- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226816647
- eISBN:
- 9780226816661
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226816661.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
This chapter reveals that the inquiries which followed Bruno Pontecorvo's flight and typified the case were influenced by two opposing tendencies that combined to greatly decrease their efficacy. On ...
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This chapter reveals that the inquiries which followed Bruno Pontecorvo's flight and typified the case were influenced by two opposing tendencies that combined to greatly decrease their efficacy. On one side, British diplomats and intelligence personnel sought to play down the whole case, so the investigations on Pontecorvo's flight to Russia were never prioritized. On the other, some journalists theorized on his past and present activities, indicating that he was an atom spy. The Joint Committee on Atomic Espionage portrayal of Pontecorvo's defection emphasized its dangers. Pontecorvo played a key role in the development of applied nuclear research, and had also been an atom spy for a long time. The conflicting interpretations by journalists and government officers gave substance to the portraits of him—the notorious spy and the clumsy defector—that have existed side by side for the last fifty years.Less
This chapter reveals that the inquiries which followed Bruno Pontecorvo's flight and typified the case were influenced by two opposing tendencies that combined to greatly decrease their efficacy. On one side, British diplomats and intelligence personnel sought to play down the whole case, so the investigations on Pontecorvo's flight to Russia were never prioritized. On the other, some journalists theorized on his past and present activities, indicating that he was an atom spy. The Joint Committee on Atomic Espionage portrayal of Pontecorvo's defection emphasized its dangers. Pontecorvo played a key role in the development of applied nuclear research, and had also been an atom spy for a long time. The conflicting interpretations by journalists and government officers gave substance to the portraits of him—the notorious spy and the clumsy defector—that have existed side by side for the last fifty years.
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226816647
- eISBN:
- 9780226816661
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226816661.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
This chapter emphasizes Bruno Pontecorvo's career after his flight, and also reviews the proliferation of accounts of his antics in espionage literature. The new accounts of the atom spy Pontecorvo ...
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This chapter emphasizes Bruno Pontecorvo's career after his flight, and also reviews the proliferation of accounts of his antics in espionage literature. The new accounts of the atom spy Pontecorvo helped to alert public opinion about the paucity of security regulations and the need to tighten them. His presence in Moscow made atomic scientists eager to get restricted information on anything he knew about atomic energy. There was a connection between Pontecorvo's presence in Russia and with the Soviets' attempts to learn more about how to find uranium. The analysis of developments in neutron well logging verified the importance of his research on prospecting problems. Ronald Reed concluded that the hypothesis that Pontecorvo was a spy could be made, but that there was not sufficient evidence to support it.Less
This chapter emphasizes Bruno Pontecorvo's career after his flight, and also reviews the proliferation of accounts of his antics in espionage literature. The new accounts of the atom spy Pontecorvo helped to alert public opinion about the paucity of security regulations and the need to tighten them. His presence in Moscow made atomic scientists eager to get restricted information on anything he knew about atomic energy. There was a connection between Pontecorvo's presence in Russia and with the Soviets' attempts to learn more about how to find uranium. The analysis of developments in neutron well logging verified the importance of his research on prospecting problems. Ronald Reed concluded that the hypothesis that Pontecorvo was a spy could be made, but that there was not sufficient evidence to support it.
Daniel W. B. Lomas
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780719099144
- eISBN:
- 9781526120922
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719099144.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics
Chapter Five studies Ministerial reactions to the spy scandals that threatened Anglo-American nuclear exchanges. Considering the cases of Alan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs, Bruno Pontecorvo, Guy Burgess and ...
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Chapter Five studies Ministerial reactions to the spy scandals that threatened Anglo-American nuclear exchanges. Considering the cases of Alan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs, Bruno Pontecorvo, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, it argues that Ministers were sensitive to claims from the United States that Britain was weak in the field of security. After the Fuchs and Pontecorvo scandals, Ministers reacted quickly to repair any damage to transatlantic relations by introducing new security procedures known as ‘Positive Vetting’. The chapter also uses newly released archival material to shed light on Ministerial reactions to the disapperance of the Foreign Office diplomats, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, in the spring of 1951. Their defection provoked widespread outrage and, once again, prompted a review of security in government, on this occasion the Foreign Office, on the instructions of the Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, now Foreign Secretary, which is explored here for the first time.Less
Chapter Five studies Ministerial reactions to the spy scandals that threatened Anglo-American nuclear exchanges. Considering the cases of Alan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs, Bruno Pontecorvo, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, it argues that Ministers were sensitive to claims from the United States that Britain was weak in the field of security. After the Fuchs and Pontecorvo scandals, Ministers reacted quickly to repair any damage to transatlantic relations by introducing new security procedures known as ‘Positive Vetting’. The chapter also uses newly released archival material to shed light on Ministerial reactions to the disapperance of the Foreign Office diplomats, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, in the spring of 1951. Their defection provoked widespread outrage and, once again, prompted a review of security in government, on this occasion the Foreign Office, on the instructions of the Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, now Foreign Secretary, which is explored here for the first time.