Ruth Glasner
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199567737
- eISBN:
- 9780191721472
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567737.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The three turning points that were studied in chapters 6‐8 are facets of a major turning point in Averroes' thought that led to the consolidation of his ‘Aristotelian atomism’. Chapter 9 examines the ...
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The three turning points that were studied in chapters 6‐8 are facets of a major turning point in Averroes' thought that led to the consolidation of his ‘Aristotelian atomism’. Chapter 9 examines the arguments that were made in the previous three chapters about dating of this turning potint, and whether it was associated with the writing of the middle commentary or with the writing of the long. The data is very confusing. The conclusion, stated in Chapter 9, is that the turning point could have been influenced by his arguments with the mutakallimūn around 1180 and that Averroes worked out his new physics when he was writing the long commentary. At this stage he looked for the writings of Alexander and tried to find support in them. The revisions of all three commentaries were made after the writing of the long commentary.Less
The three turning points that were studied in chapters 6‐8 are facets of a major turning point in Averroes' thought that led to the consolidation of his ‘Aristotelian atomism’. Chapter 9 examines the arguments that were made in the previous three chapters about dating of this turning potint, and whether it was associated with the writing of the middle commentary or with the writing of the long. The data is very confusing. The conclusion, stated in Chapter 9, is that the turning point could have been influenced by his arguments with the mutakallimūn around 1180 and that Averroes worked out his new physics when he was writing the long commentary. At this stage he looked for the writings of Alexander and tried to find support in them. The revisions of all three commentaries were made after the writing of the long commentary.
Jerry A. Fodor
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236368
- eISBN:
- 9780191597404
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236360.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have ...
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Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been seriously mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, and maintains that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. He starts by demolishing the rival theories that have prevailed in recent years—that concepts are definitions, that they are prototypes or stereotypes, that they are abstractions from belief systems, etc. He argues that all such theories are radically unsatisfactory for two closely related reasons: they hold that the content of a concept is determined, at least in part, by its inferential role; and they hold that typical concepts are structurally complex. Empirical and philosophical arguments against each of these claims are elaborated. Fodor then develops his alternative account, arguing that conceptual content is determined entirely by informational (mind—world) relations, and that typical concepts are atomic. The implications of this ‘informational atomism’ are considered in respect of issues in psychology, lexical semantics, and metaphysics, with particular attention to the relation between informational atomism and innateness.Less
Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been seriously mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, and maintains that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. He starts by demolishing the rival theories that have prevailed in recent years—that concepts are definitions, that they are prototypes or stereotypes, that they are abstractions from belief systems, etc. He argues that all such theories are radically unsatisfactory for two closely related reasons: they hold that the content of a concept is determined, at least in part, by its inferential role; and they hold that typical concepts are structurally complex. Empirical and philosophical arguments against each of these claims are elaborated. Fodor then develops his alternative account, arguing that conceptual content is determined entirely by informational (mind—world) relations, and that typical concepts are atomic. The implications of this ‘informational atomism’ are considered in respect of issues in psychology, lexical semantics, and metaphysics, with particular attention to the relation between informational atomism and innateness.
David Bostock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286867
- eISBN:
- 9780191603532
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286868.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This essay discusses almost all of Aristotle’s claims in Physics VI, highlighting some virtues in his discussion as well as inadequacies or plain mistakes. In some cases, Aristotle’s mistakes may be ...
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This essay discusses almost all of Aristotle’s claims in Physics VI, highlighting some virtues in his discussion as well as inadequacies or plain mistakes. In some cases, Aristotle’s mistakes may be put down to his imperfect grasp of the notion of infinity. But in most cases, they are due to the fact that in this book of the Physics, he is trying to argue against all forms of atomism, i.e., against atoms of space, time, movement, and atoms of matter. However, his arguments on this head are never conclusive.Less
This essay discusses almost all of Aristotle’s claims in Physics VI, highlighting some virtues in his discussion as well as inadequacies or plain mistakes. In some cases, Aristotle’s mistakes may be put down to his imperfect grasp of the notion of infinity. But in most cases, they are due to the fact that in this book of the Physics, he is trying to argue against all forms of atomism, i.e., against atoms of space, time, movement, and atoms of matter. However, his arguments on this head are never conclusive.
Mark Timmons (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199662951
- eISBN:
- 9780191745195
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199662951.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new essays that ...
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Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new essays that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This second volume includes contributions by Robert Audi, Christian Coons, Julia Driver, William J. Fitzpatrick, Thomas Hurka, Esther Shubert, Daniel Jacobson, Elinor Mason, Michael Nelson, Luke Robinson, Jacob Ross, Andrew Sepielli, and Cynthia A. Stark. The topics discussed include: Kantian intuitionism, welfarism, the objective standard of good, intention, permissibility and double effect, moral dumbfounding and moral stupidity, coercion and integrity, practical reason and morality, atomism, subjective normativity and action guidance, and Rawlsian self-respect.Less
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new essays that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This second volume includes contributions by Robert Audi, Christian Coons, Julia Driver, William J. Fitzpatrick, Thomas Hurka, Esther Shubert, Daniel Jacobson, Elinor Mason, Michael Nelson, Luke Robinson, Jacob Ross, Andrew Sepielli, and Cynthia A. Stark. The topics discussed include: Kantian intuitionism, welfarism, the objective standard of good, intention, permissibility and double effect, moral dumbfounding and moral stupidity, coercion and integrity, practical reason and morality, atomism, subjective normativity and action guidance, and Rawlsian self-respect.
David Pears
- Published in print:
- 1987
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198247708
- eISBN:
- 9780191598203
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198247702.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This is the first of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the pre‐1929 writings. Part I of the first volume consists in a brief but ...
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This is the first of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the pre‐1929 writings. Part I of the first volume consists in a brief but eloquent overview of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole; Part II critically examines the earlier system, delineating and evaluating the central ideas (logical atomism, picture theory of meaning, and solipsism) with intellectual rigour and clarity. Pears succeeds in both offering an original realist interpretation of Wittgenstein's earlier thought, one that has found many followers, and in demarcating a structural framework that makes the internal organization of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole more accessible.Less
This is the first of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the pre‐1929 writings. Part I of the first volume consists in a brief but eloquent overview of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole; Part II critically examines the earlier system, delineating and evaluating the central ideas (logical atomism, picture theory of meaning, and solipsism) with intellectual rigour and clarity. Pears succeeds in both offering an original realist interpretation of Wittgenstein's earlier thought, one that has found many followers, and in demarcating a structural framework that makes the internal organization of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole more accessible.
David O. Brink
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199266401
- eISBN:
- 9780191600906
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199266409.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of Green's attack of empiricism and defence of idealism in Prolegomena. It then identifies Green's four main aims in the first book of Prolegomena. Firstly ...
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This chapter begins with a brief discussion of Green's attack of empiricism and defence of idealism in Prolegomena. It then identifies Green's four main aims in the first book of Prolegomena. Firstly he wants to reject the common-sense view, inherited from the empiricists, that knowledge can be analysed into two separable components — the deliverances of the senses and the operations of the understanding — in which what is given by nature is real and the contributions of the understanding are not. Secondly, the attack on empiricism and atomism is supposed to support the idealist claim that in some sense nature is the product of the understanding. Thirdly, in order for the idealist to distinguish between appearance and reality, it is necessary to posit an ‘eternal’ and ‘unalterable’ system of relations in a self-conscious corporate agent that includes the finite systems of relations contained in the self-conscious minds of individual agents. Finally, much of the first book of the Prolegomena is concerned with the role of self-consciousness in the possibility of apparently discrete episodes of experience, but Green is also concerned with the role of self-consciousness in knowledge.Less
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of Green's attack of empiricism and defence of idealism in Prolegomena. It then identifies Green's four main aims in the first book of Prolegomena. Firstly he wants to reject the common-sense view, inherited from the empiricists, that knowledge can be analysed into two separable components — the deliverances of the senses and the operations of the understanding — in which what is given by nature is real and the contributions of the understanding are not. Secondly, the attack on empiricism and atomism is supposed to support the idealist claim that in some sense nature is the product of the understanding. Thirdly, in order for the idealist to distinguish between appearance and reality, it is necessary to posit an ‘eternal’ and ‘unalterable’ system of relations in a self-conscious corporate agent that includes the finite systems of relations contained in the self-conscious minds of individual agents. Finally, much of the first book of the Prolegomena is concerned with the role of self-consciousness in the possibility of apparently discrete episodes of experience, but Green is also concerned with the role of self-consciousness in knowledge.
William A. Silverman
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780192630889
- eISBN:
- 9780191723568
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780192630889.003.0044
- Subject:
- Public Health and Epidemiology, Public Health, Epidemiology
This chapter presents a 1997 commentary on neonatal care. Neonatologists often consider themselves as the unbiased protectors of their patients' best interests and assume an advocacy role. A claim is ...
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This chapter presents a 1997 commentary on neonatal care. Neonatologists often consider themselves as the unbiased protectors of their patients' best interests and assume an advocacy role. A claim is often made that doctors are justified in overriding parents' wishes when making controversial decisions about complex life-prolonging treatment. It argues that this ‘atomist’ view which sees the newborn in isolation must be challenged.Less
This chapter presents a 1997 commentary on neonatal care. Neonatologists often consider themselves as the unbiased protectors of their patients' best interests and assume an advocacy role. A claim is often made that doctors are justified in overriding parents' wishes when making controversial decisions about complex life-prolonging treatment. It argues that this ‘atomist’ view which sees the newborn in isolation must be challenged.
Stephen E. Lahey
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195183313
- eISBN:
- 9780199870349
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183313.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
Wyclif is infamous for being the first to deny the doctrine of transubstantiation, in which the bread and wine are held to become the body and blood of Christ in the sacrament of Eucharist. This ...
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Wyclif is infamous for being the first to deny the doctrine of transubstantiation, in which the bread and wine are held to become the body and blood of Christ in the sacrament of Eucharist. This doctrine has its roots in high medieval theology and had been an important topic in which theologians employed their metaphysical approaches in practical articulation of what had become the central sacrament of Christianity. By the 14th century, some had begun to assert that resolving the problems associated with Eucharistic theology was hampered by difficulties in understanding the nature of time. Wyclif seems to have employed his conception of spatio-temporal indivisibles in arguing that the traditional doctrine of transubstantiation was, as normally held, impossible, arguing that the indivisibility of temporal units, as well as the eternality of divine knowledge, made the annihilation of created substance impossible. Later, he would incorporate his radical critique of Eucharistic theology into his wider criticisms of the papacy and the church, accusing his critics of being creatures of Antichrist.Less
Wyclif is infamous for being the first to deny the doctrine of transubstantiation, in which the bread and wine are held to become the body and blood of Christ in the sacrament of Eucharist. This doctrine has its roots in high medieval theology and had been an important topic in which theologians employed their metaphysical approaches in practical articulation of what had become the central sacrament of Christianity. By the 14th century, some had begun to assert that resolving the problems associated with Eucharistic theology was hampered by difficulties in understanding the nature of time. Wyclif seems to have employed his conception of spatio-temporal indivisibles in arguing that the traditional doctrine of transubstantiation was, as normally held, impossible, arguing that the indivisibility of temporal units, as well as the eternality of divine knowledge, made the annihilation of created substance impossible. Later, he would incorporate his radical critique of Eucharistic theology into his wider criticisms of the papacy and the church, accusing his critics of being creatures of Antichrist.
Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199215393
- eISBN:
- 9780191707025
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215393.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter criticizes overly-simple accounts of causal processes, particularly atomist-reductionism-determinism. Alternatively, a case is made for considering downward causation (the effect of the ...
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This chapter criticizes overly-simple accounts of causal processes, particularly atomist-reductionism-determinism. Alternatively, a case is made for considering downward causation (the effect of the whole on its parts) as well as bottom-up causation (the effect of parts on the whole). Downward causation involves selection or constraint of lower-level causal processes on the basis of how those lower-level processes or entities fit into a broader (higher-level) causal system. Self-directed and self-causing systems are described as embodying downward causation in the form of systems operating on information and feedback, and describable in the terms of complex, nonlinear dynamical systems. Countenancing downward causation is not equivalent to denying (all) causal determinism; the lower-level variants may be produced either deterministically or randomly.Less
This chapter criticizes overly-simple accounts of causal processes, particularly atomist-reductionism-determinism. Alternatively, a case is made for considering downward causation (the effect of the whole on its parts) as well as bottom-up causation (the effect of parts on the whole). Downward causation involves selection or constraint of lower-level causal processes on the basis of how those lower-level processes or entities fit into a broader (higher-level) causal system. Self-directed and self-causing systems are described as embodying downward causation in the form of systems operating on information and feedback, and describable in the terms of complex, nonlinear dynamical systems. Countenancing downward causation is not equivalent to denying (all) causal determinism; the lower-level variants may be produced either deterministically or randomly.
Jon McGinnis
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195331479
- eISBN:
- 9780199868032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331479.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
This chapter focuses on Avicenna’s treatment of the most general principles of natural things, that is, those things that are in some way subject to motion or change. It begins with Avicenna’s ...
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This chapter focuses on Avicenna’s treatment of the most general principles of natural things, that is, those things that are in some way subject to motion or change. It begins with Avicenna’s enumeration and account of the principles of nature or causes required for motion. The discussion then turns to Avicenna’s analysis of motion and certain purported necessary conditions needed if there is to be motion, such as place, void, time, and the continuum as well as Avicenna’s arguments against atomism. Next, Avicenna’s theory of inclination (mayl) is considered as well as its role in his dynamics. The chapter concludes with his account of substantial change, the elements, and his initial introduction of a “Giver of Forms.”Less
This chapter focuses on Avicenna’s treatment of the most general principles of natural things, that is, those things that are in some way subject to motion or change. It begins with Avicenna’s enumeration and account of the principles of nature or causes required for motion. The discussion then turns to Avicenna’s analysis of motion and certain purported necessary conditions needed if there is to be motion, such as place, void, time, and the continuum as well as Avicenna’s arguments against atomism. Next, Avicenna’s theory of inclination (mayl) is considered as well as its role in his dynamics. The chapter concludes with his account of substantial change, the elements, and his initial introduction of a “Giver of Forms.”
Michael Potter
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199252619
- eISBN:
- 9780191712647
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252619.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
In the previous chapter, it was shown that the Tractatus accounted for only a limited part of arithmetic at best. When Russell read Wittgenstein's manuscript, he was convinced that this was a gap ...
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In the previous chapter, it was shown that the Tractatus accounted for only a limited part of arithmetic at best. When Russell read Wittgenstein's manuscript, he was convinced that this was a gap that needed to be filled. Curiously, it was not the omission of an account of real numbers that he found egregious, but that of a general account of cardinals. Russell was not willing simply to abandon the development of mathematics from the theory of types. He accepted, though, some of Wittgenstein's criticisms of the account he had given in Principia. He took the opportunity presented by the publication of a second edition of Principia to prepare a new Introduction indicating how mathematics could be based on a new theory of types consonant with the parts of Wittgenstein's account that Russell agreed with.Less
In the previous chapter, it was shown that the Tractatus accounted for only a limited part of arithmetic at best. When Russell read Wittgenstein's manuscript, he was convinced that this was a gap that needed to be filled. Curiously, it was not the omission of an account of real numbers that he found egregious, but that of a general account of cardinals. Russell was not willing simply to abandon the development of mathematics from the theory of types. He accepted, though, some of Wittgenstein's criticisms of the account he had given in Principia. He took the opportunity presented by the publication of a second edition of Principia to prepare a new Introduction indicating how mathematics could be based on a new theory of types consonant with the parts of Wittgenstein's account that Russell agreed with.
Catherine Wilson
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199238811
- eISBN:
- 9780191716492
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199238811.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book examines the role played by the rediscovery of the writings of the ancient atomists — the Greek philosopher Epicurus and his Latin successor, Titus Carus Lucretius — in the articulation of ...
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This book examines the role played by the rediscovery of the writings of the ancient atomists — the Greek philosopher Epicurus and his Latin successor, Titus Carus Lucretius — in the articulation of the major philosophical systems of the 17th century and the evolution of natural science, and moral and political philosophy. The book shows how the distinctive Epicurean image of the natural world as a product of time and chance — unsupervised by any god or gods — and of the social world as a sphere of human invention and moral equality, took hold in philosophy, and how Epicureanism is an acknowledged and often unacknowledged presence in the writings of Descartes, Gassendi, Hobbes, Boyle, Locke, Leibniz, and Berkeley. With chapters devoted to Epicurean physics and cosmology, the corpuscularian or ‘mechanical’ philosophy, the question of the mortality of the soul, the grounds of political authority, the contested nature of the experimental philosophy, sensuality, curiosity, and the role of pleasure and utility in ethics, the book makes a case for the significance of materialism in 17th-century philosophy, and for its continued importance in the contemporary world, without underestimating the depth and significance of the opposition to it in the Platonic and Stoic traditions. Lucretius's great poem, On the Nature of Things, supplies the frame of reference for this extended inquiry into the origins of modern philosophy.Less
This book examines the role played by the rediscovery of the writings of the ancient atomists — the Greek philosopher Epicurus and his Latin successor, Titus Carus Lucretius — in the articulation of the major philosophical systems of the 17th century and the evolution of natural science, and moral and political philosophy. The book shows how the distinctive Epicurean image of the natural world as a product of time and chance — unsupervised by any god or gods — and of the social world as a sphere of human invention and moral equality, took hold in philosophy, and how Epicureanism is an acknowledged and often unacknowledged presence in the writings of Descartes, Gassendi, Hobbes, Boyle, Locke, Leibniz, and Berkeley. With chapters devoted to Epicurean physics and cosmology, the corpuscularian or ‘mechanical’ philosophy, the question of the mortality of the soul, the grounds of political authority, the contested nature of the experimental philosophy, sensuality, curiosity, and the role of pleasure and utility in ethics, the book makes a case for the significance of materialism in 17th-century philosophy, and for its continued importance in the contemporary world, without underestimating the depth and significance of the opposition to it in the Platonic and Stoic traditions. Lucretius's great poem, On the Nature of Things, supplies the frame of reference for this extended inquiry into the origins of modern philosophy.
Tobias Reinhardt
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197263327
- eISBN:
- 9780191734168
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197263327.003.0007
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Prose and Writers: Classical, Early, and Medieval
This chapter provides a discussion on Cicero’s treatment of Epicureanism. Cicero’s and Lucretius’ renderings of Epicurean terms and notions are radically different: whereas Lucretius’ seem colourful, ...
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This chapter provides a discussion on Cicero’s treatment of Epicureanism. Cicero’s and Lucretius’ renderings of Epicurean terms and notions are radically different: whereas Lucretius’ seem colourful, suggestive, and rich, Cicero’s seem flat and matter-of-fact to the point of tedium. The purpose of atomism is to make all kinds of potentially frightening events in the world of experience less frightening by providing a rational explanation for them. The survey of terms for ‘atom’, namely atomus, corpora indiuidua, indiuidua, and corpusculum, is presented. The interpretation of the evidence from Cicero is also shown. Moreover, the chapter illustrates that Cicero read Epicurus’ texts with close attention to stylistic detail, and it is hence plausible to assume that imitating this particular aspect of Epicurus’ terminology was a relevant consideration for him. It then discusses the uses of terms for ‘atom’ and turns to the issue of what atoms ‘do’ in Cicero.Less
This chapter provides a discussion on Cicero’s treatment of Epicureanism. Cicero’s and Lucretius’ renderings of Epicurean terms and notions are radically different: whereas Lucretius’ seem colourful, suggestive, and rich, Cicero’s seem flat and matter-of-fact to the point of tedium. The purpose of atomism is to make all kinds of potentially frightening events in the world of experience less frightening by providing a rational explanation for them. The survey of terms for ‘atom’, namely atomus, corpora indiuidua, indiuidua, and corpusculum, is presented. The interpretation of the evidence from Cicero is also shown. Moreover, the chapter illustrates that Cicero read Epicurus’ texts with close attention to stylistic detail, and it is hence plausible to assume that imitating this particular aspect of Epicurus’ terminology was a relevant consideration for him. It then discusses the uses of terms for ‘atom’ and turns to the issue of what atoms ‘do’ in Cicero.
Michael Potter
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199215836
- eISBN:
- 9780191721243
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215836.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter discusses Wittgenstein's notion of meaning. It begins by considering Russell's lectures on logical atomism. It then focuses on Wittgenstein's theory that with each proposition there is ...
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This chapter discusses Wittgenstein's notion of meaning. It begins by considering Russell's lectures on logical atomism. It then focuses on Wittgenstein's theory that with each proposition there is associated some part of the world which is its meaning. The chapter then looks at the sketchiness of Wittgenstein's theory of meaning.Less
This chapter discusses Wittgenstein's notion of meaning. It begins by considering Russell's lectures on logical atomism. It then focuses on Wittgenstein's theory that with each proposition there is associated some part of the world which is its meaning. The chapter then looks at the sketchiness of Wittgenstein's theory of meaning.
Catherine Wilson
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199238811
- eISBN:
- 9780191716492
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199238811.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
While some 17th-century critics of Epicureanism, including Margaret Cavendish, focused on the impossibility of a structured and orderly world emerging from the purposeless collision of atoms, other ...
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While some 17th-century critics of Epicureanism, including Margaret Cavendish, focused on the impossibility of a structured and orderly world emerging from the purposeless collision of atoms, other critics challenged the coherence of the notion of a material particle as a fundamental building block, hoping to extirpate atheism and materialism at their source. Leibniz evolved an unusual scheme of immaterial atoms, which he termed ‘monads’. Monads were mind-like entities, dimensionless, devoid of physical properties such as shape, impenetrability, and location in absolute space, and differentiated by their experiences. Berkeley went further in proclaiming matter an incoherent idea and insisting that only ideas, God, and the human will really existed, and that the ‘external’ world was in fact in the mind.Less
While some 17th-century critics of Epicureanism, including Margaret Cavendish, focused on the impossibility of a structured and orderly world emerging from the purposeless collision of atoms, other critics challenged the coherence of the notion of a material particle as a fundamental building block, hoping to extirpate atheism and materialism at their source. Leibniz evolved an unusual scheme of immaterial atoms, which he termed ‘monads’. Monads were mind-like entities, dimensionless, devoid of physical properties such as shape, impenetrability, and location in absolute space, and differentiated by their experiences. Berkeley went further in proclaiming matter an incoherent idea and insisting that only ideas, God, and the human will really existed, and that the ‘external’ world was in fact in the mind.
Hugo Koning
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199236343
- eISBN:
- 9780191717130
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199236343.003.0006
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Literary Studies: Classical, Early, and Medieval
This chapter shows that Plato's view of Hesiod is shaped not only by a critical tradition that pairs him with Homer, but also by sophistic appropriations of a more specific kind. Prodicus in ...
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This chapter shows that Plato's view of Hesiod is shaped not only by a critical tradition that pairs him with Homer, but also by sophistic appropriations of a more specific kind. Prodicus in particular, with his concern for the ‘correctness of names’, recognized Hesiod as an intellectual ancestor. More generally, Hesiod could be appropriated to represent particular philosophical interests, including etymology and epistemological atomism. As such, he became a convenient target for Plato's attacks on those approaches.Less
This chapter shows that Plato's view of Hesiod is shaped not only by a critical tradition that pairs him with Homer, but also by sophistic appropriations of a more specific kind. Prodicus in particular, with his concern for the ‘correctness of names’, recognized Hesiod as an intellectual ancestor. More generally, Hesiod could be appropriated to represent particular philosophical interests, including etymology and epistemological atomism. As such, he became a convenient target for Plato's attacks on those approaches.
David Bostock
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199651443
- eISBN:
- 9780191741197
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199651443.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The book considers Bertrand Russell’s work in logic, mainly from 1900 to 1910, and his work in epistemology and metaphysics, mainly from 1910 to 1924. The part on logic includes a discussion of his ...
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The book considers Bertrand Russell’s work in logic, mainly from 1900 to 1910, and his work in epistemology and metaphysics, mainly from 1910 to 1924. The part on logic includes a discussion of his seminal article ‘On Denoting’ (1905), but is mainly concerned with the development of his simple and his ramified theory of types, which culminated in Principia Mathematica of 1910. The merits and drawbacks of these theories are noted. The parts on epistemology and metaphysics begin with his ‘principle of acquaintance’, which is supposed to explain our understanding of propositions, but is open to many objections. They continue with his account of what knowledge is, and with his ‘constructions’ of material objects and of minds, which aim to conform to what (according to him) can be known. They then discuss his changing views on propositions, and his largely tacit views on universals, before ending with an account of his ‘logically perfect’ language, and his claim that its structure mirrors the structure of the worldLess
The book considers Bertrand Russell’s work in logic, mainly from 1900 to 1910, and his work in epistemology and metaphysics, mainly from 1910 to 1924. The part on logic includes a discussion of his seminal article ‘On Denoting’ (1905), but is mainly concerned with the development of his simple and his ramified theory of types, which culminated in Principia Mathematica of 1910. The merits and drawbacks of these theories are noted. The parts on epistemology and metaphysics begin with his ‘principle of acquaintance’, which is supposed to explain our understanding of propositions, but is open to many objections. They continue with his account of what knowledge is, and with his ‘constructions’ of material objects and of minds, which aim to conform to what (according to him) can be known. They then discuss his changing views on propositions, and his largely tacit views on universals, before ending with an account of his ‘logically perfect’ language, and his claim that its structure mirrors the structure of the world
Gloria Vivenza
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296669
- eISBN:
- 9780191597008
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296665.003.0005
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought
Deals with some analogies between Adam Smith's and Plato's thought about the division of labour, and Adam Smith's and Aristotle's formulations concerning economic value. The two parts of the chapter ...
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Deals with some analogies between Adam Smith's and Plato's thought about the division of labour, and Adam Smith's and Aristotle's formulations concerning economic value. The two parts of the chapter survey the existing literature on the subject, and then illustrate analogies and differences between Adam Smith and the two ancient authors both from an analytical and a historical point of view.Less
Deals with some analogies between Adam Smith's and Plato's thought about the division of labour, and Adam Smith's and Aristotle's formulations concerning economic value. The two parts of the chapter survey the existing literature on the subject, and then illustrate analogies and differences between Adam Smith and the two ancient authors both from an analytical and a historical point of view.
Wayne M. Martin
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199272457
- eISBN:
- 9780191709951
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter explores one of the most problematic theoretical commitments of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological projects: the idea of a logic of consciousness or phenomeno-logic. It shows why Husserl ...
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This chapter explores one of the most problematic theoretical commitments of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological projects: the idea of a logic of consciousness or phenomeno-logic. It shows why Husserl is committed to this idea and why it is so out of step with contemporary approaches in the philosophy of mind. It then tries to render the idea intelligible along two paths. First, to take the idea of a logic of consciousness seriously, we must challenge our entrenched atomistic assumptions about conscious states. Second, to recognize the sense in which a science of consciousness might be logical, we must come to terms with Husserl's conception of an ideal science. For on a Husserlian conception, apophantic logic and phenomenology must be seen as two varieties of ideal science: systematic articulations of the content and structure of an ideal that is constitutive for conscious experience of a world.Less
This chapter explores one of the most problematic theoretical commitments of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological projects: the idea of a logic of consciousness or phenomeno-logic. It shows why Husserl is committed to this idea and why it is so out of step with contemporary approaches in the philosophy of mind. It then tries to render the idea intelligible along two paths. First, to take the idea of a logic of consciousness seriously, we must challenge our entrenched atomistic assumptions about conscious states. Second, to recognize the sense in which a science of consciousness might be logical, we must come to terms with Husserl's conception of an ideal science. For on a Husserlian conception, apophantic logic and phenomenology must be seen as two varieties of ideal science: systematic articulations of the content and structure of an ideal that is constitutive for conscious experience of a world.
Ruth Glasner
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199567737
- eISBN:
- 9780191721472
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567737.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
For the first time Averroes' physics is studied on the basis of all available texts and versions of his three commentaries on Aristotle's Physics, including texts that are extant only in Hebrew ...
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For the first time Averroes' physics is studied on the basis of all available texts and versions of his three commentaries on Aristotle's Physics, including texts that are extant only in Hebrew manuscripts and have not been hitherto studied. A comparison of these sources shows that a diachronic study is absolutely essential. Averroes changed his interpretation of the basic notions of physics—the structure of corporeal reality and the definition of motion—more than once. He has repeatedly rewritten and edited several key chapters in all three commentaries. After many hesitations he offers a bold new interpretation of physics to which this book refers as ‘Aristotelian atomism’. Ideas that are usually ascribed to scholastic scholars and others that were traced back to Averroes but only in a very general form, not only originated with him, but were fully developed by him into a comprehensive and systematic physical system. Unlike earlier Greek or Muslim atomistic systems, Averroes' Aristotelian atomism endeavours to be fully scientific, by Aristotelian standards, and still to provide a basis for an indeterministic natural philosophy. Commonly known as ‘the commentator’ and usually considered to be a faithful follower of Aristotle, Averroes is revealed in his commentaries on the Physics to be an original and sophisticated philosopher.Less
For the first time Averroes' physics is studied on the basis of all available texts and versions of his three commentaries on Aristotle's Physics, including texts that are extant only in Hebrew manuscripts and have not been hitherto studied. A comparison of these sources shows that a diachronic study is absolutely essential. Averroes changed his interpretation of the basic notions of physics—the structure of corporeal reality and the definition of motion—more than once. He has repeatedly rewritten and edited several key chapters in all three commentaries. After many hesitations he offers a bold new interpretation of physics to which this book refers as ‘Aristotelian atomism’. Ideas that are usually ascribed to scholastic scholars and others that were traced back to Averroes but only in a very general form, not only originated with him, but were fully developed by him into a comprehensive and systematic physical system. Unlike earlier Greek or Muslim atomistic systems, Averroes' Aristotelian atomism endeavours to be fully scientific, by Aristotelian standards, and still to provide a basis for an indeterministic natural philosophy. Commonly known as ‘the commentator’ and usually considered to be a faithful follower of Aristotle, Averroes is revealed in his commentaries on the Physics to be an original and sophisticated philosopher.
