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This chapter examines the question of what triggered the emergence of informal groups of states in the form of the advisory committees in the 1950s, and argues that their establishment has to be seen against the background of great power tensions in the Security Council. The early stages of UN peacekeeping saw a shift of governance from the Security Council to the Secretary-General and the General Assembly, which fostered the emergence of informal ad hoc groupings of states. The formation of advisory committees reflected the desire of the Secretary-General to strengthen his voice vis-á-vis the Security Council. When the lack of unanimity of the permanent members prevented the Council from assuming its responsibilities, the General Assembly took charge by recommending collective measures. However, when the Security Council was able to act, its resolutions and mandates entrusted to the Secretary-General often reflected a political compromise based on the lowest common denominator among its members. The workings of the two advisory committees established in the context of crises at the Suez Canal (1956-67) and in the Congo (1960-4) illustrate these points further.

This chapter on elections and electoral systems in Cameroon follows the same format as all the other country chapters in the book. The first section is introductory and contains a historical overview, discussion of the evolution of electoral provisions, an account of the current electoral provisions, and a comment on the electoral statistics. The second section consists of ten tables. These are: 2.1 Dates of National Elections, Referendums, and Coups d’Etat (there have been no coups d’états); 2.2 Electoral Body 1964–1997 (data on population size, registered voters, and votes cast); 2.3 Abbreviations (abbreviations and full names of political parties and alliances used in tables 2.6, 2.7, and 2.9); 2.4 Electoral Participation of Parties and Alliances 1956/1959–1997 (participation of political parties and alliances in chronological order and including the years and number of contested elections); 2.5 Referendums 1960–1972 (details of registered voters and votes cast); 2.6 Elections for Constitutional Assembly (not held); 2.7 Parliamentary Elections 1956–1997 (details of registered voters and votes cast in the Territorial (French Cameroon) and Legislative (Republic of Cameroon) Assemblies 1956–1960, the House of Assembly (British Cameroon/West Cameroon) 1959–1961, and the National Assembly 1964–1997); 2.8 Composition of Parliament 1956–1997 (Territorial and Legislative Assemblies 1956–1960, the House of Assembly 1959–1961, and the National Assembly 1964–1997); 2.9 Presidential Elections 1965–1997 (details of registered voters and votes cast); and 2.10 List of Power Holders 1958–1998.

In the field of electoral systems, Britain has long held out as a bastion of stability, as the country seen as least likely to undergo fundamental electoral reform, but this picture was rudely shattered in the late spring of 1997, with the election of a new Labour government. The central argument of this chapter is that the current debate over British electoral reform should be viewed as part of a wider process of the coming of age of British politics. A review of the historical debate reveals a series of failed initiatives to reform the electoral system, suggesting that the matter has never been entirely put to rest, and that there has always been the prospect of its re‐emergence. The current episode, dating from the election of the new government in 1997, provides reason to expect that electoral reform may really happen this time, and indeed already has happened in a number of British electoral arenas (European Parliament; London mayor; Northern Ireland, Scottish, Welsh and London Assemblies). The chapter is arranged as follows: the first section summarizes the historical record from 1860 to 1970, and provides evidence of a political elite willing at least to countenance the idea of experimenting with change, even if not yet prepared to embrace it; the second section explores possible explanations for why the issue re‐emerged in the 1990s and describes the reforms implemented in that period (up to 2000); this is followed by an outline of the deliberations and proposals of the Independent Commission on the Voting System for the British House of Commons (the Jenkins Commission), which was established by the new Labour prime minister, Tony Blair, in December 1997, whose report was published in October 1998 and suggested ‘alternative vote plus (AV+)’ as the new electoral system; the concluding section discusses the current prospects for electoral reform in the UK.

This chapter on elections and electoral systems in Egypt follows the same format as all the other country chapters in the book. The first section is introductory and contains a historical overview, discussion of the evolution of electoral provisions, an account of the current electoral provisions, and a comment on the electoral statistics. The second section consists of ten tables. These are: 2.1 Dates of National Elections, Referendums, and Coups d’Etat; 2.2 Electoral Body 1950–1995 (data on population size, registered voters, and votes cast); 2.3 Abbreviations (abbreviations and full names of political parties and alliances used in tables 2.6, 2.7, and 2.9); 2.4 Electoral Participation of Parties and Alliances 1950–1995 (participation of political parties and alliances in chronological order and including the years and number of contested elections); 2.5 Referendums 1956–1990 (details of registered voters and votes cast); 2.6 Elections for Constitutional Assembly (the National Assembly elected in 1974 was to act as a Constitutional Assembly); 2.7 Parliamentary Elections 1984 and 1987 (details of registered voters and votes cast); 2.8 Composition of Parliament 1950–1995; 2.9 Presidential Referendums 1956–1993 (details of registered voters and votes cast); and 2.10 List of Power Holders 1953–1998.

Again the quantity to watch is the ‘seat product’. The inverse square law of cabinet durations says that the mean cabinet duration in a country is approximately forty-two years divided by the square of the effective number of parties. In institutional terms, mean cabinet duration is approximately the inverse of the cube root of the seat product. This quantitatively predictive logical model agrees with the world averages. The results are approximate, because other factors enter.

Resistance to simplifying a complex electoral system is at its least when the existing number and size of parties are not altered. The existing effective number of parties is most likely to be maintained, when the district magnitude used in the new simple electoral system is taken as the sixth power of the effective number of parties, divided by assembly size. The task remains risky, especially when one party is very large and the others very small.

The cube root law of assembly sizes applies to first or only chambers. It says that assembly size is approximately the cube root of the country's population, because this size minimizes the workload of a representative. This quantitatively predictive logical model agrees with the world averages. Smaller countries have fewer registered parties but more party members per 1,000 population.

The more important levels have fewer positions, and the share of minorities goes down. The law of minority attrition is a quantitatively predictive logical model that expresses it more precisely. A party with a small share of seats gets an even smaller share of seats, and the precise figure depends on assembly size and the total number of voters. The law of minority attrition might also help determine which part of the ‘rubber ceiling’ on women's advancement is natural and which part is socially imposed.

Using nothing but the product of assembly size and district magnitude, a quantitatively predictive logical model allows us to estimate the average effective number of parties based on votes. Average deviation from proportional representation can also be estimated from this seat product, within plus or minus four percentage points. When estimating the likely effect of changes in electoral laws on the party system and deviation from PR, the past tendencies in the given country also must be taken into account.

The nationwide threshold of minimal representation is the average vote share needed to win one seat in the assembly. It is close to 38% divided by the square root of the seat product (assembly size times district magnitude). If greater inclusion of political minorities is desired, this threshold can be lowered by increasing district magnitude and/or assembly size. The number of serious or pertinent parties might be close to square root plus fourth root of district magnitude, plus one.

The number of seats in the European Parliament roughly equals the cube root of the population of the European Union. This theoretically based ‘cube root law of assembly sizes’ also fits most national assemblies, and it could be made the official norm for the EP. Allocation of EP seats and Council of the EU voting weights among member states has for forty years closely approximated the distribution a ‘minority enhancement equation’ predicts, solely on the basis of the number and populations of member states plus the total number of seats/voting weights. This logically founded formula could be made the official norm, so as to save political wrangling. It may also be of use for some other supranational bodies and federal second chambers.

To allocate seats to candidates or parties, even a simple electoral system must specify at least the following: the total number of seats in the assembly (assembly size); the number of seats allocated in each electoral district (district magnitude); how these seats are allocated (seat allocation formula); and how a voter can express her/his preferences (ballot structure). The simplest seat allocation formulas are d'Hondt and Sainte-Laguë divisors, and Hare quota plus largest remainders. For single-seat districts, these proportional representation formulas are reduced to First-Past-The-Post, where the candidate with the most votes wins. Complex electoral systems may offer advantages, but the ability to predict the number of parties and the average proportionality of seats to votes is lost.

The micro-mega rule says that for representation of small parties, it helps to have large assembly sizes, large district magnitudes, and large quotas or large gaps between divisors in seat allocation formulas. Conversely, large parties would prefer small assemblies, magnitudes and quotas — but only if they are absolutely certain to stay large. Worldwide tendency has been to play it safe and move toward more inclusive representation. The number of parties increases with increasing ‘seat product’ — the number of seats in the assembly times the number of seats in the average district — unless the seats are allocated by plurality in multi-seat districts.

Starting with the characteristics of the electoral systems, the ‘Duvergerian agenda’ aims at predicting the average seat and vote share distributions of parties, the effective number of parties, and deviation from proportional representation. In the case of simple electoral systems, prediction of seat shares of parties and cabinet duration has become possible. Simple electoral systems are those that use a usual proportional representation formula or First-Past-The-Post, so that assembly size and district magnitude tell most of the story.

The quantity to watch is the ‘seat product’ — the product of the assembly size and district magnitude. The number of parties represented in the assembly is approximately the fourth root of the seat product. The fractional seat share of the largest party is approximately the inverse of the eighth root of the seat product. This quantitatively predictive logical model agrees with the world averages. The results are approximate, because other factors are present.