Richard Dean
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199285723
- eISBN:
- 9780191603938
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199285721.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The humanity formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative demands that we treat humanity as an end in itself. Because this principle resonates with currently influential ideals of human rights and ...
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The humanity formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative demands that we treat humanity as an end in itself. Because this principle resonates with currently influential ideals of human rights and dignity, contemporary readers often find it compelling, even if the rest of Kant’s moral philosophy leaves them cold. Moreover, some prominent specialists in Kant’s ethics recently have turned to the humanity formulation as the most theoretically central and promising principle of Kant’s ethics. Nevertheless, despite the intuitive appeal and the increasingly recognized philosophical importance of the humanity formulation, it has received less attention than many other, less central, aspects of Kant’s ethics. This book is the most sustained and systematic examination yet of the humanity formulation. It argues that the ‘rational nature’ that must be treated as an end in itself is not a minimally rational nature consisting of the power to set ends or the unrealized capacity to act morally, but instead is the more properly rational nature possessed by someone who gives priority to moral principles over any contrary impulses. In other words, good will is the end in itself. This non-standard reading of the humanity formulation provides a firm theoretical foundation for deriving plausible approaches to particular moral issues. Contrary to first impressions, it does not impose moralistic demands to pass judgment on others’ character. This reading of the humanity formulation also enables progress on problems of interest to Kant scholars such as reconstructing Kant’s argument for accepting the humanity formulation as a basic moral principle, and allows for increased understanding of the relationship between Kant’s ethics and supposedly Kantian ideas such as ‘respect for autonomy’.Less
The humanity formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative demands that we treat humanity as an end in itself. Because this principle resonates with currently influential ideals of human rights and dignity, contemporary readers often find it compelling, even if the rest of Kant’s moral philosophy leaves them cold. Moreover, some prominent specialists in Kant’s ethics recently have turned to the humanity formulation as the most theoretically central and promising principle of Kant’s ethics. Nevertheless, despite the intuitive appeal and the increasingly recognized philosophical importance of the humanity formulation, it has received less attention than many other, less central, aspects of Kant’s ethics. This book is the most sustained and systematic examination yet of the humanity formulation. It argues that the ‘rational nature’ that must be treated as an end in itself is not a minimally rational nature consisting of the power to set ends or the unrealized capacity to act morally, but instead is the more properly rational nature possessed by someone who gives priority to moral principles over any contrary impulses. In other words, good will is the end in itself. This non-standard reading of the humanity formulation provides a firm theoretical foundation for deriving plausible approaches to particular moral issues. Contrary to first impressions, it does not impose moralistic demands to pass judgment on others’ character. This reading of the humanity formulation also enables progress on problems of interest to Kant scholars such as reconstructing Kant’s argument for accepting the humanity formulation as a basic moral principle, and allows for increased understanding of the relationship between Kant’s ethics and supposedly Kantian ideas such as ‘respect for autonomy’.
Alasdair R Maclean
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199545520
- eISBN:
- 9780191721113
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545520.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Medical Law
The law, particularly the judge-made reactive common law, is always open to the influence of ethical discourses challenging the dominant view. In the context of healthcare provision, the power of the ...
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The law, particularly the judge-made reactive common law, is always open to the influence of ethical discourses challenging the dominant view. In the context of healthcare provision, the power of the medical profession traditionally allowed the dominant approach to remain relatively safe from external challenge. More recently, with the development of the discipline of bioethics and other societal changes, the traditional norms have come under increasing scrutiny and challenge and this continuing ethical critique is at its strongest in the field of healthcare law. This chapter examines the possible impact that this relatively new discourse has had on the legal regulation of consent to medical treatment, focusing particularly on the legal duty to disclose information.Less
The law, particularly the judge-made reactive common law, is always open to the influence of ethical discourses challenging the dominant view. In the context of healthcare provision, the power of the medical profession traditionally allowed the dominant approach to remain relatively safe from external challenge. More recently, with the development of the discipline of bioethics and other societal changes, the traditional norms have come under increasing scrutiny and challenge and this continuing ethical critique is at its strongest in the field of healthcare law. This chapter examines the possible impact that this relatively new discourse has had on the legal regulation of consent to medical treatment, focusing particularly on the legal duty to disclose information.
Attracta Ingram
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198279631
- eISBN:
- 9780191599545
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198279639.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This book presents a conception of rights as a type of political claim, justified by a Kantian ideal of autonomy. This justification provides a moral basis for rights independent of law and custom, ...
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This book presents a conception of rights as a type of political claim, justified by a Kantian ideal of autonomy. This justification provides a moral basis for rights independent of law and custom, and tied to an image of citizenship which is appropriate to the practice of pluralist liberal democracy. The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 discusses the concept of self-ownership and the proprietary conception of rights. Part II explores the concept of self-government and the political conception of rights.Less
This book presents a conception of rights as a type of political claim, justified by a Kantian ideal of autonomy. This justification provides a moral basis for rights independent of law and custom, and tied to an image of citizenship which is appropriate to the practice of pluralist liberal democracy. The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 discusses the concept of self-ownership and the proprietary conception of rights. Part II explores the concept of self-government and the political conception of rights.
Harry Brighouse
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199257874
- eISBN:
- 9780191598845
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257876.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Defends a theory of social justice for education from within an egalitarian version of liberalism. The theory involves a strong commitment to educational equality, and to the idea that children's ...
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Defends a theory of social justice for education from within an egalitarian version of liberalism. The theory involves a strong commitment to educational equality, and to the idea that children's rights include a right to personal autonomy. The book argues that school reform must always be evaluated from the perspective of social justice and applies the theory, in particular, to school choice proposals. It looks at the parental choice schemes in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and in England and Wales, and argues that they fall short of the requirements of justice, but that not all such schemes must do so. It elaborates an abstract voucher scheme that would combine choice with justice, and offers ways by which actual choice‐based reform can be modified to meet the requirements of justice.Less
Defends a theory of social justice for education from within an egalitarian version of liberalism. The theory involves a strong commitment to educational equality, and to the idea that children's rights include a right to personal autonomy. The book argues that school reform must always be evaluated from the perspective of social justice and applies the theory, in particular, to school choice proposals. It looks at the parental choice schemes in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and in England and Wales, and argues that they fall short of the requirements of justice, but that not all such schemes must do so. It elaborates an abstract voucher scheme that would combine choice with justice, and offers ways by which actual choice‐based reform can be modified to meet the requirements of justice.
Cécile Fabre
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296751
- eISBN:
- 9780191599200
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296754.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The desirability, or lack thereof, of bills of rights has been the focus of some of the most enduring political debates over the last two centuries. Unlike civil and political rights, social rights ...
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The desirability, or lack thereof, of bills of rights has been the focus of some of the most enduring political debates over the last two centuries. Unlike civil and political rights, social rights to the meeting of needs, standard rights to adequate minimum income, education, housing, and health care are usually not given constitutional protection. The book argues that individuals have social rights to adequate minimum income, housing, health care, and education, and that those rights must be entrenched in the constitution of a democratic state. That is, the democratic majority should not be able to repeal them, and certain institutions (for instance, the judiciary) should be given the power to strike down laws passed by the legislature that are in breach of those rights. Thus, the book is located at the crossroads of two major issues of contemporary political philosophy, to wit, the issue of democracy and the issue of distributive justice. It stems from the perception that there may be conflicts between the demands of democracy and the demands of distributive justice, both of which are crucially important, and from the resulting recognition that the question of the relationship between these two values cannot be ignored.Less
The desirability, or lack thereof, of bills of rights has been the focus of some of the most enduring political debates over the last two centuries. Unlike civil and political rights, social rights to the meeting of needs, standard rights to adequate minimum income, education, housing, and health care are usually not given constitutional protection. The book argues that individuals have social rights to adequate minimum income, housing, health care, and education, and that those rights must be entrenched in the constitution of a democratic state. That is, the democratic majority should not be able to repeal them, and certain institutions (for instance, the judiciary) should be given the power to strike down laws passed by the legislature that are in breach of those rights. Thus, the book is located at the crossroads of two major issues of contemporary political philosophy, to wit, the issue of democracy and the issue of distributive justice. It stems from the perception that there may be conflicts between the demands of democracy and the demands of distributive justice, both of which are crucially important, and from the resulting recognition that the question of the relationship between these two values cannot be ignored.
Margaret P. Battin, Leslie P. Francis, Jay A. Jacobson, and Charles B. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195335842
- eISBN:
- 9780199868926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335842.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter first documents the virtually complete absence of infectious disease examples and concerns at the time bioethics emerged as a field. It then argues that this oversight was not benign by ...
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This chapter first documents the virtually complete absence of infectious disease examples and concerns at the time bioethics emerged as a field. It then argues that this oversight was not benign by considering two central issues in the field—informed consent and distributive justice—and showing how they might have been framed differently had infectiousness been at the forefront of concern. The solution to this omission might be to apply standard approaches in liberal bioethics, such as autonomy and the harm principle, to infectious examples. It is argued that this is insufficient, however. Taking infectious disease into account requires understanding the patient as victim and as vector. Infectiousness reminds us that as autonomous agents we are both embodied and vulnerable in our relationships with others. The chapter concludes by applying this re-understanding of agency to the examples of informed consent and distributive justice in health care.Less
This chapter first documents the virtually complete absence of infectious disease examples and concerns at the time bioethics emerged as a field. It then argues that this oversight was not benign by considering two central issues in the field—informed consent and distributive justice—and showing how they might have been framed differently had infectiousness been at the forefront of concern. The solution to this omission might be to apply standard approaches in liberal bioethics, such as autonomy and the harm principle, to infectious examples. It is argued that this is insufficient, however. Taking infectious disease into account requires understanding the patient as victim and as vector. Infectiousness reminds us that as autonomous agents we are both embodied and vulnerable in our relationships with others. The chapter concludes by applying this re-understanding of agency to the examples of informed consent and distributive justice in health care.
Margaret P. Battin, Leslie P. Francis, Jay A. Jacobson, and Charles B. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195335842
- eISBN:
- 9780199868926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335842.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Traditional liberal paradigms in bioethics have rested on a misleading picture of the self as a separate individual. This chapter develops a biologicized picture of the self as a “way station”: so to ...
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Traditional liberal paradigms in bioethics have rested on a misleading picture of the self as a separate individual. This chapter develops a biologicized picture of the self as a “way station”: so to speak, a launching pad and breeding ground of biological organisms, some pathological and many benign, that are transmitted from one human individual to another. Understanding people as way-station selves embedded in a web of infectious disease requires rethinking some of the most basic concepts of bioethics: autonomy, the harm principle, and responsibility, among others. The autonomous agent cannot be seen as an isolated individual, but must be viewed as acting in biological relationships with others. The harm principle's basic idea that intervention is permissible only to prevent people from harming each other must be reshaped by the recognition that there is no easy way to separate actions that harm only the individual him/herself from actions that affect others. Responsibility must be rethought in light of the biological reality that people may infect others unknowingly, and may never know the sources of the infections they contract. Although people may be more or less aware of their susceptibility to infectious disease, there is always a sense in which each person stands in unknown relationships of potential contagion to others.Less
Traditional liberal paradigms in bioethics have rested on a misleading picture of the self as a separate individual. This chapter develops a biologicized picture of the self as a “way station”: so to speak, a launching pad and breeding ground of biological organisms, some pathological and many benign, that are transmitted from one human individual to another. Understanding people as way-station selves embedded in a web of infectious disease requires rethinking some of the most basic concepts of bioethics: autonomy, the harm principle, and responsibility, among others. The autonomous agent cannot be seen as an isolated individual, but must be viewed as acting in biological relationships with others. The harm principle's basic idea that intervention is permissible only to prevent people from harming each other must be reshaped by the recognition that there is no easy way to separate actions that harm only the individual him/herself from actions that affect others. Responsibility must be rethought in light of the biological reality that people may infect others unknowingly, and may never know the sources of the infections they contract. Although people may be more or less aware of their susceptibility to infectious disease, there is always a sense in which each person stands in unknown relationships of potential contagion to others.
Margaret P. Battin, Leslie P. Francis, Jay A. Jacobson, and Charles B. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195335842
- eISBN:
- 9780199868926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335842.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter begins to put the PVV view to work in the analysis of both traditional and newer ethical issues in bioethics. Here, the chapter re-examines staple issues of bioethics such as ...
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This chapter begins to put the PVV view to work in the analysis of both traditional and newer ethical issues in bioethics. Here, the chapter re-examines staple issues of bioethics such as truth-telling, informed consent, privacy and confidentiality, and end-of-life decision making in light of the importance of taking both victimhood and vectorhood into account. To take one example, refusals of patients to be told the truth that might be respected on traditional autonomy grounds look quite different if the truth at issue includes possibilities of contagion. Informed consent must include a discussion of the risks the patient potentially poses to others—as well as the risks posed by others. Using the PVV view, this chapter also takes up more novel issues about duties of physicians, such as the duty to warn, the duty to treat, and the duty to reduce levels of mistakes. Physicians who are potentially infectious themselves, for example, have a duty to consider their own roles as vectors, not solely the interests of the patient.Less
This chapter begins to put the PVV view to work in the analysis of both traditional and newer ethical issues in bioethics. Here, the chapter re-examines staple issues of bioethics such as truth-telling, informed consent, privacy and confidentiality, and end-of-life decision making in light of the importance of taking both victimhood and vectorhood into account. To take one example, refusals of patients to be told the truth that might be respected on traditional autonomy grounds look quite different if the truth at issue includes possibilities of contagion. Informed consent must include a discussion of the risks the patient potentially poses to others—as well as the risks posed by others. Using the PVV view, this chapter also takes up more novel issues about duties of physicians, such as the duty to warn, the duty to treat, and the duty to reduce levels of mistakes. Physicians who are potentially infectious themselves, for example, have a duty to consider their own roles as vectors, not solely the interests of the patient.
Margaret P. Battin, Leslie P. Francis, Jay A. Jacobson, and Charles B. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195335842
- eISBN:
- 9780199868926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335842.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter uses the example of a homeless man with multiple drug-resistant tuberculosis to explore ethical conflicts that arise between the public health officers' emphasis on “control-the-vector” ...
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This chapter uses the example of a homeless man with multiple drug-resistant tuberculosis to explore ethical conflicts that arise between the public health officers' emphasis on “control-the-vector” approach to managing tuberculosis patients, which may include involuntary screening, isolation, and coerced treatment, and the concerns of autonomy-oriented traditional medical ethicists that patients' rights be respected. It suggests a synthesis of these competing values and approaches that might be implemented by a physician who cares both for the patient and for the health of the public, and who understands that the individual patient is as vulnerable to being infected by others as others are to being infected by the patient. The chapter also raises issues about care of the dying in transmissible infectious disease: in this case, the patient wants only to go home and be with his dog, but for disease-control reasons cannot be allowed to be at large. The tension is reduced with a creative solution in a way that demonstrates a simple case of recognizing that the patient is both victim and vector at one and the same time.Less
This chapter uses the example of a homeless man with multiple drug-resistant tuberculosis to explore ethical conflicts that arise between the public health officers' emphasis on “control-the-vector” approach to managing tuberculosis patients, which may include involuntary screening, isolation, and coerced treatment, and the concerns of autonomy-oriented traditional medical ethicists that patients' rights be respected. It suggests a synthesis of these competing values and approaches that might be implemented by a physician who cares both for the patient and for the health of the public, and who understands that the individual patient is as vulnerable to being infected by others as others are to being infected by the patient. The chapter also raises issues about care of the dying in transmissible infectious disease: in this case, the patient wants only to go home and be with his dog, but for disease-control reasons cannot be allowed to be at large. The tension is reduced with a creative solution in a way that demonstrates a simple case of recognizing that the patient is both victim and vector at one and the same time.
Attracta Ingram
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198279631
- eISBN:
- 9780191599545
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198279639.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter presents a synthesis of the concept of rights against the state discussed in this volume. It argues that the difference between a libertarian and social-democratic liberal state is not ...
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This chapter presents a synthesis of the concept of rights against the state discussed in this volume. It argues that the difference between a libertarian and social-democratic liberal state is not merely the differences in the packages of rights associated with each. The content of each package differs in each case because the structure of rights is different. It is a mistake to defend self-ownership on the grounds of autonomy, since the two are incompatible.Less
This chapter presents a synthesis of the concept of rights against the state discussed in this volume. It argues that the difference between a libertarian and social-democratic liberal state is not merely the differences in the packages of rights associated with each. The content of each package differs in each case because the structure of rights is different. It is a mistake to defend self-ownership on the grounds of autonomy, since the two are incompatible.
Jonathan Quong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199594870
- eISBN:
- 9780191723513
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199594870.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
A growing number of political philosophers favour a view called liberal perfectionism. According to this view, liberal political morality is characterized by a commitment to helping individuals lead ...
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A growing number of political philosophers favour a view called liberal perfectionism. According to this view, liberal political morality is characterized by a commitment to helping individuals lead autonomous lives and making other valuable choices. This book rejects this widely held view and offers an alternative account of liberal political morality. It argues that the liberal state should not be engaged in determining what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile life nor try to make sure that individuals live up to this ideal. Instead, it should remain neutral on the issue of the good life, and restrict itself to establishing the fair terms within which individuals can pursue their own beliefs about what gives value to their lives. The book thus defends a position known as political liberalism. The first part of the book subjects the liberal perfectionist position to critical scrutiny, advancing three major objections which raise serious doubts about the liberal perfectionist position with regard to autonomy, paternalism, and political legitimacy. The second part of the book presents and defends a distinctive version of political liberalism. In particular, it clarifies and develops political liberalism's central thesis: that political principles, in order to be legitimate, must be publicly justifiable to reasonable people. Drawing on the work of John Rawls, the author offers his own interpretation of this idea, and rebuts some of the main objections that have been pressed against it. In doing so, he provides novel arguments regarding the nature of an overlapping consensus, the structure of political justification, the idea of public reason, and the status of unreasonable persons.Less
A growing number of political philosophers favour a view called liberal perfectionism. According to this view, liberal political morality is characterized by a commitment to helping individuals lead autonomous lives and making other valuable choices. This book rejects this widely held view and offers an alternative account of liberal political morality. It argues that the liberal state should not be engaged in determining what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile life nor try to make sure that individuals live up to this ideal. Instead, it should remain neutral on the issue of the good life, and restrict itself to establishing the fair terms within which individuals can pursue their own beliefs about what gives value to their lives. The book thus defends a position known as political liberalism. The first part of the book subjects the liberal perfectionist position to critical scrutiny, advancing three major objections which raise serious doubts about the liberal perfectionist position with regard to autonomy, paternalism, and political legitimacy. The second part of the book presents and defends a distinctive version of political liberalism. In particular, it clarifies and develops political liberalism's central thesis: that political principles, in order to be legitimate, must be publicly justifiable to reasonable people. Drawing on the work of John Rawls, the author offers his own interpretation of this idea, and rebuts some of the main objections that have been pressed against it. In doing so, he provides novel arguments regarding the nature of an overlapping consensus, the structure of political justification, the idea of public reason, and the status of unreasonable persons.
Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199289172
- eISBN:
- 9780191711084
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289172.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Economy
In many Western democracies, ethnic and racial minorities have demanded, and sometimes achieved, greater recognition and accommodation of their identities. This is reflected in the adoption of ...
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In many Western democracies, ethnic and racial minorities have demanded, and sometimes achieved, greater recognition and accommodation of their identities. This is reflected in the adoption of multiculturalism policies for immigrant groups, the acceptance of territorial autonomy and language rights for national minorities, and the recognition of land claims and self-government rights for indigenous peoples. These claims for recognition have been controversial, in part because of fears that they make it more difficult to sustain a robust welfare state by eroding the interpersonal trust, social solidarity and political coalitions that sustain redistribution. Are these fears of a conflict between a ‘politics of recognition’ and a ‘politics of redistribution’ valid? This book aims to test this question empirically, using both cross-national statistical analyses of the relationships among diversity policies, public attitudes and the welfare state, and case studies of the recognition/redistribution linkage in the political coalitions in particular countries, including the United States, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, and in Latin America. These studies suggest that that there is no general or inherent tendency for recognition to undermine redistribution, and that the relationship between these two forms of politics can be supportive as well as competitive, depending on the context. These findings shed light, not only on the nature and effects of multiculturalism, but also on wider debates about the social and political foundations of the welfare state, and indeed about our most basic concepts of citizenship and national identity.Less
In many Western democracies, ethnic and racial minorities have demanded, and sometimes achieved, greater recognition and accommodation of their identities. This is reflected in the adoption of multiculturalism policies for immigrant groups, the acceptance of territorial autonomy and language rights for national minorities, and the recognition of land claims and self-government rights for indigenous peoples. These claims for recognition have been controversial, in part because of fears that they make it more difficult to sustain a robust welfare state by eroding the interpersonal trust, social solidarity and political coalitions that sustain redistribution. Are these fears of a conflict between a ‘politics of recognition’ and a ‘politics of redistribution’ valid? This book aims to test this question empirically, using both cross-national statistical analyses of the relationships among diversity policies, public attitudes and the welfare state, and case studies of the recognition/redistribution linkage in the political coalitions in particular countries, including the United States, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, and in Latin America. These studies suggest that that there is no general or inherent tendency for recognition to undermine redistribution, and that the relationship between these two forms of politics can be supportive as well as competitive, depending on the context. These findings shed light, not only on the nature and effects of multiculturalism, but also on wider debates about the social and political foundations of the welfare state, and indeed about our most basic concepts of citizenship and national identity.
Matthew Clayton
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199268948
- eISBN:
- 9780191603693
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199268940.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter sets out the liberal ideals of justice and legitimacy that form the basis of the conception of upbringing defended in later chapters. It begins with a summary of Rawls’s conception of ...
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This chapter sets out the liberal ideals of justice and legitimacy that form the basis of the conception of upbringing defended in later chapters. It begins with a summary of Rawls’s conception of political morality, then discusses the different dimensions of liberal autonomy and summarizes Rawls’s case for anti-perfectionist justice. Section 3 considers certain objections to Rawls’s political liberalism and against Rawls, asserting the view that autonomy should be treated as valuable in non-political lives. Section 4 sets out a conception of advantage with which to judge the demands of justice, drawing on Rawls’s account of the interests of citizens and Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance scheme. Finally, the questions addressed in later chapters are clarified by reference to recent discussions of the issue of the site of political morality offered by G.A. Cohen and Andrew Williams.Less
This chapter sets out the liberal ideals of justice and legitimacy that form the basis of the conception of upbringing defended in later chapters. It begins with a summary of Rawls’s conception of political morality, then discusses the different dimensions of liberal autonomy and summarizes Rawls’s case for anti-perfectionist justice. Section 3 considers certain objections to Rawls’s political liberalism and against Rawls, asserting the view that autonomy should be treated as valuable in non-political lives. Section 4 sets out a conception of advantage with which to judge the demands of justice, drawing on Rawls’s account of the interests of citizens and Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance scheme. Finally, the questions addressed in later chapters are clarified by reference to recent discussions of the issue of the site of political morality offered by G.A. Cohen and Andrew Williams.
Matthew Clayton
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199268948
- eISBN:
- 9780191603693
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199268940.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Can parents legitimately enrol their child into controversial religious practices or disputed conceptions of human well being? Many liberals assert that they can, provided that this enrolment does ...
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Can parents legitimately enrol their child into controversial religious practices or disputed conceptions of human well being? Many liberals assert that they can, provided that this enrolment does not jeopardize the child’s development of autonomy. This chapter defends the view that the ideal of individual autonomy supports a negative answer to the question. It draws a distinction between autonomy as an end-state to be achieved, and autonomy as a precondition for legitimate enrolment into controversial ethical practices. The argument begins with a defence of the view that parental conduct must conform to certain aspects of Rawls’s ideal of public reason, since it is relevantly like political activity. The intrinsic and instrumental merits of the precondition conception of autonomy are discussed. The chapter closes with a critique of certain arguments for enrolment, which emphasize intimacy or the child’s development of the capacity for autonomous judgement.Less
Can parents legitimately enrol their child into controversial religious practices or disputed conceptions of human well being? Many liberals assert that they can, provided that this enrolment does not jeopardize the child’s development of autonomy. This chapter defends the view that the ideal of individual autonomy supports a negative answer to the question. It draws a distinction between autonomy as an end-state to be achieved, and autonomy as a precondition for legitimate enrolment into controversial ethical practices. The argument begins with a defence of the view that parental conduct must conform to certain aspects of Rawls’s ideal of public reason, since it is relevantly like political activity. The intrinsic and instrumental merits of the precondition conception of autonomy are discussed. The chapter closes with a critique of certain arguments for enrolment, which emphasize intimacy or the child’s development of the capacity for autonomous judgement.
James Herbert
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197264294
- eISBN:
- 9780191734335
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264294.003.0004
- Subject:
- Sociology, Education
This chapter discusses the separation and independence of the AHRB from the HEFCE. In 2001, through the aid of Bahram Bekhradnia, the AHRB gained autonomy from the HEFCE. At the beginning of the ...
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This chapter discusses the separation and independence of the AHRB from the HEFCE. In 2001, through the aid of Bahram Bekhradnia, the AHRB gained autonomy from the HEFCE. At the beginning of the fiscal year in April 2001, the ARHB became a company limited by guarantee. In September of the same year, the organisation gained legal status as a charity, hence affording it certain tax advantages. The newly independent company and charity took on new trustees, however it retained its broad responsibilities. It also took on the responsibility for producing its own audited Statutory Accounts. At the same time, the organisation's staff formally transferred to the employment of the ARHB and in the following year additional staff were recruited. In the month of October, the organisation signed a ten-year lease contract on its new office in Whitefriars Building in Bristol. In addition, the organisation was also attaining full realization of its programmes and objectives. It formed three award schemes including the Research Leave scheme. It also created the Fellowships in the Creative and Performing Arts. In addition, the organisation also formed new funding schemes and in 2002, upon the approval of the government, the Research Council funded projects throughout the UK. In sum, as Chief Executive David Eastwood puts it, the ARHB was achieving independence and operating in ways which still mirrored those of the research councils.Less
This chapter discusses the separation and independence of the AHRB from the HEFCE. In 2001, through the aid of Bahram Bekhradnia, the AHRB gained autonomy from the HEFCE. At the beginning of the fiscal year in April 2001, the ARHB became a company limited by guarantee. In September of the same year, the organisation gained legal status as a charity, hence affording it certain tax advantages. The newly independent company and charity took on new trustees, however it retained its broad responsibilities. It also took on the responsibility for producing its own audited Statutory Accounts. At the same time, the organisation's staff formally transferred to the employment of the ARHB and in the following year additional staff were recruited. In the month of October, the organisation signed a ten-year lease contract on its new office in Whitefriars Building in Bristol. In addition, the organisation was also attaining full realization of its programmes and objectives. It formed three award schemes including the Research Leave scheme. It also created the Fellowships in the Creative and Performing Arts. In addition, the organisation also formed new funding schemes and in 2002, upon the approval of the government, the Research Council funded projects throughout the UK. In sum, as Chief Executive David Eastwood puts it, the ARHB was achieving independence and operating in ways which still mirrored those of the research councils.
David Wendler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199730087
- eISBN:
- 9780199776689
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730087.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Millions of children suffer from diseases and illnesses who do not have adequate treatment. And many other children are harmed by medicines intended to help them. To protect and help these children ...
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Millions of children suffer from diseases and illnesses who do not have adequate treatment. And many other children are harmed by medicines intended to help them. To protect and help these children society needs to conduct pediatric research. Yet, critics and courts have argued that it is unethical to expose children to research risks for the benefit of others. They argue that this practice violates our obligation to protect children and exploits them for the benefit of others. In this way, clinical research with children poses what appears to be an irresolvable dilemma: either we can protect pediatric subjects from exploitation or we can protect pediatric patients from dangerous medicines, but not both. The present work, which is the first to systematically evaluate this dilemma, offers an original justification for pediatric research based on an in-depth analysis of when it is in our interests to help others.Less
Millions of children suffer from diseases and illnesses who do not have adequate treatment. And many other children are harmed by medicines intended to help them. To protect and help these children society needs to conduct pediatric research. Yet, critics and courts have argued that it is unethical to expose children to research risks for the benefit of others. They argue that this practice violates our obligation to protect children and exploits them for the benefit of others. In this way, clinical research with children poses what appears to be an irresolvable dilemma: either we can protect pediatric subjects from exploitation or we can protect pediatric patients from dangerous medicines, but not both. The present work, which is the first to systematically evaluate this dilemma, offers an original justification for pediatric research based on an in-depth analysis of when it is in our interests to help others.
Joshua Cohen
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199581498
- eISBN:
- 9780191722875
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199581498.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Political Philosophy
The fundamental problem of Rousseau's political philosophy is to find a form of association that protects the person and goods of each person without demanding from them a morally unacceptable ...
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The fundamental problem of Rousseau's political philosophy is to find a form of association that protects the person and goods of each person without demanding from them a morally unacceptable sacrifice of autonomy. His solution to this problem, specified by a social contract, is the society of the general will: a free community of equals, whose members share a commitment to the common good, and in which each gives the law to him or herself. But how could it be that we accept a common authority and yet remain fully autonomous; and is such a society genuinely possible for human beings? Rousseau answers the first question by filling out the ideal of a free community of equals, regulated by the general will. He answers the second by showing that human beings can, appearances notwithstanding, live together in a free community of equals, motivated by the general will, and by describing how a free community of equals might work institutionally, as a form of democracy. At the heart of the argument is the idea that human beings are naturally good but corrupted by bad institutions. With institutions that advance the common good and secure each citizen's self-worth, people may acquire the requisite motivations. To this end, Rousseau favors direct-democratic lawmaking, and emphasizes the importance of strong communal solidarities. But the ideal of a free community of equals may be more robust — and more robustly attractive — than his proposals about direct democracy and communitarian ideas of solidarity might suggest.Less
The fundamental problem of Rousseau's political philosophy is to find a form of association that protects the person and goods of each person without demanding from them a morally unacceptable sacrifice of autonomy. His solution to this problem, specified by a social contract, is the society of the general will: a free community of equals, whose members share a commitment to the common good, and in which each gives the law to him or herself. But how could it be that we accept a common authority and yet remain fully autonomous; and is such a society genuinely possible for human beings? Rousseau answers the first question by filling out the ideal of a free community of equals, regulated by the general will. He answers the second by showing that human beings can, appearances notwithstanding, live together in a free community of equals, motivated by the general will, and by describing how a free community of equals might work institutionally, as a form of democracy. At the heart of the argument is the idea that human beings are naturally good but corrupted by bad institutions. With institutions that advance the common good and secure each citizen's self-worth, people may acquire the requisite motivations. To this end, Rousseau favors direct-democratic lawmaking, and emphasizes the importance of strong communal solidarities. But the ideal of a free community of equals may be more robust — and more robustly attractive — than his proposals about direct democracy and communitarian ideas of solidarity might suggest.
David B. Resnik
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195375893
- eISBN:
- 9780199866632
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195375893.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book examines the relationship between science and politics and argues for a balance between scientific independence and government oversight and control. It uses ethical theories and historical ...
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This book examines the relationship between science and politics and argues for a balance between scientific independence and government oversight and control. It uses ethical theories and historical case studies to argue for the autonomy of science within limits. The autonomy of scientists should be restricted only for a compelling social purpose, and restrictions should be the minimum necessary to achieve this purpose. The autonomy of scientific organizations may be restricted if the social benefits of restriction outweigh the harms. There are a variety of legitimate reasons for restricting the autonomy of scientific organizations and institutions, including promoting health and safety, protecting the environment, ensuring financial accountability, promoting research integrity, protecting human and animal research subjects, and establishing fair employment practices. The government should enact restrictions that benefit society while doing minimal damage to the progress and objectivity of science. Government oversight of science should be appropriately balanced, well‐measured, and fair. The first three chapters of the book develop a conceptual framework for thinking about government restrictions on the autonomy of science. The last six chapters of the book apply this framework to different situations, including government science advice, government funding of research, national security issues, research with human subjects, and science education.Less
This book examines the relationship between science and politics and argues for a balance between scientific independence and government oversight and control. It uses ethical theories and historical case studies to argue for the autonomy of science within limits. The autonomy of scientists should be restricted only for a compelling social purpose, and restrictions should be the minimum necessary to achieve this purpose. The autonomy of scientific organizations may be restricted if the social benefits of restriction outweigh the harms. There are a variety of legitimate reasons for restricting the autonomy of scientific organizations and institutions, including promoting health and safety, protecting the environment, ensuring financial accountability, promoting research integrity, protecting human and animal research subjects, and establishing fair employment practices. The government should enact restrictions that benefit society while doing minimal damage to the progress and objectivity of science. Government oversight of science should be appropriately balanced, well‐measured, and fair. The first three chapters of the book develop a conceptual framework for thinking about government restrictions on the autonomy of science. The last six chapters of the book apply this framework to different situations, including government science advice, government funding of research, national security issues, research with human subjects, and science education.
Wayne Norman
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198293354
- eISBN:
- 9780191604126
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198293356.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This book addresses some of the special challenges that arise when two or more national communities share the same (multinational) state. As a work in normative political philosophy, its principal ...
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This book addresses some of the special challenges that arise when two or more national communities share the same (multinational) state. As a work in normative political philosophy, its principal aim is to evaluate the political and institutional choices of citizens and governments in states with rival nationalist discourses and nation-building projects. The first chapter takes stock of a decade of intense philosophical and sociological debates about the nature of nations and nationalism. The remainder of the book focuses on the three major political and institutional choices in multinational states. First, what can political actors and governments legitimately do to shape citizens’ national identity or identities? This is the core question in the ethics of nation-building. Second, how can minority and majority national communities each be given an adequate degree of self-determination, including equal rights to carry out nation-building projects, within a democratic federal state? Finally, even in a world where most national minorities cannot have their own state, how should the constitutions of multinational federations regulate secessionist politics within the rule of law and the ideals of democracy?Less
This book addresses some of the special challenges that arise when two or more national communities share the same (multinational) state. As a work in normative political philosophy, its principal aim is to evaluate the political and institutional choices of citizens and governments in states with rival nationalist discourses and nation-building projects. The first chapter takes stock of a decade of intense philosophical and sociological debates about the nature of nations and nationalism. The remainder of the book focuses on the three major political and institutional choices in multinational states. First, what can political actors and governments legitimately do to shape citizens’ national identity or identities? This is the core question in the ethics of nation-building. Second, how can minority and majority national communities each be given an adequate degree of self-determination, including equal rights to carry out nation-building projects, within a democratic federal state? Finally, even in a world where most national minorities cannot have their own state, how should the constitutions of multinational federations regulate secessionist politics within the rule of law and the ideals of democracy?
Benjamin Reilly
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199286874
- eISBN:
- 9780191713156
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199286874.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter examines the theory and practice of the various approaches to the sharing and dividing of governing power in the Asia-Pacific. It first looks at the broad issues of executive structure ...
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This chapter examines the theory and practice of the various approaches to the sharing and dividing of governing power in the Asia-Pacific. It first looks at the broad issues of executive structure and the distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems across the region, at the divergent approaches taken by Asian and Pacific states to both formal and informal practices of executive inclusion, and at the empirical relationship between these variables and broader goals of political stability. An ‘index of power-sharing’ is constructed to compare the horizontal sharing of powers over time. The experience of vertical power-sharing via measures such as federalism, devolution, and autonomy is then considered. Overall, the evidence suggests that while informal executive power-sharing practices have been relatively successful, formal requirements for inclusive cabinets have been dogged by problems.Less
This chapter examines the theory and practice of the various approaches to the sharing and dividing of governing power in the Asia-Pacific. It first looks at the broad issues of executive structure and the distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems across the region, at the divergent approaches taken by Asian and Pacific states to both formal and informal practices of executive inclusion, and at the empirical relationship between these variables and broader goals of political stability. An ‘index of power-sharing’ is constructed to compare the horizontal sharing of powers over time. The experience of vertical power-sharing via measures such as federalism, devolution, and autonomy is then considered. Overall, the evidence suggests that while informal executive power-sharing practices have been relatively successful, formal requirements for inclusive cabinets have been dogged by problems.
