one is intuitively aware of oneself, qua subject, as a physical object. Intuitive awareness of oneself as a physical object involves various forms of bodily awareness in which one is presented to oneself, qua subject, as shaped, solid, and located. These forms of bodily self‐awareness are required for self‐consciousness because they are necessary for consciousness of one's own identity as the subject of different representations, and for consciousness of these representations as representations of an objective world. This account of self‐consciousness helps undermine various forms of idealism and reductionism about the self.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236986
- eISBN:
- 9780191598593
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236980.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Part 1 (Chs. 2–7) argues that mental events (consisting in the instantiation of mental properties – sensations, thoughts, purposes, desires, and beliefs) are distinct from physical events (such as ...
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Part 1 (Chs. 2–7) argues that mental events (consisting in the instantiation of mental properties – sensations, thoughts, purposes, desires, and beliefs) are distinct from physical events (such as brain events), although in causal interaction with them. Part 2 argues that these mental events consist in the instantiations of properties in immaterial substances, souls. A human being (and any higher animal) consists of two parts, the essential part – his soul, and a contingent part – his body. It is extremely unlikely that there could be a scientific explanation of the creation of souls. Humans are distinguished from the higher animals by an ability to reason logically, and by having moral awareness, free will, and an integrated system of beliefs and desires. Neither direct empirical evidence nor pure a priori philosophical argument can show what will happen to the soul after death. This could only be shown by some very general metaphysical system.Less
Part 1 (Chs. 2–7) argues that mental events (consisting in the instantiation of mental properties – sensations, thoughts, purposes, desires, and beliefs) are distinct from physical events (such as brain events), although in causal interaction with them. Part 2 argues that these mental events consist in the instantiations of properties in immaterial substances, souls. A human being (and any higher animal) consists of two parts, the essential part – his soul, and a contingent part – his body. It is extremely unlikely that there could be a scientific explanation of the creation of souls. Humans are distinguished from the higher animals by an ability to reason logically, and by having moral awareness, free will, and an integrated system of beliefs and desires. Neither direct empirical evidence nor pure a priori philosophical argument can show what will happen to the soul after death. This could only be shown by some very general metaphysical system.
Bill Brewer
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199250455
- eISBN:
- 9780191597114
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250456.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Discusses the role of conscious experiences in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. Most epistemology of perception takes a person's possession of beliefs about the mind‐independent world for ...
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Discusses the role of conscious experiences in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. Most epistemology of perception takes a person's possession of beliefs about the mind‐independent world for granted and goes on to ask what further conditions these beliefs must meet if they are to be cases of knowledge. I argue that this approach is completely mistaken. Perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs if there are to be any determinate beliefs about particular objects in the world at all. So there are epistemic requirements upon the very possibility of empirical belief. The crucial epistemological role of experience lies in its essential contribution to the subject's understanding of certain perceptual demonstrative contents, simply grasping which provides him with a reason to endorse them in belief. I explain in detail how this is so; defend my position against a wide range of objections; compare and contrast it with a number of influential alternative views in the area; and bring out its connection with Russell's Principle of Acquaintance, and its consequences for the compatibility of content externalism with an adequate account of self‐knowledge.Less
Discusses the role of conscious experiences in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. Most epistemology of perception takes a person's possession of beliefs about the mind‐independent world for granted and goes on to ask what further conditions these beliefs must meet if they are to be cases of knowledge. I argue that this approach is completely mistaken. Perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs if there are to be any determinate beliefs about particular objects in the world at all. So there are epistemic requirements upon the very possibility of empirical belief. The crucial epistemological role of experience lies in its essential contribution to the subject's understanding of certain perceptual demonstrative contents, simply grasping which provides him with a reason to endorse them in belief. I explain in detail how this is so; defend my position against a wide range of objections; compare and contrast it with a number of influential alternative views in the area; and bring out its connection with Russell's Principle of Acquaintance, and its consequences for the compatibility of content externalism with an adequate account of self‐knowledge.
Lucy O'Brien
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199261482
- eISBN:
- 9780191718632
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter attempted to characterize the nature of an agent's awareness. It argues that an agent's awareness is a familiar feature of active psychological phenomena rather than passive ones, and is ...
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This chapter attempted to characterize the nature of an agent's awareness. It argues that an agent's awareness is a familiar feature of active psychological phenomena rather than passive ones, and is therefore a feature of paradigm thoughts and utterances; an agent's awareness is an awareness we can have without conceptualizing or self-ascribing it; and that agent's awareness is a feature of thoughts and utterances that the thought or utterance has by virtue of its mode of occurrence.Less
This chapter attempted to characterize the nature of an agent's awareness. It argues that an agent's awareness is a familiar feature of active psychological phenomena rather than passive ones, and is therefore a feature of paradigm thoughts and utterances; an agent's awareness is an awareness we can have without conceptualizing or self-ascribing it; and that agent's awareness is a feature of thoughts and utterances that the thought or utterance has by virtue of its mode of occurrence.
Michael W. Foley and Dean R. Hoge
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195188707
- eISBN:
- 9780199785315
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195188707.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
Most communities encourage lay involvement in worship and leadership, thereby teaching civic skills. Smaller Protestant churches, Hindu ashrams, Sikh congregations, and even some activist Catholic ...
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Most communities encourage lay involvement in worship and leadership, thereby teaching civic skills. Smaller Protestant churches, Hindu ashrams, Sikh congregations, and even some activist Catholic parishes do this well. Some communities engage in direct training in civic skills, through literacy and English classes, naturalization and citizenship classes, discussion groups and forums, and programs to promote greater civic awareness. Lay and religious leadership is often crucial to mobilizing members around homeland causes or immigrant issues, and encouraging immigrants to exercise their civic skills in such causes.Less
Most communities encourage lay involvement in worship and leadership, thereby teaching civic skills. Smaller Protestant churches, Hindu ashrams, Sikh congregations, and even some activist Catholic parishes do this well. Some communities engage in direct training in civic skills, through literacy and English classes, naturalization and citizenship classes, discussion groups and forums, and programs to promote greater civic awareness. Lay and religious leadership is often crucial to mobilizing members around homeland causes or immigrant issues, and encouraging immigrants to exercise their civic skills in such causes.
Eileen Barker
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195177299
- eISBN:
- 9780199785537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195177299.003.0015
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter presents an exercise in the practical application of the sociology of knowledge, the key question being the variety of often-conflicting descriptions that are publicly available on the ...
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This chapter presents an exercise in the practical application of the sociology of knowledge, the key question being the variety of often-conflicting descriptions that are publicly available on the content and nature of new religions. Various types of perspectives about the movements are delineated with an discussion of “where they are coming from” — that is, what are the underlying interests concerning the movements that motivate the members of different categories of “cult-watching groups” — how the methodology they employ results in their selecting certain aspects of the movements' beliefs, practices, and organization (and ignoring other aspects) in the construction of their images of the movements.Less
This chapter presents an exercise in the practical application of the sociology of knowledge, the key question being the variety of often-conflicting descriptions that are publicly available on the content and nature of new religions. Various types of perspectives about the movements are delineated with an discussion of “where they are coming from” — that is, what are the underlying interests concerning the movements that motivate the members of different categories of “cult-watching groups” — how the methodology they employ results in their selecting certain aspects of the movements' beliefs, practices, and organization (and ignoring other aspects) in the construction of their images of the movements.
Shaun Nichols and Stephen P. Stich
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198236108
- eISBN:
- 9780191600920
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236107.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This volume defends an integrated account of the psychological mechanisms underlying “mindreading,” the commonplace capacity to understand the mind. The authors maintain that it is, as commonsense ...
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This volume defends an integrated account of the psychological mechanisms underlying “mindreading,” the commonplace capacity to understand the mind. The authors maintain that it is, as commonsense would suggest, vital to distinguish between reading others’ minds and reading one’s own. In reading other minds, the imagination plays a central role. As a result, the authors begin with an explicit and systematic account of pretense and imagination which proposes that pretense representations are contained in a separate mental workspace, the “Possible World Box,” which is part of the basic architecture of the human mind. The mechanisms subserving pretense get recruited in reading other minds, a capacity that implicates multifarious kinds of processes, including those favored by simulation approaches to mindreading, those favored by information-based approaches, and processes that don’t fit into either category. None of these mechanisms or processes, though, explains how we read our own minds, which, according to the authors, requires invoking an entirely independent set of mechanisms.Less
This volume defends an integrated account of the psychological mechanisms underlying “mindreading,” the commonplace capacity to understand the mind. The authors maintain that it is, as commonsense would suggest, vital to distinguish between reading others’ minds and reading one’s own. In reading other minds, the imagination plays a central role. As a result, the authors begin with an explicit and systematic account of pretense and imagination which proposes that pretense representations are contained in a separate mental workspace, the “Possible World Box,” which is part of the basic architecture of the human mind. The mechanisms subserving pretense get recruited in reading other minds, a capacity that implicates multifarious kinds of processes, including those favored by simulation approaches to mindreading, those favored by information-based approaches, and processes that don’t fit into either category. None of these mechanisms or processes, though, explains how we read our own minds, which, according to the authors, requires invoking an entirely independent set of mechanisms.
J. M. Hinton
- Published in print:
- 1973
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198244035
- eISBN:
- 9780191680717
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244035.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses an event of which one is the subject. It has three components, three requirements, in the idea of ‘the subject of an event’ here. In the first place, whoever is reported as ...
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This chapter discusses an event of which one is the subject. It has three components, three requirements, in the idea of ‘the subject of an event’ here. In the first place, whoever is reported as having or having had the experience is the grammatical subject of the event-report, or can easily be made the grammatical subject and to some extent the test-subject; it seems that the event must not depart too widely from the old, submerged meaning of an experience as an experiment, test, or trial to which something is subjected. The third requirement is one which the chapter states in an ambiguous and potentially misleading, though not unnatural, form as a preliminary to analysing what it involves: the grammatical subject and test-subject of the event must also be the conscious subject, or there must be the right sort of consciousness or awareness.Less
This chapter discusses an event of which one is the subject. It has three components, three requirements, in the idea of ‘the subject of an event’ here. In the first place, whoever is reported as having or having had the experience is the grammatical subject of the event-report, or can easily be made the grammatical subject and to some extent the test-subject; it seems that the event must not depart too widely from the old, submerged meaning of an experience as an experiment, test, or trial to which something is subjected. The third requirement is one which the chapter states in an ambiguous and potentially misleading, though not unnatural, form as a preliminary to analysing what it involves: the grammatical subject and test-subject of the event must also be the conscious subject, or there must be the right sort of consciousness or awareness.
J. M. Hinton
- Published in print:
- 1973
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198244035
- eISBN:
- 9780191680717
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244035.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter states that it characteristically requires the grammatical subject of an event to be in some sense its conscious subject, before it calls the event an experience in the ordinary ...
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This chapter states that it characteristically requires the grammatical subject of an event to be in some sense its conscious subject, before it calls the event an experience in the ordinary biographical sense of the word. It suggests that it normally requires the subject to have a certain special kind of awareness of the event itself. It need not amount to knowledge that the event in question is occurring or has occurred, nor is such knowledge sufficient. The chapter also takes cases in which the grammatical subject of the event might not have been the conscious subject of it, because there might not have been the right sort of consciousness or awareness on his part. Then the event would not have counted as an experience. The requirement of the right sort of consciousness is only more or less built into the ordinary biographical notion of an experience in this type of case.Less
This chapter states that it characteristically requires the grammatical subject of an event to be in some sense its conscious subject, before it calls the event an experience in the ordinary biographical sense of the word. It suggests that it normally requires the subject to have a certain special kind of awareness of the event itself. It need not amount to knowledge that the event in question is occurring or has occurred, nor is such knowledge sufficient. The chapter also takes cases in which the grammatical subject of the event might not have been the conscious subject of it, because there might not have been the right sort of consciousness or awareness on his part. Then the event would not have counted as an experience. The requirement of the right sort of consciousness is only more or less built into the ordinary biographical notion of an experience in this type of case.
Avner de‐Shalit
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199240388
- eISBN:
- 9780191599033
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199240388.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
What kind of theory should and can we use to persuade others of the importance of environment‐friendly policies? More precisely, in what sense is liberalism environment friendly and in what sense is ...
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What kind of theory should and can we use to persuade others of the importance of environment‐friendly policies? More precisely, in what sense is liberalism environment friendly and in what sense is it not? de‐Shalit suggests that liberalism has been exceptionally effective in eliminating environmental literacy and raising environmental awareness. Nevertheless, it is inadequate when it comes to fostering environmental political consciousness.Less
What kind of theory should and can we use to persuade others of the importance of environment‐friendly policies? More precisely, in what sense is liberalism environment friendly and in what sense is it not? de‐Shalit suggests that liberalism has been exceptionally effective in eliminating environmental literacy and raising environmental awareness. Nevertheless, it is inadequate when it comes to fostering environmental political consciousness.
Franz Urban Pappi
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294719
- eISBN:
- 9780191599361
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294719.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Reference
Advances a model of voting in multi‐party systems in the light of existing theory and research, with the addition of a mediating variable––party preference profiles. This variable serves as a link ...
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Advances a model of voting in multi‐party systems in the light of existing theory and research, with the addition of a mediating variable––party preference profiles. This variable serves as a link between political reasoning and vote choice, and separates the processes of political awareness and voting behaviour. An analysis is offered for the explanation of how party preferences are formed and how they influence voting decisions.Less
Advances a model of voting in multi‐party systems in the light of existing theory and research, with the addition of a mediating variable––party preference profiles. This variable serves as a link between political reasoning and vote choice, and separates the processes of political awareness and voting behaviour. An analysis is offered for the explanation of how party preferences are formed and how they influence voting decisions.
Michael Bergmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275748
- eISBN:
- 9780191603907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275742.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
According to internalists, for a belief to be justified it is not enough that it has certain virtues (such as being reliably formed or supported by the evidence), the person holding it must be aware ...
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According to internalists, for a belief to be justified it is not enough that it has certain virtues (such as being reliably formed or supported by the evidence), the person holding it must be aware that he has those virtues. This awareness requirement, which internalists think is necessary for justification, comes in two forms: strong and weak. This chapter argues that internalists face the following dilemma: if they endorse the strong awareness requirement, they are faced with regress problems leading to extreme skepticism; if they endorse the weak awareness requirement, they lose the main motivation for their internalism.Less
According to internalists, for a belief to be justified it is not enough that it has certain virtues (such as being reliably formed or supported by the evidence), the person holding it must be aware that he has those virtues. This awareness requirement, which internalists think is necessary for justification, comes in two forms: strong and weak. This chapter argues that internalists face the following dilemma: if they endorse the strong awareness requirement, they are faced with regress problems leading to extreme skepticism; if they endorse the weak awareness requirement, they lose the main motivation for their internalism.
Michael Bergmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275748
- eISBN:
- 9780191603907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275742.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Internalists are typically careful to design their views to escape the famous dilemma for foundationalism posed by Wilfrid Sellars. Because the Sellarsian dilemma is similar in ways to the dilemma ...
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Internalists are typically careful to design their views to escape the famous dilemma for foundationalism posed by Wilfrid Sellars. Because the Sellarsian dilemma is similar in ways to the dilemma proposed in Chapter 1, this might make such internalists think that their views can escape this dilemma as well. This chapter argues that even those most sensitive to the Sellarsian dilemma — Richard Fumerton, Timothy McGrew, Laurence BonJour, and Evan Fales — fail to escape the dilemma proposed in Chapter 1.Less
Internalists are typically careful to design their views to escape the famous dilemma for foundationalism posed by Wilfrid Sellars. Because the Sellarsian dilemma is similar in ways to the dilemma proposed in Chapter 1, this might make such internalists think that their views can escape this dilemma as well. This chapter argues that even those most sensitive to the Sellarsian dilemma — Richard Fumerton, Timothy McGrew, Laurence BonJour, and Evan Fales — fail to escape the dilemma proposed in Chapter 1.
John Foster
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237693
- eISBN:
- 9780191597442
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237693.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The broad representative theory (BRT) claims that, whenever someone perceives a physical item, his perceptual contact with it is psychologically mediated, i.e. it is constituted by the combination of ...
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The broad representative theory (BRT) claims that, whenever someone perceives a physical item, his perceptual contact with it is psychologically mediated, i.e. it is constituted by the combination of his being in a more fundamental psychological state, which is not in itself physical‐item perceptive, and certain additional facts that do not involve anything further about his current psychological condition. One worry about BRT, in whatever form it is developed, is that, granted that the relevant psychological states are not in themselves perceptive, there is a prima facie difficulty in understanding how the subject's perceptual awareness can reach beyond the boundaries of his own mind. With the emergence of the sense‐quale theory (SQT) as the correct account of the nature of phenomenal experience, this worry turns into a decisive objection. For it is clear that, under SQT, the subject does not genuinely perceive external items at all. All he genuinely perceives—all that form genuine objects of his perceptual awareness—are sense‐qualia, which, because of the interpretative components of his phenomenal experiences, he (mistakenly) perceives as external items. However, if we do not have perceptual access to the physical world, it turns out that we do not have epistemic access either: we cannot acquire knowledge of the physical world or even well‐grounded beliefs about it. But this leaves us with a problem. For the conclusion that we have neither perceptual nor epistemic access to the physical world is one that, even from the standpoint of philosophical reflection, we cannot bring ourselves to accept.Less
The broad representative theory (BRT) claims that, whenever someone perceives a physical item, his perceptual contact with it is psychologically mediated, i.e. it is constituted by the combination of his being in a more fundamental psychological state, which is not in itself physical‐item perceptive, and certain additional facts that do not involve anything further about his current psychological condition. One worry about BRT, in whatever form it is developed, is that, granted that the relevant psychological states are not in themselves perceptive, there is a prima facie difficulty in understanding how the subject's perceptual awareness can reach beyond the boundaries of his own mind. With the emergence of the sense‐quale theory (SQT) as the correct account of the nature of phenomenal experience, this worry turns into a decisive objection. For it is clear that, under SQT, the subject does not genuinely perceive external items at all. All he genuinely perceives—all that form genuine objects of his perceptual awareness—are sense‐qualia, which, because of the interpretative components of his phenomenal experiences, he (mistakenly) perceives as external items. However, if we do not have perceptual access to the physical world, it turns out that we do not have epistemic access either: we cannot acquire knowledge of the physical world or even well‐grounded beliefs about it. But this leaves us with a problem. For the conclusion that we have neither perceptual nor epistemic access to the physical world is one that, even from the standpoint of philosophical reflection, we cannot bring ourselves to accept.
Jean Blondel, Richard Sinnott, and Palle Svensson
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198293088
- eISBN:
- 9780191598814
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198293089.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Deals with the cognitive dimension of orientations to European integration and the European institutions, focusing on awareness, interest, and knowledge. It concludes by examining the bivariate ...
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Deals with the cognitive dimension of orientations to European integration and the European institutions, focusing on awareness, interest, and knowledge. It concludes by examining the bivariate relationships between these variables and the types of electoral participation/abstention.Less
Deals with the cognitive dimension of orientations to European integration and the European institutions, focusing on awareness, interest, and knowledge. It concludes by examining the bivariate relationships between these variables and the types of electoral participation/abstention.
