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Aporia

David Wolfsdorf

in Trials of Reason: Plato and the Crafting of Philosophy

“Aporia” distinguishes two form of aporia among the early dialogues, epistemic, which occurs in all the texts, and dramatic, which occurs only in some. It is argued that the occurrence of dramatic ... More

“Aporia” distinguishes two form of aporia among the early dialogues, epistemic, which occurs in all the texts, and dramatic, which occurs only in some. It is argued that the occurrence of dramatic aporia in select dialogues reflects the theme of the difficulty of realizing philosophy as a rational discursive enterprise within a political community of antiphilosophical attitudes.Less

Socrates' Speech: The Nature of Erōs

Frisbee C. C. Sheffield

in Plato's Symposium: The Ethics of Desire

This chapter begins with Socrates' account of the nature of eros. The first part of the chapter explores Socrates' account of eros as an intermediate psychological state. The desire for beautiful and ... More

This chapter begins with Socrates' account of the nature of eros. The first part of the chapter explores Socrates' account of eros as an intermediate psychological state. The desire for beautiful and good things confronts us with something beautiful and good that our mortal natures lack (an experience of aporia), and yet we awaken a more than human ability to transcend that nature and to strive towards a divine state of possession (euporia). The second part of the chapter explores Socrates' claim that we desire the good and beautiful things we lack in more detail. Socrates singles out wisdom as one of the most beautiful things, and goes on to sketch an account of how eros' nature manifests itself in the pursuit of wisdom. The chapter concludes by arguing that eros' intermediate nature, as manifested in the pursuit of wisdom in particular, is exemplified in the behaviour of Socrates and his alter ego Diotima at this symposium.Less

Explanation and Essence in Plato's Phaedo

Vasilis Politis

in Definition in Greek Philosophy

This chapter makes several proposals concerning Plato's discussion in Phaedo (95e f.), where causes or explanations are said to be or be based on forms or essences. It states that Plato's argument ... More

This chapter makes several proposals concerning Plato's discussion in Phaedo (95e f.), where causes or explanations are said to be or be based on forms or essences. It states that Plato's argument involves not a contentious notion of a Platonic form but only the notion of essence in the sense of the correct answer to a question of the type ‘What is’, with which we are familiar from earlier in this dialogue, from Plato's earlier dialogues. Second, the chapter suggests, Plato's argument does not rely on a presupposed notion of essence but rather serves to establish the need for such a notion in the context of explanation. Third, it contends, Plato's argument does not rely on the principle ‘like-explains/causes-like’ but rather on the requirement that explanations must be uniform, which Plato spells out independently of that principle. Fourth, the chapter argues, in Plato's account of explanation, which involves basic essences, physical or material components of things can be genuinely part of explanations. Finally, Plato's argument is to be understood as conducted according to a general method of argument and inquiry. This method of argument and inquiry consists in first articulating a particular aporia about explanation in general, and then arguing that a particular account of explanation is both necessary and sufficient to resolve this aporia. The aporia is that, on the one hand, no proposed explanation is genuinely explanatory unless it is uniform; but, on the other hand, no currently proposed explanations, be they everyday or the scientific ones favoured by the natural philosophers, are uniform or begin to indicate how the uniformity-requirement is to be satisfied in the explanations that we propose.Less

Definition and Division in Plato's Sophist

Lesley Brown

in Definition in Greek Philosophy

This chapter investigates the so-called method of division, purportedly used in the dialogue Sophist to give the essence of the sophist, i.e., of the sophistic art or expertise. The dialogue's enigma ... More

This chapter investigates the so-called method of division, purportedly used in the dialogue Sophist to give the essence of the sophist, i.e., of the sophistic art or expertise. The dialogue's enigma is that it offers not one but seven different definitions, all of them satirical or whimsical, and each purporting to be the account of what sophistry is. The chapter rejects readings on which each of these ‘definitions’, or just the final one — the sophist as a producer of images — is meant seriously as an account of what sophistry is. It argues that the initial assumption — that there is a definable expertise (technē) of sophistry — is one Plato can hardly have shared, given his criteria for what counts as a technē. The chapter concludes that in the Sophist Plato shows both how close sophistry and true philosophy are, and also how they differ — all this without intending the reader to assume that the method of division has revealed any essence of sophistry, since there can be no such thing.Less

Derrida: Différance and the “Plural Logic of the Aporia”

Andrea Hurst

in Derrida Vis-à-vis Lacan: Interweaving Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis

This chapter offers a detailed account of Jacques Derrida's quasi-transcendental thinking. It tries to undo the ties of the interpretative straitjacket that binds ... More

This chapter offers a detailed account of Jacques Derrida's quasi-transcendental thinking. It tries to undo the ties of the interpretative straitjacket that binds Derrida's thinking into an aneconomic freeplay of differences, which sees “deconstruction” as merely the hysterical dismantling of any construction. It also lays a basis for grasping Derrida's deconstructive readings of Sigmund Freud. The discussion begins by criticizing Richard Rorty's early misreadings, which provide excellent material for an attempt to counter the one-sidedness of readings that make of Derrida's philosophical strategy a freeplay relativism. To counter such misreadings, this chapter offers an account of différance in accordance with the “plural logic of the aporia”, aligning “différance as temporization” with the economic aporia and “différance as spacing” with the aneconomic aporia.Less

Plato's Aporetic Style

George Rudebusch

in Socrates, Pleasure, and Value

There has been persistent controversy about the aporetic dialogs. Are they meant to convey any underlying philosophical position? A strong argument in favor of a negative answer rests on the ... More

There has been persistent controversy about the aporetic dialogs. Are they meant to convey any underlying philosophical position? A strong argument in favor of a negative answer rests on the following premise: if Plato had been trying to present a positive doctrine in his aporetic dialogs, he would have chosen a more straightforward style of writing for his purpose. I argue that this premise is false.Less

Speaker and Audience Construction

Jeanne Fahnestock

in Rhetorical Style: The Uses of Language in Persuasion

Language evolved for communication, so it has “built in” features that respond to the givens of human discourse. Part III, beginning with this chapter, covers the language choices that acknowledge ... More

Language evolved for communication, so it has “built in” features that respond to the givens of human discourse. Part III, beginning with this chapter, covers the language choices that acknowledge the immediacy of discourse, beginning with the partners in communication: the speaker or writer and the hearer or reader. The real roles of source and recipient are also constructed by the language of a text, whether or not they are made explicit. Extreme cases of fashioning the mutual roles of speakers and recipients are modeled in the salutations recommended in medieval letter-writing manuals. Typically, the role construction in a text can be made explicit when the personal pronouns creating rhetorical agents and audiences are used: I, you, we. Each of these choices has special uses and there are corresponding genres of fictional address. When there are no explicit references to the speaker and audience, the text may seem impersonal or objective, but speaker/audience roles are still assigned. The goal of discourse can be to change the relationship, or what Goffman called the footing, between the speaker and the addressee, and the constructed footing can in turn serve what Burke called the persuasive identification between the arguer and the audience. In rhetorical manuals, striking methods of speaker/audience construction were noted. The apostrophe involves specifically calling on or hailing an addressee. Arguers can also partition their audiences, dividing them into subgroups and making the whole group aware of its differences. They can also speak frankly to one subgroup in the presence of another, or even try to purge the audience and purify the remainder. Finally, arguers can ask questions in a variety of ways that turn audiences into cooperative responders.Less

Thought and Memory in the Talmud: The Ambiguous Status of “The Author”—and Beyond

Sergey Dolgopolski

in The Open Past: Subjectivity and Remembering in the Talmud

Deciphering the figure of “The Author” in the Talmud, the chapter develops a framework of analysis, where it actively engages the resources – the approaches and theories – of Talmud criticism while ... More

Deciphering the figure of “The Author” in the Talmud, the chapter develops a framework of analysis, where it actively engages the resources – the approaches and theories – of Talmud criticism while broadening the context of inquiry to include conflicting rhetorical and philosophical understandings of what it means to remember and what role thinking may play in memory. The chapter identifies aporias arising from associating the thinking in the Talmud with a person, such as “The Author.”Less

Conclusion – and Retrospect Conclusion – and Retrospect Metaphysicsc A 10

John M. Cooper

in Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha: Symposium Aristotelicum

The first part of the chapter translates and discusses, section by section, Metaphysics Α 10. The second part rveiews in retrospect Aristotle's intentions in Metaphysics Α as a whole, and the ... More

The first part of the chapter translates and discusses, section by section, Metaphysics Α 10. The second part rveiews in retrospect Aristotle's intentions in Metaphysics Α as a whole, and the progress of his argument through the 10 chapters of the book. It is Aristotle's intention (presented in chapters 1-2) to search for the first principles and causes of being, by reviewing and examining the opinions of his predecessors on this subject. A distinction must be made between Aristotle's report (chapters 3-6) of his predecessors' opinions and his critical discussion (chapters 8-9) of the difficulties (ἀπορίαι) he thinks their views involve; at the end of the book Aristotle reminds us that we need to mull over these difficulties for ourselves: this is the programme set for Book B.Less

Simonides, Part 4

Harry Berger Jr.

Ward Risvold and J. Benjamin Fuqua (eds)

in Couch City: Socrates against Simonides

Reading the final divisions, this chapter begins by considering how Socrates and Protagoras have proven Simonides’s poem to be fruitless and concludes by doing the same to Socrates himself. The ... More

Reading the final divisions, this chapter begins by considering how Socrates and Protagoras have proven Simonides’s poem to be fruitless and concludes by doing the same to Socrates himself. The chapter posits that Socrates has created a necessary aporia in his debate with Protagoras over the nature of good, wherein neither can be right or wrong without also countermanding their own position.Less

The Aporia in the Charmides About Reflexive Knowledge and the Contribution to its Solution in the sun Analogy of the Republic

Vasilis Politis

in Pursuing the Good: Ethics and Metaphysics in Plato's Republic

This chapter has two aims. Section I examines the aporia in the Charmides about a certain kind of knowledge (for short, reflexive knowledge): the knowledge of what one knows, that one knows it, and ... More

This chapter has two aims. Section I examines the aporia in the Charmides about a certain kind of knowledge (for short, reflexive knowledge): the knowledge of what one knows, that one knows it, and of what one does not know, that one does not know it. The aporia is whether or not, first, it is possible that there should be such a knowledge as this, and, second, if this is possible, the possession of it would be of any benefit. The chapter concentrates on the following questions. First, what is supposed to be the source of this aporia? And, second, what is supposed to be its positive upshot, especially in view of the fact that this dialogue ends not with a solution to it but, on the contrary, with a declaration of defeat in the face of it? Section II examines Plato's account of the idea of the good in the Sun-analogy of the Republic. It begins by considering certain central features of this account in its own right, and argues that the idea of the good is characterised as the joint cause of precisely two kinds of thing: on the one hand, the being, truth, and knowability of the things that are, are true and are knowable; on the other hand, the ability of the rational soul to know these things. Against this background, the chapter goes on to argue that the account of the idea of the good in the Sun analogy provides the resources for an account of reflexive knowledge which holds out promise of solving the Charmides aporia, that is, showing how reflexive knowledge can be both possible and beneficial, and of doing so in a way which addresses both the source and the upshot of this aporia as treated in the Charmides.Less

Critique and Political Ethics: Justice as a Question

Annika Thiem

in Unbecoming Subjects: Judith Butler, Moral Philosophy, and Critical Responsibility

No person lives as fully self-sufficient, autonomous beings; everyone is implicated in the lives of others not only at the beginning and end of one's lives, but all ... More

No person lives as fully self-sufficient, autonomous beings; everyone is implicated in the lives of others not only at the beginning and end of one's lives, but all throughout. Whether people like it or not, whether they want it or not, people are part of this interconnected global relationship. Since people cannot shed this collective social condition of living in this world, it would seem that considerations of ethics cannot limit themselves to the individually good life. Instead, the conditions of life as social and global issues, as well as their negotiation in politics, economics, and civil society, cannot fall beyond the scope of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy has to reflect on the aporia of having to formulate evaluative criteria to assess social and historical realities, while at the same time such formulations cannot but emerge from very particular social and historical positions themselves.Less

The Transcendental Relation in Lacanian Psychoanalysis

Andrea Hurst

in Derrida Vis-à-vis Lacan: Interweaving Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis

This chapter deals with Jacques Lacan's complex articulation of “the transcendental relation”. Favoring more concrete metaphorics over mathematical symbolization, this ... More

This chapter deals with Jacques Lacan's complex articulation of “the transcendental relation”. Favoring more concrete metaphorics over mathematical symbolization, this chapter takes the articulated imagoes that appear in Lacan's early essays as an orienting armature to explain the “Gödelian structure” of the transcendental relation. These also serve to emphasize that other humans are the primary and most significant “objects” or “others” implicated in the constitution of the subject in the transcendental relation. The “other”, which takes the three generalized forms of Nebenmensch, alter egos, and speaking others, is not a neutral, inert object. The family complexes of Lacan's early writings offer a metaphorical organization that remains a productive and orientating heuristic for understanding the complexities of his account of the transcendental relation. By using these structural metaphors, Lacan is at pains to point out that subjective development is not shaped by instincts but by complex imaginary constructs that inaugurate drives. This chapter shows how each of these complexes may be read according to the three moments of the “plural logic of the aporia”.Less

The “Talking Cure”: Language and Psychoanalysis

Andrea Hurst

in Derrida Vis-à-vis Lacan: Interweaving Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis

For Lacan, “successful negotiation of oedipal conflicts is quite literally a matter of learning to speak properly”. This chapter examines precisely what this means and how ... More

For Lacan, “successful negotiation of oedipal conflicts is quite literally a matter of learning to speak properly”. This chapter examines precisely what this means and how it is tied to questions of ethics and power. It examines Lacan's Seminar on the “Purloined Letter”, in which he capitalizes on both the literary metaphor and the ambiguity of the story's axial motif (namely, the “letter”, which allows for the play of multiple metaphorical manipulations) to demonstrate that the orders of the Real, Imaginary, and Symbolic can and must be understood in linguistic terms. This accords with his insistence on the fundamental importance of a linguistic theory in psychoanalysis and undergirds his call for psychoanalytic theory to situate Sigmund Freud's fundamental concepts “in a field of language” and to order them “in relation to the function of speech”. To read this seminar in terms of the “plural logic of the aporia” poses a direct challenge to Jacques Derrida's reading of this text. This chapter also looks at Barbara Johnson's seminal essay “The Frame of Reference”.Less

Conclusion: To Do Just ice to Lacan

Andrea Hurst

in Derrida Vis-à-vis Lacan: Interweaving Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis

This book has tried to demonstrate how the “plural logic of the aporia” emerges from out of the relative ruin of the transcendental tradition and how it comes into its own in ... More

This book has tried to demonstrate how the “plural logic of the aporia” emerges from out of the relative ruin of the transcendental tradition and how it comes into its own in Derrida's thinking as a “repetition compulsion” that one could also call iterability. Turning to the family resemblance that joins Jacques Derrida to Jacques Lacan, it has described how this logic informs Derrida's reading of key Freudian texts. Turning to Lacan, it has attempted to show that he rereads Sigmund Freud's texts in terms of a “structural logic” that accords precisely with the “plural logic of the aporia”. This makes of Lacan's return to Freud just as much an iteration of psychoanalysis, or an inventive repetition, as Derrida's. That an accord can quite easily be established between deconstruction and Lacanian psychoanalysis on the basis of a shared poststructural “logic” makes Derrida's stubborn resistance to Lacanian discourse all the more curious. Derrida reiterates that the Seminar on “The Purloined Letter” binds together at least eight of the most deconstructible motifs of philosophy.Less

Surviving with Ghosts: Second-generation Holocaust narratives

Rachel Falconer

in Hell in Contemporary Literature: Western Descent Narratives since 1945

This chapter addresses the themes of belatedness or afterwardness by contrasting two fictional novels about the Second World War. Fugitive Pieces and Austerlitz were written a generation after the ... More

This chapter addresses the themes of belatedness or afterwardness by contrasting two fictional novels about the Second World War. Fugitive Pieces and Austerlitz were written a generation after the war – 1996 and 2001, respectively — and present a traumatic recollection of childhood memories. These memories can represent the descent to Hell. The chapter also determines that the different ways these novels represent war show how memories of Hell can work to trick or unexpectedly release survivors from unbearable aporia.Less