Jessica Moss
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199656349
- eISBN:
- 9780191742156
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656349.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Aristotle holds that we desire things because they appear good to us – a view still dominant in philosophy now. But what is it for something to appear good? This book argues that Aristotle ...
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Aristotle holds that we desire things because they appear good to us – a view still dominant in philosophy now. But what is it for something to appear good? This book argues that Aristotle understands appearances of goodness as literal quasi-perceptual appearances, operations of a psychological capacity responsible for phenomena like dreams and visualization: phantasia (‘imagination’). It then uses Aristotle’s detailed accounts of phantasia and its relation to perception and thought to gain new insight into some of the most debated areas of his philosophy: his accounts of emotions, akrasia, ethical habituation, character, deliberation, and desire. The result is a new – and controversial – interpretation of Aristotle’s moral psychology: one which greatly restricts the role of reason in ethical matters, and gives an absolutely central role to pleasure.Less
Aristotle holds that we desire things because they appear good to us – a view still dominant in philosophy now. But what is it for something to appear good? This book argues that Aristotle understands appearances of goodness as literal quasi-perceptual appearances, operations of a psychological capacity responsible for phenomena like dreams and visualization: phantasia (‘imagination’). It then uses Aristotle’s detailed accounts of phantasia and its relation to perception and thought to gain new insight into some of the most debated areas of his philosophy: his accounts of emotions, akrasia, ethical habituation, character, deliberation, and desire. The result is a new – and controversial – interpretation of Aristotle’s moral psychology: one which greatly restricts the role of reason in ethical matters, and gives an absolutely central role to pleasure.
David Wolfsdorf
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195327328
- eISBN:
- 9780199870646
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327328.003.0002
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Ancient Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy
This chapter explains how arguments in Meno, Protagoras, and Lysis present a coherent conception of desire. Furthermore, it is argued that the much discussed passage at Gorgias 466–68 is ...
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This chapter explains how arguments in Meno, Protagoras, and Lysis present a coherent conception of desire. Furthermore, it is argued that the much discussed passage at Gorgias 466–68 is hermeneutically insignificant for the early dialogues' conception of desire. Finally, the chapter examines salient forms of antiphilosophical desire among the texts: philotimia (love of honor) and philhêdonia (love of pleasure).Less
This chapter explains how arguments in Meno, Protagoras, and Lysis present a coherent conception of desire. Furthermore, it is argued that the much discussed passage at Gorgias 466–68 is hermeneutically insignificant for the early dialogues' conception of desire. Finally, the chapter examines salient forms of antiphilosophical desire among the texts: philotimia (love of honor) and philhêdonia (love of pleasure).
Iakovos Vasiliou
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198712923
- eISBN:
- 9780191809767
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712923.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter examines a number of claims made by Jessica Moss in her book, Aristotle on the Apparent Good. Aristotle’s ‘apparent good’ refers to what someone believes or takes to be good and also, ...
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This chapter examines a number of claims made by Jessica Moss in her book, Aristotle on the Apparent Good. Aristotle’s ‘apparent good’ refers to what someone believes or takes to be good and also, sometimes simultaneously, to what merely seems to be good as opposed to what genuinely is. Of course, what appears good to the virtuous person is genuinely good. Hence, one of the primary aims of Jessica Moss’ wide-ranging book is to argue that apparent good not only has the meanings just canvassed, but also is frequently meant ‘literally’ to refer to the good as it appears to perception or to ‘quasi-perception’, i.e. phantasia. The chapter presents a critique of the weaknesses in the arguments of this book and looks at how Moss’ conclusions come together. It also highlights the advantages to be gained from engaging with this book.Less
This chapter examines a number of claims made by Jessica Moss in her book, Aristotle on the Apparent Good. Aristotle’s ‘apparent good’ refers to what someone believes or takes to be good and also, sometimes simultaneously, to what merely seems to be good as opposed to what genuinely is. Of course, what appears good to the virtuous person is genuinely good. Hence, one of the primary aims of Jessica Moss’ wide-ranging book is to argue that apparent good not only has the meanings just canvassed, but also is frequently meant ‘literally’ to refer to the good as it appears to perception or to ‘quasi-perception’, i.e. phantasia. The chapter presents a critique of the weaknesses in the arguments of this book and looks at how Moss’ conclusions come together. It also highlights the advantages to be gained from engaging with this book.
Gösta Grönroos
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198746980
- eISBN:
- 9780191809163
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746980.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The question raised in this chapter is why Aristotle portrays the bad person as being in a miserable state. It is argued that the bad person suffers from a mental conflict, which consists of a clash ...
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The question raised in this chapter is why Aristotle portrays the bad person as being in a miserable state. It is argued that the bad person suffers from a mental conflict, which consists of a clash between two different kinds of desire, and that fulfilling one of the desires violates values that she also desires. But in contrast to the akratic person, the bad person has no proper conception of the good. Nevertheless, although the bad person may succeed in achieving what she thinks is good, she feels miserable not only on account of failing to fulfil her desire for the truly good life, but also on account of doing things that she finds degrading for her.Less
The question raised in this chapter is why Aristotle portrays the bad person as being in a miserable state. It is argued that the bad person suffers from a mental conflict, which consists of a clash between two different kinds of desire, and that fulfilling one of the desires violates values that she also desires. But in contrast to the akratic person, the bad person has no proper conception of the good. Nevertheless, although the bad person may succeed in achieving what she thinks is good, she feels miserable not only on account of failing to fulfil her desire for the truly good life, but also on account of doing things that she finds degrading for her.
