István Hargittai
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195178456
- eISBN:
- 9780199787012
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178456.003.0004
- Subject:
- Physics, History of Physics
By the start of World War II, the Martians had become involved in politics. They helped the United States get ready for modern warfare, including advancements in air power, the atomic bomb, and an ...
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By the start of World War II, the Martians had become involved in politics. They helped the United States get ready for modern warfare, including advancements in air power, the atomic bomb, and an ever-enhanced application of the computer in weapons development. They initiated the Manhattan Project and participated in it. However, they became divided as to the desirability of actually using the atomic bomb after Germany’s defeat.Less
By the start of World War II, the Martians had become involved in politics. They helped the United States get ready for modern warfare, including advancements in air power, the atomic bomb, and an ever-enhanced application of the computer in weapons development. They initiated the Manhattan Project and participated in it. However, they became divided as to the desirability of actually using the atomic bomb after Germany’s defeat.
Yuki Miyamoto
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780823240500
- eISBN:
- 9780823240548
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823240500.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Literature
This monograph explores the ethics and religious sensibilities of a group of the hibakusha (survivors) of 1945's atomic bombings. Although the atomic bombings of 1945 have been studied from the ...
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This monograph explores the ethics and religious sensibilities of a group of the hibakusha (survivors) of 1945's atomic bombings. Although the atomic bombings of 1945 have been studied from the points of view of various disciplines, the survivors' ethic—not retaliation, but reconciliation—emerging from their experiences and supported by their religious sensibilities, has never been addressed sufficiently in academic discourse. Rather their ethic has been excluded from the atomic bomb discourse or nuclear ethics. In examining Hiroshima city's “secular” commemoration, Hiroshima's True Pure Land Buddhist understanding, and Nagasaki's Roman Catholic tradition, I argue that the hibakusha's ethic and philosophy, based upon critical self-reflection, could offer resources for the constructing ethics based upon memories, especially in the post-9–11 world. Thus, this monograph, responding to this lacuna in scholarship, invites readers to go beyond the mushroom cloud where they encounter actual hibakusha's ethical thoughts.Less
This monograph explores the ethics and religious sensibilities of a group of the hibakusha (survivors) of 1945's atomic bombings. Although the atomic bombings of 1945 have been studied from the points of view of various disciplines, the survivors' ethic—not retaliation, but reconciliation—emerging from their experiences and supported by their religious sensibilities, has never been addressed sufficiently in academic discourse. Rather their ethic has been excluded from the atomic bomb discourse or nuclear ethics. In examining Hiroshima city's “secular” commemoration, Hiroshima's True Pure Land Buddhist understanding, and Nagasaki's Roman Catholic tradition, I argue that the hibakusha's ethic and philosophy, based upon critical self-reflection, could offer resources for the constructing ethics based upon memories, especially in the post-9–11 world. Thus, this monograph, responding to this lacuna in scholarship, invites readers to go beyond the mushroom cloud where they encounter actual hibakusha's ethical thoughts.
Mary Palevsky
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520220553
- eISBN:
- 9780520923652
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520220553.001.0001
- Subject:
- Anthropology, American and Canadian Cultural Anthropology
More than most of us, this book's author needed to come to terms with the moral complexities of the atomic bomb: Her parents worked on its development during World War II and were profoundly changed ...
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More than most of us, this book's author needed to come to terms with the moral complexities of the atomic bomb: Her parents worked on its development during World War II and were profoundly changed by that experience. After they died, unanswered questions sent their daughter on a search for understanding. This chronicle is the story of that quest. It takes the author, and us, on a journey into the minds, memories, and emotions of the bomb builders. Scientists Hans Bethe, Edward Teller, Joseph Rotblat, Herbert York, Philip Morrison, and Robert Wilson, and philosopher David Hawkins responded to the author's personal approach in a way that dramatically expands their previously published statements. This prompted these men to recall their lives vividly and to reexamine their own decisions, debating within themselves the complex issues raised by the bomb. The author herself, seeking to comprehend the widely differing ways in which individual scientists made choices about the bomb and made sense of their work, deeply reconsiders those questions of commitment and conscience her parents faced. In personal vignettes that complement the interviews, this book captures other remembrances of the bomb through commemorative events and chance encounters with people who were “there.” The concluding chapter reframes the crucial moral questions in terms that show the questions themselves to be the abiding legacy we all share.Less
More than most of us, this book's author needed to come to terms with the moral complexities of the atomic bomb: Her parents worked on its development during World War II and were profoundly changed by that experience. After they died, unanswered questions sent their daughter on a search for understanding. This chronicle is the story of that quest. It takes the author, and us, on a journey into the minds, memories, and emotions of the bomb builders. Scientists Hans Bethe, Edward Teller, Joseph Rotblat, Herbert York, Philip Morrison, and Robert Wilson, and philosopher David Hawkins responded to the author's personal approach in a way that dramatically expands their previously published statements. This prompted these men to recall their lives vividly and to reexamine their own decisions, debating within themselves the complex issues raised by the bomb. The author herself, seeking to comprehend the widely differing ways in which individual scientists made choices about the bomb and made sense of their work, deeply reconsiders those questions of commitment and conscience her parents faced. In personal vignettes that complement the interviews, this book captures other remembrances of the bomb through commemorative events and chance encounters with people who were “there.” The concluding chapter reframes the crucial moral questions in terms that show the questions themselves to be the abiding legacy we all share.
Rieko Asai
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823231201
- eISBN:
- 9780823240791
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823231201.003.0012
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter explores the role that anti-nuclear activists have played in shaping the public memory of the war's cataclysmic end. It examines how, soon after the war's end, a ...
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This chapter explores the role that anti-nuclear activists have played in shaping the public memory of the war's cataclysmic end. It examines how, soon after the war's end, a diverse network of nuclear activists, led by atomic scientists, world federalists, and pacifists, challenged the then-dominant view supporting the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The major force that struck out against the orthodox view of the atomic bombings—the World Peace Day movement—began in 1948 owing to the work of Hiroshima survivor Kiyoshi Tanimoto and Austrian émigré Alfred Parker. The chapter demonstrates that Cold War tension and virulent anticommunism delivered setbacks to World Peace Day, from which the movement would never recover. However, even as the efforts of Parker and Tanimoto began to founder, Christian pacifists in the United States, anchored by the Fellowship for Reconciliation (FOR), injected new life into the movement to commemorate August 6. In turn, this revived movement galvanized antinuclear activists to push for successful limits on nuclear testing during the 1960s while simultaneously dehistoricizing the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.Less
This chapter explores the role that anti-nuclear activists have played in shaping the public memory of the war's cataclysmic end. It examines how, soon after the war's end, a diverse network of nuclear activists, led by atomic scientists, world federalists, and pacifists, challenged the then-dominant view supporting the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The major force that struck out against the orthodox view of the atomic bombings—the World Peace Day movement—began in 1948 owing to the work of Hiroshima survivor Kiyoshi Tanimoto and Austrian émigré Alfred Parker. The chapter demonstrates that Cold War tension and virulent anticommunism delivered setbacks to World Peace Day, from which the movement would never recover. However, even as the efforts of Parker and Tanimoto began to founder, Christian pacifists in the United States, anchored by the Fellowship for Reconciliation (FOR), injected new life into the movement to commemorate August 6. In turn, this revived movement galvanized antinuclear activists to push for successful limits on nuclear testing during the 1960s while simultaneously dehistoricizing the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Vernon W. Ruttan
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195188042
- eISBN:
- 9780199783410
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195188047.003.0004
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
Nuclear power is an example of a technology that, in the absence of military and defense-related research, development, and procurement, would not have been developed at all. The demonstration of ...
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Nuclear power is an example of a technology that, in the absence of military and defense-related research, development, and procurement, would not have been developed at all. The demonstration of controlled nuclear fission at the University of Chicago’s Stagg Field on December 2, 1942 initiated a chain of events that led to the development of the atomic bomb and nuclear power. The design of the first nuclear power reactor, located at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, was adapted from nuclear reactors developed to power nuclear submarines. Premature commitment to light water reactor technology appears, in retrospect, to have been a source of failure of the nuclear power industry to realize the promise it appeared to have in the 1950s. It is possible that during the first half of the 21st century, nuclear power will be able to make a significant contribution to meeting the growth in demand for electric power; by substituting for carbon-based fuels, it may also contribute to slowing the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.Less
Nuclear power is an example of a technology that, in the absence of military and defense-related research, development, and procurement, would not have been developed at all. The demonstration of controlled nuclear fission at the University of Chicago’s Stagg Field on December 2, 1942 initiated a chain of events that led to the development of the atomic bomb and nuclear power. The design of the first nuclear power reactor, located at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, was adapted from nuclear reactors developed to power nuclear submarines. Premature commitment to light water reactor technology appears, in retrospect, to have been a source of failure of the nuclear power industry to realize the promise it appeared to have in the 1950s. It is possible that during the first half of the 21st century, nuclear power will be able to make a significant contribution to meeting the growth in demand for electric power; by substituting for carbon-based fuels, it may also contribute to slowing the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
Shane J. Maddock
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- July 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780807833551
- eISBN:
- 9781469604220
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/9780807895849_maddock.6
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History
This chapter examines the development of nuclear weapons during World War II and early efforts to control their spread. It opens with a warning from physicist James Franck to President Harry S. ...
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This chapter examines the development of nuclear weapons during World War II and early efforts to control their spread. It opens with a warning from physicist James Franck to President Harry S. Truman in September 1945 that “the idea that there exists a secret formula [for the atomic bomb] which can be guarded in its entirety” should be dismissed “as too stupid even for the movies and the funny papers.” The chapter notes that the president ignored this warning and soon pledged publicly that the United States would hold its atomic monopoly as “a sacred trust” until “world cooperation for peace” achieved “a state of perfection.” It notes that political and military leaders dismissed such physicists as starry-eyed idealists, but events soon exposed policymakers as the deluded ones.Less
This chapter examines the development of nuclear weapons during World War II and early efforts to control their spread. It opens with a warning from physicist James Franck to President Harry S. Truman in September 1945 that “the idea that there exists a secret formula [for the atomic bomb] which can be guarded in its entirety” should be dismissed “as too stupid even for the movies and the funny papers.” The chapter notes that the president ignored this warning and soon pledged publicly that the United States would hold its atomic monopoly as “a sacred trust” until “world cooperation for peace” achieved “a state of perfection.” It notes that political and military leaders dismissed such physicists as starry-eyed idealists, but events soon exposed policymakers as the deluded ones.
Mary Palevsky
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520220553
- eISBN:
- 9780520923652
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520220553.003.0003
- Subject:
- Anthropology, American and Canadian Cultural Anthropology
On December 1, 1995, the author traveled to Stanford University to meet with Edward Teller at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, and immediately had two reactions on meeting him. ...
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On December 1, 1995, the author traveled to Stanford University to meet with Edward Teller at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, and immediately had two reactions on meeting him. First, she felt intimidated and dared not to interrupt him, and second, that he seemed intent on persuading her of the rightness of his view. This chapter presents Teller's views on the defense budget allocated on the atomic bomb; his regrets on the atomic bombing of Hiroshima; his links with Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, and Leo Szilard; his views on Nazism and Communism; an argument for the continued development of weapons after the cold war; and the enemies of science. In some ways, the author found the controversial “father of the hydrogen bomb” intense, uncompromising, and opinionated, but he also possessed a good sense of humor.Less
On December 1, 1995, the author traveled to Stanford University to meet with Edward Teller at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, and immediately had two reactions on meeting him. First, she felt intimidated and dared not to interrupt him, and second, that he seemed intent on persuading her of the rightness of his view. This chapter presents Teller's views on the defense budget allocated on the atomic bomb; his regrets on the atomic bombing of Hiroshima; his links with Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, and Leo Szilard; his views on Nazism and Communism; an argument for the continued development of weapons after the cold war; and the enemies of science. In some ways, the author found the controversial “father of the hydrogen bomb” intense, uncompromising, and opinionated, but he also possessed a good sense of humor.
Mary Palevsky
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520220553
- eISBN:
- 9780520923652
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520220553.003.0004
- Subject:
- Anthropology, American and Canadian Cultural Anthropology
On December 6, 1945, four months after Hiroshima, physicist Philip Morrison testified before Senator Brien McMahon's Special Committee on Atomic Energy, created to investigate problems relating to ...
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On December 6, 1945, four months after Hiroshima, physicist Philip Morrison testified before Senator Brien McMahon's Special Committee on Atomic Energy, created to investigate problems relating to the development, use, and control of atomic energy. Morrison, like many atomic scientists, was deeply concerned about the postwar meaning of the bomb long before the senators heard the faintest rumblings of the weapon's thunder, and emphasized that the atomic bomb was more than a new weapon; it was a revolution in war making, and therefore in history. The author met him in his office at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This chapter presents Morrison's views on the race for the development of the atomic bomb; the decision to use the bomb on Japanese cities; his participation in the Manhattan Project; and his chosen role as a witness and a chronicler of these world-changing events.Less
On December 6, 1945, four months after Hiroshima, physicist Philip Morrison testified before Senator Brien McMahon's Special Committee on Atomic Energy, created to investigate problems relating to the development, use, and control of atomic energy. Morrison, like many atomic scientists, was deeply concerned about the postwar meaning of the bomb long before the senators heard the faintest rumblings of the weapon's thunder, and emphasized that the atomic bomb was more than a new weapon; it was a revolution in war making, and therefore in history. The author met him in his office at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This chapter presents Morrison's views on the race for the development of the atomic bomb; the decision to use the bomb on Japanese cities; his participation in the Manhattan Project; and his chosen role as a witness and a chronicler of these world-changing events.
David Holloway
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804783590
- eISBN:
- 9780804788915
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804783590.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
In an unusually well-documented contribution on Russian secret intelligence, David Holloway posits reasons for Stalin’s unpreparedness in 1940-1941. This, it is fair to say, has long been an ...
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In an unusually well-documented contribution on Russian secret intelligence, David Holloway posits reasons for Stalin’s unpreparedness in 1940-1941. This, it is fair to say, has long been an obsessive object of interest and study in Russia, because it made all the difference to the course of the war that followed from June 1941. Rather than rushing into moral judgments about the régime, Holloway instead takes a cool look at what information came in to Stalin and allows for the fact that not all the incoming intelligence data were consistent. And in respect of revelations about U.S. construction of the atomic bomb, Holloway shows that Stalin once again consciously distanced himself from the findings of the intelligence services in reaching a final judgment. Whereas in the former case, it nearly led to disaster; in respect of the latter, Stalin was undoubtedly correct.Less
In an unusually well-documented contribution on Russian secret intelligence, David Holloway posits reasons for Stalin’s unpreparedness in 1940-1941. This, it is fair to say, has long been an obsessive object of interest and study in Russia, because it made all the difference to the course of the war that followed from June 1941. Rather than rushing into moral judgments about the régime, Holloway instead takes a cool look at what information came in to Stalin and allows for the fact that not all the incoming intelligence data were consistent. And in respect of revelations about U.S. construction of the atomic bomb, Holloway shows that Stalin once again consciously distanced himself from the findings of the intelligence services in reaching a final judgment. Whereas in the former case, it nearly led to disaster; in respect of the latter, Stalin was undoubtedly correct.
Rosemary Foot
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292920
- eISBN:
- 9780191599286
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292929.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This is the third of four chapters focusing on America’s perceptions of China’s capabilities, and dwelling on the correspondence between those perceptions and the projected consequences. It presents ...
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This is the third of four chapters focusing on America’s perceptions of China’s capabilities, and dwelling on the correspondence between those perceptions and the projected consequences. It presents an assessment of America’s perceptions of China as a nuclear power, discussing the new complexities that this brought to the Sino-American relationship and to their respective broader foreign-policy agendas. The different sections of the chapter look at the process of China’s acquisition of the atomic bomb (the first atomic device was exploded by them in October 1964), the US response to this, US and international assessments of China’s nuclear power and the impact on non-proliferation, and US assessments of China’s nuclear weapons programme.Less
This is the third of four chapters focusing on America’s perceptions of China’s capabilities, and dwelling on the correspondence between those perceptions and the projected consequences. It presents an assessment of America’s perceptions of China as a nuclear power, discussing the new complexities that this brought to the Sino-American relationship and to their respective broader foreign-policy agendas. The different sections of the chapter look at the process of China’s acquisition of the atomic bomb (the first atomic device was exploded by them in October 1964), the US response to this, US and international assessments of China’s nuclear power and the impact on non-proliferation, and US assessments of China’s nuclear weapons programme.
Alex J. Bellamy
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199288427
- eISBN:
- 9780191745430
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288427.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics, Political Theory
This chapter examines the bombing of German and Japanese cities during the Second World War. Between 300,000–600,000 German civilians and over 200,000 Japanese civilians were killed by allied bombing ...
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This chapter examines the bombing of German and Japanese cities during the Second World War. Between 300,000–600,000 German civilians and over 200,000 Japanese civilians were killed by allied bombing during the Second World War, most as a result of raids intentionally targeted against civilians themselves. The campaigns culminated with the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The path followed by the RAF and US Army Air Corps (USAAF) in the European and Pacific theatres respectively followed a similar trajectory. At the beginning of the war, both committed themselves to precision raids against military targets. But a combination of bombing inaccuracy, poor weather, high casualty rates, and strategic preferences persuaded the RAF (over Germany) and USAAF (over Japan) to adopt area bombing aimed at ‘dehousing’ workers and demoralising enemy populations, thereby disrupting industrial production. Interestingly, however, although the British and American governments were clearly intent on targeting civilians, they refused to admit that this was their purpose and devised elaborate arguments to claim that they were not targeting civilians. This revealed the growing influence of civilian immunity but also its limits, setting a pattern that was repeated during the Cold War.Less
This chapter examines the bombing of German and Japanese cities during the Second World War. Between 300,000–600,000 German civilians and over 200,000 Japanese civilians were killed by allied bombing during the Second World War, most as a result of raids intentionally targeted against civilians themselves. The campaigns culminated with the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The path followed by the RAF and US Army Air Corps (USAAF) in the European and Pacific theatres respectively followed a similar trajectory. At the beginning of the war, both committed themselves to precision raids against military targets. But a combination of bombing inaccuracy, poor weather, high casualty rates, and strategic preferences persuaded the RAF (over Germany) and USAAF (over Japan) to adopt area bombing aimed at ‘dehousing’ workers and demoralising enemy populations, thereby disrupting industrial production. Interestingly, however, although the British and American governments were clearly intent on targeting civilians, they refused to admit that this was their purpose and devised elaborate arguments to claim that they were not targeting civilians. This revealed the growing influence of civilian immunity but also its limits, setting a pattern that was repeated during the Cold War.
Mary Palevsky
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520220553
- eISBN:
- 9780520923652
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520220553.003.0008
- Subject:
- Anthropology, American and Canadian Cultural Anthropology
Herbert York was the first director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the first chancellor of the University of California at San Diego. During World War II, the University of ...
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Herbert York was the first director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the first chancellor of the University of California at San Diego. During World War II, the University of California managed the Los Alamos laboratory for the federal government. York worked in Manhattan Project Site Y-12 in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where he was a member of the scientific team producing enriched uranium. For young Manhattan Project scientists such as York and the author's parents, the wartime bomb-building effort was an opportunity to work with many of the scientific giants of the era. York's own career is a significant link in this chain of connections. This chapter presents York's well-reasoned arguments in support of the decision to drop the bomb, and the deep context in which the war and the ultimate use of the bomb developed.Less
Herbert York was the first director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the first chancellor of the University of California at San Diego. During World War II, the University of California managed the Los Alamos laboratory for the federal government. York worked in Manhattan Project Site Y-12 in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where he was a member of the scientific team producing enriched uranium. For young Manhattan Project scientists such as York and the author's parents, the wartime bomb-building effort was an opportunity to work with many of the scientific giants of the era. York's own career is a significant link in this chain of connections. This chapter presents York's well-reasoned arguments in support of the decision to drop the bomb, and the deep context in which the war and the ultimate use of the bomb developed.
Robert Jay Lifton
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- July 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780807843444
- eISBN:
- 9781469602363
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/9780807882894_lifton.8
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
This chapter presents the relationship observed between physical fears and early radiation effects, and how they could turn into lifetime bodily concerns. During the years that followed, these fears ...
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This chapter presents the relationship observed between physical fears and early radiation effects, and how they could turn into lifetime bodily concerns. During the years that followed, these fears and concerns became greatly magnified by a development which has come to epitomize the hibakusha's third encounter with death: his growing awareness that medical studies were demonstrating an abnormally high rate of leukemia among survivors of the atomic bomb. There has thus arisen the scientifically inaccurate but emotionally charged term “Abomb disease,” which has taken for its medical model this always fatal malignancy of the blood-forming organs. In 1948, an increased incidence of leukemia was first noted, and it reached a peak between 1950 and 1952.Less
This chapter presents the relationship observed between physical fears and early radiation effects, and how they could turn into lifetime bodily concerns. During the years that followed, these fears and concerns became greatly magnified by a development which has come to epitomize the hibakusha's third encounter with death: his growing awareness that medical studies were demonstrating an abnormally high rate of leukemia among survivors of the atomic bomb. There has thus arisen the scientifically inaccurate but emotionally charged term “Abomb disease,” which has taken for its medical model this always fatal malignancy of the blood-forming organs. In 1948, an increased incidence of leukemia was first noted, and it reached a peak between 1950 and 1952.
Dee Garrison
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195183191
- eISBN:
- 9780199788804
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183191.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This prologue outlines how the advent of hydrogen weapons transformed the practice of war. It explains why modern nuclear weapons cannot be compared with those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It ...
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This prologue outlines how the advent of hydrogen weapons transformed the practice of war. It explains why modern nuclear weapons cannot be compared with those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It then discusses the effects of a nuclear explosion and life after a nuclear war.Less
This prologue outlines how the advent of hydrogen weapons transformed the practice of war. It explains why modern nuclear weapons cannot be compared with those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It then discusses the effects of a nuclear explosion and life after a nuclear war.
John Tirman
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780195381214
- eISBN:
- 9780190252373
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780195381214.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter focuses on the three-year war in Korea (1950–1953) pitting South Korea and United Nations forces versus North Korea and China. It examines the politics of the Korean War, with particular ...
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This chapter focuses on the three-year war in Korea (1950–1953) pitting South Korea and United Nations forces versus North Korea and China. It examines the politics of the Korean War, with particular emphasis on America's fixation on eradicating communism by trying to contain China and the Soviet Union, as well as the war's strategic implications through the use of atomic bombs. It also assesses the enormous number of casualties and the stark contrast between American indifference and Korean suffering. In addition, it considers why the American public forgot the war so soon while it was being waged and why they seemed to show more interest in its politics than in the carnage it caused to civilians. Finally, the chapter discusses America's decision to put Syngman Rhee in power by creating the Republic of Korea in 1948.Less
This chapter focuses on the three-year war in Korea (1950–1953) pitting South Korea and United Nations forces versus North Korea and China. It examines the politics of the Korean War, with particular emphasis on America's fixation on eradicating communism by trying to contain China and the Soviet Union, as well as the war's strategic implications through the use of atomic bombs. It also assesses the enormous number of casualties and the stark contrast between American indifference and Korean suffering. In addition, it considers why the American public forgot the war so soon while it was being waged and why they seemed to show more interest in its politics than in the carnage it caused to civilians. Finally, the chapter discusses America's decision to put Syngman Rhee in power by creating the Republic of Korea in 1948.
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226467597
- eISBN:
- 9780226466958
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226466958.003.0010
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Media Studies
By the summer of 1945, when the atomic bomb reaffirmed science's alliance with the body politic, the tone and direction of popularization had already shifted. Postwar coverage of atomic energy began ...
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By the summer of 1945, when the atomic bomb reaffirmed science's alliance with the body politic, the tone and direction of popularization had already shifted. Postwar coverage of atomic energy began in celebration and curiosity, but within months even radio—that comforting source of baseball, music, and laughter—was exploring the terrible potential of atomic warfare, the acrimonious political debate over military versus civilian control of the atom, and the chilling implications of increased scientific secrecy. Having previously been dramatized and humanized, science on the radio now became more politicized.Less
By the summer of 1945, when the atomic bomb reaffirmed science's alliance with the body politic, the tone and direction of popularization had already shifted. Postwar coverage of atomic energy began in celebration and curiosity, but within months even radio—that comforting source of baseball, music, and laughter—was exploring the terrible potential of atomic warfare, the acrimonious political debate over military versus civilian control of the atom, and the chilling implications of increased scientific secrecy. Having previously been dramatized and humanized, science on the radio now became more politicized.
Mary Palevsky
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520220553
- eISBN:
- 9780520923652
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520220553.003.0001
- Subject:
- Anthropology, American and Canadian Cultural Anthropology
This chapter introduces the author's memories of the atomic bomb when she was still a little girl. Her parents, both Chicagoans, fell in love and married while working on the creation of the atomic ...
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This chapter introduces the author's memories of the atomic bomb when she was still a little girl. Her parents, both Chicagoans, fell in love and married while working on the creation of the atomic bomb. They were scientific workers, first at Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory and later at the bomb-building lab in New Mexico. The author's father, Harry Palevsky, worked on instrumentation at Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory, where Enrico Fermi and his colleagues had achieved the first man-made, controlled nuclear chain reaction. Harry later recommended Elaine Sammel for Los Alamos. Within three weeks of their wedding, the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the war ended. The chapter explores how the author's journey began in trying to understand the connection of her parents to the development of the atomic bomb.Less
This chapter introduces the author's memories of the atomic bomb when she was still a little girl. Her parents, both Chicagoans, fell in love and married while working on the creation of the atomic bomb. They were scientific workers, first at Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory and later at the bomb-building lab in New Mexico. The author's father, Harry Palevsky, worked on instrumentation at Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory, where Enrico Fermi and his colleagues had achieved the first man-made, controlled nuclear chain reaction. Harry later recommended Elaine Sammel for Los Alamos. Within three weeks of their wedding, the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the war ended. The chapter explores how the author's journey began in trying to understand the connection of her parents to the development of the atomic bomb.
Richard Crockatt
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- October 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198785491
- eISBN:
- 9780191827402
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198785491.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, History of Ideas, Political History
This chapter addresses the issue of Einstein’s supposed involvement with the atom bomb. His signature on the letter to Roosevelt in 1939 warning the President that fission of uranium could mean bombs ...
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This chapter addresses the issue of Einstein’s supposed involvement with the atom bomb. His signature on the letter to Roosevelt in 1939 warning the President that fission of uranium could mean bombs of enormous power had some influence in prompting the establishment of the Manhattan Project, though he did not participate in the project itself, not least because he was considered a security risk. The public impression that Einstein had been associated with the atom bomb dogged his career. In fact Einstein’s connection to the atomic issues was always political, visible in the post-war period in his advocacy of international control of nuclear energy, his chairmanship of the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, and his opposition to the H-bomb, culminating in the Russell–Einstein Manifesto. Though published some months after his death in April 1955, his signature on this document cemented his association with the anti-nuclear movement.Less
This chapter addresses the issue of Einstein’s supposed involvement with the atom bomb. His signature on the letter to Roosevelt in 1939 warning the President that fission of uranium could mean bombs of enormous power had some influence in prompting the establishment of the Manhattan Project, though he did not participate in the project itself, not least because he was considered a security risk. The public impression that Einstein had been associated with the atom bomb dogged his career. In fact Einstein’s connection to the atomic issues was always political, visible in the post-war period in his advocacy of international control of nuclear energy, his chairmanship of the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, and his opposition to the H-bomb, culminating in the Russell–Einstein Manifesto. Though published some months after his death in April 1955, his signature on this document cemented his association with the anti-nuclear movement.
John Baylis and Kristan Stoddart
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198702023
- eISBN:
- 9780191771682
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198702023.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Chapter 1 highlights the impact which the atomic bombs that had been dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on Britain’s post-war leaders, giving rise to a ‘deterrence habit of mind’. The beliefs of ...
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Chapter 1 highlights the impact which the atomic bombs that had been dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on Britain’s post-war leaders, giving rise to a ‘deterrence habit of mind’. The beliefs of the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, and his Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, were particularly important in the acceptance of the view that a revolution in military affairs had taken place that involved a change in both the character and nature of warfare. The operationalization of these ideas, however, was the work of a number of influential individuals, departments, boards, committees and sub-committees that, over time, developed Britain’s nuclear strategy.Less
Chapter 1 highlights the impact which the atomic bombs that had been dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on Britain’s post-war leaders, giving rise to a ‘deterrence habit of mind’. The beliefs of the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, and his Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, were particularly important in the acceptance of the view that a revolution in military affairs had taken place that involved a change in both the character and nature of warfare. The operationalization of these ideas, however, was the work of a number of influential individuals, departments, boards, committees and sub-committees that, over time, developed Britain’s nuclear strategy.
Daniel F. Harrington
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780813136134
- eISBN:
- 9780813136837
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813136134.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
The Western powers had to decide their next step; Chapter 6 describes their deliberations. Long-term prospects appeared bleak: sooner or later the Western powers would have to abandon the city to ...
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The Western powers had to decide their next step; Chapter 6 describes their deliberations. Long-term prospects appeared bleak: sooner or later the Western powers would have to abandon the city to save its population from starvation, or (as US military governor Lucius Clay proposed) use force to break the blockade—an action his critics was sure would trigger world war. In the short term, Washington deployed B-29s to the United Kingdom to deter the Soviets and show resolve. Truman and his advisers debated whether to transfer custody of atomic weapons to the Pentagon. The National Security Council on July 22 endorsed diplomatic approaches to Moscow and an expanded airlift, leaving unresolved the long-term dilemma facing the US and its allies.Less
The Western powers had to decide their next step; Chapter 6 describes their deliberations. Long-term prospects appeared bleak: sooner or later the Western powers would have to abandon the city to save its population from starvation, or (as US military governor Lucius Clay proposed) use force to break the blockade—an action his critics was sure would trigger world war. In the short term, Washington deployed B-29s to the United Kingdom to deter the Soviets and show resolve. Truman and his advisers debated whether to transfer custody of atomic weapons to the Pentagon. The National Security Council on July 22 endorsed diplomatic approaches to Moscow and an expanded airlift, leaving unresolved the long-term dilemma facing the US and its allies.
