Patricia Kitcher
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199754823
- eISBN:
- 9780199855889
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199754823.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this chapter the background materials from the Empiricists, the Rationalists, and Kant’s earlier work, and the interpretations of the structure of the transcendental deduction and of the crucial ...
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In this chapter the background materials from the Empiricists, the Rationalists, and Kant’s earlier work, and the interpretations of the structure of the transcendental deduction and of the crucial notion of ‘synthesis’ are brought together in an account of the argument that the ‘unity of apperception’ is a necessary condition for rational cognition. The chapter explains in more detail what Kant understands by ‘rational cognition’ and it clarifies his various formulations of the ‘principle of apperception.’ It also shows how the theory of apperception fits into the deduction of the legitimacy of the categories and it considers the relations between transcendental and empirical apperception.Less
In this chapter the background materials from the Empiricists, the Rationalists, and Kant’s earlier work, and the interpretations of the structure of the transcendental deduction and of the crucial notion of ‘synthesis’ are brought together in an account of the argument that the ‘unity of apperception’ is a necessary condition for rational cognition. The chapter explains in more detail what Kant understands by ‘rational cognition’ and it clarifies his various formulations of the ‘principle of apperception.’ It also shows how the theory of apperception fits into the deduction of the legitimacy of the categories and it considers the relations between transcendental and empirical apperception.
Patricia Kitcher
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199754823
- eISBN:
- 9780199855889
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199754823.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Kant introduces ‘apperception’ both as a principle that is presupposed in cognition and as a power or faculty that creates cognition. This chapter focuses on the power/faculty of apperception and ...
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Kant introduces ‘apperception’ both as a principle that is presupposed in cognition and as a power or faculty that creates cognition. This chapter focuses on the power/faculty of apperception and shows its relation to other notions of the self that appear in Kant’s philosophy, including his theory of the ‘psychological ideal’ and his references to a ‘noumenal’ self. It also contrasts the analysis of the argument for apperception presented in Chapter 9 with two same-sounding accounts, those of Henry Allison and Eric Watkins.Less
Kant introduces ‘apperception’ both as a principle that is presupposed in cognition and as a power or faculty that creates cognition. This chapter focuses on the power/faculty of apperception and shows its relation to other notions of the self that appear in Kant’s philosophy, including his theory of the ‘psychological ideal’ and his references to a ‘noumenal’ self. It also contrasts the analysis of the argument for apperception presented in Chapter 9 with two same-sounding accounts, those of Henry Allison and Eric Watkins.
Karl Ameriks
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199205349
- eISBN:
- 9780191709272
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205349.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter offers an apologetic interpretation of the most basic features of Kant's central doctrine of apperception, and argues that this doctrine reveals that Kant's view of the self is in fact ...
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This chapter offers an apologetic interpretation of the most basic features of Kant's central doctrine of apperception, and argues that this doctrine reveals that Kant's view of the self is in fact largely the opposite of the so-called Cartesian subjectivism that has been so often ascribed to him. For Kant, the subject of apperception is ‘non-Cartesian’ in key epistemological as well as ontological senses: its determinate knowledge of itself, as of all other things, depends basically on spatial intuition, and it has no theoretically demonstrable existence as a pure spirit. The project of clarifying Kant's position in this way has much more than a merely exegetical significance, for it also reveals that his ultimate Critical doctrine of the self remains in many ways as worthy of consideration as the best contemporary theories.Less
This chapter offers an apologetic interpretation of the most basic features of Kant's central doctrine of apperception, and argues that this doctrine reveals that Kant's view of the self is in fact largely the opposite of the so-called Cartesian subjectivism that has been so often ascribed to him. For Kant, the subject of apperception is ‘non-Cartesian’ in key epistemological as well as ontological senses: its determinate knowledge of itself, as of all other things, depends basically on spatial intuition, and it has no theoretically demonstrable existence as a pure spirit. The project of clarifying Kant's position in this way has much more than a merely exegetical significance, for it also reveals that his ultimate Critical doctrine of the self remains in many ways as worthy of consideration as the best contemporary theories.
Sally Sedgwick
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199698363
- eISBN:
- 9780191738692
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698363.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter identifies ‘speculative’ elements Hegel claims to discover in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, elements he believes Kant himself failed to appreciate. That is, Hegel discovers resources ...
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This chapter identifies ‘speculative’ elements Hegel claims to discover in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, elements he believes Kant himself failed to appreciate. That is, Hegel discovers resources in the Transcendental Deduction for overcoming the heterogeneity of concept and intuition. In his view, the idea of identity is, for example, implicit in Kant’s conception of the faculty of the original synthetic unity of apperception. This chapter provides further evidence that the identity Hegel claims to discover in the Transcendental Deduction is achieved neither by a reduction of concepts to intuitions, nor by a reduction of intuitions to concepts. The lesson Hegel believes we should ultimately derive from the Transcendental Deduction is that we need a new and non-Kantian account of the nature and origin of conceptual form.Less
This chapter identifies ‘speculative’ elements Hegel claims to discover in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, elements he believes Kant himself failed to appreciate. That is, Hegel discovers resources in the Transcendental Deduction for overcoming the heterogeneity of concept and intuition. In his view, the idea of identity is, for example, implicit in Kant’s conception of the faculty of the original synthetic unity of apperception. This chapter provides further evidence that the identity Hegel claims to discover in the Transcendental Deduction is achieved neither by a reduction of concepts to intuitions, nor by a reduction of intuitions to concepts. The lesson Hegel believes we should ultimately derive from the Transcendental Deduction is that we need a new and non-Kantian account of the nature and origin of conceptual form.
Patricia Kitcher
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199754823
- eISBN:
- 9780199855889
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199754823.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The book presents Kant’s theory of the cognitive subject. It begins by setting the stage for his discussions of the unity and power of ‘apperception’ by presenting the attempts of his predecessors to ...
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The book presents Kant’s theory of the cognitive subject. It begins by setting the stage for his discussions of the unity and power of ‘apperception’ by presenting the attempts of his predecessors to explain the nature of the self and of self-consciousness, and the relation between self-consciousness and object cognition. The central chapters lay out the structure of the transcendental deduction, the argument from cognition to the necessary unity of apperception, and the relations among his theories of the unity and power of apperception, the ‘psychological ideal,’ and the ‘noumenal’ self. Later chapters draw on this material to offer a more precise account of his criticism that the Rational Psychologists failed to understand the unique character of the representation ‘I-think’ and to defend Kant against the charges that his theory of cognition and apperception is inconsistent or psychologistic. The concluding chapters present Kantian alternatives to recent theories of the activities of the self in cognition and moral action, the self-ascription of belief, knowledge of other minds, the appropriate explananda for theories of consciousness, and the efficacy of ‘transcendental’ arguments.Less
The book presents Kant’s theory of the cognitive subject. It begins by setting the stage for his discussions of the unity and power of ‘apperception’ by presenting the attempts of his predecessors to explain the nature of the self and of self-consciousness, and the relation between self-consciousness and object cognition. The central chapters lay out the structure of the transcendental deduction, the argument from cognition to the necessary unity of apperception, and the relations among his theories of the unity and power of apperception, the ‘psychological ideal,’ and the ‘noumenal’ self. Later chapters draw on this material to offer a more precise account of his criticism that the Rational Psychologists failed to understand the unique character of the representation ‘I-think’ and to defend Kant against the charges that his theory of cognition and apperception is inconsistent or psychologistic. The concluding chapters present Kantian alternatives to recent theories of the activities of the self in cognition and moral action, the self-ascription of belief, knowledge of other minds, the appropriate explananda for theories of consciousness, and the efficacy of ‘transcendental’ arguments.
John Skorupski
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199587636
- eISBN:
- 9780191595394
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587636.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Self‐determining actors must be able to know what reasons they have. They must be able to audit those reasons, to assess whether they have warrant for a particular response. Chapter 5 defines warrant ...
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Self‐determining actors must be able to know what reasons they have. They must be able to audit those reasons, to assess whether they have warrant for a particular response. Chapter 5 defines warrant and discusses its structure, distinguishing it from justification and knowledge. It argues that if self‐determination is possible reason relations must be a priori.Less
Self‐determining actors must be able to know what reasons they have. They must be able to audit those reasons, to assess whether they have warrant for a particular response. Chapter 5 defines warrant and discusses its structure, distinguishing it from justification and knowledge. It argues that if self‐determination is possible reason relations must be a priori.
Patricia Kitcher
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199754823
- eISBN:
- 9780199855889
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199754823.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter addresses three questions about the doctrine of ‘inner sense’ that Kant adapted from Locke: Why did he originally believe that a Lockean inner sense was crucial for a theory of rational ...
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This chapter addresses three questions about the doctrine of ‘inner sense’ that Kant adapted from Locke: Why did he originally believe that a Lockean inner sense was crucial for a theory of rational cognition? Why did he then demote ‘inner sense’ in the Critique and introduce ‘transcendental apperception’ as the key faculty in cognition? How do recent criticisms of inner sense theories affect Kant’s residual uses of the notion?Less
This chapter addresses three questions about the doctrine of ‘inner sense’ that Kant adapted from Locke: Why did he originally believe that a Lockean inner sense was crucial for a theory of rational cognition? Why did he then demote ‘inner sense’ in the Critique and introduce ‘transcendental apperception’ as the key faculty in cognition? How do recent criticisms of inner sense theories affect Kant’s residual uses of the notion?
Patricia Kitcher
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199754823
- eISBN:
- 9780199855889
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199754823.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter explains some of the puzzles about self-consciousness that bedeviled Locke, Leibniz, and Kant’s less well-known predecessors, Wolff, Crusius, and Merian. It presents Leibniz’s unusual ...
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This chapter explains some of the puzzles about self-consciousness that bedeviled Locke, Leibniz, and Kant’s less well-known predecessors, Wolff, Crusius, and Merian. It presents Leibniz’s unusual theory of apperception. It also looks at several episodes in the lively debate about the priority of self-consciousness versus object cognition that seems to stand behind Kant’s unusual claim that self-consciousness and object cognition are necessary and sufficient conditions for each other.Less
This chapter explains some of the puzzles about self-consciousness that bedeviled Locke, Leibniz, and Kant’s less well-known predecessors, Wolff, Crusius, and Merian. It presents Leibniz’s unusual theory of apperception. It also looks at several episodes in the lively debate about the priority of self-consciousness versus object cognition that seems to stand behind Kant’s unusual claim that self-consciousness and object cognition are necessary and sufficient conditions for each other.
Patricia Kitcher
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199754823
- eISBN:
- 9780199855889
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199754823.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter looks at a set of unpublished notes that contain Kant’s first systematic discussion of ‘apperception’ in relation to the requirements of cognition. One interpretive controversy ...
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This chapter looks at a set of unpublished notes that contain Kant’s first systematic discussion of ‘apperception’ in relation to the requirements of cognition. One interpretive controversy surrounding the notes is whether the ‘apperception’ they discuss is ‘substantial’ (the view of Wolfgang Carl), ‘empirical’ (the view of Paul Guyer), or something else. By considering the materials that Kant had available at the time of these notes (around 1775), we can appreciate the breakthrough that enabled him finally to produce a transcendental deduction centered on the notion of ‘apperception’ half a decade later, viz. the recognition that the representation ‘I-think’ has no content of its own.Less
This chapter looks at a set of unpublished notes that contain Kant’s first systematic discussion of ‘apperception’ in relation to the requirements of cognition. One interpretive controversy surrounding the notes is whether the ‘apperception’ they discuss is ‘substantial’ (the view of Wolfgang Carl), ‘empirical’ (the view of Paul Guyer), or something else. By considering the materials that Kant had available at the time of these notes (around 1775), we can appreciate the breakthrough that enabled him finally to produce a transcendental deduction centered on the notion of ‘apperception’ half a decade later, viz. the recognition that the representation ‘I-think’ has no content of its own.
John Skorupski
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199587636
- eISBN:
- 9780191595394
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587636.003.0019
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
A certain group of concepts hang together as ingredients in our understanding of ourselves and others as persons: apperception, grasp of reasons, self‐determination, will and freedom. They are ...
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A certain group of concepts hang together as ingredients in our understanding of ourselves and others as persons: apperception, grasp of reasons, self‐determination, will and freedom. They are surveyed in this chapter.Less
A certain group of concepts hang together as ingredients in our understanding of ourselves and others as persons: apperception, grasp of reasons, self‐determination, will and freedom. They are surveyed in this chapter.
Patricia Kitcher
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199608553
- eISBN:
- 9780191729645
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608553.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines Kant’s theory of the unity of apperception and the argument he offers for it in the transcendental deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason. His theory is that the unity of ...
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This chapter examines Kant’s theory of the unity of apperception and the argument he offers for it in the transcendental deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason. His theory is that the unity of apperception is created through the conscious synthesizing of materials in rational cognitions. Those conscious acts create and grasp the necessary connection of mental states in a single ‘I’. Because the unity of apperception is a necessary condition for rational cognition, his ‘transcendental argument’ for it is unique to that case. The special features of his argument are shown by comparing his case for mental unity with that offered recently by Quassim Cassam. Kant’s theory of necessary for cognition conscious synthesizing also suggests difficulties for current theories of consciousness.Less
This chapter examines Kant’s theory of the unity of apperception and the argument he offers for it in the transcendental deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason. His theory is that the unity of apperception is created through the conscious synthesizing of materials in rational cognitions. Those conscious acts create and grasp the necessary connection of mental states in a single ‘I’. Because the unity of apperception is a necessary condition for rational cognition, his ‘transcendental argument’ for it is unique to that case. The special features of his argument are shown by comparing his case for mental unity with that offered recently by Quassim Cassam. Kant’s theory of necessary for cognition conscious synthesizing also suggests difficulties for current theories of consciousness.
Udo Thiel
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199542499
- eISBN:
- 9780191730917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542499.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Leibniz gives the most original and complex account of personal identity from an immaterialist point of view. This chapter analyses and evaluates Leibniz's account and the ways in which it was taken ...
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Leibniz gives the most original and complex account of personal identity from an immaterialist point of view. This chapter analyses and evaluates Leibniz's account and the ways in which it was taken up and developed by the leading metaphysician in eighteenth-century Germany, Christian Wolff. The chapter begins with an account of the development of Leibniz's thought on individuation and identity in general and then turns to Leibniz's account of personal identity. There are some similarities between Leibniz's and Locke's accounts, but the differences are, in the last analysis, more significant than the similarities. Whereas Locke argues for keeping personal and substantial identity separate, Leibniz maintains that the (personal) identity required for morality can be preserved only by the metaphysical identity of the self as immaterial soul. Yet, unlike some immaterialists, Leibniz argues that the identity of the soul, as substance (metaphysical identity), is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the identity of the self as person (moral identity). The problem in Leibniz's account lies mainly in his failure to provide a clear account of the notion of relating to one's own self. The chapter examines various possible reading of Leibnizian consciousness or apperception and concludes that it is a higher order account of consciousness. The main focus of the chapter's discussion of Wolff is the latter's notion of consciousness. Like the anonymous author of the Essay on Consciousness, discussed in chapter 8, but arrived at independently, Wolff is arguing for a mutual dependence of the consciousness of objects and self-consciousness. He constructs the possibility of both self-consciousness and the consciousness of objects in terms of the mental act of distinguishing. In terms of Personal identity Wolff largely follows Leibniz, but emphasises that it is consciousness of our own diachronic identity that makes us a person.Less
Leibniz gives the most original and complex account of personal identity from an immaterialist point of view. This chapter analyses and evaluates Leibniz's account and the ways in which it was taken up and developed by the leading metaphysician in eighteenth-century Germany, Christian Wolff. The chapter begins with an account of the development of Leibniz's thought on individuation and identity in general and then turns to Leibniz's account of personal identity. There are some similarities between Leibniz's and Locke's accounts, but the differences are, in the last analysis, more significant than the similarities. Whereas Locke argues for keeping personal and substantial identity separate, Leibniz maintains that the (personal) identity required for morality can be preserved only by the metaphysical identity of the self as immaterial soul. Yet, unlike some immaterialists, Leibniz argues that the identity of the soul, as substance (metaphysical identity), is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the identity of the self as person (moral identity). The problem in Leibniz's account lies mainly in his failure to provide a clear account of the notion of relating to one's own self. The chapter examines various possible reading of Leibnizian consciousness or apperception and concludes that it is a higher order account of consciousness. The main focus of the chapter's discussion of Wolff is the latter's notion of consciousness. Like the anonymous author of the Essay on Consciousness, discussed in chapter 8, but arrived at independently, Wolff is arguing for a mutual dependence of the consciousness of objects and self-consciousness. He constructs the possibility of both self-consciousness and the consciousness of objects in terms of the mental act of distinguishing. In terms of Personal identity Wolff largely follows Leibniz, but emphasises that it is consciousness of our own diachronic identity that makes us a person.
Udo Thiel
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199542499
- eISBN:
- 9780191730917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542499.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
There was a long and lively debate about of Wolff’s account of consciousness and self-consciousness in the eighteenth century; and in this context, non-Wolffian views about personal identity were ...
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There was a long and lively debate about of Wolff’s account of consciousness and self-consciousness in the eighteenth century; and in this context, non-Wolffian views about personal identity were advanced, even if not always explicitly, as part of the critiques of Leibniz and Wolff. The main focus of this chapter is the issue of consciousness and self-consciousness. The chapter begins with an examination of a debate about the relationship between followers and critics of Wolff concerning consciousness and the act of distinguishing. Critics such as Rüdiger and Crusius argue against Wolff that the act of distinguishing presupposes consciousness, and so the latter cannot depend on the former. Defenders of Wolff, such as Klosse, argue that even having any sensation or feeling involves distinguishing it from previous perceptions. Hollmann holds that we have no direct consciousness of either the self or objects, rather we are immediately conscious only of representations, while von Creuz hints at the notion of a self-consciousness that is independent of the consciousness of objects and the act of distinguishing. The most important critics of Wolff are Johann Georg Sulzer and Jean Bernard Mérian, discussed in detail in this chapter. Sulzer introduces, contra Wolff, a fundamental distinction between two basic mental powers: representing (object-directed) and feeling (subject-directed). He undermines his own distinction, however, by adopting an essentially Wolffian notion of consciousness. On the positive side and more strongly than other thinkers of the time, Sulzer links self-consciousness to our physical existence. Mérian develops his critique of Wolff differently, arguing that self-consciousness is absolutely fundamental: it is an immediate or “original” apperception that is necessary to all thought as such. This idea of an original self-consciousness as a necessary condition of all thought sounds rather Kantian. Nevertheless, there are several crucial differences between Kant’s and Mérian’s accounts.Less
There was a long and lively debate about of Wolff’s account of consciousness and self-consciousness in the eighteenth century; and in this context, non-Wolffian views about personal identity were advanced, even if not always explicitly, as part of the critiques of Leibniz and Wolff. The main focus of this chapter is the issue of consciousness and self-consciousness. The chapter begins with an examination of a debate about the relationship between followers and critics of Wolff concerning consciousness and the act of distinguishing. Critics such as Rüdiger and Crusius argue against Wolff that the act of distinguishing presupposes consciousness, and so the latter cannot depend on the former. Defenders of Wolff, such as Klosse, argue that even having any sensation or feeling involves distinguishing it from previous perceptions. Hollmann holds that we have no direct consciousness of either the self or objects, rather we are immediately conscious only of representations, while von Creuz hints at the notion of a self-consciousness that is independent of the consciousness of objects and the act of distinguishing. The most important critics of Wolff are Johann Georg Sulzer and Jean Bernard Mérian, discussed in detail in this chapter. Sulzer introduces, contra Wolff, a fundamental distinction between two basic mental powers: representing (object-directed) and feeling (subject-directed). He undermines his own distinction, however, by adopting an essentially Wolffian notion of consciousness. On the positive side and more strongly than other thinkers of the time, Sulzer links self-consciousness to our physical existence. Mérian develops his critique of Wolff differently, arguing that self-consciousness is absolutely fundamental: it is an immediate or “original” apperception that is necessary to all thought as such. This idea of an original self-consciousness as a necessary condition of all thought sounds rather Kantian. Nevertheless, there are several crucial differences between Kant’s and Mérian’s accounts.
Grant Gillett
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198239932
- eISBN:
- 9780191680045
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239932.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter discusses the present view, which sees the subject of experience quintessentially as a concept-user. In order to understand that issue, it is suggested that a modified reading of Kant's ...
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This chapter discusses the present view, which sees the subject of experience quintessentially as a concept-user. In order to understand that issue, it is suggested that a modified reading of Kant's ‘synthetic unity of apperception’ should be carried out. There are also implications for accounts of personal identity presented in the discussions in the chapter.Less
This chapter discusses the present view, which sees the subject of experience quintessentially as a concept-user. In order to understand that issue, it is suggested that a modified reading of Kant's ‘synthetic unity of apperception’ should be carried out. There are also implications for accounts of personal identity presented in the discussions in the chapter.
Robert Hanna
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199272044
- eISBN:
- 9780191699573
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272044.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, General
This chapter argues that the key explanatory notion in Immanuel Kant's general cognitive semantics is his epigenetic or generative/productive theory of the mind, according to which object-directed ...
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This chapter argues that the key explanatory notion in Immanuel Kant's general cognitive semantics is his epigenetic or generative/productive theory of the mind, according to which object-directed representations — including intuitions, concepts, schemata of the imagination, and, most centrally, judgements — are created by the rule-guided application of our innate capacities for spontaneous synthesis to raw sensory intake under the original synthetic unity of apperception. This chapter explores the precise conditions under which all cognitive meaning creation is possible. Broadly speaking, these conditions split into two types: formal or logical conditions and material conditions, or conditions specially relevant to the objective validity. The topic of objective validity leads directly to a discussion of what is clearly the explanatory foundation of all objective mental representations or meanings for Kant: transcendental idealism.Less
This chapter argues that the key explanatory notion in Immanuel Kant's general cognitive semantics is his epigenetic or generative/productive theory of the mind, according to which object-directed representations — including intuitions, concepts, schemata of the imagination, and, most centrally, judgements — are created by the rule-guided application of our innate capacities for spontaneous synthesis to raw sensory intake under the original synthetic unity of apperception. This chapter explores the precise conditions under which all cognitive meaning creation is possible. Broadly speaking, these conditions split into two types: formal or logical conditions and material conditions, or conditions specially relevant to the objective validity. The topic of objective validity leads directly to a discussion of what is clearly the explanatory foundation of all objective mental representations or meanings for Kant: transcendental idealism.
Daniel L. Everett
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780226070766
- eISBN:
- 9780226401430
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226401430.001.0001
- Subject:
- Anthropology, Social and Cultural Anthropology
This book discusses the unarticulated unconscious and tacit knowledge, termed “dark matter of the mind,” which underlies and enables verbal communication. Humans, when they speak or interpret, make ...
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This book discusses the unarticulated unconscious and tacit knowledge, termed “dark matter of the mind,” which underlies and enables verbal communication. Humans, when they speak or interpret, make use of a wide variety of skills and distinctions, in grammar, phonetics, organization of information by importance, and assumptions taken for given, for example, which compose this dark matter. The book’s contention is that this unconscious knowledge is not a product of innate human psychology, but rather of cultural influences and experiences. The book draws on the author’s experience attempting to translate the Bible and its cultural context for the Pirahãs in the Brazilian Amazon as a missionary activity. This missionary activity was hindered by a large number of underlying, largely unspoken, assumptions on the part of the American author on one side and the Pirahãs on the other which it impossible to translate the New Testament in such a way that it would be accessible for the Pirahãs in the same way that is to Americans. The author’s experience as a missionary, along with other studies of cultural conditioning, confirms an understanding of the individual which echoes the Buddhist concept of Anatman, which asserts that there is no innate human nature, but only the self which is entirely composed of memory and experience.Less
This book discusses the unarticulated unconscious and tacit knowledge, termed “dark matter of the mind,” which underlies and enables verbal communication. Humans, when they speak or interpret, make use of a wide variety of skills and distinctions, in grammar, phonetics, organization of information by importance, and assumptions taken for given, for example, which compose this dark matter. The book’s contention is that this unconscious knowledge is not a product of innate human psychology, but rather of cultural influences and experiences. The book draws on the author’s experience attempting to translate the Bible and its cultural context for the Pirahãs in the Brazilian Amazon as a missionary activity. This missionary activity was hindered by a large number of underlying, largely unspoken, assumptions on the part of the American author on one side and the Pirahãs on the other which it impossible to translate the New Testament in such a way that it would be accessible for the Pirahãs in the same way that is to Americans. The author’s experience as a missionary, along with other studies of cultural conditioning, confirms an understanding of the individual which echoes the Buddhist concept of Anatman, which asserts that there is no innate human nature, but only the self which is entirely composed of memory and experience.
C. Thomas Powell
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198244486
- eISBN:
- 9780191680779
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244486.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter examines the views of Immanuel Kant on the first person as they relate to his theory of self-consciousness and compares them with those of Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe. In recent ...
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This chapter examines the views of Immanuel Kant on the first person as they relate to his theory of self-consciousness and compares them with those of Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe. In recent years, a good deal of literature has developed around the location of a philosophical/linguistic datum: that the first-person pronoun is completely immune from reference failure. In fact, this datum is actually two, since there are two ways of failing to achieve a reference that are not possible when one uses the expression ‘I’. The first kind of reference failure is the referential equivalent of shooting at one's shadow: the attempted reference fails precisely because no referent exists. The second kind of reference failure is more a matter of shooting an innocent bystander: the attempted reference actually does refer, but to the wrong referent.Less
This chapter examines the views of Immanuel Kant on the first person as they relate to his theory of self-consciousness and compares them with those of Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe. In recent years, a good deal of literature has developed around the location of a philosophical/linguistic datum: that the first-person pronoun is completely immune from reference failure. In fact, this datum is actually two, since there are two ways of failing to achieve a reference that are not possible when one uses the expression ‘I’. The first kind of reference failure is the referential equivalent of shooting at one's shadow: the attempted reference fails precisely because no referent exists. The second kind of reference failure is more a matter of shooting an innocent bystander: the attempted reference actually does refer, but to the wrong referent.
Karl Ameriks
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238973
- eISBN:
- 9780191597022
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238975.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book presents the first extensive analysis in English of Kant's systematic criticism of dogmatic accounts of the mind as a distinctive object.This criticism has been much admired, especially in ...
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This book presents the first extensive analysis in English of Kant's systematic criticism of dogmatic accounts of the mind as a distinctive object.This criticism has been much admired, especially in Anglophone circles, but interpreters have rarely paid attention to its full historical context and the many different dimensions of its treatment of the mind.In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant organizes his criticism in terms of four fundamental fallacies or ‘paralogisms’ of ‘rational psychology’, and he discusses these under the heading of four traditional topics: substantiality, simplicity, identity, and ideality of the soul.A close analysis of Kant's earlier work, including notes from his lectures on metaphysics (most of which have been only recently published in German), demonstrates that Kant's most fundamental views here concern several topics that are not listed as one of the four explicit paralogism headings.In particular, his views on causality, judgement, and the mind's immateriality, independence (freedom), and immortality have a hidden and central importance.Throughout his career, Kant's views evolved on these topics, especially in the period of the extensive revisions of the paralogisms for the second ed. of the first Critique, when Kant published his major works on ethics, the Groundwork and the second Critique.In this period, he also developed his most sophisticated discussions of apperception and transcendental idealism.The volume outlines and evaluates the history and structure of each of Kant's major arguments in this area, and it comments on their relation to major lines of interpretation and developments in contemporary philosophy.It concludes that Kant's ultimate position on most doctrines concerning the mind is much closer to rationalism than is generally appreciated, and that this position also maintains, for the most part, a revolutionary critical perspective that remains highly relevant for current discussions.Less
This book presents the first extensive analysis in English of Kant's systematic criticism of dogmatic accounts of the mind as a distinctive object.
This criticism has been much admired, especially in Anglophone circles, but interpreters have rarely paid attention to its full historical context and the many different dimensions of its treatment of the mind.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant organizes his criticism in terms of four fundamental fallacies or ‘paralogisms’ of ‘rational psychology’, and he discusses these under the heading of four traditional topics: substantiality, simplicity, identity, and ideality of the soul.
A close analysis of Kant's earlier work, including notes from his lectures on metaphysics (most of which have been only recently published in German), demonstrates that Kant's most fundamental views here concern several topics that are not listed as one of the four explicit paralogism headings.
In particular, his views on causality, judgement, and the mind's immateriality, independence (freedom), and immortality have a hidden and central importance.
Throughout his career, Kant's views evolved on these topics, especially in the period of the extensive revisions of the paralogisms for the second ed. of the first Critique, when Kant published his major works on ethics, the Groundwork and the second Critique.
In this period, he also developed his most sophisticated discussions of apperception and transcendental idealism.
The volume outlines and evaluates the history and structure of each of Kant's major arguments in this area, and it comments on their relation to major lines of interpretation and developments in contemporary philosophy.
It concludes that Kant's ultimate position on most doctrines concerning the mind is much closer to rationalism than is generally appreciated, and that this position also maintains, for the most part, a revolutionary critical perspective that remains highly relevant for current discussions.
Hubert Schwyzer
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198248293
- eISBN:
- 9780191681110
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248293.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses a claim that can serve as a premise for the main argument of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Pure apperception is defined in this chapter as the necessity of ...
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This chapter discusses a claim that can serve as a premise for the main argument of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Pure apperception is defined in this chapter as the necessity of being able to ascribe representations or data of consciousness.Less
This chapter discusses a claim that can serve as a premise for the main argument of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Pure apperception is defined in this chapter as the necessity of being able to ascribe representations or data of consciousness.
Karl Ameriks
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238973
- eISBN:
- 9780191597022
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238975.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter concerns human freedom, a topic that Kant remarkably struck from the list of main topics in rational psychology, although right before the Critique, he had given it pride of place. ...
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This chapter concerns human freedom, a topic that Kant remarkably struck from the list of main topics in rational psychology, although right before the Critique, he had given it pride of place. Hence, it is crucial to see why the Critique neither presents nor directly criticizes the rationalist arguments for our freedom with which Kant was extremely familiar. Kant's views here must be understood in terms of clues from his lectures, and especially in the light of the different kinds of arguments to freedom, which he presents in his Groundwork (a ‘deduction’) and second Critique (a ‘fact of reason’). I connect the changes in his presentation there with the clearer expression, in the second ed. of the first Critique, of his anti‐rationalist doctrine of self‐knowledge (as dependent on knowing spatial things). In this way, I show how—to appreciate the full interconnection and development of Kant's theoretical and practical views on freedom—we need to go beyond readings by Beck, Paton, Henrich, and others.Less
This chapter concerns human freedom, a topic that Kant remarkably struck from the list of main topics in rational psychology, although right before the Critique, he had given it pride of place. Hence, it is crucial to see why the Critique neither presents nor directly criticizes the rationalist arguments for our freedom with which Kant was extremely familiar. Kant's views here must be understood in terms of clues from his lectures, and especially in the light of the different kinds of arguments to freedom, which he presents in his Groundwork (a ‘deduction’) and second Critique (a ‘fact of reason’). I connect the changes in his presentation there with the clearer expression, in the second ed. of the first Critique, of his anti‐rationalist doctrine of self‐knowledge (as dependent on knowing spatial things). In this way, I show how—to appreciate the full interconnection and development of Kant's theoretical and practical views on freedom—we need to go beyond readings by Beck, Paton, Henrich, and others.