István Hargittai
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195178456
- eISBN:
- 9780199787012
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178456.003.0004
- Subject:
- Physics, History of Physics
By the start of World War II, the Martians had become involved in politics. They helped the United States get ready for modern warfare, including advancements in air power, the atomic bomb, and an ...
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By the start of World War II, the Martians had become involved in politics. They helped the United States get ready for modern warfare, including advancements in air power, the atomic bomb, and an ever-enhanced application of the computer in weapons development. They initiated the Manhattan Project and participated in it. However, they became divided as to the desirability of actually using the atomic bomb after Germany’s defeat.Less
By the start of World War II, the Martians had become involved in politics. They helped the United States get ready for modern warfare, including advancements in air power, the atomic bomb, and an ever-enhanced application of the computer in weapons development. They initiated the Manhattan Project and participated in it. However, they became divided as to the desirability of actually using the atomic bomb after Germany’s defeat.
Yuki Miyamoto
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780823240500
- eISBN:
- 9780823240548
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823240500.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Literature
This monograph explores the ethics and religious sensibilities of a group of the hibakusha (survivors) of 1945's atomic bombings. Although the atomic bombings of 1945 have been studied from the ...
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This monograph explores the ethics and religious sensibilities of a group of the hibakusha (survivors) of 1945's atomic bombings. Although the atomic bombings of 1945 have been studied from the points of view of various disciplines, the survivors' ethic—not retaliation, but reconciliation—emerging from their experiences and supported by their religious sensibilities, has never been addressed sufficiently in academic discourse. Rather their ethic has been excluded from the atomic bomb discourse or nuclear ethics. In examining Hiroshima city's “secular” commemoration, Hiroshima's True Pure Land Buddhist understanding, and Nagasaki's Roman Catholic tradition, I argue that the hibakusha's ethic and philosophy, based upon critical self-reflection, could offer resources for the constructing ethics based upon memories, especially in the post-9–11 world. Thus, this monograph, responding to this lacuna in scholarship, invites readers to go beyond the mushroom cloud where they encounter actual hibakusha's ethical thoughts.Less
This monograph explores the ethics and religious sensibilities of a group of the hibakusha (survivors) of 1945's atomic bombings. Although the atomic bombings of 1945 have been studied from the points of view of various disciplines, the survivors' ethic—not retaliation, but reconciliation—emerging from their experiences and supported by their religious sensibilities, has never been addressed sufficiently in academic discourse. Rather their ethic has been excluded from the atomic bomb discourse or nuclear ethics. In examining Hiroshima city's “secular” commemoration, Hiroshima's True Pure Land Buddhist understanding, and Nagasaki's Roman Catholic tradition, I argue that the hibakusha's ethic and philosophy, based upon critical self-reflection, could offer resources for the constructing ethics based upon memories, especially in the post-9–11 world. Thus, this monograph, responding to this lacuna in scholarship, invites readers to go beyond the mushroom cloud where they encounter actual hibakusha's ethical thoughts.
Mary Palevsky
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520220553
- eISBN:
- 9780520923652
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520220553.001.0001
- Subject:
- Anthropology, American and Canadian Cultural Anthropology
More than most of us, this book's author needed to come to terms with the moral complexities of the atomic bomb: Her parents worked on its development during World War II and were profoundly changed ...
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More than most of us, this book's author needed to come to terms with the moral complexities of the atomic bomb: Her parents worked on its development during World War II and were profoundly changed by that experience. After they died, unanswered questions sent their daughter on a search for understanding. This chronicle is the story of that quest. It takes the author, and us, on a journey into the minds, memories, and emotions of the bomb builders. Scientists Hans Bethe, Edward Teller, Joseph Rotblat, Herbert York, Philip Morrison, and Robert Wilson, and philosopher David Hawkins responded to the author's personal approach in a way that dramatically expands their previously published statements. This prompted these men to recall their lives vividly and to reexamine their own decisions, debating within themselves the complex issues raised by the bomb. The author herself, seeking to comprehend the widely differing ways in which individual scientists made choices about the bomb and made sense of their work, deeply reconsiders those questions of commitment and conscience her parents faced. In personal vignettes that complement the interviews, this book captures other remembrances of the bomb through commemorative events and chance encounters with people who were “there.” The concluding chapter reframes the crucial moral questions in terms that show the questions themselves to be the abiding legacy we all share.Less
More than most of us, this book's author needed to come to terms with the moral complexities of the atomic bomb: Her parents worked on its development during World War II and were profoundly changed by that experience. After they died, unanswered questions sent their daughter on a search for understanding. This chronicle is the story of that quest. It takes the author, and us, on a journey into the minds, memories, and emotions of the bomb builders. Scientists Hans Bethe, Edward Teller, Joseph Rotblat, Herbert York, Philip Morrison, and Robert Wilson, and philosopher David Hawkins responded to the author's personal approach in a way that dramatically expands their previously published statements. This prompted these men to recall their lives vividly and to reexamine their own decisions, debating within themselves the complex issues raised by the bomb. The author herself, seeking to comprehend the widely differing ways in which individual scientists made choices about the bomb and made sense of their work, deeply reconsiders those questions of commitment and conscience her parents faced. In personal vignettes that complement the interviews, this book captures other remembrances of the bomb through commemorative events and chance encounters with people who were “there.” The concluding chapter reframes the crucial moral questions in terms that show the questions themselves to be the abiding legacy we all share.
Rieko Asai
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823231201
- eISBN:
- 9780823240791
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823231201.003.0012
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter explores the role that anti-nuclear activists have played in shaping the public memory of the war's cataclysmic end. It examines how, soon after the war's end, a ...
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This chapter explores the role that anti-nuclear activists have played in shaping the public memory of the war's cataclysmic end. It examines how, soon after the war's end, a diverse network of nuclear activists, led by atomic scientists, world federalists, and pacifists, challenged the then-dominant view supporting the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The major force that struck out against the orthodox view of the atomic bombings—the World Peace Day movement—began in 1948 owing to the work of Hiroshima survivor Kiyoshi Tanimoto and Austrian émigré Alfred Parker. The chapter demonstrates that Cold War tension and virulent anticommunism delivered setbacks to World Peace Day, from which the movement would never recover. However, even as the efforts of Parker and Tanimoto began to founder, Christian pacifists in the United States, anchored by the Fellowship for Reconciliation (FOR), injected new life into the movement to commemorate August 6. In turn, this revived movement galvanized antinuclear activists to push for successful limits on nuclear testing during the 1960s while simultaneously dehistoricizing the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.Less
This chapter explores the role that anti-nuclear activists have played in shaping the public memory of the war's cataclysmic end. It examines how, soon after the war's end, a diverse network of nuclear activists, led by atomic scientists, world federalists, and pacifists, challenged the then-dominant view supporting the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The major force that struck out against the orthodox view of the atomic bombings—the World Peace Day movement—began in 1948 owing to the work of Hiroshima survivor Kiyoshi Tanimoto and Austrian émigré Alfred Parker. The chapter demonstrates that Cold War tension and virulent anticommunism delivered setbacks to World Peace Day, from which the movement would never recover. However, even as the efforts of Parker and Tanimoto began to founder, Christian pacifists in the United States, anchored by the Fellowship for Reconciliation (FOR), injected new life into the movement to commemorate August 6. In turn, this revived movement galvanized antinuclear activists to push for successful limits on nuclear testing during the 1960s while simultaneously dehistoricizing the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Shane J. Maddock
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- July 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780807833551
- eISBN:
- 9781469604220
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/9780807895849_maddock.6
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History
This chapter examines the development of nuclear weapons during World War II and early efforts to control their spread. It opens with a warning from physicist James Franck to President Harry S. ...
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This chapter examines the development of nuclear weapons during World War II and early efforts to control their spread. It opens with a warning from physicist James Franck to President Harry S. Truman in September 1945 that “the idea that there exists a secret formula [for the atomic bomb] which can be guarded in its entirety” should be dismissed “as too stupid even for the movies and the funny papers.” The chapter notes that the president ignored this warning and soon pledged publicly that the United States would hold its atomic monopoly as “a sacred trust” until “world cooperation for peace” achieved “a state of perfection.” It notes that political and military leaders dismissed such physicists as starry-eyed idealists, but events soon exposed policymakers as the deluded ones.Less
This chapter examines the development of nuclear weapons during World War II and early efforts to control their spread. It opens with a warning from physicist James Franck to President Harry S. Truman in September 1945 that “the idea that there exists a secret formula [for the atomic bomb] which can be guarded in its entirety” should be dismissed “as too stupid even for the movies and the funny papers.” The chapter notes that the president ignored this warning and soon pledged publicly that the United States would hold its atomic monopoly as “a sacred trust” until “world cooperation for peace” achieved “a state of perfection.” It notes that political and military leaders dismissed such physicists as starry-eyed idealists, but events soon exposed policymakers as the deluded ones.
Vernon W. Ruttan
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195188042
- eISBN:
- 9780199783410
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195188047.003.0004
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
Nuclear power is an example of a technology that, in the absence of military and defense-related research, development, and procurement, would not have been developed at all. The demonstration of ...
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Nuclear power is an example of a technology that, in the absence of military and defense-related research, development, and procurement, would not have been developed at all. The demonstration of controlled nuclear fission at the University of Chicago’s Stagg Field on December 2, 1942 initiated a chain of events that led to the development of the atomic bomb and nuclear power. The design of the first nuclear power reactor, located at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, was adapted from nuclear reactors developed to power nuclear submarines. Premature commitment to light water reactor technology appears, in retrospect, to have been a source of failure of the nuclear power industry to realize the promise it appeared to have in the 1950s. It is possible that during the first half of the 21st century, nuclear power will be able to make a significant contribution to meeting the growth in demand for electric power; by substituting for carbon-based fuels, it may also contribute to slowing the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.Less
Nuclear power is an example of a technology that, in the absence of military and defense-related research, development, and procurement, would not have been developed at all. The demonstration of controlled nuclear fission at the University of Chicago’s Stagg Field on December 2, 1942 initiated a chain of events that led to the development of the atomic bomb and nuclear power. The design of the first nuclear power reactor, located at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, was adapted from nuclear reactors developed to power nuclear submarines. Premature commitment to light water reactor technology appears, in retrospect, to have been a source of failure of the nuclear power industry to realize the promise it appeared to have in the 1950s. It is possible that during the first half of the 21st century, nuclear power will be able to make a significant contribution to meeting the growth in demand for electric power; by substituting for carbon-based fuels, it may also contribute to slowing the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
Robert Jay Lifton
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- July 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780807843444
- eISBN:
- 9781469602363
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/9780807882894_lifton.8
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
This chapter presents the relationship observed between physical fears and early radiation effects, and how they could turn into lifetime bodily concerns. During the years that followed, these fears ...
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This chapter presents the relationship observed between physical fears and early radiation effects, and how they could turn into lifetime bodily concerns. During the years that followed, these fears and concerns became greatly magnified by a development which has come to epitomize the hibakusha's third encounter with death: his growing awareness that medical studies were demonstrating an abnormally high rate of leukemia among survivors of the atomic bomb. There has thus arisen the scientifically inaccurate but emotionally charged term “Abomb disease,” which has taken for its medical model this always fatal malignancy of the blood-forming organs. In 1948, an increased incidence of leukemia was first noted, and it reached a peak between 1950 and 1952.Less
This chapter presents the relationship observed between physical fears and early radiation effects, and how they could turn into lifetime bodily concerns. During the years that followed, these fears and concerns became greatly magnified by a development which has come to epitomize the hibakusha's third encounter with death: his growing awareness that medical studies were demonstrating an abnormally high rate of leukemia among survivors of the atomic bomb. There has thus arisen the scientifically inaccurate but emotionally charged term “Abomb disease,” which has taken for its medical model this always fatal malignancy of the blood-forming organs. In 1948, an increased incidence of leukemia was first noted, and it reached a peak between 1950 and 1952.
Mary Palevsky
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520220553
- eISBN:
- 9780520923652
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520220553.003.0003
- Subject:
- Anthropology, American and Canadian Cultural Anthropology
On December 1, 1995, the author traveled to Stanford University to meet with Edward Teller at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, and immediately had two reactions on meeting him. ...
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On December 1, 1995, the author traveled to Stanford University to meet with Edward Teller at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, and immediately had two reactions on meeting him. First, she felt intimidated and dared not to interrupt him, and second, that he seemed intent on persuading her of the rightness of his view. This chapter presents Teller's views on the defense budget allocated on the atomic bomb; his regrets on the atomic bombing of Hiroshima; his links with Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, and Leo Szilard; his views on Nazism and Communism; an argument for the continued development of weapons after the cold war; and the enemies of science. In some ways, the author found the controversial “father of the hydrogen bomb” intense, uncompromising, and opinionated, but he also possessed a good sense of humor.Less
On December 1, 1995, the author traveled to Stanford University to meet with Edward Teller at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, and immediately had two reactions on meeting him. First, she felt intimidated and dared not to interrupt him, and second, that he seemed intent on persuading her of the rightness of his view. This chapter presents Teller's views on the defense budget allocated on the atomic bomb; his regrets on the atomic bombing of Hiroshima; his links with Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, and Leo Szilard; his views on Nazism and Communism; an argument for the continued development of weapons after the cold war; and the enemies of science. In some ways, the author found the controversial “father of the hydrogen bomb” intense, uncompromising, and opinionated, but he also possessed a good sense of humor.
Mary Palevsky
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520220553
- eISBN:
- 9780520923652
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520220553.003.0004
- Subject:
- Anthropology, American and Canadian Cultural Anthropology
On December 6, 1945, four months after Hiroshima, physicist Philip Morrison testified before Senator Brien McMahon's Special Committee on Atomic Energy, created to investigate problems relating to ...
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On December 6, 1945, four months after Hiroshima, physicist Philip Morrison testified before Senator Brien McMahon's Special Committee on Atomic Energy, created to investigate problems relating to the development, use, and control of atomic energy. Morrison, like many atomic scientists, was deeply concerned about the postwar meaning of the bomb long before the senators heard the faintest rumblings of the weapon's thunder, and emphasized that the atomic bomb was more than a new weapon; it was a revolution in war making, and therefore in history. The author met him in his office at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This chapter presents Morrison's views on the race for the development of the atomic bomb; the decision to use the bomb on Japanese cities; his participation in the Manhattan Project; and his chosen role as a witness and a chronicler of these world-changing events.Less
On December 6, 1945, four months after Hiroshima, physicist Philip Morrison testified before Senator Brien McMahon's Special Committee on Atomic Energy, created to investigate problems relating to the development, use, and control of atomic energy. Morrison, like many atomic scientists, was deeply concerned about the postwar meaning of the bomb long before the senators heard the faintest rumblings of the weapon's thunder, and emphasized that the atomic bomb was more than a new weapon; it was a revolution in war making, and therefore in history. The author met him in his office at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This chapter presents Morrison's views on the race for the development of the atomic bomb; the decision to use the bomb on Japanese cities; his participation in the Manhattan Project; and his chosen role as a witness and a chronicler of these world-changing events.
David Holloway
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804783590
- eISBN:
- 9780804788915
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804783590.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
In an unusually well-documented contribution on Russian secret intelligence, David Holloway posits reasons for Stalin’s unpreparedness in 1940-1941. This, it is fair to say, has long been an ...
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In an unusually well-documented contribution on Russian secret intelligence, David Holloway posits reasons for Stalin’s unpreparedness in 1940-1941. This, it is fair to say, has long been an obsessive object of interest and study in Russia, because it made all the difference to the course of the war that followed from June 1941. Rather than rushing into moral judgments about the régime, Holloway instead takes a cool look at what information came in to Stalin and allows for the fact that not all the incoming intelligence data were consistent. And in respect of revelations about U.S. construction of the atomic bomb, Holloway shows that Stalin once again consciously distanced himself from the findings of the intelligence services in reaching a final judgment. Whereas in the former case, it nearly led to disaster; in respect of the latter, Stalin was undoubtedly correct.Less
In an unusually well-documented contribution on Russian secret intelligence, David Holloway posits reasons for Stalin’s unpreparedness in 1940-1941. This, it is fair to say, has long been an obsessive object of interest and study in Russia, because it made all the difference to the course of the war that followed from June 1941. Rather than rushing into moral judgments about the régime, Holloway instead takes a cool look at what information came in to Stalin and allows for the fact that not all the incoming intelligence data were consistent. And in respect of revelations about U.S. construction of the atomic bomb, Holloway shows that Stalin once again consciously distanced himself from the findings of the intelligence services in reaching a final judgment. Whereas in the former case, it nearly led to disaster; in respect of the latter, Stalin was undoubtedly correct.
Hal M. Friedman
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780813176550
- eISBN:
- 9780813176581
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813176550.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, Military History
Interservice rivalry between the United States Army and Navy over the 1946 Bikini Atoll atomic bomb tests was an example of a larger rivalry over roles, missions, and budgets that was endemic to U.S. ...
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Interservice rivalry between the United States Army and Navy over the 1946 Bikini Atoll atomic bomb tests was an example of a larger rivalry over roles, missions, and budgets that was endemic to U.S. defense policy immediately after World War II.The tests became embroiled in this larger conflict because of the perception that they could be employed by either service to argue its case for the lion’s share of resources in the postwar world.Therefore, each service went to great lengths to try to assure the press and public that the tests were not “rigged.”What is most interesting, however, about the atomic bomb tests of Operation Crossroads was the fact that the test results were so inconclusive.Less
Interservice rivalry between the United States Army and Navy over the 1946 Bikini Atoll atomic bomb tests was an example of a larger rivalry over roles, missions, and budgets that was endemic to U.S. defense policy immediately after World War II.The tests became embroiled in this larger conflict because of the perception that they could be employed by either service to argue its case for the lion’s share of resources in the postwar world.Therefore, each service went to great lengths to try to assure the press and public that the tests were not “rigged.”What is most interesting, however, about the atomic bomb tests of Operation Crossroads was the fact that the test results were so inconclusive.
Mary Palevsky
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520220553
- eISBN:
- 9780520923652
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520220553.003.0008
- Subject:
- Anthropology, American and Canadian Cultural Anthropology
Herbert York was the first director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the first chancellor of the University of California at San Diego. During World War II, the University of ...
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Herbert York was the first director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the first chancellor of the University of California at San Diego. During World War II, the University of California managed the Los Alamos laboratory for the federal government. York worked in Manhattan Project Site Y-12 in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where he was a member of the scientific team producing enriched uranium. For young Manhattan Project scientists such as York and the author's parents, the wartime bomb-building effort was an opportunity to work with many of the scientific giants of the era. York's own career is a significant link in this chain of connections. This chapter presents York's well-reasoned arguments in support of the decision to drop the bomb, and the deep context in which the war and the ultimate use of the bomb developed.Less
Herbert York was the first director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the first chancellor of the University of California at San Diego. During World War II, the University of California managed the Los Alamos laboratory for the federal government. York worked in Manhattan Project Site Y-12 in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where he was a member of the scientific team producing enriched uranium. For young Manhattan Project scientists such as York and the author's parents, the wartime bomb-building effort was an opportunity to work with many of the scientific giants of the era. York's own career is a significant link in this chain of connections. This chapter presents York's well-reasoned arguments in support of the decision to drop the bomb, and the deep context in which the war and the ultimate use of the bomb developed.
Rosemary Foot
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292920
- eISBN:
- 9780191599286
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292929.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This is the third of four chapters focusing on America’s perceptions of China’s capabilities, and dwelling on the correspondence between those perceptions and the projected consequences. It presents ...
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This is the third of four chapters focusing on America’s perceptions of China’s capabilities, and dwelling on the correspondence between those perceptions and the projected consequences. It presents an assessment of America’s perceptions of China as a nuclear power, discussing the new complexities that this brought to the Sino-American relationship and to their respective broader foreign-policy agendas. The different sections of the chapter look at the process of China’s acquisition of the atomic bomb (the first atomic device was exploded by them in October 1964), the US response to this, US and international assessments of China’s nuclear power and the impact on non-proliferation, and US assessments of China’s nuclear weapons programme.Less
This is the third of four chapters focusing on America’s perceptions of China’s capabilities, and dwelling on the correspondence between those perceptions and the projected consequences. It presents an assessment of America’s perceptions of China as a nuclear power, discussing the new complexities that this brought to the Sino-American relationship and to their respective broader foreign-policy agendas. The different sections of the chapter look at the process of China’s acquisition of the atomic bomb (the first atomic device was exploded by them in October 1964), the US response to this, US and international assessments of China’s nuclear power and the impact on non-proliferation, and US assessments of China’s nuclear weapons programme.
Alex J. Bellamy
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199288427
- eISBN:
- 9780191745430
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288427.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics, Political Theory
This chapter examines the bombing of German and Japanese cities during the Second World War. Between 300,000–600,000 German civilians and over 200,000 Japanese civilians were killed by allied bombing ...
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This chapter examines the bombing of German and Japanese cities during the Second World War. Between 300,000–600,000 German civilians and over 200,000 Japanese civilians were killed by allied bombing during the Second World War, most as a result of raids intentionally targeted against civilians themselves. The campaigns culminated with the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The path followed by the RAF and US Army Air Corps (USAAF) in the European and Pacific theatres respectively followed a similar trajectory. At the beginning of the war, both committed themselves to precision raids against military targets. But a combination of bombing inaccuracy, poor weather, high casualty rates, and strategic preferences persuaded the RAF (over Germany) and USAAF (over Japan) to adopt area bombing aimed at ‘dehousing’ workers and demoralising enemy populations, thereby disrupting industrial production. Interestingly, however, although the British and American governments were clearly intent on targeting civilians, they refused to admit that this was their purpose and devised elaborate arguments to claim that they were not targeting civilians. This revealed the growing influence of civilian immunity but also its limits, setting a pattern that was repeated during the Cold War.Less
This chapter examines the bombing of German and Japanese cities during the Second World War. Between 300,000–600,000 German civilians and over 200,000 Japanese civilians were killed by allied bombing during the Second World War, most as a result of raids intentionally targeted against civilians themselves. The campaigns culminated with the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The path followed by the RAF and US Army Air Corps (USAAF) in the European and Pacific theatres respectively followed a similar trajectory. At the beginning of the war, both committed themselves to precision raids against military targets. But a combination of bombing inaccuracy, poor weather, high casualty rates, and strategic preferences persuaded the RAF (over Germany) and USAAF (over Japan) to adopt area bombing aimed at ‘dehousing’ workers and demoralising enemy populations, thereby disrupting industrial production. Interestingly, however, although the British and American governments were clearly intent on targeting civilians, they refused to admit that this was their purpose and devised elaborate arguments to claim that they were not targeting civilians. This revealed the growing influence of civilian immunity but also its limits, setting a pattern that was repeated during the Cold War.
Ken Young and Warner R. Schilling
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781501745164
- eISBN:
- 9781501745171
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501745164.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter is an account of the impact on U.S. thinking and policy of the first Soviet atomic bomb test. It ended the U.S. monopoly of atomic weapons—a development that some had foreseen and others ...
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This chapter is an account of the impact on U.S. thinking and policy of the first Soviet atomic bomb test. It ended the U.S. monopoly of atomic weapons—a development that some had foreseen and others had discounted as a possibility. An atomic Russia triggered fears of a “bolt from the blue” assault on U.S. cities. One reaction was to seek to prioritize U.S. air defenses. Another was to confirm the program agreed to that summer to accelerate the production of fissionable material for atomic bombs. The surge of anxiety also brought hitherto obscure speculations about thermonuclear physics into the public domain. It seemed apparent to some that the Soviet nuclear threat should be countered not by a multiplication of atomic bombs but by an American “superbomb.”Less
This chapter is an account of the impact on U.S. thinking and policy of the first Soviet atomic bomb test. It ended the U.S. monopoly of atomic weapons—a development that some had foreseen and others had discounted as a possibility. An atomic Russia triggered fears of a “bolt from the blue” assault on U.S. cities. One reaction was to seek to prioritize U.S. air defenses. Another was to confirm the program agreed to that summer to accelerate the production of fissionable material for atomic bombs. The surge of anxiety also brought hitherto obscure speculations about thermonuclear physics into the public domain. It seemed apparent to some that the Soviet nuclear threat should be countered not by a multiplication of atomic bombs but by an American “superbomb.”
Dee Garrison
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195183191
- eISBN:
- 9780199788804
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183191.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This prologue outlines how the advent of hydrogen weapons transformed the practice of war. It explains why modern nuclear weapons cannot be compared with those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It ...
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This prologue outlines how the advent of hydrogen weapons transformed the practice of war. It explains why modern nuclear weapons cannot be compared with those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It then discusses the effects of a nuclear explosion and life after a nuclear war.Less
This prologue outlines how the advent of hydrogen weapons transformed the practice of war. It explains why modern nuclear weapons cannot be compared with those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It then discusses the effects of a nuclear explosion and life after a nuclear war.
Vince Houghton
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781501739590
- eISBN:
- 9781501739606
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Political History
The first chapter details the causes of the United States Government’s considerable apprehension about the German atomic bomb program. By 1942 American progress in atomic development had made it ...
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The first chapter details the causes of the United States Government’s considerable apprehension about the German atomic bomb program. By 1942 American progress in atomic development had made it apparent that atomic bombs were more than theoretical possibilities, they were practical certainties. That is to say, it was only a matter of time before someone built an atomic bomb. The Germans had the best scientists, a well-developed industrial system, widespread political support, and they had a significant head start. American scientists had reason to worry.Less
The first chapter details the causes of the United States Government’s considerable apprehension about the German atomic bomb program. By 1942 American progress in atomic development had made it apparent that atomic bombs were more than theoretical possibilities, they were practical certainties. That is to say, it was only a matter of time before someone built an atomic bomb. The Germans had the best scientists, a well-developed industrial system, widespread political support, and they had a significant head start. American scientists had reason to worry.
Vince Houghton
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781501739590
- eISBN:
- 9781501739606
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, Political History
The sixth chapter discusses the reasons the United States Government did not consider the Soviet atomic bomb program an immediate national security threat. In contrast to their beliefs about German ...
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The sixth chapter discusses the reasons the United States Government did not consider the Soviet atomic bomb program an immediate national security threat. In contrast to their beliefs about German science, many American scientists and some within the civilian and military leadership regarded Soviet science as institutionally backward, and many of its scientists as intellectual inferiors. Other key players in American leadership, including Leslie Groves, argued that the Soviet Union did not have the industrial capabilities to manufacture an atomic bomb in less than 20 years. Regardless of the reasoning (whether it was an indictment of Soviet science, Soviet industry, or the Soviet system), the people in the positions of power in the United States almost universally assumed they had time to build an effective atomic intelligence system, and do so before the Soviets made much of that system obsolete.Less
The sixth chapter discusses the reasons the United States Government did not consider the Soviet atomic bomb program an immediate national security threat. In contrast to their beliefs about German science, many American scientists and some within the civilian and military leadership regarded Soviet science as institutionally backward, and many of its scientists as intellectual inferiors. Other key players in American leadership, including Leslie Groves, argued that the Soviet Union did not have the industrial capabilities to manufacture an atomic bomb in less than 20 years. Regardless of the reasoning (whether it was an indictment of Soviet science, Soviet industry, or the Soviet system), the people in the positions of power in the United States almost universally assumed they had time to build an effective atomic intelligence system, and do so before the Soviets made much of that system obsolete.
Robert Jay Lifton
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- July 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780807843444
- eISBN:
- 9781469602363
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/9780807882894_lifton
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
In Japan, “hibakusha” means “the people affected by the explosion”—specifically, the explosion of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima in 1945. In this study, the winner of the 1969 National Book Award in ...
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In Japan, “hibakusha” means “the people affected by the explosion”—specifically, the explosion of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima in 1945. In this study, the winner of the 1969 National Book Award in Science studies the psychological effects of the bomb on 90,000 survivors. He sees this analysis as providing a last chance to understand—and be motivated to avoid—nuclear war. This compassionate treatment is a significant contribution to the atomic age.Less
In Japan, “hibakusha” means “the people affected by the explosion”—specifically, the explosion of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima in 1945. In this study, the winner of the 1969 National Book Award in Science studies the psychological effects of the bomb on 90,000 survivors. He sees this analysis as providing a last chance to understand—and be motivated to avoid—nuclear war. This compassionate treatment is a significant contribution to the atomic age.
John Tirman
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780195381214
- eISBN:
- 9780190252373
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780195381214.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter focuses on the three-year war in Korea (1950–1953) pitting South Korea and United Nations forces versus North Korea and China. It examines the politics of the Korean War, with particular ...
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This chapter focuses on the three-year war in Korea (1950–1953) pitting South Korea and United Nations forces versus North Korea and China. It examines the politics of the Korean War, with particular emphasis on America's fixation on eradicating communism by trying to contain China and the Soviet Union, as well as the war's strategic implications through the use of atomic bombs. It also assesses the enormous number of casualties and the stark contrast between American indifference and Korean suffering. In addition, it considers why the American public forgot the war so soon while it was being waged and why they seemed to show more interest in its politics than in the carnage it caused to civilians. Finally, the chapter discusses America's decision to put Syngman Rhee in power by creating the Republic of Korea in 1948.Less
This chapter focuses on the three-year war in Korea (1950–1953) pitting South Korea and United Nations forces versus North Korea and China. It examines the politics of the Korean War, with particular emphasis on America's fixation on eradicating communism by trying to contain China and the Soviet Union, as well as the war's strategic implications through the use of atomic bombs. It also assesses the enormous number of casualties and the stark contrast between American indifference and Korean suffering. In addition, it considers why the American public forgot the war so soon while it was being waged and why they seemed to show more interest in its politics than in the carnage it caused to civilians. Finally, the chapter discusses America's decision to put Syngman Rhee in power by creating the Republic of Korea in 1948.
