Search Results

The humanity formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative demands that we treat humanity as an end in itself. Because this principle resonates with currently influential ideals of human rights and dignity, contemporary readers often find it compelling, even if the rest of Kant’s moral philosophy leaves them cold. Moreover, some prominent specialists in Kant’s ethics recently have turned to the humanity formulation as the most theoretically central and promising principle of Kant’s ethics. Nevertheless, despite the intuitive appeal and the increasingly recognized philosophical importance of the humanity formulation, it has received less attention than many other, less central, aspects of Kant’s ethics. This book is the most sustained and systematic examination yet of the humanity formulation. It argues that the ‘rational nature’ that must be treated as an end in itself is not a minimally rational nature consisting of the power to set ends or the unrealized capacity to act morally, but instead is the more properly rational nature possessed by someone who gives priority to moral principles over any contrary impulses. In other words, good will is the end in itself. This non-standard reading of the humanity formulation provides a firm theoretical foundation for deriving plausible approaches to particular moral issues. Contrary to first impressions, it does not impose moralistic demands to pass judgment on others’ character. This reading of the humanity formulation also enables progress on problems of interest to Kant scholars such as reconstructing Kant’s argument for accepting the humanity formulation as a basic moral principle, and allows for increased understanding of the relationship between Kant’s ethics and supposedly Kantian ideas such as ‘respect for autonomy’.

Defends a theory of social justice for education from within an egalitarian version of liberalism. The theory involves a strong commitment to educational equality, and to the idea that children's rights include a right to personal autonomy. The book argues that school reform must always be evaluated from the perspective of social justice and applies the theory, in particular, to school choice proposals. It looks at the parental choice schemes in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and in England and Wales, and argues that they fall short of the requirements of justice, but that not all such schemes must do so. It elaborates an abstract voucher scheme that would combine choice with justice, and offers ways by which actual choice‐based reform can be modified to meet the requirements of justice.

The desirability, or lack thereof, of bills of rights has been the focus of some of the most enduring political debates over the last two centuries. Unlike civil and political rights, social rights to the meeting of needs, standard rights to adequate minimum income, education, housing, and health care are usually not given constitutional protection. The book argues that individuals have social rights to adequate minimum income, housing, health care, and education, and that those rights must be entrenched in the constitution of a democratic state. That is, the democratic majority should not be able to repeal them, and certain institutions (for instance, the judiciary) should be given the power to strike down laws passed by the legislature that are in breach of those rights. Thus, the book is located at the crossroads of two major issues of contemporary political philosophy, to wit, the issue of democracy and the issue of distributive justice. It stems from the perception that there may be conflicts between the demands of democracy and the demands of distributive justice, both of which are crucially important, and from the resulting recognition that the question of the relationship between these two values cannot be ignored.

A growing number of political philosophers favour a view called liberal perfectionism. According to this view, liberal political morality is characterized by a commitment to helping individuals lead autonomous lives and making other valuable choices. This book rejects this widely held view and offers an alternative account of liberal political morality. It argues that the liberal state should not be engaged in determining what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile life nor try to make sure that individuals live up to this ideal. Instead, it should remain neutral on the issue of the good life, and restrict itself to establishing the fair terms within which individuals can pursue their own beliefs about what gives value to their lives. The book thus defends a position known as political liberalism. The first part of the book subjects the liberal perfectionist position to critical scrutiny, advancing three major objections which raise serious doubts about the liberal perfectionist position with regard to autonomy, paternalism, and political legitimacy. The second part of the book presents and defends a distinctive version of political liberalism. In particular, it clarifies and develops political liberalism's central thesis: that political principles, in order to be legitimate, must be publicly justifiable to reasonable people. Drawing on the work of John Rawls, the author offers his own interpretation of this idea, and rebuts some of the main objections that have been pressed against it. In doing so, he provides novel arguments regarding the nature of an overlapping consensus, the structure of political justification, the idea of public reason, and the status of unreasonable persons.

In many Western democracies, ethnic and racial minorities have demanded, and sometimes achieved, greater recognition and accommodation of their identities. This is reflected in the adoption of multiculturalism policies for immigrant groups, the acceptance of territorial autonomy and language rights for national minorities, and the recognition of land claims and self-government rights for indigenous peoples. These claims for recognition have been controversial, in part because of fears that they make it more difficult to sustain a robust welfare state by eroding the interpersonal trust, social solidarity and political coalitions that sustain redistribution. Are these fears of a conflict between a ‘politics of recognition’ and a ‘politics of redistribution’ valid? This book aims to test this question empirically, using both cross-national statistical analyses of the relationships among diversity policies, public attitudes and the welfare state, and case studies of the recognition/redistribution linkage in the political coalitions in particular countries, including the United States, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, and in Latin America. These studies suggest that that there is no general or inherent tendency for recognition to undermine redistribution, and that the relationship between these two forms of politics can be supportive as well as competitive, depending on the context. These findings shed light, not only on the nature and effects of multiculturalism, but also on wider debates about the social and political foundations of the welfare state, and indeed about our most basic concepts of citizenship and national identity.

The fundamental problem of Rousseau's political philosophy is to find a form of association that protects the person and goods of each person without demanding from them a morally unacceptable sacrifice of autonomy. His solution to this problem, specified by a social contract, is the society of the general will: a free community of equals, whose members share a commitment to the common good, and in which each gives the law to him or herself. But how could it be that we accept a common authority and yet remain fully autonomous; and is such a society genuinely possible for human beings? Rousseau answers the first question by filling out the ideal of a free community of equals, regulated by the general will. He answers the second by showing that human beings can, appearances notwithstanding, live together in a free community of equals, motivated by the general will, and by describing how a free community of equals might work institutionally, as a form of democracy. At the heart of the argument is the idea that human beings are naturally good but corrupted by bad institutions. With institutions that advance the common good and secure each citizen's self-worth, people may acquire the requisite motivations. To this end, Rousseau favors direct-democratic lawmaking, and emphasizes the importance of strong communal solidarities. But the ideal of a free community of equals may be more robust — and more robustly attractive — than his proposals about direct democracy and communitarian ideas of solidarity might suggest.

Millions of children suffer from diseases and illnesses who do not have adequate treatment. And many other children are harmed by medicines intended to help them. To protect and help these children society needs to conduct pediatric research. Yet, critics and courts have argued that it is unethical to expose children to research risks for the benefit of others. They argue that this practice violates our obligation to protect children and exploits them for the benefit of others. In this way, clinical research with children poses what appears to be an irresolvable dilemma: either we can protect pediatric subjects from exploitation or we can protect pediatric patients from dangerous medicines, but not both. The present work, which is the first to systematically evaluate this dilemma, offers an original justification for pediatric research based on an in-depth analysis of when it is in our interests to help others.

This book examines the relationship between science and politics and argues for a balance between scientific independence and government oversight and control. It uses ethical theories and historical case studies to argue for the autonomy of science within limits. The autonomy of scientists should be restricted only for a compelling social purpose, and restrictions should be the minimum necessary to achieve this purpose. The autonomy of scientific organizations may be restricted if the social benefits of restriction outweigh the harms. There are a variety of legitimate reasons for restricting the autonomy of scientific organizations and institutions, including promoting health and safety, protecting the environment, ensuring financial accountability, promoting research integrity, protecting human and animal research subjects, and establishing fair employment practices. The government should enact restrictions that benefit society while doing minimal damage to the progress and objectivity of science. Government oversight of science should be appropriately balanced, well‐measured, and fair. The first three chapters of the book develop a conceptual framework for thinking about government restrictions on the autonomy of science. The last six chapters of the book apply this framework to different situations, including government science advice, government funding of research, national security issues, research with human subjects, and science education.

This book addresses some of the special challenges that arise when two or more national communities share the same (multinational) state. As a work in normative political philosophy, its principal aim is to evaluate the political and institutional choices of citizens and governments in states with rival nationalist discourses and nation-building projects. The first chapter takes stock of a decade of intense philosophical and sociological debates about the nature of nations and nationalism. The remainder of the book focuses on the three major political and institutional choices in multinational states. First, what can political actors and governments legitimately do to shape citizens’ national identity or identities? This is the core question in the ethics of nation-building. Second, how can minority and majority national communities each be given an adequate degree of self-determination, including equal rights to carry out nation-building projects, within a democratic federal state? Finally, even in a world where most national minorities cannot have their own state, how should the constitutions of multinational federations regulate secessionist politics within the rule of law and the ideals of democracy?

Autonomy is a key concept in contemporary moral philosophy with deep roots in the history of the subject. However, there is still no agreed view about the correct way to formulate an account of autonomy that adequately captures both our capacity for self-determination and our responsiveness to reasons. This book develops a theory of autonomy that is Kantian in orientation but which engages closely with recent arguments about agency, morality, and practical reasoning. There are two aspects in which the theory defended in this book is distinctive. First, whereas autonomy has primarily been understood in terms of our relation to ourselves, the theory defended here shows that it also centrally involves our relation to others. Identifying the intersubjective dimension of autonomy is crucial for the defence of autonomy as a morality of freedom. Second, autonomy must be treated as a composite concept and hence not capturable in simple definitions such as acting on one’s higher order desires or on principles one endorses. One of the virtues of the composite picture is that it shows autonomy at the intersection of concerns with morality, practical rationality, and freedom. Autonomy pertains to all these areas, though it does not exactly coincide with any of them. Showing this, and so tracing the scope of autonomy, is an essential part of the project. The aim is to show that autonomy is theoretically plausible, psychologically realistic, and morally attractive.

This book reads tragedy as a genre in which the protagonist is estranged from the world around him, and, displaced in time, space, and language, comes to inhabit a milieu which is no longer shared by other characters. This alienation from others also entails a decomposition of the integrity of the individual, which is often seen in tragedy's uncertainty about the protagonists' autonomy: do they act, or do the gods act through them? Where are the boundaries of the self, and the boundaries of the human? After an introductory essay exploring the theatrical and linguistic means by which the protagonist is made to inhabit a strange and singular world, the book devotes essays to plays from classical, renaissance, and neo-classical literature by Aeschylus, Sophocles, Seneca, William Shakespeare, and Jean Racine. Close attention is paid to the linguistic strangeness of the texts which is often smoothed over by editors and translators, as it is through the weirdness of tragic language that the deep estrangement of the characters is shown. Accordingly, the Greek, Latin, and French texts are quoted in the originals, with translations added, and attention is paid to textual cruces which illustrate the linguistic and conceptual difficulties of these plays.

It is argued that the strong claim biological parents have to raise their children isn't a property right but an instance of our general right to continue whatever we have begun. Implications are drawn for a wide range of cases in which there is a dispute over who should serve as parents to a child. Arguments are offered against saying that our only proper concern in such cases is the best interest of the child. A way is offered of also identifying what claims the various adults have in the matter and deciding how those are properly balanced with the child's own claims. The book also contends that children have a claim of their own to have their autonomy respected. Conclusions are drawn about paternalism toward one's children, about reacting differently to bad behavior when the wrongdoer is “only a child,” and about the way in which children should participate in their raising. A final set of chapters concern parents and their grown children. One conclusion is that parents do not have an obligation to love their grown children come what may. Another is that the filial obligations grown children have are best understood not as debts of gratitude but as obligations to give your parents a place in your affections that is roughly equivalent to the one they gave you while you were under their care. The closing chapter offers an alternative to John Hardwig's view about an obligation to die rather than cost your loved ones too dearly.