Frank Lovett
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199579419
- eISBN:
- 9780191722837
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579419.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
In all societies, past and present, many persons and groups have been subject to domination. Properly understood, domination is a great evil, the suffering of which ought to be minimized as far as ...
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In all societies, past and present, many persons and groups have been subject to domination. Properly understood, domination is a great evil, the suffering of which ought to be minimized as far as possible. Surprisingly, however, political and social theorists have failed to provide a detailed analysis of the concept of domination in general. This study aims to redress this lacuna. It argues first that domination should be understood as a condition experienced by persons or groups to the extent that they are dependent on a social relationship in which some other person or group wields arbitrary power over them; this is termed the “arbitrary power conception” of domination. Second, it argues that we should regard it as wrong to perpetrate or permit unnecessary domination and, thus, that as a matter of justice the political and social institutions and practices of any society should be organized so as to minimize avoidable domination; this is termed “justice as minimizing domination (JMD),” a conception of social justice that connects with more familiar civic republican accounts of freedom as nondomination. In developing these arguments, this study employs a variety of methodological techniques — including conceptual analysis, formal modeling, social theory, and moral philosophy; existing accounts of dependency, power, social convention, and so on are clarified, expanded, or revised along the way. While of special interest to contemporary civic republicans, this study should appeal to a broad audience with diverse methodological and substantive interests.Less
In all societies, past and present, many persons and groups have been subject to domination. Properly understood, domination is a great evil, the suffering of which ought to be minimized as far as possible. Surprisingly, however, political and social theorists have failed to provide a detailed analysis of the concept of domination in general. This study aims to redress this lacuna. It argues first that domination should be understood as a condition experienced by persons or groups to the extent that they are dependent on a social relationship in which some other person or group wields arbitrary power over them; this is termed the “arbitrary power conception” of domination. Second, it argues that we should regard it as wrong to perpetrate or permit unnecessary domination and, thus, that as a matter of justice the political and social institutions and practices of any society should be organized so as to minimize avoidable domination; this is termed “justice as minimizing domination (JMD),” a conception of social justice that connects with more familiar civic republican accounts of freedom as nondomination. In developing these arguments, this study employs a variety of methodological techniques — including conceptual analysis, formal modeling, social theory, and moral philosophy; existing accounts of dependency, power, social convention, and so on are clarified, expanded, or revised along the way. While of special interest to contemporary civic republicans, this study should appeal to a broad audience with diverse methodological and substantive interests.
Frank Lovett
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199579419
- eISBN:
- 9780191722837
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579419.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter considers and rejects hegemony and other form‐based conceptions of domination. It defends instead an arbitrary power conception, according to which one person or group experienced ...
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This chapter considers and rejects hegemony and other form‐based conceptions of domination. It defends instead an arbitrary power conception, according to which one person or group experienced domination to the extent that it is dependent on a social relationship in which some other person or group wields arbitrary power over them. The idea of arbitrariness is analyzed with the aid of a discussion of social conventions. Democratic and other substantive interpretations of arbitrariness are rejected in favor of a procedural interpretation.Less
This chapter considers and rejects hegemony and other form‐based conceptions of domination. It defends instead an arbitrary power conception, according to which one person or group experienced domination to the extent that it is dependent on a social relationship in which some other person or group wields arbitrary power over them. The idea of arbitrariness is analyzed with the aid of a discussion of social conventions. Democratic and other substantive interpretations of arbitrariness are rejected in favor of a procedural interpretation.
Anja Eleveld
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781447340010
- eISBN:
- 9781447340164
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Policy Press
- DOI:
- 10.1332/policypress/9781447340010.003.0012
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
This chapter examines how the republican theory of non-domination can be used for a normative analysis of WTW relationships. It is argued that Lovett’s conception of non-domination captures some of ...
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This chapter examines how the republican theory of non-domination can be used for a normative analysis of WTW relationships. It is argued that Lovett’s conception of non-domination captures some of the defining elements of these relationships. However, his conception of rules is (too) strongly rooted in the ideas of reasonability and impartiality, as a result of which vulnerable people in particular are at risk of being excluded from its (potentially protective) scope. Therefore, a republican normative analysis of WTW practices should also take account of Pettit’s more inclusive, democratic account of the republican theory of non-domination that is more attentive to the need for democratic oversight over discretionary spaces of welfare officers and work supervisors.Less
This chapter examines how the republican theory of non-domination can be used for a normative analysis of WTW relationships. It is argued that Lovett’s conception of non-domination captures some of the defining elements of these relationships. However, his conception of rules is (too) strongly rooted in the ideas of reasonability and impartiality, as a result of which vulnerable people in particular are at risk of being excluded from its (potentially protective) scope. Therefore, a republican normative analysis of WTW practices should also take account of Pettit’s more inclusive, democratic account of the republican theory of non-domination that is more attentive to the need for democratic oversight over discretionary spaces of welfare officers and work supervisors.
Maurizio Viroli
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151823
- eISBN:
- 9781400840274
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151823.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter discusses the court system. When an enormous or arbitrary power establishes itself in a country, the court system is created. A court exists when a person, by virtue of his enormous ...
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This chapter discusses the court system. When an enormous or arbitrary power establishes itself in a country, the court system is created. A court exists when a person, by virtue of his enormous power, constantly occupies a more elevated and central position in relation to a relatively large number of individuals who depend on him in order to gain, keep, and increase their wealth, status, and chance of appearing and being seen and admired. This system depends on the effective power of the signore to distribute to the courtiers material and symbolic benefits and to threaten them, equally effectively, with the loss of those goods. In the court system, the prince too depends to a certain degree on the courtiers and all those whom he can benefit or threaten. However, the superior power of the signore and his central position are not in question. Ultimately, the most important reason for a court's existence is the practice of servitude.Less
This chapter discusses the court system. When an enormous or arbitrary power establishes itself in a country, the court system is created. A court exists when a person, by virtue of his enormous power, constantly occupies a more elevated and central position in relation to a relatively large number of individuals who depend on him in order to gain, keep, and increase their wealth, status, and chance of appearing and being seen and admired. This system depends on the effective power of the signore to distribute to the courtiers material and symbolic benefits and to threaten them, equally effectively, with the loss of those goods. In the court system, the prince too depends to a certain degree on the courtiers and all those whom he can benefit or threaten. However, the superior power of the signore and his central position are not in question. Ultimately, the most important reason for a court's existence is the practice of servitude.
Maurizio Viroli
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151823
- eISBN:
- 9781400840274
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151823.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter explores a number of unmistakable signs that servants can be recognized by. The first is fear. Those who live under the arbitrary power of another man never feels safe, even if they are ...
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This chapter explores a number of unmistakable signs that servants can be recognized by. The first is fear. Those who live under the arbitrary power of another man never feels safe, even if they are not oppressed, because they know that the man who is dominating them can take their lives, or humiliate them, or deprive them of their property. They are downcast, they do not look other men in the eye, they are inclined to lie and dissimulate, and most important of all, they are incapable of courage. In contrast, the distinctive mark of political liberty is the sentiment of security and safety, understood as the absence of fear. Along with fear, another distinctive sign of dependency is servility, that is, the inclination to indulge a powerful man in order to obtain or maintain privileges. The flatterer, in order to perform his duties properly, must also insult, denigrate, and deride the enemies of the prince.Less
This chapter explores a number of unmistakable signs that servants can be recognized by. The first is fear. Those who live under the arbitrary power of another man never feels safe, even if they are not oppressed, because they know that the man who is dominating them can take their lives, or humiliate them, or deprive them of their property. They are downcast, they do not look other men in the eye, they are inclined to lie and dissimulate, and most important of all, they are incapable of courage. In contrast, the distinctive mark of political liberty is the sentiment of security and safety, understood as the absence of fear. Along with fear, another distinctive sign of dependency is servility, that is, the inclination to indulge a powerful man in order to obtain or maintain privileges. The flatterer, in order to perform his duties properly, must also insult, denigrate, and deride the enemies of the prince.
FRANCES HARRIS
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198202240
- eISBN:
- 9780191675232
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198202240.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
Sarah was one of many who showed no remorse for the death of Charles II as she believed that he merely succumbed to the orders of France and that he was one of those behind the killing of the Whig ...
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Sarah was one of many who showed no remorse for the death of Charles II as she believed that he merely succumbed to the orders of France and that he was one of those behind the killing of the Whig leaders which proceeded the Rye House plot. She believed that James II, brother and successor to Charles II, managed the public better. She favoured the fact that he opted to establish his own religion that would enable the saving of souls. In this chapter we see Sarah performing as a Court servant and the chapter shows that she had several shortcomings in this position. The chapter includes a discussion on how England had been freed from ‘Arbitrary power & popery’, and how Sarah's political attitudes were shaped through the broken ties and the risks she had taken in achieving such a purpose.Less
Sarah was one of many who showed no remorse for the death of Charles II as she believed that he merely succumbed to the orders of France and that he was one of those behind the killing of the Whig leaders which proceeded the Rye House plot. She believed that James II, brother and successor to Charles II, managed the public better. She favoured the fact that he opted to establish his own religion that would enable the saving of souls. In this chapter we see Sarah performing as a Court servant and the chapter shows that she had several shortcomings in this position. The chapter includes a discussion on how England had been freed from ‘Arbitrary power & popery’, and how Sarah's political attitudes were shaped through the broken ties and the risks she had taken in achieving such a purpose.
T. R. S. Allan
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199685066
- eISBN:
- 9780191765353
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685066.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law, Philosophy of Law
Constitutional law and practice aspire to conform to the rule of law, conceived as a fundamental ideal linked to ideals of liberty and justice. The special value of legality is best understood as ...
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Constitutional law and practice aspire to conform to the rule of law, conceived as a fundamental ideal linked to ideals of liberty and justice. The special value of legality is best understood as compliance with the conditions that secure liberty as independence. The writings of Dicey, Hayek, and Locke can be seen as contributions to that republican notion of freedom. It is an ideal that extends beyond formal equality to embrace a more substantive conception of equal citizenship: the equal protection of the law. A bill of attainder cannot qualify as law; nor can measures based on irrational (unjustifiable) discrimination. The rule of law is a bulwark against arbitrary power, from whatever source it arises; it invokes and informs a moral conception of law. Since administrative discretion threatens liberty as independence it must be checked by judicial review, enforcing rigorous standards of due process.Less
Constitutional law and practice aspire to conform to the rule of law, conceived as a fundamental ideal linked to ideals of liberty and justice. The special value of legality is best understood as compliance with the conditions that secure liberty as independence. The writings of Dicey, Hayek, and Locke can be seen as contributions to that republican notion of freedom. It is an ideal that extends beyond formal equality to embrace a more substantive conception of equal citizenship: the equal protection of the law. A bill of attainder cannot qualify as law; nor can measures based on irrational (unjustifiable) discrimination. The rule of law is a bulwark against arbitrary power, from whatever source it arises; it invokes and informs a moral conception of law. Since administrative discretion threatens liberty as independence it must be checked by judicial review, enforcing rigorous standards of due process.
Gerald J Postema
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- March 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198729327
- eISBN:
- 9780191796265
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198729327.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
The rule of law promises protection and recourse against the arbitrary exercise of power. The guiding aim of the rule-of-law ideal is served when law’s rule extends to all forms of power in the ...
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The rule of law promises protection and recourse against the arbitrary exercise of power. The guiding aim of the rule-of-law ideal is served when law’s rule extends to all forms of power in the polity, social as well as political—the rule of law is not only a mode of governance, but also a mode of association. This chapter defends the centrality to the rule of law of the task of protecting individuals from power wielded by non-governmental entities and individuals. It also argues that the rule of law takes hold in a polity only when law is planted firmly in a commonwealth of mutual faithfulness to the differentiated and interconnected responsibilities of fidelity to law (mutual accountability). Law rules not only when government officials are held accountable for the discharge of their duties under law, but also when ordinary citizens structure their relationships by law and hold each other accountable to the common, public terms that the law provides.Less
The rule of law promises protection and recourse against the arbitrary exercise of power. The guiding aim of the rule-of-law ideal is served when law’s rule extends to all forms of power in the polity, social as well as political—the rule of law is not only a mode of governance, but also a mode of association. This chapter defends the centrality to the rule of law of the task of protecting individuals from power wielded by non-governmental entities and individuals. It also argues that the rule of law takes hold in a polity only when law is planted firmly in a commonwealth of mutual faithfulness to the differentiated and interconnected responsibilities of fidelity to law (mutual accountability). Law rules not only when government officials are held accountable for the discharge of their duties under law, but also when ordinary citizens structure their relationships by law and hold each other accountable to the common, public terms that the law provides.
Lisa M Austin and Dennis Klimchuk (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- March 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198729327
- eISBN:
- 9780191796265
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198729327.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
Notwithstanding deep points of disagreement, there is a general—albeit largely implicit—consensus among theorists of the rule of law around what we call the public law presumption: the view that the ...
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Notwithstanding deep points of disagreement, there is a general—albeit largely implicit—consensus among theorists of the rule of law around what we call the public law presumption: the view that the rule of law is essentially a public law doctrine. We see this view expressed in influential accounts of the rule of law including the work of Dicey, Hayek, Fuller, and Raz. The goal of this book is to challenge the public law presumption. The chapters in this collection all consider the idea that the rule of law concerns the nature of law generally and the conditions under which any relationship—between citizens as well as between citizens and the state—becomes subject to law. They address two major questions. The first question is whether our understanding of the rule of law is enriched by considering how and to what degree it is expressed or realized in private law. For example, many of the chapters address the ways in which the private law secures rule of law values such as non-arbitrariness and guidance. The second question is whether our understanding of the private law is enriched by adding the principles of the rule of law to the traditional list of core private law concepts. For example, many of the chapters show how private law concerns are usefully illuminated through rule of law themes, including strict liability, limitation periods, equity, and ‘boilerplate’.Less
Notwithstanding deep points of disagreement, there is a general—albeit largely implicit—consensus among theorists of the rule of law around what we call the public law presumption: the view that the rule of law is essentially a public law doctrine. We see this view expressed in influential accounts of the rule of law including the work of Dicey, Hayek, Fuller, and Raz. The goal of this book is to challenge the public law presumption. The chapters in this collection all consider the idea that the rule of law concerns the nature of law generally and the conditions under which any relationship—between citizens as well as between citizens and the state—becomes subject to law. They address two major questions. The first question is whether our understanding of the rule of law is enriched by considering how and to what degree it is expressed or realized in private law. For example, many of the chapters address the ways in which the private law secures rule of law values such as non-arbitrariness and guidance. The second question is whether our understanding of the private law is enriched by adding the principles of the rule of law to the traditional list of core private law concepts. For example, many of the chapters show how private law concerns are usefully illuminated through rule of law themes, including strict liability, limitation periods, equity, and ‘boilerplate’.
Assaf Sharon
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198759621
- eISBN:
- 9780191821608
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198759621.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter argues that contemporary republicanism is mistaken in its claim that the rule of law is compatible with individual liberty (understood as non-domination), because it is non-arbitrary. It ...
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This chapter argues that contemporary republicanism is mistaken in its claim that the rule of law is compatible with individual liberty (understood as non-domination), because it is non-arbitrary. It considers three republican definitions of non-arbitrariness—in terms of consent, interests, and control—and argues that all three are dubious and that the rule of law does not satisfy any of them. The chapter then analyzes republican concerns with arbitrariness as resistance towards discretionary powers and argues, finally, that the republican idea of eliminating discretionary power is not always desirable or essential to political freedom. Discretionary powers are not necessarily dominating and may be independently desirable, and non-discretionary powers can be dominating. The exclusive focus on arbitrary interferences with liberty obscures principal forms of political domination.Less
This chapter argues that contemporary republicanism is mistaken in its claim that the rule of law is compatible with individual liberty (understood as non-domination), because it is non-arbitrary. It considers three republican definitions of non-arbitrariness—in terms of consent, interests, and control—and argues that all three are dubious and that the rule of law does not satisfy any of them. The chapter then analyzes republican concerns with arbitrariness as resistance towards discretionary powers and argues, finally, that the republican idea of eliminating discretionary power is not always desirable or essential to political freedom. Discretionary powers are not necessarily dominating and may be independently desirable, and non-discretionary powers can be dominating. The exclusive focus on arbitrary interferences with liberty obscures principal forms of political domination.
Thomas J. Donahue-Ochoa
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190051686
- eISBN:
- 9780190051716
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190051686.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Chapter 5 mounts the main argument of the book to show that oppression makes everyone unfree. The main ideas are that oppressions are despotic over their victims, that they can endure only if they ...
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Chapter 5 mounts the main argument of the book to show that oppression makes everyone unfree. The main ideas are that oppressions are despotic over their victims, that they can endure only if they try to suppress all actual or potential resistance, that any institutional feature of society that suppresses resistance has established authority, that institutional features with established authority are central social institutions, while suppressing resistance to central social institutions counts as authoritarian tactics used against everyone, that such tactics count as arbitrary power, and that to be subjected to such power is to be subjected to unfreedom of the kind theorized by neo-republicans and Hayekian competitive-order theorists. And since we all have a decent-life interest in freedom from arbitrary power, we are all harmed by such oppression, since it sets back this interest for everyone in society.Less
Chapter 5 mounts the main argument of the book to show that oppression makes everyone unfree. The main ideas are that oppressions are despotic over their victims, that they can endure only if they try to suppress all actual or potential resistance, that any institutional feature of society that suppresses resistance has established authority, that institutional features with established authority are central social institutions, while suppressing resistance to central social institutions counts as authoritarian tactics used against everyone, that such tactics count as arbitrary power, and that to be subjected to such power is to be subjected to unfreedom of the kind theorized by neo-republicans and Hayekian competitive-order theorists. And since we all have a decent-life interest in freedom from arbitrary power, we are all harmed by such oppression, since it sets back this interest for everyone in society.
Susan James
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- November 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198713074
- eISBN:
- 9780191781438
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198713074.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Spinoza offers a way to contest the view that we can only deal with environmental risks by giving up a significant degree of freedom. Unlike other defenders of the republican conception of liberty, ...
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Spinoza offers a way to contest the view that we can only deal with environmental risks by giving up a significant degree of freedom. Unlike other defenders of the republican conception of liberty, he argues that we can be made unfree by non-human things such as viruses or weather-patterns. Insofar as we are subject to their arbitrary power, we are already in a condition of servitude. If we adopt this Spinozist diagnosis of our condition, the problem we confront is not so much whether we are willing to give up existing freedoms as whether we can find the means to overcome a lack of freedom that is arguably more destructive than we generally recognize.Less
Spinoza offers a way to contest the view that we can only deal with environmental risks by giving up a significant degree of freedom. Unlike other defenders of the republican conception of liberty, he argues that we can be made unfree by non-human things such as viruses or weather-patterns. Insofar as we are subject to their arbitrary power, we are already in a condition of servitude. If we adopt this Spinozist diagnosis of our condition, the problem we confront is not so much whether we are willing to give up existing freedoms as whether we can find the means to overcome a lack of freedom that is arguably more destructive than we generally recognize.
Susan James
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- November 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198713074
- eISBN:
- 9780191781438
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198713074.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
In his Ethics, Spinoza uses a republican conception of political liberty as a model for a broader theory of philosophical freedom. According to the republican view, we only live freely when we are ...
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In his Ethics, Spinoza uses a republican conception of political liberty as a model for a broader theory of philosophical freedom. According to the republican view, we only live freely when we are not subject to the arbitrary power of other agents. But if we consider our metaphysical position as individuals surrounded by things more powerful than ourselves, it seems that freedom is beyond our reach. We cannot but be subject to the arbitrary power of external things. Spinoza responds to this problem by arguing that, when we reason, we are not acted on by external things and are thus not subject to their arbitrary power. Extending the republican view beyond politics allows him to conclude that philosophizing liberates us.Less
In his Ethics, Spinoza uses a republican conception of political liberty as a model for a broader theory of philosophical freedom. According to the republican view, we only live freely when we are not subject to the arbitrary power of other agents. But if we consider our metaphysical position as individuals surrounded by things more powerful than ourselves, it seems that freedom is beyond our reach. We cannot but be subject to the arbitrary power of external things. Spinoza responds to this problem by arguing that, when we reason, we are not acted on by external things and are thus not subject to their arbitrary power. Extending the republican view beyond politics allows him to conclude that philosophizing liberates us.
Margaret Jane Radin
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- March 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198729327
- eISBN:
- 9780191796265
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198729327.003.0014
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
In today’s USA, transactions between firms and consumers (or businesses in the position of consumers) routinely contain fine-print terms deleting rights to legal remedies against the firm. Remedial ...
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In today’s USA, transactions between firms and consumers (or businesses in the position of consumers) routinely contain fine-print terms deleting rights to legal remedies against the firm. Remedial rights should not be treated as mere default rules routinely waivable through receipt of fine-print contracts (‘boilerplate’), because such rights deletions threaten the rule of law by undermining rights structures that are central to the state’s obligations toward the public. Boilerplate rights deletions place recipients into ‘quasi-anarchy’, a one-sided situation resembling, for recipients, the anarchy that the state is supposed to supplant. They underwrite a scheme of privatization that amounts to the exercise of arbitrary power over recipients; and they transgress the principle of equality before the law by separating people that retain legal rights from people that do not. Such rights should remain situated in the public realm.Less
In today’s USA, transactions between firms and consumers (or businesses in the position of consumers) routinely contain fine-print terms deleting rights to legal remedies against the firm. Remedial rights should not be treated as mere default rules routinely waivable through receipt of fine-print contracts (‘boilerplate’), because such rights deletions threaten the rule of law by undermining rights structures that are central to the state’s obligations toward the public. Boilerplate rights deletions place recipients into ‘quasi-anarchy’, a one-sided situation resembling, for recipients, the anarchy that the state is supposed to supplant. They underwrite a scheme of privatization that amounts to the exercise of arbitrary power over recipients; and they transgress the principle of equality before the law by separating people that retain legal rights from people that do not. Such rights should remain situated in the public realm.
Laura Brace
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- December 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198766841
- eISBN:
- 9780191821127
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198766841.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter explores some of the connections between Wollstonecraft’s ideas about slavery and property and anti-slavery arguments of the 1790s about slavery as a state of war, the illegitimate ...
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This chapter explores some of the connections between Wollstonecraft’s ideas about slavery and property and anti-slavery arguments of the 1790s about slavery as a state of war, the illegitimate exercise of arbitrary power, and freedom as intrinsically connected to owning a property in the person. There were a plurality of languages about slavery and property available to Wollstonecraft, some of it Lockean, others more radical or republican, and she made intriguing use of them all in the context of a wider political discourse about encroaching executive despotism and arbitrary political power. By locating Wollstonecraft’s ideas about slavery and property in the context of this anti-tyrannicism and related anti-slavery arguments about improvement, property in the person, humanity, barbarity, and degradation, this chapter draws out the implications of her arguments for the development of the public sphere and a sense of belonging to civil society in the late eighteenth century.Less
This chapter explores some of the connections between Wollstonecraft’s ideas about slavery and property and anti-slavery arguments of the 1790s about slavery as a state of war, the illegitimate exercise of arbitrary power, and freedom as intrinsically connected to owning a property in the person. There were a plurality of languages about slavery and property available to Wollstonecraft, some of it Lockean, others more radical or republican, and she made intriguing use of them all in the context of a wider political discourse about encroaching executive despotism and arbitrary political power. By locating Wollstonecraft’s ideas about slavery and property in the context of this anti-tyrannicism and related anti-slavery arguments about improvement, property in the person, humanity, barbarity, and degradation, this chapter draws out the implications of her arguments for the development of the public sphere and a sense of belonging to civil society in the late eighteenth century.
Robert S. Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198798736
- eISBN:
- 9780191839504
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198798736.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
How can citizens best protect themselves from the arbitrary power of abusive spouses, tyrannical bosses, and corrupt politicians? Exit Left makes the case that in each of these three spheres the ...
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How can citizens best protect themselves from the arbitrary power of abusive spouses, tyrannical bosses, and corrupt politicians? Exit Left makes the case that in each of these three spheres the answer is the same: exit. By promoting open and competitive markets and providing the information and financial resources necessary to enable exit, we can empower people’s voices and offer them an escape from abuse and exploitation. This will advance a conception of freedom, viz. freedom as non-domination (FND), that is central to contemporary republican thought. Neo-republicans have typically promoted FND through constitutional means (the separation of powers, judicial review, the rule of law, and federalism) and participatory ones (democratic elections and oversight), but this book focuses on economic means, ones that have been neglected by contemporary republicans but were commonly invoked in the older, commercial-republican tradition of Alexander Hamilton, Immanuel Kant, and Adam Smith. Just as Philip Pettit and other neo-republicans have revived and revised classical republicanism, so this book will do the same for commercial republicanism. This revival will enlarge republican practice by encouraging greater use of market mechanisms, even as it hews closely to existing republican theory.Less
How can citizens best protect themselves from the arbitrary power of abusive spouses, tyrannical bosses, and corrupt politicians? Exit Left makes the case that in each of these three spheres the answer is the same: exit. By promoting open and competitive markets and providing the information and financial resources necessary to enable exit, we can empower people’s voices and offer them an escape from abuse and exploitation. This will advance a conception of freedom, viz. freedom as non-domination (FND), that is central to contemporary republican thought. Neo-republicans have typically promoted FND through constitutional means (the separation of powers, judicial review, the rule of law, and federalism) and participatory ones (democratic elections and oversight), but this book focuses on economic means, ones that have been neglected by contemporary republicans but were commonly invoked in the older, commercial-republican tradition of Alexander Hamilton, Immanuel Kant, and Adam Smith. Just as Philip Pettit and other neo-republicans have revived and revised classical republicanism, so this book will do the same for commercial republicanism. This revival will enlarge republican practice by encouraging greater use of market mechanisms, even as it hews closely to existing republican theory.
Mark Tushnet
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199670024
- eISBN:
- 9780191749414
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199670024.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter examines the complex relationship between judicial accountability and judicial independence. If judges are unaccountable to the public, they can become the people's rulers. Yet, if they ...
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This chapter examines the complex relationship between judicial accountability and judicial independence. If judges are unaccountable to the public, they can become the people's rulers. Yet, if they are too accountable to the public they can exercise arbitrary power. The chapter describes mechanisms of achieving accountability through various methods of judicial appointment and removal. But, it argues, more important than those methods is the idea of ensuring judicial accountability by insisting that judges be accountable to the law. That notion, too, is complex. It includes some idea of responsibility to past law-makers, coupled with some idea of accountability to contemporary professionals who define for judges what it means to make decisions according to law.Less
This chapter examines the complex relationship between judicial accountability and judicial independence. If judges are unaccountable to the public, they can become the people's rulers. Yet, if they are too accountable to the public they can exercise arbitrary power. The chapter describes mechanisms of achieving accountability through various methods of judicial appointment and removal. But, it argues, more important than those methods is the idea of ensuring judicial accountability by insisting that judges be accountable to the law. That notion, too, is complex. It includes some idea of responsibility to past law-makers, coupled with some idea of accountability to contemporary professionals who define for judges what it means to make decisions according to law.
Martin Krygier
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- October 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198864738
- eISBN:
- 9780191896774
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198864738.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
Why have Kaczyński in Poland and Orbán in Hungary found so apparently easy what Donald Trump, whose power and ambitions are not small and whose motivations appear to tend in similar directions, finds ...
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Why have Kaczyński in Poland and Orbán in Hungary found so apparently easy what Donald Trump, whose power and ambitions are not small and whose motivations appear to tend in similar directions, finds so hard: to overwhelm and take over independent institutions that were hoped by many to be able to temper power? The chapter suggests that a fundamental part of the answer stems from a specific failure of understanding—of the significance of institutionalization—among those who led the optimistic projects of the 1990s that now seem to be unravelling at speed. Next, it argues that their populist opponents have unfortunately displayed a better awareness in these matters. Finally, it suggests some responses that lawyers might and are right to make to the onslaughts they face. In this struggle, the efforts of lawyers are not sufficient, because the crisis is fundamentally social and political, but they are necessary.Less
Why have Kaczyński in Poland and Orbán in Hungary found so apparently easy what Donald Trump, whose power and ambitions are not small and whose motivations appear to tend in similar directions, finds so hard: to overwhelm and take over independent institutions that were hoped by many to be able to temper power? The chapter suggests that a fundamental part of the answer stems from a specific failure of understanding—of the significance of institutionalization—among those who led the optimistic projects of the 1990s that now seem to be unravelling at speed. Next, it argues that their populist opponents have unfortunately displayed a better awareness in these matters. Finally, it suggests some responses that lawyers might and are right to make to the onslaughts they face. In this struggle, the efforts of lawyers are not sufficient, because the crisis is fundamentally social and political, but they are necessary.
Thomas J. Donahue
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190051686
- eISBN:
- 9780190051716
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190051686.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
It is often said that we live in global systems of injustice. But if so, what are they, and what are their moral consequences? This book offers a theory of global injustice—“Unfreedom for All.” The ...
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It is often said that we live in global systems of injustice. But if so, what are they, and what are their moral consequences? This book offers a theory of global injustice—“Unfreedom for All.” The theory explores and defends the old adage that “No one is free while others are oppressed” by putting five questions: Why and when ought we to combat injustices done to distant others, and does this require joining in solidarity against them? Do we live under global systems of injustice? What counts as systematic injustice or oppression? Who if anyone is made unfree by such injustices? What harms do they do? Unfreedom for All shows that the “No one is free” creed either answers or results from each of these questions. It defends that creed by considering how systematic injustices—such as global severe poverty, male supremacy, or racial oppression—are perpetuated. The book argues that where your society does such an injustice, it systematically suppresses anyone’s resistance to the injustice—including yours. It uses authoritarian tactics against everyone, so you too are subject to arbitrary power. Hence you too are unfree. This holds just as true of systematic injustices done by global society, and this should be the main reason for joining in solidarity against injustice.Less
It is often said that we live in global systems of injustice. But if so, what are they, and what are their moral consequences? This book offers a theory of global injustice—“Unfreedom for All.” The theory explores and defends the old adage that “No one is free while others are oppressed” by putting five questions: Why and when ought we to combat injustices done to distant others, and does this require joining in solidarity against them? Do we live under global systems of injustice? What counts as systematic injustice or oppression? Who if anyone is made unfree by such injustices? What harms do they do? Unfreedom for All shows that the “No one is free” creed either answers or results from each of these questions. It defends that creed by considering how systematic injustices—such as global severe poverty, male supremacy, or racial oppression—are perpetuated. The book argues that where your society does such an injustice, it systematically suppresses anyone’s resistance to the injustice—including yours. It uses authoritarian tactics against everyone, so you too are subject to arbitrary power. Hence you too are unfree. This holds just as true of systematic injustices done by global society, and this should be the main reason for joining in solidarity against injustice.
Nicholas Jolley
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198791706
- eISBN:
- 9780191837883
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198791706.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter explores Locke’s lifelong concern with the issue of toleration against the background of the political and religious crises through which he lived. It is argued that the constancy of ...
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This chapter explores Locke’s lifelong concern with the issue of toleration against the background of the political and religious crises through which he lived. It is argued that the constancy of Locke’s interest in this issue is rivalled only by his concern with natural law. The chapter charts the development of Locke’s thought about toleration from the authoritarian views of his early writings to the more liberal views of his later works for which he is famous. The chapter also discusses the biographical and political factors that help to explain the development of his views; attention is paid to the impact of Shaftesbury, the Exclusion Crisis, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and the ‘Glorious’ Revolution of 1688.Less
This chapter explores Locke’s lifelong concern with the issue of toleration against the background of the political and religious crises through which he lived. It is argued that the constancy of Locke’s interest in this issue is rivalled only by his concern with natural law. The chapter charts the development of Locke’s thought about toleration from the authoritarian views of his early writings to the more liberal views of his later works for which he is famous. The chapter also discusses the biographical and political factors that help to explain the development of his views; attention is paid to the impact of Shaftesbury, the Exclusion Crisis, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and the ‘Glorious’ Revolution of 1688.