Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262083768
- eISBN:
- 9780262275682
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262083768.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The goal of this chapter is to show that the blobjectivist position is, in fact, a type of austere realism. It begins by presenting some initial methodological remarks, and then follows the ...
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The goal of this chapter is to show that the blobjectivist position is, in fact, a type of austere realism. It begins by presenting some initial methodological remarks, and then follows the commonsense-driven road from simple realism to austere realism. This road inevitably forks along the way, and these forks in the road lead to a range of potentially viable austere ontologies, including blobjectivism—all of which could be wedded to generic austere realism to yield a specific species of that genus position. After careful examination of these ontologies, three principal alternatives stand out as theoretically preferable—blobjectivism is one of these three.Less
The goal of this chapter is to show that the blobjectivist position is, in fact, a type of austere realism. It begins by presenting some initial methodological remarks, and then follows the commonsense-driven road from simple realism to austere realism. This road inevitably forks along the way, and these forks in the road lead to a range of potentially viable austere ontologies, including blobjectivism—all of which could be wedded to generic austere realism to yield a specific species of that genus position. After careful examination of these ontologies, three principal alternatives stand out as theoretically preferable—blobjectivism is one of these three.
Terence E. Horgan and Matjaž Potrč
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262083768
- eISBN:
- 9780262275682
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262083768.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book describes and defends an ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous common-sense posits, and that statements ...
More
This book describes and defends an ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous common-sense posits, and that statements employing such posits are nonetheless true, when truth is understood to be semantic correctness under contextually operative semantic standards. The chapters argue that austere realism emerges naturally from consideration of the deep problems within the naive common-sense approach to truth and ontology. They offer an account of truth that confronts these deep internal problems and is independently plausible: contextual semantics, which asserts that truth is semantically correct affirmability. Under contextual semantics, much ordinary and scientific thought and discourse is true because its truth is indirect correspondence to the world. After offering further arguments for austere realism and addressing objections to it, the chapters consider various alternative austere ontologies. They advance a specific version they call “blobjectivism”—the view that the right ontology includes only one concrete particular, the entire cosmos (“the blobject”), which, although it has enormous local spatiotemporal variability, does not have any proper parts.Less
This book describes and defends an ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous common-sense posits, and that statements employing such posits are nonetheless true, when truth is understood to be semantic correctness under contextually operative semantic standards. The chapters argue that austere realism emerges naturally from consideration of the deep problems within the naive common-sense approach to truth and ontology. They offer an account of truth that confronts these deep internal problems and is independently plausible: contextual semantics, which asserts that truth is semantically correct affirmability. Under contextual semantics, much ordinary and scientific thought and discourse is true because its truth is indirect correspondence to the world. After offering further arguments for austere realism and addressing objections to it, the chapters consider various alternative austere ontologies. They advance a specific version they call “blobjectivism”—the view that the right ontology includes only one concrete particular, the entire cosmos (“the blobject”), which, although it has enormous local spatiotemporal variability, does not have any proper parts.
Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262083768
- eISBN:
- 9780262275682
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262083768.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter expands on the defense of austere realism by addressing the three challenges most likely to be raised against it. The first challenge relates to austere realism's support of austere ...
More
This chapter expands on the defense of austere realism by addressing the three challenges most likely to be raised against it. The first challenge relates to austere realism's support of austere ontology; this makes austere realism contrary to common sense beliefs about the world or to what facts science puts forth about the world. The second challenge concerns the problems faced by the appeal to contextual variability of semantic standards, which will be discussed in detail here. Finally, the third challenge concerns the skeptical doubts apt to arise regarding whether an adequate general account can be given of matters like the variety of indirect correspondence semantic standards and the dynamics of contextual variation in semantic standards.Less
This chapter expands on the defense of austere realism by addressing the three challenges most likely to be raised against it. The first challenge relates to austere realism's support of austere ontology; this makes austere realism contrary to common sense beliefs about the world or to what facts science puts forth about the world. The second challenge concerns the problems faced by the appeal to contextual variability of semantic standards, which will be discussed in detail here. Finally, the third challenge concerns the skeptical doubts apt to arise regarding whether an adequate general account can be given of matters like the variety of indirect correspondence semantic standards and the dynamics of contextual variation in semantic standards.