Stanley Hoffmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275359
- eISBN:
- 9780191603686
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275351.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Why has peace been often unjust, and why has justice been more belligerent than peaceful? Frequently, peace or armistice has served only to put a temporary end to violence, and has left some or all ...
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Why has peace been often unjust, and why has justice been more belligerent than peaceful? Frequently, peace or armistice has served only to put a temporary end to violence, and has left some or all sides feeling dissatisfied. Peace has also been an imposition on the part of the victors of conflict to the end of some notion of order, thus leaving the affected common people to draw their own conclusions without ever being consulted. It is for this reason that justice is often more properly envisioned as the image of a fighter with his sword rather than a balancing scale. In this chapter, Hoffman explores the complexity of how peace and justice might be wedded in international relations, and gives the reader sound starting points for thinking about this conceptual approach.Less
Why has peace been often unjust, and why has justice been more belligerent than peaceful? Frequently, peace or armistice has served only to put a temporary end to violence, and has left some or all sides feeling dissatisfied. Peace has also been an imposition on the part of the victors of conflict to the end of some notion of order, thus leaving the affected common people to draw their own conclusions without ever being consulted. It is for this reason that justice is often more properly envisioned as the image of a fighter with his sword rather than a balancing scale. In this chapter, Hoffman explores the complexity of how peace and justice might be wedded in international relations, and gives the reader sound starting points for thinking about this conceptual approach.
Erik Goldstein
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198215844
- eISBN:
- 9780191678226
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198215844.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Military History
This introductory chapter discusses the importance of studying the planning phase in order to understand better British actions at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. It suggests that though a third ...
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This introductory chapter discusses the importance of studying the planning phase in order to understand better British actions at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. It suggests that though a third of the period between the armistice and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles was occupied solely with preparations, the histories of the peace settlement have neglected it because of a lack of information. It highlights the Foreign Office's creation of the Political Intelligence Department (PID) to coordinate and synthesize the materials that were to be used by British officials in the post-war negotiating table.Less
This introductory chapter discusses the importance of studying the planning phase in order to understand better British actions at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. It suggests that though a third of the period between the armistice and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles was occupied solely with preparations, the histories of the peace settlement have neglected it because of a lack of information. It highlights the Foreign Office's creation of the Political Intelligence Department (PID) to coordinate and synthesize the materials that were to be used by British officials in the post-war negotiating table.
Steven Casey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195306927
- eISBN:
- 9780199867936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306927.003.0013
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
Initially, Eisenhower's emergence as the Republican nominee for president also helped to sustain a basic consensus behind the war, for Ike was a moderate who was prepared to defend Truman's decision ...
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Initially, Eisenhower's emergence as the Republican nominee for president also helped to sustain a basic consensus behind the war, for Ike was a moderate who was prepared to defend Truman's decision to intervene in Korea. As the campaign progressed, Eisenhower's comments became more critical. But even his decisive promise to voters to “go to Korea” was ambiguous. It was intended to signal that something new had to be done to end the fighting, while leaving Ike free to decide precisely what—and, crucially, while also ensuring that he kept his distance from MacArthur and the Republican right. On becoming president, Eisenhower therefore retained a good deal of freedom. But in terms of public relations, he swiftly made many of the same mistakes that had plagued Truman's early efforts. And only Stalin's death, which in turn led to a thawing of the communist position, revived the armistice negotiations and resulted in an end to this long and costly war.Less
Initially, Eisenhower's emergence as the Republican nominee for president also helped to sustain a basic consensus behind the war, for Ike was a moderate who was prepared to defend Truman's decision to intervene in Korea. As the campaign progressed, Eisenhower's comments became more critical. But even his decisive promise to voters to “go to Korea” was ambiguous. It was intended to signal that something new had to be done to end the fighting, while leaving Ike free to decide precisely what—and, crucially, while also ensuring that he kept his distance from MacArthur and the Republican right. On becoming president, Eisenhower therefore retained a good deal of freedom. But in terms of public relations, he swiftly made many of the same mistakes that had plagued Truman's early efforts. And only Stalin's death, which in turn led to a thawing of the communist position, revived the armistice negotiations and resulted in an end to this long and costly war.
Asa Briggs
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780192129567
- eISBN:
- 9780191670022
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780192129567.003.0024
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Cultural History
This chapter discusses the British Broadcasting Corporation's (BBC) programming after the defeat of Germany. It explains that the BBC had begun to consider as early as October 1943 what form its ...
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This chapter discusses the British Broadcasting Corporation's (BBC) programming after the defeat of Germany. It explains that the BBC had begun to consider as early as October 1943 what form its programmes should take immediately following an armistice with Germany. It highlights BBC Director-General William Haley's plan to seek balance rejoicing, thanksgiving, tribute, and warning; and describes the talks prepared for the autumn of 1944 which included ‘full employment’ and ‘reconstruction’.Less
This chapter discusses the British Broadcasting Corporation's (BBC) programming after the defeat of Germany. It explains that the BBC had begun to consider as early as October 1943 what form its programmes should take immediately following an armistice with Germany. It highlights BBC Director-General William Haley's plan to seek balance rejoicing, thanksgiving, tribute, and warning; and describes the talks prepared for the autumn of 1944 which included ‘full employment’ and ‘reconstruction’.
Asa Briggs
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780192129567
- eISBN:
- 9780191670022
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780192129567.003.0009
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Cultural History
This chapter focuses on British broadcasting in France during the months of June and July 1940. It explains that during this period, there was a need for urgent action in relation to France, which ...
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This chapter focuses on British broadcasting in France during the months of June and July 1940. It explains that during this period, there was a need for urgent action in relation to France, which passed quickly from friendship and alliance to non-belligerence and tacit hostility after the German blitzkrieg attack. It discusses the British Broadcasting Corporation's (BBC) first use of the term French Armistice in its broadcast to France during this period. It also highlights Charles De Gaulle's decision to broadcast his message to Occupied France from London.Less
This chapter focuses on British broadcasting in France during the months of June and July 1940. It explains that during this period, there was a need for urgent action in relation to France, which passed quickly from friendship and alliance to non-belligerence and tacit hostility after the German blitzkrieg attack. It discusses the British Broadcasting Corporation's (BBC) first use of the term French Armistice in its broadcast to France during this period. It also highlights Charles De Gaulle's decision to broadcast his message to Occupied France from London.
Thomas J. Laub
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199539321
- eISBN:
- 9780191715808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539321.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Military History, European Modern History
‘The shocking defeat’ begins with an overview of Allied and Axis military strategy during the phony war, surveys German plans for the invasion of France, and describes the Western Campaign between ...
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‘The shocking defeat’ begins with an overview of Allied and Axis military strategy during the phony war, surveys German plans for the invasion of France, and describes the Western Campaign between May and June 1940. In the face of what might be called ‘catastrophic success', Hitler placed conservative generals in charge of an improvised military administration, and the latter established a standard of conduct that was largely unadulterated by Nazi ideology. The 1938 Munich Agreement and the 1939 Nazi‐Soviet Non‐Aggression Pact prepared French society for some of the dramatic changes associated with military defeat and the 1940 Armistice Agreement.Less
‘The shocking defeat’ begins with an overview of Allied and Axis military strategy during the phony war, surveys German plans for the invasion of France, and describes the Western Campaign between May and June 1940. In the face of what might be called ‘catastrophic success', Hitler placed conservative generals in charge of an improvised military administration, and the latter established a standard of conduct that was largely unadulterated by Nazi ideology. The 1938 Munich Agreement and the 1939 Nazi‐Soviet Non‐Aggression Pact prepared French society for some of the dramatic changes associated with military defeat and the 1940 Armistice Agreement.
Donald Read
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198207689
- eISBN:
- 9780191677779
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198207689.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, Cultural History, British and Irish Modern History
This chapter explores the experiences of Reuters during the war. Reuter correspondents had never forgotten that they were writing for the news agency of the British Empire. The call of patriotism was ...
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This chapter explores the experiences of Reuters during the war. Reuter correspondents had never forgotten that they were writing for the news agency of the British Empire. The call of patriotism was very strong during the First World War. Reuters had not foreseen the outbreak of the First World War, even though its European correspondents had been busy reporting the tensions of the immediate pre-war years. For the first time in the war British correspondents were fully briefed about what was intended for the opening day of war; and they were allowed to view the battlefield from vantage points. What they witnessed turned out to be a traumatic experience in the history of the British Empire. Reuters played its part in publicizing and encouraging the war effort throughout the worldwide territories of the British Empire.Less
This chapter explores the experiences of Reuters during the war. Reuter correspondents had never forgotten that they were writing for the news agency of the British Empire. The call of patriotism was very strong during the First World War. Reuters had not foreseen the outbreak of the First World War, even though its European correspondents had been busy reporting the tensions of the immediate pre-war years. For the first time in the war British correspondents were fully briefed about what was intended for the opening day of war; and they were allowed to view the battlefield from vantage points. What they witnessed turned out to be a traumatic experience in the history of the British Empire. Reuters played its part in publicizing and encouraging the war effort throughout the worldwide territories of the British Empire.
Erik Goldstein
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198215844
- eISBN:
- 9780191678226
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198215844.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Military History
This chapter examines the beginnings of Great Britain's preparation for the post-war peace settlement. It explains that Britain had been planning for the peace conference even before the armistice ...
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This chapter examines the beginnings of Great Britain's preparation for the post-war peace settlement. It explains that Britain had been planning for the peace conference even before the armistice was signed in November 1918. It explains that the planning for the eventual post-war conference originated as vaguely defined discussions in a series of ad hoc committees and reports which started with Prime Minister H. H. Asquith's War Committee in August 1916.Less
This chapter examines the beginnings of Great Britain's preparation for the post-war peace settlement. It explains that Britain had been planning for the peace conference even before the armistice was signed in November 1918. It explains that the planning for the eventual post-war conference originated as vaguely defined discussions in a series of ad hoc committees and reports which started with Prime Minister H. H. Asquith's War Committee in August 1916.
John Kent
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198203025
- eISBN:
- 9780191675669
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203025.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History
The three years from the outbreak of the war to the Allied invasion of North Africa were undoubtedly the most traumatic in 20th-century Anglo-French relations. A sense of having been let down and ...
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The three years from the outbreak of the war to the Allied invasion of North Africa were undoubtedly the most traumatic in 20th-century Anglo-French relations. A sense of having been let down and abandoned provided fertile ground for traditional anti-French prejudices and created a strong feeling that France, unreliable and incapable, was now to lose its identity and become a slave to Nazi Germany. However, on June 24, the armistice between France and Germany was signed, and it was dear to the British that there was little chance of securing a government in exile containing prominent French military or political leaders. By June 24, when General Charles Noguès interned the politicians who had fled from Bordeaux, this possibility had become remote. Britain was left with Charles de Gaulle.Less
The three years from the outbreak of the war to the Allied invasion of North Africa were undoubtedly the most traumatic in 20th-century Anglo-French relations. A sense of having been let down and abandoned provided fertile ground for traditional anti-French prejudices and created a strong feeling that France, unreliable and incapable, was now to lose its identity and become a slave to Nazi Germany. However, on June 24, the armistice between France and Germany was signed, and it was dear to the British that there was little chance of securing a government in exile containing prominent French military or political leaders. By June 24, when General Charles Noguès interned the politicians who had fled from Bordeaux, this possibility had become remote. Britain was left with Charles de Gaulle.
Julian Jackson
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198207061
- eISBN:
- 9780191677465
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198207061.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter restores the notion of discontinuity by examining the impact of the defeat of May 1940. Without defeat there would have been no Vichy ...
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This chapter restores the notion of discontinuity by examining the impact of the defeat of May 1940. Without defeat there would have been no Vichy regime, but without the trends examined in the previous chapters, the Vichy regime would not have taken the form that it did.Less
This chapter restores the notion of discontinuity by examining the impact of the defeat of May 1940. Without defeat there would have been no Vichy regime, but without the trends examined in the previous chapters, the Vichy regime would not have taken the form that it did.
Zbyněk Zeman and Antonín Klimek
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198205838
- eISBN:
- 9780191676802
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198205838.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter describes the sequence of misfortunes the Habsburg dynasty went through when Beneš was posted as the foreign minister. Beneš told the visitors that Czechoslovaks had nothing to fear ...
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This chapter describes the sequence of misfortunes the Habsburg dynasty went through when Beneš was posted as the foreign minister. Beneš told the visitors that Czechoslovaks had nothing to fear either from Vienna and Budapest, or indeed from Berlin. Beneš confirmed that the allies would help them with supplies of every kind, and with troops to establish the security of the new state. After returning from Geneva to Paris, Beneš discovered that the Allied governments were reluctant to invite Czechoslovak delegates to the armistice negotiations. Beneš plotted an agreement for military co-operation with the French in November 1918. All border disputes were put before the appropriate commissions of experts, and Beneš managed to acquire respect among them.Less
This chapter describes the sequence of misfortunes the Habsburg dynasty went through when Beneš was posted as the foreign minister. Beneš told the visitors that Czechoslovaks had nothing to fear either from Vienna and Budapest, or indeed from Berlin. Beneš confirmed that the allies would help them with supplies of every kind, and with troops to establish the security of the new state. After returning from Geneva to Paris, Beneš discovered that the Allied governments were reluctant to invite Czechoslovak delegates to the armistice negotiations. Beneš plotted an agreement for military co-operation with the French in November 1918. All border disputes were put before the appropriate commissions of experts, and Beneš managed to acquire respect among them.
Yezid Sayigh
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198296430
- eISBN:
- 9780191685224
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198296430.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Infiltration was a widespread phenomenon, as former mujahidin set up their own bands or operated on ‘contract’ for Arab military intelligence services, but neither they nor Husayni attempted to ...
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Infiltration was a widespread phenomenon, as former mujahidin set up their own bands or operated on ‘contract’ for Arab military intelligence services, but neither they nor Husayni attempted to construct modem political organizations on that basis. Egypt was the first country to conclude an armistice agreement with Israel, and, like Jordan, was anxious to avoid further conflict after 1949. The Egyptian command then placed a section of the police under another officer, ʻAbd-al-'Azim al-Saharti, to guard public installations in Gaza. Unlike the border police, the Saharti battalion, as it came to be known, was attached to the military governor's office. This caused considerable resentment among the Palestinian personnel, who took this to indicate a lower status. Palestinian anger at Israeli reprisals and Egyptian restrictions erupted in March, as demonstrators took to the streets of Gaza to demand conscription and the distribution of arms to the local population.Less
Infiltration was a widespread phenomenon, as former mujahidin set up their own bands or operated on ‘contract’ for Arab military intelligence services, but neither they nor Husayni attempted to construct modem political organizations on that basis. Egypt was the first country to conclude an armistice agreement with Israel, and, like Jordan, was anxious to avoid further conflict after 1949. The Egyptian command then placed a section of the police under another officer, ʻAbd-al-'Azim al-Saharti, to guard public installations in Gaza. Unlike the border police, the Saharti battalion, as it came to be known, was attached to the military governor's office. This caused considerable resentment among the Palestinian personnel, who took this to indicate a lower status. Palestinian anger at Israeli reprisals and Egyptian restrictions erupted in March, as demonstrators took to the streets of Gaza to demand conscription and the distribution of arms to the local population.
Avi Shlaim
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198294597
- eISBN:
- 9780191685057
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198294597.003.0035
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines the armistices negotiations between Israel and the neighbouring Arab states. The negotiations got under way with the help of United Nations acting mediator Ralph Bunche in ...
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This chapter examines the armistices negotiations between Israel and the neighbouring Arab states. The negotiations got under way with the help of United Nations acting mediator Ralph Bunche in January 1949. Israel negotiated bilaterally with each of the neighbouring states including Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. This chapter discusses the details of the armistice agreement with each of Israel's Arab neighbours.Less
This chapter examines the armistices negotiations between Israel and the neighbouring Arab states. The negotiations got under way with the help of United Nations acting mediator Ralph Bunche in January 1949. Israel negotiated bilaterally with each of the neighbouring states including Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. This chapter discusses the details of the armistice agreement with each of Israel's Arab neighbours.
Avi Shlaim
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198294597
- eISBN:
- 9780191685057
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198294597.003.0041
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines the distinguishing characteristics of the armistice agreements signed by Israel with its neighbouring Arab states. The agreements signed at Rhodes were all temporary in ...
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This chapter examines the distinguishing characteristics of the armistice agreements signed by Israel with its neighbouring Arab states. The agreements signed at Rhodes were all temporary in character and they were tailored to meet the needs of a brief transition period. The armistices proved sterile because after the Rhodes conference Arab political activists and the Arab press started saying that this was only a truce and that the conflict continued. This reaction was triggered by an acute sense of frustration at the failure of Arab diplomacy and the widespread fear of Israeli expansionism.Less
This chapter examines the distinguishing characteristics of the armistice agreements signed by Israel with its neighbouring Arab states. The agreements signed at Rhodes were all temporary in character and they were tailored to meet the needs of a brief transition period. The armistices proved sterile because after the Rhodes conference Arab political activists and the Arab press started saying that this was only a truce and that the conflict continued. This reaction was triggered by an acute sense of frustration at the failure of Arab diplomacy and the widespread fear of Israeli expansionism.
Jonathan H. Ebel
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780300176704
- eISBN:
- 9780300216356
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300176704.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Social History
Using materials and events from the years immediately following the Great War, this chapter examines the religious dimensions of the relationship between the United States and its military in the ...
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Using materials and events from the years immediately following the Great War, this chapter examines the religious dimensions of the relationship between the United States and its military in the interwar period. Written sources from the period used Christian language and imagery to develop a civil religious orthodoxy to which idealization and veneration of the soldier are central. Embodied and performative sources, such as parades and anti-communist riots, indicate that soldiers engaged with and often embraced this civil religion, accepting the authority society bestowed on them and acting the part of the word of the nation made flesh.Less
Using materials and events from the years immediately following the Great War, this chapter examines the religious dimensions of the relationship between the United States and its military in the interwar period. Written sources from the period used Christian language and imagery to develop a civil religious orthodoxy to which idealization and veneration of the soldier are central. Embodied and performative sources, such as parades and anti-communist riots, indicate that soldiers engaged with and often embraced this civil religion, accepting the authority society bestowed on them and acting the part of the word of the nation made flesh.
Gerhard L. Weinberg
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693627
- eISBN:
- 9780191741258
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693627.003.0032
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Both sides in World War II expected the other to accept unconditional surrender. If Hitler had been overthrown by internal opposition there might have been a compromise peace. France and Finland were ...
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Both sides in World War II expected the other to accept unconditional surrender. If Hitler had been overthrown by internal opposition there might have been a compromise peace. France and Finland were the only participants to secure an armistice. Stalin might have been interested in a separate peace with Germany but Hitler was not. German and Japanese war aims precluded serious negotiations. Concern over Germany's starting a third world war greatly influenced the Allies, and especially Roosevelt, to insist on unconditional surrender. Worry that Japanese soldiers might fight on after the occupation of the home islands and an official surrender led the Allies to agree to Japan keeping an imperial system subject to Allied command. The war ended with all participants on the defeated side with the exception of Finland completely occupied by the victors.Less
Both sides in World War II expected the other to accept unconditional surrender. If Hitler had been overthrown by internal opposition there might have been a compromise peace. France and Finland were the only participants to secure an armistice. Stalin might have been interested in a separate peace with Germany but Hitler was not. German and Japanese war aims precluded serious negotiations. Concern over Germany's starting a third world war greatly influenced the Allies, and especially Roosevelt, to insist on unconditional surrender. Worry that Japanese soldiers might fight on after the occupation of the home islands and an official surrender led the Allies to agree to Japan keeping an imperial system subject to Allied command. The war ended with all participants on the defeated side with the exception of Finland completely occupied by the victors.
DOUGLAS NEWTON
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198203148
- eISBN:
- 9780191675744
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203148.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, European Modern History
The chapter discusses the willing attitude of Germany towards democracy and the various factors at work in the eventual British decision for armistice. The armistice was a premature suspension of ...
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The chapter discusses the willing attitude of Germany towards democracy and the various factors at work in the eventual British decision for armistice. The armistice was a premature suspension of hostilities that denied Allied arms and British arms in particular, in other words, an imminent ‘knock-out blow’. The chapter seeks to emphasize the importance of three factors, namely, domestic political preoccupations, entrenched hostility to Wilsonianism, and waning confidence in British military capabilities. These factors above all guided the British political elite during the making of the armistice. Moreover, the armistice was accepted not because of confidence in an overwhelming British military strength, but rather from fear of an imminent exposure of military weakness.Less
The chapter discusses the willing attitude of Germany towards democracy and the various factors at work in the eventual British decision for armistice. The armistice was a premature suspension of hostilities that denied Allied arms and British arms in particular, in other words, an imminent ‘knock-out blow’. The chapter seeks to emphasize the importance of three factors, namely, domestic political preoccupations, entrenched hostility to Wilsonianism, and waning confidence in British military capabilities. These factors above all guided the British political elite during the making of the armistice. Moreover, the armistice was accepted not because of confidence in an overwhelming British military strength, but rather from fear of an imminent exposure of military weakness.
DOUGLAS NEWTON
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198203148
- eISBN:
- 9780191675744
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203148.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, European Modern History
The chapter discusses the close coincidence of the two key events that ended the First World War, the revolution in Germany and the armistice at Compiegne, and their enormous consequences for the ...
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The chapter discusses the close coincidence of the two key events that ended the First World War, the revolution in Germany and the armistice at Compiegne, and their enormous consequences for the history of peacemaking. The British government, under great pressure to obtain an armistice, accepted the fact that a ‘dictated peace’ in the pure sense of the phrase had been surrendered. The British did secure two reservations to the Fourteen Points, but these did not threaten the conditional nature of the armistice contract and the British were still bound to the bulk of the Wilsonian program.Less
The chapter discusses the close coincidence of the two key events that ended the First World War, the revolution in Germany and the armistice at Compiegne, and their enormous consequences for the history of peacemaking. The British government, under great pressure to obtain an armistice, accepted the fact that a ‘dictated peace’ in the pure sense of the phrase had been surrendered. The British did secure two reservations to the Fourteen Points, but these did not threaten the conditional nature of the armistice contract and the British were still bound to the bulk of the Wilsonian program.
David French
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198205593
- eISBN:
- 9780191676680
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198205593.003.0012
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Political History
The armistice terms which Britain helped to negotiate in the autumn of 1918 represented a qualified success. At sea they safeguarded Britain's maritime supremacy, and on land they confirmed that if ...
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The armistice terms which Britain helped to negotiate in the autumn of 1918 represented a qualified success. At sea they safeguarded Britain's maritime supremacy, and on land they confirmed that if the German army did resume fighting, it would do so at a distinct disadvantage, and on its own soil. They ensured that decisions on the issues of reparations, freedom of the seas, and the future of enemy colonies could be postponed for what the British hoped would be a more auspicious occasion. In Africa and Asia they robbed Turkey or Germany of any hope of menacing Britain's imperial security. But what they had failed to do was to establish a new balance of power in Europe that would promote Britain's post-war interests by ensuring stability on the continent. That was something which would have to be left to the peace conference.Less
The armistice terms which Britain helped to negotiate in the autumn of 1918 represented a qualified success. At sea they safeguarded Britain's maritime supremacy, and on land they confirmed that if the German army did resume fighting, it would do so at a distinct disadvantage, and on its own soil. They ensured that decisions on the issues of reparations, freedom of the seas, and the future of enemy colonies could be postponed for what the British hoped would be a more auspicious occasion. In Africa and Asia they robbed Turkey or Germany of any hope of menacing Britain's imperial security. But what they had failed to do was to establish a new balance of power in Europe that would promote Britain's post-war interests by ensuring stability on the continent. That was something which would have to be left to the peace conference.
Scott Newton
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198202127
- eISBN:
- 9780191675164
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198202127.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
The three-year, limited-war strategy could not survive the collapse of France. The Maginot Line and the French army had failed utterly to hold up the German advance. Following the signature of the ...
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The three-year, limited-war strategy could not survive the collapse of France. The Maginot Line and the French army had failed utterly to hold up the German advance. Following the signature of the Franco-German armistice on 22 June 1940 the British confronted a European politico-economic bloc either directly controlled or dominated by Nazi Germany. All of the north and west European coast from the Arctic Circle to the mouth of the Loire was in hostile hands. The Italian entry into the war opened a second front in the Mediterranean and east Africa; there was concern about Japanese expansionism in the Far East. So not only had the foundations of the strategy for defeating Germany been destroyed but the nightmare of an isolated Britain engaged in a three-front war was now a serious prospect. The government was left with a stark choice between peace with Germany, on Hitler's terms, or fighting on with the minimum objective of strengthening its bargaining power in any negotiation and with the more hopeful, maximum one of prolonging the conflict until American aid and maybe participation made victory certain.Less
The three-year, limited-war strategy could not survive the collapse of France. The Maginot Line and the French army had failed utterly to hold up the German advance. Following the signature of the Franco-German armistice on 22 June 1940 the British confronted a European politico-economic bloc either directly controlled or dominated by Nazi Germany. All of the north and west European coast from the Arctic Circle to the mouth of the Loire was in hostile hands. The Italian entry into the war opened a second front in the Mediterranean and east Africa; there was concern about Japanese expansionism in the Far East. So not only had the foundations of the strategy for defeating Germany been destroyed but the nightmare of an isolated Britain engaged in a three-front war was now a serious prospect. The government was left with a stark choice between peace with Germany, on Hitler's terms, or fighting on with the minimum objective of strengthening its bargaining power in any negotiation and with the more hopeful, maximum one of prolonging the conflict until American aid and maybe participation made victory certain.
