Philip Pettit
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296423
- eISBN:
- 9780191600081
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296428.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Interference involves an intentional or quasi‐intentional worsening of someone's choice situation and occurs on an arbitrary basis to the extent that it is not forced to track the interests and ideas ...
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Interference involves an intentional or quasi‐intentional worsening of someone's choice situation and occurs on an arbitrary basis to the extent that it is not forced to track the interests and ideas of those who suffer the interference. One party dominates another just so far as they have the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis in some of the other's choices; where such domination occurs, it will tend to be a matter of common knowledge among relevant parties but that is not part of the definition. Domination in the sense defined may occur without actual interference: it requires only the capacity for interference; and interference may occur without any domination: if the interference is not arbitrary then it will not dominate. Non‐domination may be advanced in a society either through people coming to have equal powers, or through a legal regime stopping people from dominating one another without itself dominating anyone in turn. When someone enjoys non‐domination, it will usually be a matter of common knowledge among relevant parties, so that non‐domination has a subjective and inter‐subjective aspect: it is associated with tranquillity, in Montesquieu's phrase, and with the ability to look others in the eye. Notwithstanding the allegations of Paley and early liberals, freedom as non‐domination is not a confused ideal, it comes in degrees both of intensity and extent, and it is not an impossibly radical ideal; the rich demands that it would make on the state look capable of being satisfied in our world, even if they were not capable of satisfaction in Paley's.Less
Interference involves an intentional or quasi‐intentional worsening of someone's choice situation and occurs on an arbitrary basis to the extent that it is not forced to track the interests and ideas of those who suffer the interference. One party dominates another just so far as they have the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis in some of the other's choices; where such domination occurs, it will tend to be a matter of common knowledge among relevant parties but that is not part of the definition. Domination in the sense defined may occur without actual interference: it requires only the capacity for interference; and interference may occur without any domination: if the interference is not arbitrary then it will not dominate. Non‐domination may be advanced in a society either through people coming to have equal powers, or through a legal regime stopping people from dominating one another without itself dominating anyone in turn. When someone enjoys non‐domination, it will usually be a matter of common knowledge among relevant parties, so that non‐domination has a subjective and inter‐subjective aspect: it is associated with tranquillity, in Montesquieu's phrase, and with the ability to look others in the eye. Notwithstanding the allegations of Paley and early liberals, freedom as non‐domination is not a confused ideal, it comes in degrees both of intensity and extent, and it is not an impossibly radical ideal; the rich demands that it would make on the state look capable of being satisfied in our world, even if they were not capable of satisfaction in Paley's.
Janet Broughton
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195169720
- eISBN:
- 9780199786343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169727.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This essay contrasts Descartes with three skeptical figures: the Doubting Pyrrhonist, the Agrippan Pyrrhonist, and the Cartesian Skeptic. It argues that the meditator in Descartes’s Meditations is ...
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This essay contrasts Descartes with three skeptical figures: the Doubting Pyrrhonist, the Agrippan Pyrrhonist, and the Cartesian Skeptic. It argues that the meditator in Descartes’s Meditations is different from all three of these skeptics. Seeing the distinctive character of the meditator helps us understand how Descartes could have hoped to meet the challenge of skepticism.Less
This essay contrasts Descartes with three skeptical figures: the Doubting Pyrrhonist, the Agrippan Pyrrhonist, and the Cartesian Skeptic. It argues that the meditator in Descartes’s Meditations is different from all three of these skeptics. Seeing the distinctive character of the meditator helps us understand how Descartes could have hoped to meet the challenge of skepticism.
Frank Lovett
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199579419
- eISBN:
- 9780191722837
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579419.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter considers and rejects hegemony and other form‐based conceptions of domination. It defends instead an arbitrary power conception, according to which one person or group experienced ...
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This chapter considers and rejects hegemony and other form‐based conceptions of domination. It defends instead an arbitrary power conception, according to which one person or group experienced domination to the extent that it is dependent on a social relationship in which some other person or group wields arbitrary power over them. The idea of arbitrariness is analyzed with the aid of a discussion of social conventions. Democratic and other substantive interpretations of arbitrariness are rejected in favor of a procedural interpretation.Less
This chapter considers and rejects hegemony and other form‐based conceptions of domination. It defends instead an arbitrary power conception, according to which one person or group experienced domination to the extent that it is dependent on a social relationship in which some other person or group wields arbitrary power over them. The idea of arbitrariness is analyzed with the aid of a discussion of social conventions. Democratic and other substantive interpretations of arbitrariness are rejected in favor of a procedural interpretation.
David F. Armstrong and Sherman E. Wilcox
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195163483
- eISBN:
- 9780199867523
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195163483.003.0007
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter proposes a reunification of language and gesture, claiming that only by starting with the premise that signed languages are the original and prototypical languages can we achieve a unity ...
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This chapter proposes a reunification of language and gesture, claiming that only by starting with the premise that signed languages are the original and prototypical languages can we achieve a unity of speech and sign as forms of language. Rather than searching for this unity in ever more abstracted ways away from the linguistic material itself, the gestural substance of linguistic communication, it is argued that unity can be achieved by seeing language as grounded in embodied action — visible movement.Less
This chapter proposes a reunification of language and gesture, claiming that only by starting with the premise that signed languages are the original and prototypical languages can we achieve a unity of speech and sign as forms of language. Rather than searching for this unity in ever more abstracted ways away from the linguistic material itself, the gestural substance of linguistic communication, it is argued that unity can be achieved by seeing language as grounded in embodied action — visible movement.
Joseph Mendola
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199534999
- eISBN:
- 9780191715969
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers three clusters of facts about reference and truth. They depend on the vagueness and indeterminacy of reference, deference to experts about the notion of reference, and the way ...
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This chapter considers three clusters of facts about reference and truth. They depend on the vagueness and indeterminacy of reference, deference to experts about the notion of reference, and the way in which extensions of terms rest on quirky and arbitrary social facts. It explores the dark side of the linguistic division of labour. It argues that internalism is correct on these grounds, and that truth and reference are flawed semantic notions.Less
This chapter considers three clusters of facts about reference and truth. They depend on the vagueness and indeterminacy of reference, deference to experts about the notion of reference, and the way in which extensions of terms rest on quirky and arbitrary social facts. It explores the dark side of the linguistic division of labour. It argues that internalism is correct on these grounds, and that truth and reference are flawed semantic notions.
Kok-Chor Tan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199588855
- eISBN:
- 9780191738586
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588855.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter builds on the luck egalitarian ideal defended in Part II, arguing that since equality matters independently of the ideal of democracy, it potentially applies outside the confines of the ...
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This chapter builds on the luck egalitarian ideal defended in Part II, arguing that since equality matters independently of the ideal of democracy, it potentially applies outside the confines of the (democratic) state. On my institutional luck egalitarian account, what is significant is whether there are global practices and institutions that systemically translate natural and arbitrary facts about persons into significant advantages for some and disadvantages for others. This chapter thus elaborates on the ways in which global institutions and practices turn facts that are “arbitrary from a moral point of view” and contingencies into actual social advantages and disadvantages for persons. It points out that the institutional focus prevents global luck egalitarianism from sliding into the absurdity often attributed to it, namely, that global luck egalitarianism has to take on distributive (not just humanitarian) commitments to anyone who so happens to be worse off. Distributive obligations kick in only where there is some institutional order that transforms luck into differential life prospects.Less
This chapter builds on the luck egalitarian ideal defended in Part II, arguing that since equality matters independently of the ideal of democracy, it potentially applies outside the confines of the (democratic) state. On my institutional luck egalitarian account, what is significant is whether there are global practices and institutions that systemically translate natural and arbitrary facts about persons into significant advantages for some and disadvantages for others. This chapter thus elaborates on the ways in which global institutions and practices turn facts that are “arbitrary from a moral point of view” and contingencies into actual social advantages and disadvantages for persons. It points out that the institutional focus prevents global luck egalitarianism from sliding into the absurdity often attributed to it, namely, that global luck egalitarianism has to take on distributive (not just humanitarian) commitments to anyone who so happens to be worse off. Distributive obligations kick in only where there is some institutional order that transforms luck into differential life prospects.
Kok-Chor Tan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199588855
- eISBN:
- 9780191738586
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588855.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Chapter 7 examines objections against extending luck egalitarian considerations to the global domain. These are objections that even if nationality is arbitrary, and that the aim of egalitarian ...
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Chapter 7 examines objections against extending luck egalitarian considerations to the global domain. These are objections that even if nationality is arbitrary, and that the aim of egalitarian justice is to mitigate arbitrary influences on persons’ life options, it is not obvious that global egalitarianism will be the result. It considers, specifically, recent arguments by David Miller, who argues that the fact that nationality is arbitrary does mean that it is morally irrelevant and has to be factored out; and Andrea Sangiovanni, who argues that mitigating for national arbitrariness need not imply global egalitarianism, since a further argument is needed to establish global egalitarianism as the default global distributive pattern.Less
Chapter 7 examines objections against extending luck egalitarian considerations to the global domain. These are objections that even if nationality is arbitrary, and that the aim of egalitarian justice is to mitigate arbitrary influences on persons’ life options, it is not obvious that global egalitarianism will be the result. It considers, specifically, recent arguments by David Miller, who argues that the fact that nationality is arbitrary does mean that it is morally irrelevant and has to be factored out; and Andrea Sangiovanni, who argues that mitigating for national arbitrariness need not imply global egalitarianism, since a further argument is needed to establish global egalitarianism as the default global distributive pattern.
Eoin Carolan
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199568673
- eISBN:
- 9780191721588
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199568673.003.004
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law, Public International Law
This chapter seeks to develop a more suitable theory of institutional separation from the values and exceptions identified in the previous chapter. It proceeds from the previous chapter's conclusion ...
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This chapter seeks to develop a more suitable theory of institutional separation from the values and exceptions identified in the previous chapter. It proceeds from the previous chapter's conclusion that the courts have used independent standards of fairness or justice to legitimize the actions of bodies which are not appropriately regulated by the traditional tripartite theory. This reliance on justice also ties in with the discussion in Chapter 1 of the necessity for the public to regard a constitutional system as 'good', if it is to be effective. After examining a number of options, the chapter concludes that non-arbitrariness is the appropriate foundational principle for the institutional theory. This is because this principle allows for effective governance but provides a means of taking due account of the interests of the individual citizen. It is a principle with sufficient universality to be reasonably used in this way.Less
This chapter seeks to develop a more suitable theory of institutional separation from the values and exceptions identified in the previous chapter. It proceeds from the previous chapter's conclusion that the courts have used independent standards of fairness or justice to legitimize the actions of bodies which are not appropriately regulated by the traditional tripartite theory. This reliance on justice also ties in with the discussion in Chapter 1 of the necessity for the public to regard a constitutional system as 'good', if it is to be effective. After examining a number of options, the chapter concludes that non-arbitrariness is the appropriate foundational principle for the institutional theory. This is because this principle allows for effective governance but provides a means of taking due account of the interests of the individual citizen. It is a principle with sufficient universality to be reasonably used in this way.
Stephan W. Schill
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199589104
- eISBN:
- 9780191595455
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589104.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law, Public International Law
This chapter discusses fair and equitable treatment as one of the core concepts of international investment protection. It suggests that the jurisprudence of investment tribunals on fair and ...
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This chapter discusses fair and equitable treatment as one of the core concepts of international investment protection. It suggests that the jurisprudence of investment tribunals on fair and equitable treatment can be conceptualized under a primarily institutional and procedural concept of the rule for law that has parallels in the major domestic legal systems of liberal democracies, and argues that such an understanding can be normatively grounded in the objective of international investment treaties. This overarching understanding translates into several sub-elements of fair and equitable treatment, including the requirement of stability, predictability and consistency, the principle of legality, the protection of legitimate expectations, procedural due process and denial of justice, substantive due process and protection against discrimination and arbitrariness, transparency, and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.Less
This chapter discusses fair and equitable treatment as one of the core concepts of international investment protection. It suggests that the jurisprudence of investment tribunals on fair and equitable treatment can be conceptualized under a primarily institutional and procedural concept of the rule for law that has parallels in the major domestic legal systems of liberal democracies, and argues that such an understanding can be normatively grounded in the objective of international investment treaties. This overarching understanding translates into several sub-elements of fair and equitable treatment, including the requirement of stability, predictability and consistency, the principle of legality, the protection of legitimate expectations, procedural due process and denial of justice, substantive due process and protection against discrimination and arbitrariness, transparency, and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.
David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199751808
- eISBN:
- 9780199894840
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199751808.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This book defends an interconnected set of moral arguments for God's existence by arguing that classical theism better explains moral duty, freedom, and responsibility than naturalism does. After ...
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This book defends an interconnected set of moral arguments for God's existence by arguing that classical theism better explains moral duty, freedom, and responsibility than naturalism does. After furnishing positive arguments in favor of moral apologetics, the book defends theistic ethics against a number of objections inspired by the Euthyphro Dilemma. Such objections include normativity, “no reasons,” abhorrent commands, vacuity, epistemic, and autonomy objections. Subsequent chapters deploy seven distinctions that together enable both a defense of theistic ethics and an advancement of the moral argument(s) for God's existence. The relevant distinctions encompass matters of scope, semantics, modality, morality, epistemology, meta-ethics, and ontology. The book makes the case not just that God exists, but that a God of perfect love exists, a God who is holy, impeccable, perfect, and a God of covenantal fidelity who can be trusted. Such a notion of Deity provides the needed resources to answer the problem of evil and make sense of Old Testament conquest narratives, while at the same time providing warrant to resist portraits of God that are impossible to square with nonnegotiable moral intuitions. Finally, the book argues that morality receives its fullest and deepest illumination in light of distinctively Christian doctrines such as resurrection, incarnation, and heaven.Less
This book defends an interconnected set of moral arguments for God's existence by arguing that classical theism better explains moral duty, freedom, and responsibility than naturalism does. After furnishing positive arguments in favor of moral apologetics, the book defends theistic ethics against a number of objections inspired by the Euthyphro Dilemma. Such objections include normativity, “no reasons,” abhorrent commands, vacuity, epistemic, and autonomy objections. Subsequent chapters deploy seven distinctions that together enable both a defense of theistic ethics and an advancement of the moral argument(s) for God's existence. The relevant distinctions encompass matters of scope, semantics, modality, morality, epistemology, meta-ethics, and ontology. The book makes the case not just that God exists, but that a God of perfect love exists, a God who is holy, impeccable, perfect, and a God of covenantal fidelity who can be trusted. Such a notion of Deity provides the needed resources to answer the problem of evil and make sense of Old Testament conquest narratives, while at the same time providing warrant to resist portraits of God that are impossible to square with nonnegotiable moral intuitions. Finally, the book argues that morality receives its fullest and deepest illumination in light of distinctively Christian doctrines such as resurrection, incarnation, and heaven.
Cara Nine
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199580217
- eISBN:
- 9780191741456
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580217.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter engages with cosmopolitan theory in order to set the stage for the theory of exclusive collective resource rights. It criticizes the claim that territorial borders are morally arbitrary. ...
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This chapter engages with cosmopolitan theory in order to set the stage for the theory of exclusive collective resource rights. It criticizes the claim that territorial borders are morally arbitrary. Because of the importance of a collective’s relationship to the land and resources for the capacity of individuals to meet basic needs, denying that certain collectives have a prima facie claim to natural resources may constitute an unjustifiable harm to individuals. As such, our placement in the distribution of natural resources is not ‘up for grabs’ in the redistribution of goods.Less
This chapter engages with cosmopolitan theory in order to set the stage for the theory of exclusive collective resource rights. It criticizes the claim that territorial borders are morally arbitrary. Because of the importance of a collective’s relationship to the land and resources for the capacity of individuals to meet basic needs, denying that certain collectives have a prima facie claim to natural resources may constitute an unjustifiable harm to individuals. As such, our placement in the distribution of natural resources is not ‘up for grabs’ in the redistribution of goods.
Onora O'Neill
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195145397
- eISBN:
- 9780199752393
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145399.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
O'Neill's central concern here is to explicate Kant's account of how we could have unconditional practical reasons to do as morality requires, where unconditional practical reasons are those not ...
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O'Neill's central concern here is to explicate Kant's account of how we could have unconditional practical reasons to do as morality requires, where unconditional practical reasons are those not based upon arbitrarily chosen ends. But then, what is their basis? Kant's proposal, O'Neill argues, is that what makes a practical reason unconditional is its universal recognizability. An unconditional practical reason is one that can be seen to be a reason for action by any rational audience; its appeal relies on no parochial concerns. Such universal appeal is captured by the categorical imperative test (O'Neill examines in detail three of the formulations of this): only principles of action that pass this test can be universally recognized as yielding practical reasons.Less
O'Neill's central concern here is to explicate Kant's account of how we could have unconditional practical reasons to do as morality requires, where unconditional practical reasons are those not based upon arbitrarily chosen ends. But then, what is their basis? Kant's proposal, O'Neill argues, is that what makes a practical reason unconditional is its universal recognizability. An unconditional practical reason is one that can be seen to be a reason for action by any rational audience; its appeal relies on no parochial concerns. Such universal appeal is captured by the categorical imperative test (O'Neill examines in detail three of the formulations of this): only principles of action that pass this test can be universally recognized as yielding practical reasons.
Robert Kane
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195126563
- eISBN:
- 9780199868506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195126564.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
We turn to the “Intelligibility Question” about free will: How, if at all, can one make sense of a free will that is incompatible with determinism? If free choices are not determined, they must be ...
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We turn to the “Intelligibility Question” about free will: How, if at all, can one make sense of a free will that is incompatible with determinism? If free choices are not determined, they must be undetermined. But undetermined events, it is often argued, occur by chance; and choices or actions that occur by chance would be “arbitrary,” “capricious,” “random,” “irrational,” and not under the control of agents – hence not responsible actions at all. These familiar charges are traced to “plurality conditions” for free will: free agents must not only be able to choose and choose otherwise, they must be able to choose and choose otherwise, either way rationally, voluntarily, intentionally, and having voluntary control over their choices. In order to satisfy these plurality requirements, traditional incompatibilist or libertarian theories of free will have usually appealed to obscure or mysterious forms of agency or causation, which are problematic for a number reasons discussed in the chapter.Less
We turn to the “Intelligibility Question” about free will: How, if at all, can one make sense of a free will that is incompatible with determinism? If free choices are not determined, they must be undetermined. But undetermined events, it is often argued, occur by chance; and choices or actions that occur by chance would be “arbitrary,” “capricious,” “random,” “irrational,” and not under the control of agents – hence not responsible actions at all. These familiar charges are traced to “plurality conditions” for free will: free agents must not only be able to choose and choose otherwise, they must be able to choose and choose otherwise, either way rationally, voluntarily, intentionally, and having voluntary control over their choices. In order to satisfy these plurality requirements, traditional incompatibilist or libertarian theories of free will have usually appealed to obscure or mysterious forms of agency or causation, which are problematic for a number reasons discussed in the chapter.
Matthew H. Kramer
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199642182
- eISBN:
- 9780191732188
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199642182.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Criminal Law and Criminology, Philosophy of Law
This chapter explores some problems surrounding the administration of capital punishment: the possibility of mistakes, the alleged arbitrariness of the distinctions between defendants who are ...
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This chapter explores some problems surrounding the administration of capital punishment: the possibility of mistakes, the alleged arbitrariness of the distinctions between defendants who are executed and defendants who are merely imprisoned, and the occurrence of racial discrimination in sentencing. While the chapter allows that each of these problems does exist to a certain degree, it maintains that each of them has been significantly overstated and misunderstood. Hence, although the chapter leaves open the possibility that capital punishment is never justifiable in practice (even while being justifiable in principle), it provides grounds for thinking that the use of such punishment can be legitimate as well as obligatory in credible contexts.Less
This chapter explores some problems surrounding the administration of capital punishment: the possibility of mistakes, the alleged arbitrariness of the distinctions between defendants who are executed and defendants who are merely imprisoned, and the occurrence of racial discrimination in sentencing. While the chapter allows that each of these problems does exist to a certain degree, it maintains that each of them has been significantly overstated and misunderstood. Hence, although the chapter leaves open the possibility that capital punishment is never justifiable in practice (even while being justifiable in principle), it provides grounds for thinking that the use of such punishment can be legitimate as well as obligatory in credible contexts.
Diana Raffman
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199915101
- eISBN:
- 9780199392650
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199915101.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Because they lack sharp boundaries of application, vague words like ‘tall’ and ‘adult’ cause logical and semantic problems in philosophy, decision theory, and the law, among other disciplines. ...
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Because they lack sharp boundaries of application, vague words like ‘tall’ and ‘adult’ cause logical and semantic problems in philosophy, decision theory, and the law, among other disciplines. Several theories of vagueness have been proposed to resolve these difficulties, but none has been widely accepted. The book contends that previous accounts have made two critical mistakes: they suppose that a semantic (non-epistemic) theory must abandon bivalence, and they overlook the character of ordinary speech using vague words. The book develops a new theory of vagueness — the multiple range theory — that corrects these errors. The new theory begins with the observation that ordinary speakers apply vague words in multiple arbitrarily different but equally competent ways, even when context is held fixed. (e.g., they stop at different places in a sorites series.) This feature of competent use is taken to reflect multiple ranges of application in the semantics of vague words, where a range of application is a range of properties whose instantiations satisfy a given word on one permissible way of applying it; e.g., a range of ‘tall’ is a range of heights, a range of ‘adult’ a range of ages. The fundamental idea is that a vague word applies to a different set of things relative to each of its ranges — even when context is fixed. The fact that the ranges of a vague word are arbitrarily different — there is no reason to favor any particular one — is key to solving the sorites paradox, perhaps the most serious problem arising from vague words. The multiple range theory employs a classical logic and bivalent semantics. It is more intuitive and simpler than other approaches; e.g., it has no need of a definiteness operator, and it eliminates higher-order borderline cases. A principal conclusion of the book is that competent use of vague words cannot be fully rule-governed; at crucial junctures, use is determined by brute psychological mechanism.Less
Because they lack sharp boundaries of application, vague words like ‘tall’ and ‘adult’ cause logical and semantic problems in philosophy, decision theory, and the law, among other disciplines. Several theories of vagueness have been proposed to resolve these difficulties, but none has been widely accepted. The book contends that previous accounts have made two critical mistakes: they suppose that a semantic (non-epistemic) theory must abandon bivalence, and they overlook the character of ordinary speech using vague words. The book develops a new theory of vagueness — the multiple range theory — that corrects these errors. The new theory begins with the observation that ordinary speakers apply vague words in multiple arbitrarily different but equally competent ways, even when context is held fixed. (e.g., they stop at different places in a sorites series.) This feature of competent use is taken to reflect multiple ranges of application in the semantics of vague words, where a range of application is a range of properties whose instantiations satisfy a given word on one permissible way of applying it; e.g., a range of ‘tall’ is a range of heights, a range of ‘adult’ a range of ages. The fundamental idea is that a vague word applies to a different set of things relative to each of its ranges — even when context is fixed. The fact that the ranges of a vague word are arbitrarily different — there is no reason to favor any particular one — is key to solving the sorites paradox, perhaps the most serious problem arising from vague words. The multiple range theory employs a classical logic and bivalent semantics. It is more intuitive and simpler than other approaches; e.g., it has no need of a definiteness operator, and it eliminates higher-order borderline cases. A principal conclusion of the book is that competent use of vague words cannot be fully rule-governed; at crucial junctures, use is determined by brute psychological mechanism.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199572380
- eISBN:
- 9780191728914
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572380.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
Vagueness seems repugnant to the very idea of making a norm, and to the idea of rule-governed behaviour, because it leaves conduct (to some extent) unregulated. But vagueness can be valuable to ...
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Vagueness seems repugnant to the very idea of making a norm, and to the idea of rule-governed behaviour, because it leaves conduct (to some extent) unregulated. But vagueness can be valuable to rule-makers, because their use of it is valuable to the people to whom rules are addressed. In fact, far from being repugnant to the idea of making a norm, vagueness is of central importance to lawmakers (and other persons who make norms). It is a central technique in normative texts: it is often needed in order to pursue the purposes of making norms. Not all norms are vague. But vagueness is of central importance to the very idea of guiding conduct by norms.Less
Vagueness seems repugnant to the very idea of making a norm, and to the idea of rule-governed behaviour, because it leaves conduct (to some extent) unregulated. But vagueness can be valuable to rule-makers, because their use of it is valuable to the people to whom rules are addressed. In fact, far from being repugnant to the idea of making a norm, vagueness is of central importance to lawmakers (and other persons who make norms). It is a central technique in normative texts: it is often needed in order to pursue the purposes of making norms. Not all norms are vague. But vagueness is of central importance to the very idea of guiding conduct by norms.
Martins Paparinskis
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199694501
- eISBN:
- 9780191741272
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694501.003.0009
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
This chapter addresses the international minimum standard on protection of property other than regarding administration of justice. The tripartite analytical approach applied in Chapter 8 is ...
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This chapter addresses the international minimum standard on protection of property other than regarding administration of justice. The tripartite analytical approach applied in Chapter 8 is followed, relying on the classical customary law to provide the broad contours of the rule that will be filled in by human rights reasoning and confirmed by modern investment cases. Unlike the standard of administration of justice where practice of sufficient quantity and similarity exists at all levels of the argument, the broader standard of protection of property requires considerable qualifications at each step. Overall, it is suggested that contemporary international law requires conduct that is non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory, transparent, and complies with due process; it is less obvious that the perspective of legitimate or reasonable expectations has a useful added value.Less
This chapter addresses the international minimum standard on protection of property other than regarding administration of justice. The tripartite analytical approach applied in Chapter 8 is followed, relying on the classical customary law to provide the broad contours of the rule that will be filled in by human rights reasoning and confirmed by modern investment cases. Unlike the standard of administration of justice where practice of sufficient quantity and similarity exists at all levels of the argument, the broader standard of protection of property requires considerable qualifications at each step. Overall, it is suggested that contemporary international law requires conduct that is non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory, transparent, and complies with due process; it is less obvious that the perspective of legitimate or reasonable expectations has a useful added value.
Federico Ortino
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- February 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198842637
- eISBN:
- 9780191878541
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198842637.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
This book provides a conceptual and legal analysis of the core of investment protection guarantees that emerge from international treaties signed since 1959 for the promotion and protection of ...
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This book provides a conceptual and legal analysis of the core of investment protection guarantees that emerge from international treaties signed since 1959 for the promotion and protection of foreign investment. It focuses on both the origin and evolution of investment treaty standards. In terms of origin, the work considers the broader context at the time when the first modern investment treaty was concluded. In terms of evolution, the work examines (a) the many decisions of ad hoc arbitral tribunals that have been called upon to apply these treaties in order to resolve the several hundred investor–State disputes, as well as (b) some of the recent investment treaties that in the past ten to fifteen years have attempted to clarify and/or reform the content and scope of investment protection guarantees. This study posits that the key investment protection provisions in investment treaties (and thus much of the related controversy) revolve around three distinct concepts: legal stability, investment’s value and reasonableness. This book advances two main arguments. First, from the very beginning, the protection afforded to foreign investments by modern investment treaties has been an exceptionally broad one and as such restrictive of the host State’s ability to regulate. Second, while a growing number of investment treaty tribunals as well as new investment treaties have to some extent reined in such broad protections, the evolution of key investment protection standards has been (and in many ways still is) marred by inconsistency and uncertainty.Less
This book provides a conceptual and legal analysis of the core of investment protection guarantees that emerge from international treaties signed since 1959 for the promotion and protection of foreign investment. It focuses on both the origin and evolution of investment treaty standards. In terms of origin, the work considers the broader context at the time when the first modern investment treaty was concluded. In terms of evolution, the work examines (a) the many decisions of ad hoc arbitral tribunals that have been called upon to apply these treaties in order to resolve the several hundred investor–State disputes, as well as (b) some of the recent investment treaties that in the past ten to fifteen years have attempted to clarify and/or reform the content and scope of investment protection guarantees. This study posits that the key investment protection provisions in investment treaties (and thus much of the related controversy) revolve around three distinct concepts: legal stability, investment’s value and reasonableness. This book advances two main arguments. First, from the very beginning, the protection afforded to foreign investments by modern investment treaties has been an exceptionally broad one and as such restrictive of the host State’s ability to regulate. Second, while a growing number of investment treaty tribunals as well as new investment treaties have to some extent reined in such broad protections, the evolution of key investment protection standards has been (and in many ways still is) marred by inconsistency and uncertainty.
Daniel Z. Korman
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198732532
- eISBN:
- 9780191796760
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732532.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
One of the central questions of material-object metaphysics is which highly visible objects there are right before our eyes. This book defends a conservative view, according to which our ordinary, ...
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One of the central questions of material-object metaphysics is which highly visible objects there are right before our eyes. This book defends a conservative view, according to which our ordinary, natural judgments about which objects there are are more or less correct. It begins with an overview of the arguments that have led people away from the conservative view, into revisionary views according to which there are far more objects than we ordinarily take there to be (permissivism) or far fewer (eliminativism). It criticizes a variety of compatibilist strategies, according to which these revisionary views are actually compatible with our ordinary beliefs; responds to debunking arguments, according to which these beliefs are the products of arbitrary biological and cultural influences; responds to objections that the conservative’s verdicts about which objects there are and aren’t are objectionably arbitrary; responds to the argument from vagueness, which purports to show that the sort of restriction that conservatives want to impose on which composites there are is bound to give rise to vagueness about what exists, something that is ruled out by widely accepted theories of vagueness; and responds to the overdetermination argument, the argument from material constitution, and the problem of the many, all of which are meant to motivate eliminativism by showing that accepting ordinary objects commits one to one or another absurdity.Less
One of the central questions of material-object metaphysics is which highly visible objects there are right before our eyes. This book defends a conservative view, according to which our ordinary, natural judgments about which objects there are are more or less correct. It begins with an overview of the arguments that have led people away from the conservative view, into revisionary views according to which there are far more objects than we ordinarily take there to be (permissivism) or far fewer (eliminativism). It criticizes a variety of compatibilist strategies, according to which these revisionary views are actually compatible with our ordinary beliefs; responds to debunking arguments, according to which these beliefs are the products of arbitrary biological and cultural influences; responds to objections that the conservative’s verdicts about which objects there are and aren’t are objectionably arbitrary; responds to the argument from vagueness, which purports to show that the sort of restriction that conservatives want to impose on which composites there are is bound to give rise to vagueness about what exists, something that is ruled out by widely accepted theories of vagueness; and responds to the overdetermination argument, the argument from material constitution, and the problem of the many, all of which are meant to motivate eliminativism by showing that accepting ordinary objects commits one to one or another absurdity.
D. J. Galligan
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198256526
- eISBN:
- 9780191681653
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198256526.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration, Philosophy of Law
The strategies of legal regulation of discretionary authority may be divided into two broad categories: one is concerned with participatory procedures to ensure the representation of groups and ...
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The strategies of legal regulation of discretionary authority may be divided into two broad categories: one is concerned with participatory procedures to ensure the representation of groups and interests; the other concentrates on developing a framework of legal principles which shape and influence discretionary decisions. But before going on to consider the basis and principles of legal regulation, this chapter begins by examining more closely the anatomy of discretionary decisions and the way decisions are made, identifying some of the primary influences and constraints affecting the decision process, and suggesting different types of decisions that can occur within discretion. This leads into a brief survey of administrative theory and its implications for legal regulation. The final task in this chapter is to consider the place within discretionary contexts of a number of critical concepts, in particular rationality, arbitrariness, fairness, and guidance.Less
The strategies of legal regulation of discretionary authority may be divided into two broad categories: one is concerned with participatory procedures to ensure the representation of groups and interests; the other concentrates on developing a framework of legal principles which shape and influence discretionary decisions. But before going on to consider the basis and principles of legal regulation, this chapter begins by examining more closely the anatomy of discretionary decisions and the way decisions are made, identifying some of the primary influences and constraints affecting the decision process, and suggesting different types of decisions that can occur within discretion. This leads into a brief survey of administrative theory and its implications for legal regulation. The final task in this chapter is to consider the place within discretionary contexts of a number of critical concepts, in particular rationality, arbitrariness, fairness, and guidance.
