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A Virtue Epistemology

Ernest Sosa

in A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199297023
eISBN:
9780191711411
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter presents a theory of knowledge as coming in two main varieties: the animal and the reflective. Animal knowledge is apt belief, which hits the mark of truth through the exercise of ... More


Beyond Similarity

Sam Glucksberg

in Understanding Figurative Language: From Metaphor to Idioms

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
January 2008
ISBN:
9780195111095
eISBN:
9780199872107
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195111095.003.0003
Subject:
Psychology, Cognitive Psychology

This chapter addresses the traditional pragmatic view that metaphors are understood as implicit comparisons, i.e., as similes. This position, as well as the salience imbalance proposal that ... More


Beyond Comparison Property Attribution

Sam Glucksberg

in Understanding Figurative Language: From Metaphor to Idioms

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
January 2008
ISBN:
9780195111095
eISBN:
9780199872107
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195111095.003.0004
Subject:
Psychology, Cognitive Psychology

Property attribution is examined in two forms of metaphor — nominal (e.g., lawyers are “sharks”) and predicative (e.g., the dog “flew” across the yard), as well as in compound nouns, such as “feather ... More


Fictions

Jody Azzouni

in Talking About Nothing: Numbers, Hallucinations and Fictions

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199738946
eISBN:
9780199866175
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738946.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, General

Fictional discourse, this chapter shows, is a truth-apt discourse that’s supported on and defers to what may be described as a pretence (or story-telling) practice that isn’t truth-apt. Nevertheless, ... More


The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

David Copp (ed.)

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780195147797
eISBN:
9780199785841
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195147790.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory is a major new reference work in ethical theory, consisting of commissioned essays by leading moral philosophers. The handbook is divided into two parts, ... More


A Path into Formal Pragmatics

Stephen J Barker

in Renewing Meaning: A Speech-Act Theoretic Approach

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
August 2004
ISBN:
9780199263660
eISBN:
9780191601354
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199263663.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

I develop the theory of proto-assertions, and proto-illocutionary acts, which are sentential speech-acts that can function as sentence meanings. I critique the standard semantic conception of truth. ... More


Are Moral Beliefs Truth‐Apt?

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

in Moral Skepticisms

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780195187724
eISBN:
9780199786121
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195187725.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter discusses expressivism as a form of moral skepticism that denies the truth-aptness of moral beliefs and judgments. It focuses on whether expressivists can solve the problem of embedding ... More


Epistemic Circularity

Ernest Sosa

in Knowing Full Well

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691143972
eISBN:
9781400836918
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691143972.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter defends the epistemic circularity involved in meta-aptness and thereby in the full aptness of knowing full well. It begins by explaining two forms of bootstrapping: the inference from ... More


Blame and Guilt

David Owens

in Shaping the Normative Landscape

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199691500
eISBN:
9780191744938
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691500.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Though neither blame nor guilt are themselves good or desirable, the fact that blame or guilt would be a good thing in certain circumstances is itself a good thing, at least in the context of certain ... More


Apt Imaginings: Feelings for Fictions and Other Creatures of the Mind

Jonathan Gilmore

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
February 2020
ISBN:
9780190096342
eISBN:
9780190096373
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190096342.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Aesthetics

Do people’s responses to works of art track their responses to the real world? Specifically, do emotions, cognitions, and desires elicited by fictional stories and visual imaginings differ—in their ... More


Descartes’s Pyrrhonian Virtue Epistemology

Ernest Sosa

in Epistemology

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
January 2019
ISBN:
9780691183268
eISBN:
9781400883059
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691183268.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter discusses how Descartes uses his principle of clarity and distinctness to raise his first-order judgments to the scientia level. Error is what one must avoid, not just falsity; so he ... More


Knowledge as Action

Ernest Sosa

in Epistemology

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
January 2019
ISBN:
9780691183268
eISBN:
9781400883059
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691183268.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues that judgment and knowledge itself are forms of intentional action. Such action falls under a certain normative structure of success, competence, and aptness, or success that ... More


Knowledge, Default, and Skepticism

Ernest Sosa

in Epistemic Entitlement

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
March 2020
ISBN:
9780198713524
eISBN:
9780191781940
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198713524.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, American Philosophy

Virtue epistemology takes its own approach to the questions of traditional epistemology. In what follows, a fresh treatment of philosophical skepticism is enabled by a distinctive notion of default ... More


Truth, Truth-aptness, and Belief

Neil Sinclair

in Practical Expressivism

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
February 2021
ISBN:
9780198866107
eISBN:
9780191898327
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198866107.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Three of the forms and assumptions of moral practice are that moral judgements are truth-apt, sometimes true, and that they express moral beliefs. Vindicating these assumptions seems inconsistent ... More


Descartes’s Epistemology*

Ernest Sosa

in Scepticism and Perceptual Justification

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
June 2014
ISBN:
9780199658343
eISBN:
9780191760983
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Descartes is a virtue epistemologist. Not only does he distinguish centrally between animal and reflective knowledge - in his terms, between cognitio and scientia - but in additionhe conceives of ... More


Pure versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional Implicature

Stephen Barker

in Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
October 2014
ISBN:
9780199347582
eISBN:
9780199347605
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

One hybrid theory for moral sentences is the implicature theory (IT), according to which, in producing a value utterance, the speaker U says that Jane has F for some natural property F and ... More


Judgment and Agency

Ernest Sosa

in Judgment and Agency

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
April 2015
ISBN:
9780198719694
eISBN:
9780191788765
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719694.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A concept of the fully apt performance is explicated, which helps guide us beyond anything found in earlier virtue epistemology. A fully apt performance is one that aims not only to attain its basic ... More


Intentional Action and Judgment

Ernest Sosa

in Judgment and Agency

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
April 2015
ISBN:
9780198719694
eISBN:
9780191788765
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719694.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter turns to a topic broached already in Chapter 1: the nature of intentional action and the conditions for its aptness. In the end not even a weak subcredal form of knowledge turns out to ... More


Apt Emotions and Normative Continuity

Jonathan Gilmore

in Apt Imaginings: Feelings for Fictions and Other Creatures of the Mind

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
February 2020
ISBN:
9780190096342
eISBN:
9780190096373
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190096342.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Aesthetics

This chapter characterizes a set of parallel assumptions. One, shared by many otherwise different contemporary philosophical treatments of the emotions, is that our affective responses are ... More


When are Structural Equation Models Apt? Causation versus Grounding

Lina Jansson

in Explanation Beyond Causation: Philosophical Perspectives on Non-Causal Explanations

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780198777946
eISBN:
9780191823404
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198777946.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology

While much about the notion of ground in contemporary metaphysics is contested, there is large agreement that ground is closely connected to a certain kind of explanation. Recently, Jonathan Schaffer ... More


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