Robert Pitofsky
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195372823
- eISBN:
- 9780199871773
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372823.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter presents four papers from some of the most eminent people in the antitrust field. It analyzes “barriers to entry” from a practical rather than theoretical point of view, and concludes ...
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This chapter presents four papers from some of the most eminent people in the antitrust field. It analyzes “barriers to entry” from a practical rather than theoretical point of view, and concludes that conservatives seem to be generous in allowing entrenched dominant firms to rely on a variety of coercion and intimidation tactics. It notes a wide-spread sense of “something gone wrong” with today's antitrust enforcement, in particular a growing sense of too much emphasis on over-simplified economic models. The chapter then provides a full and fair historic review of Warren Court excesses, and the Chicago School's remarkable influence in reversing some trends that most would ridicule today. It gives examples of areas where the Chicago School has not prevailed because of unrealistic economic approaches. It then emphasizes the complexity of evaluating the successes and failures of the Chicago School, noting examples of each kind of outcome. Finally, the chapter notes that many changes over the last half century, for better or worse, are the result of a variety of influences—not just fashions of economic analysis. It concludes that there are significant areas where extreme applications of conservative economic thought have “overshot the mark” and expresses concern that any such academic influences may lead to under-enforcement.Less
This chapter presents four papers from some of the most eminent people in the antitrust field. It analyzes “barriers to entry” from a practical rather than theoretical point of view, and concludes that conservatives seem to be generous in allowing entrenched dominant firms to rely on a variety of coercion and intimidation tactics. It notes a wide-spread sense of “something gone wrong” with today's antitrust enforcement, in particular a growing sense of too much emphasis on over-simplified economic models. The chapter then provides a full and fair historic review of Warren Court excesses, and the Chicago School's remarkable influence in reversing some trends that most would ridicule today. It gives examples of areas where the Chicago School has not prevailed because of unrealistic economic approaches. It then emphasizes the complexity of evaluating the successes and failures of the Chicago School, noting examples of each kind of outcome. Finally, the chapter notes that many changes over the last half century, for better or worse, are the result of a variety of influences—not just fashions of economic analysis. It concludes that there are significant areas where extreme applications of conservative economic thought have “overshot the mark” and expresses concern that any such academic influences may lead to under-enforcement.
Michael A. Carrier
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195342581
- eISBN:
- 9780199867035
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342581.003.0016
- Subject:
- Law, Intellectual Property, IT, and Media Law
This concluding chapter synthesizes the benefits of treating the IP and antitrust laws together in seeking to foster innovation. It recounts the wide swath of the economy and expanse of cutting-edge ...
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This concluding chapter synthesizes the benefits of treating the IP and antitrust laws together in seeking to foster innovation. It recounts the wide swath of the economy and expanse of cutting-edge innovation topics covered by the proposals. It shows how the recommendations rescue Congress's intent, and recaps the nuance and practical nature of the proposals. It underscores the global appeal of the topics and analysis of the laws of Australia, China, the EU, India, Japan, and Korea. Finally it shows how the book seeks to carve out a greater role for innovation in copyright, patent, and antitrust law.Less
This concluding chapter synthesizes the benefits of treating the IP and antitrust laws together in seeking to foster innovation. It recounts the wide swath of the economy and expanse of cutting-edge innovation topics covered by the proposals. It shows how the recommendations rescue Congress's intent, and recaps the nuance and practical nature of the proposals. It underscores the global appeal of the topics and analysis of the laws of Australia, China, the EU, India, Japan, and Korea. Finally it shows how the book seeks to carve out a greater role for innovation in copyright, patent, and antitrust law.
Louis Galambos
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199251902
- eISBN:
- 9780191719059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251902.003.0006
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Business History
In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration drastically altered American antitrust policy, virtually eliminating Section 2 cases involving monopolies. This chapter provides a context for that decision by ...
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In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration drastically altered American antitrust policy, virtually eliminating Section 2 cases involving monopolies. This chapter provides a context for that decision by tracing the efforts that the federal government made since 1890 to reconcile an opposition to highly concentrated economic power with the even stronger enthusiasm Americans have always had for the economic success they associated with the nation's largest enterprises. In this setting, judges and government lawyers struggled over the years to come up with a clear concept of monopoly. In the global economy of the late 20th century, the Reagan policy innovation solved that problem and proved to be timely and significant. The new policy allowed American firms to get up to global scale, either through strategic alliances or through mergers that would not have been allowed under previous administrations.Less
In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration drastically altered American antitrust policy, virtually eliminating Section 2 cases involving monopolies. This chapter provides a context for that decision by tracing the efforts that the federal government made since 1890 to reconcile an opposition to highly concentrated economic power with the even stronger enthusiasm Americans have always had for the economic success they associated with the nation's largest enterprises. In this setting, judges and government lawyers struggled over the years to come up with a clear concept of monopoly. In the global economy of the late 20th century, the Reagan policy innovation solved that problem and proved to be timely and significant. The new policy allowed American firms to get up to global scale, either through strategic alliances or through mergers that would not have been allowed under previous administrations.
David C. Mowery
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199574759
- eISBN:
- 9780191722660
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199574759.003.0002
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Innovation
This chapter discusses the case of USA, in which economic catch‐up with such European countries as Britain and Germany occurred during the final decades of the nineteenth century. Throughout this ...
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This chapter discusses the case of USA, in which economic catch‐up with such European countries as Britain and Germany occurred during the final decades of the nineteenth century. Throughout this catch‐up process, its growth trajectory changed from the one that relied on expanding capital and labor inputs to a more knowledge‐intensive one. It acquired knowledge needed for this transition from outside as well as from within. The patent law was enacted in 1790, soon after its independence, and influenced the development of corporate structure and strategy. The chapter discusses the technology transfer and intellectual property protection in the textile industry that occurred mainly in 1810–60, the “Golden Age” of the independent inventor, such as Edison, in 1860–1900, the patent regime and economic catch‐up in organic chemicals in 1900–30, and the relationship between patent policy, antitrust policy, and the structure of industrial R&D.Less
This chapter discusses the case of USA, in which economic catch‐up with such European countries as Britain and Germany occurred during the final decades of the nineteenth century. Throughout this catch‐up process, its growth trajectory changed from the one that relied on expanding capital and labor inputs to a more knowledge‐intensive one. It acquired knowledge needed for this transition from outside as well as from within. The patent law was enacted in 1790, soon after its independence, and influenced the development of corporate structure and strategy. The chapter discusses the technology transfer and intellectual property protection in the textile industry that occurred mainly in 1810–60, the “Golden Age” of the independent inventor, such as Edison, in 1860–1900, the patent regime and economic catch‐up in organic chemicals in 1900–30, and the relationship between patent policy, antitrust policy, and the structure of industrial R&D.
Andrea M. Herrmann
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199543434
- eISBN:
- 9780191715693
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199543434.001.0001
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Strategy, Political Economy
This book examines how firms adapt to the pressures of increasing international competition by testing both the arguments on ‘strategy specialization’ proposed in the competitiveness literature in ...
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This book examines how firms adapt to the pressures of increasing international competition by testing both the arguments on ‘strategy specialization’ proposed in the competitiveness literature in general, and those offered by contributors to the ‘varieties of capitalism’ debate in particular. If different economies are characterized by distinct institutional arrangements — successful firms would be the ones that exploit their comparative advantages and specialize in the competitive strategies facilitated by national institutions. The book begins with an assessment of how many pharmaceutical firms in Germany, Italy, and the UK pursue strategies facilitated by national institutions governing financial markets, antitrust activities, and the labour market. Quantitative analyses reveal that deviant firms, competing through institutionally unsupported strategies, outnumber conforming firms by far. Not only does this finding run counter to the expectations of the competitiveness literature, it brings up a whole new line of inquiry. How can firms compete through strategies that are not supported by national institutions? To address this question, the book combines quantitative analyses with qualitative insights, showing that firms do not necessarily exploit comparative institutional advantages, but that they can successfully circumvent institutional constraints. International markets and individual collaboration on a contractual basis allow firms to compete despite comparative institutional disadvantages. These findings suggest that trade liberalization tends to foster strategy diversification rather than strategy specialization, depending on the inventiveness of entrepreneurs in developing individual approaches toward competing.Less
This book examines how firms adapt to the pressures of increasing international competition by testing both the arguments on ‘strategy specialization’ proposed in the competitiveness literature in general, and those offered by contributors to the ‘varieties of capitalism’ debate in particular. If different economies are characterized by distinct institutional arrangements — successful firms would be the ones that exploit their comparative advantages and specialize in the competitive strategies facilitated by national institutions. The book begins with an assessment of how many pharmaceutical firms in Germany, Italy, and the UK pursue strategies facilitated by national institutions governing financial markets, antitrust activities, and the labour market. Quantitative analyses reveal that deviant firms, competing through institutionally unsupported strategies, outnumber conforming firms by far. Not only does this finding run counter to the expectations of the competitiveness literature, it brings up a whole new line of inquiry. How can firms compete through strategies that are not supported by national institutions? To address this question, the book combines quantitative analyses with qualitative insights, showing that firms do not necessarily exploit comparative institutional advantages, but that they can successfully circumvent institutional constraints. International markets and individual collaboration on a contractual basis allow firms to compete despite comparative institutional disadvantages. These findings suggest that trade liberalization tends to foster strategy diversification rather than strategy specialization, depending on the inventiveness of entrepreneurs in developing individual approaches toward competing.
Steven W. Usselman
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199241057
- eISBN:
- 9780191714290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199241057.003.0004
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Information Technology
The fortunes of the American computer industry illustrates a remarkable economic success story in terms of global performance. What is especially striking about the industry is its resilience — its ...
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The fortunes of the American computer industry illustrates a remarkable economic success story in terms of global performance. What is especially striking about the industry is its resilience — its ability to sustain dominance across a series of technical watersheds. Proponents of virtually every theory on economic activity and from every school of political economy have found some basis for support in the experiences of the computer industry. This chapter adds one more element to the story: government competition policy, specifically antitrust, and its close cousin, intellectual property law.Less
The fortunes of the American computer industry illustrates a remarkable economic success story in terms of global performance. What is especially striking about the industry is its resilience — its ability to sustain dominance across a series of technical watersheds. Proponents of virtually every theory on economic activity and from every school of political economy have found some basis for support in the experiences of the computer industry. This chapter adds one more element to the story: government competition policy, specifically antitrust, and its close cousin, intellectual property law.
Eric Guthey
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199251902
- eISBN:
- 9780191719059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251902.003.0012
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Business History
A narrative analysis of New Economy romanticism as a stylized genre of media hype reveals how the framing of celebrity business leaders folds individual personalities together with corporate ...
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A narrative analysis of New Economy romanticism as a stylized genre of media hype reveals how the framing of celebrity business leaders folds individual personalities together with corporate structures in ways that mirror the persistent American confusion over the simultaneously private and public identity of the firm. Media coverage of Ted Turner, Bill Gates, and Jim Clark exhibits a progression away from traditional strategies for legitimizing corporate activity toward antimanagerialism — a romanticized assault on the legitimacy of powerful bureaucratic organizations that paradoxically legitimizes corporate power itself. This argument expands the notion of what counts as governance literature to include business biography and even pop culture narratives, and to embrace a range of broader cultural issues such as the challenge the corporation poses for the American liberal imagination, and the question of what it means to be a person in a corporate society.Less
A narrative analysis of New Economy romanticism as a stylized genre of media hype reveals how the framing of celebrity business leaders folds individual personalities together with corporate structures in ways that mirror the persistent American confusion over the simultaneously private and public identity of the firm. Media coverage of Ted Turner, Bill Gates, and Jim Clark exhibits a progression away from traditional strategies for legitimizing corporate activity toward antimanagerialism — a romanticized assault on the legitimacy of powerful bureaucratic organizations that paradoxically legitimizes corporate power itself. This argument expands the notion of what counts as governance literature to include business biography and even pop culture narratives, and to embrace a range of broader cultural issues such as the challenge the corporation poses for the American liberal imagination, and the question of what it means to be a person in a corporate society.
Naomi R. Lamoreaux
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199251902
- eISBN:
- 9780191719059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251902.003.0002
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Business History
This chapter argues that a focus on big business has distorted the understanding of the legal history of the corporation. The relevant context for understanding the evolution of the form must be ...
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This chapter argues that a focus on big business has distorted the understanding of the legal history of the corporation. The relevant context for understanding the evolution of the form must be broadened to include two related but somewhat contradictory trends: first, the democratization of the corporate form of enterprise (that is, its adoption by increasing numbers of small businesses); and second, a growing tendency in the general culture to see enterprises as manifestations of collective action rather than individual initiative. These trends forced courts and policy makers to reconsider the nature of corporations and also created considerable confusion about how corporations differed from the other main organizational form employed by small businesses — partnerships. The end result of this reconsideration was a rigid definition of the two forms that severely limited the contractual freedom of small businesses.Less
This chapter argues that a focus on big business has distorted the understanding of the legal history of the corporation. The relevant context for understanding the evolution of the form must be broadened to include two related but somewhat contradictory trends: first, the democratization of the corporate form of enterprise (that is, its adoption by increasing numbers of small businesses); and second, a growing tendency in the general culture to see enterprises as manifestations of collective action rather than individual initiative. These trends forced courts and policy makers to reconsider the nature of corporations and also created considerable confusion about how corporations differed from the other main organizational form employed by small businesses — partnerships. The end result of this reconsideration was a rigid definition of the two forms that severely limited the contractual freedom of small businesses.
Anu Bradford
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195387704
- eISBN:
- 9780199866762
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387704.003.0016
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
This chapter focuses on the relative merits of binding and nonbinding international antitrust cooperation. It argues that the primary impediment to international antitrust cooperation is the ...
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This chapter focuses on the relative merits of binding and nonbinding international antitrust cooperation. It argues that the primary impediment to international antitrust cooperation is the disagreement over the substance and institutional form of such cooperation. This disagreement has led states to water down the proposed binding international antitrust agreement to the point of severely limiting, if not eliminating, any net benefits. In the end, states have chosen not to spend resources and political capital in negotiating a binding international agreement that fails to generate substantial benefits, preferring to resolve their differences informally on a case-by-case basis.Less
This chapter focuses on the relative merits of binding and nonbinding international antitrust cooperation. It argues that the primary impediment to international antitrust cooperation is the disagreement over the substance and institutional form of such cooperation. This disagreement has led states to water down the proposed binding international antitrust agreement to the point of severely limiting, if not eliminating, any net benefits. In the end, states have chosen not to spend resources and political capital in negotiating a binding international agreement that fails to generate substantial benefits, preferring to resolve their differences informally on a case-by-case basis.
Thomas E. Kauper
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195372823
- eISBN:
- 9780199871773
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372823.003.0005
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This paper begins by noting a widespread unease, indeed a sense of “something gone wrong”—with today's antitrust enforcement. In particular, it notes a growing sense of too much emphasis on ...
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This paper begins by noting a widespread unease, indeed a sense of “something gone wrong”—with today's antitrust enforcement. In particular, it notes a growing sense of too much emphasis on oversimplified and unrealistic economic models and too little emphasis on actual market effects. In an effort to understand Chicago School influence, the paper looks back to the 1950s and 1960s and describes the inviting target offered by excessive antitrust enforcement during those decades, citing many Supreme Court decisions ridiculed by almost all today. The Chicago School succeeded in part because of the nature of its opponent. Despite Chicago's undoubted, and generally constructive influence, it has not always achieved its sought-after outcomes. State-engineered exemptions from the federal antitrust laws (the “State Action Doctrine”) have grown in a way contrary to a primary reliance on the free market; there is no sign of Chicago influence in the federal legislative arena, and there is a growing concern about Chicago's oversimplified and unrealistic economic models that seem to ignore actual market facts.Less
This paper begins by noting a widespread unease, indeed a sense of “something gone wrong”—with today's antitrust enforcement. In particular, it notes a growing sense of too much emphasis on oversimplified and unrealistic economic models and too little emphasis on actual market effects. In an effort to understand Chicago School influence, the paper looks back to the 1950s and 1960s and describes the inviting target offered by excessive antitrust enforcement during those decades, citing many Supreme Court decisions ridiculed by almost all today. The Chicago School succeeded in part because of the nature of its opponent. Despite Chicago's undoubted, and generally constructive influence, it has not always achieved its sought-after outcomes. State-engineered exemptions from the federal antitrust laws (the “State Action Doctrine”) have grown in a way contrary to a primary reliance on the free market; there is no sign of Chicago influence in the federal legislative arena, and there is a growing concern about Chicago's oversimplified and unrealistic economic models that seem to ignore actual market facts.
Daniel L. Rubinfeld
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195372823
- eISBN:
- 9780199871773
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372823.003.0006
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This paper suggests that while the influence of industrial organization economics has grown substantially over time, it would be overly simplistic to characterize that influence as having been driven ...
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This paper suggests that while the influence of industrial organization economics has grown substantially over time, it would be overly simplistic to characterize that influence as having been driven solely by a group of conservative antitrust legal and/or economic scholars. Differences among antitrust economists are as likely due to the fact economists hold a range of views as to the meaning of economic efficiency, and they differ significantly in their beliefs as to the likely efficacy of government intervention. The paper begins with an overview of the history of antitrust policy. It explains how important precedents in the law have followed, albeit with a substantial lag, important developments in the economics of industrial organization that serve as important underpinnings of the law. It then explains why and how economists' views of antitrust policy differ, and how and why conservative economics has overshot the mark to some degree.Less
This paper suggests that while the influence of industrial organization economics has grown substantially over time, it would be overly simplistic to characterize that influence as having been driven solely by a group of conservative antitrust legal and/or economic scholars. Differences among antitrust economists are as likely due to the fact economists hold a range of views as to the meaning of economic efficiency, and they differ significantly in their beliefs as to the likely efficacy of government intervention. The paper begins with an overview of the history of antitrust policy. It explains how important precedents in the law have followed, albeit with a substantial lag, important developments in the economics of industrial organization that serve as important underpinnings of the law. It then explains why and how economists' views of antitrust policy differ, and how and why conservative economics has overshot the mark to some degree.
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost and Lawrence P. Casalino
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195390131
- eISBN:
- 9780199775934
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195390131.003.009
- Subject:
- Law, Medical Law
This chapter proposes the adaptation of traditional Medicare to accommodate value-purchasing strategies, specifically medical homes and accountable care systems. It also examines legal barriers under ...
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This chapter proposes the adaptation of traditional Medicare to accommodate value-purchasing strategies, specifically medical homes and accountable care systems. It also examines legal barriers under the Medicare law and other federal and state laws to implementing these strategies.Less
This chapter proposes the adaptation of traditional Medicare to accommodate value-purchasing strategies, specifically medical homes and accountable care systems. It also examines legal barriers under the Medicare law and other federal and state laws to implementing these strategies.
Michael A. Carrier
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195342581
- eISBN:
- 9780199867035
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342581.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Intellectual Property, IT, and Media Law
This chapter sheds light on antitrust. It begins with a primer explaining the most important of the regime's doctrines. It then places today's law in context by tracing the history of antitrust law. ...
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This chapter sheds light on antitrust. It begins with a primer explaining the most important of the regime's doctrines. It then places today's law in context by tracing the history of antitrust law. It concludes by surveying the evidence on the need for antitrust.Less
This chapter sheds light on antitrust. It begins with a primer explaining the most important of the regime's doctrines. It then places today's law in context by tracing the history of antitrust law. It concludes by surveying the evidence on the need for antitrust.
Michael A. Carrier
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195342581
- eISBN:
- 9780199867035
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195342581.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Intellectual Property, IT, and Media Law
This chapter explores the underpinnings of the mutual distrust between intellectual property (IP) and antitrust and the various stages of their relationship. It begins by discussing the conflict ...
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This chapter explores the underpinnings of the mutual distrust between intellectual property (IP) and antitrust and the various stages of their relationship. It begins by discussing the conflict between IP and antitrust. It then traces the three stages of the intersection in the 20th century, in which courts first refused to impose liability for patent-based activity, then limited patentees' power, then moved toward a predominant IP. The chapter concludes by examining important agency guidelines and courts' analyses of refusals to license.Less
This chapter explores the underpinnings of the mutual distrust between intellectual property (IP) and antitrust and the various stages of their relationship. It begins by discussing the conflict between IP and antitrust. It then traces the three stages of the intersection in the 20th century, in which courts first refused to impose liability for patent-based activity, then limited patentees' power, then moved toward a predominant IP. The chapter concludes by examining important agency guidelines and courts' analyses of refusals to license.
Damien Géradin and Michel Kerf
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199242436
- eISBN:
- 9780191697104
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199242436.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Competition Law
Controlling market power is a crucial issue in a liberalised telecommunications market where incumbents usually remain dominant for some time after the opening of the market to competition. ...
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Controlling market power is a crucial issue in a liberalised telecommunications market where incumbents usually remain dominant for some time after the opening of the market to competition. Controlling market power can be achieved through two distinct sets of rules and institutions: economy-wide antitrust rules and institutions, which have been in place in most industrialised countries for several decades, and infrastructure or sector-specific rules and institutions which have been specifically adopted to promote competition and control market power in telecommunications or in particular infrastructure sectors. In this context, the relationship between the two sets of rules and institutions becomes an issue of growing importance. Relying on a comparative analysis of five countries (the United States, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Chile, and Australia), the present book seeks to shed some light on how economy-wide and infrastructure or sector-specific components of the regulatory framework should be designed and on what the respective roles of such components should be based to maximise the efficiency of economic regulation in telecommunications.Less
Controlling market power is a crucial issue in a liberalised telecommunications market where incumbents usually remain dominant for some time after the opening of the market to competition. Controlling market power can be achieved through two distinct sets of rules and institutions: economy-wide antitrust rules and institutions, which have been in place in most industrialised countries for several decades, and infrastructure or sector-specific rules and institutions which have been specifically adopted to promote competition and control market power in telecommunications or in particular infrastructure sectors. In this context, the relationship between the two sets of rules and institutions becomes an issue of growing importance. Relying on a comparative analysis of five countries (the United States, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Chile, and Australia), the present book seeks to shed some light on how economy-wide and infrastructure or sector-specific components of the regulatory framework should be designed and on what the respective roles of such components should be based to maximise the efficiency of economic regulation in telecommunications.
Louis Kaplow
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691158624
- eISBN:
- 9781400846078
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691158624.003.0004
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
This chapter examines competition law's doctrine on horizontal agreements. It begins by addressing the U.S. statute, Sherman Act Section 1. The chapter then turns to the leading Supreme Court ...
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This chapter examines competition law's doctrine on horizontal agreements. It begins by addressing the U.S. statute, Sherman Act Section 1. The chapter then turns to the leading Supreme Court precedents on Section 1. These are the primary source of U.S. antitrust law in general and specifically in delineating what constitutes a horizontal agreement. Here, there is more conflict than meets the eye. Finally, the corresponding provision in the European Union, Article 101, is examined. Because the underlying questions and the relevant economic theory of oligopolistic coordination are the same, it is natural to expect similar challenges to arise, and they do.Less
This chapter examines competition law's doctrine on horizontal agreements. It begins by addressing the U.S. statute, Sherman Act Section 1. The chapter then turns to the leading Supreme Court precedents on Section 1. These are the primary source of U.S. antitrust law in general and specifically in delineating what constitutes a horizontal agreement. Here, there is more conflict than meets the eye. Finally, the corresponding provision in the European Union, Article 101, is examined. Because the underlying questions and the relevant economic theory of oligopolistic coordination are the same, it is natural to expect similar challenges to arise, and they do.
Richard Schmalensee
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195372823
- eISBN:
- 9780199871773
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372823.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This paper argues that the victories and even the losses of the Chicago School as constructive, because the losses stimulated more rigorous thinking. It revisits the theoretical battles of the 1950s ...
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This paper argues that the victories and even the losses of the Chicago School as constructive, because the losses stimulated more rigorous thinking. It revisits the theoretical battles of the 1950s and 1960s, and demonstrates how conservative economic analysis called a halt to some questionable initiatives such as deconcentration of major industries as a result of “no-fault” monopoly enforcement, preference for small businesses for the sake of their smallness, and disregard of the value of efficiencies in various transactions, even holding efficiencies against the legality of a transaction.Less
This paper argues that the victories and even the losses of the Chicago School as constructive, because the losses stimulated more rigorous thinking. It revisits the theoretical battles of the 1950s and 1960s, and demonstrates how conservative economic analysis called a halt to some questionable initiatives such as deconcentration of major industries as a result of “no-fault” monopoly enforcement, preference for small businesses for the sake of their smallness, and disregard of the value of efficiencies in various transactions, even holding efficiencies against the legality of a transaction.
Irwin M. Stelzer
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195372823
- eISBN:
- 9780199871773
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372823.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This paper characterizes the conservative view as follows: it looks at antitrust as inefficient, contributing unwisely to an excess of government regulation, and unnecessary because market power is ...
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This paper characterizes the conservative view as follows: it looks at antitrust as inefficient, contributing unwisely to an excess of government regulation, and unnecessary because market power is transient and only economic analysis (i.e., efficiency) matters. It then examines various kinds of anticompetitive behavior, particularly low or “predatory” prices by a dominant firm, from an unusual and perhaps unique point of view. Conservative analysis argues that if there is ease of entry, there is no problem that antitrust needs to address. If the wrongdoer tries to raise prices or curtail output, it will be swamped, so the argument goes, by new entry. The paper asks what a venture capitalist would consider before supporting efforts of a smaller challenger to enter a dominant firm's market. If the entrenched dominant incumbent can rely on a variety of coercion and intimidation tactics, as conservatives seem to allow, venture capitalists will often not support the challenger. As a result, the goal of protecting a free market to provide a fair and open opportunity to all comers will not be served. To achieve that goal, the antitrust laws must be vigorously enforced — that is not the state of affairs today.Less
This paper characterizes the conservative view as follows: it looks at antitrust as inefficient, contributing unwisely to an excess of government regulation, and unnecessary because market power is transient and only economic analysis (i.e., efficiency) matters. It then examines various kinds of anticompetitive behavior, particularly low or “predatory” prices by a dominant firm, from an unusual and perhaps unique point of view. Conservative analysis argues that if there is ease of entry, there is no problem that antitrust needs to address. If the wrongdoer tries to raise prices or curtail output, it will be swamped, so the argument goes, by new entry. The paper asks what a venture capitalist would consider before supporting efforts of a smaller challenger to enter a dominant firm's market. If the entrenched dominant incumbent can rely on a variety of coercion and intimidation tactics, as conservatives seem to allow, venture capitalists will often not support the challenger. As a result, the goal of protecting a free market to provide a fair and open opportunity to all comers will not be served. To achieve that goal, the antitrust laws must be vigorously enforced — that is not the state of affairs today.
F. M. Scherer
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195372823
- eISBN:
- 9780199871773
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372823.003.0004
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This paper observes that antitrust analysis has moved sharply to the conservative side and emphasizes the complexity of issues. First, it notes that the move toward less enforcement does not reflect ...
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This paper observes that antitrust analysis has moved sharply to the conservative side and emphasizes the complexity of issues. First, it notes that the move toward less enforcement does not reflect just the influence of economists but also of lawyers, enforcement officials, and judges who believe in the precept that government is the problem and not the solution. Second, it observes that conservative approaches avoiding government intervention is not a consistent view of the Chicago School. It has advocated vigorous antitrust enforcement in the area of price-fixing among direct rivals (cartel policy) and occasionally advocated limits on the size of corporations. However, in recent years, extreme Chicago views have influenced enforcement, particularly during Republican administrations. Illustrations include declining enforcement efforts with respect to predatory pricing, concentrated (i.e., oligopoly) markets, and mergers. As an example of scholarship that argues that market forces will solve all problems, the paper cites an article by J. McGee to the effect that with the exception of industries where the state blocks entry “[t]here is the strongest presumption that the existing structure [of industry] is the efficient structure.” In a concluding section, the paper takes on a specific issue that has been advocated as a result of conservative economic analysis and has achieved substantial support. That view, virtually a consensus in terms of conservative economic analysis, is that government regulation of intellectual property—particularly mandatory licensing of patents as a remedy for wrong-doing—will reduce investments in innovation and, in the long run, injure consumers. That conclusion is inconsistent with a body of empirical evidence that antitrust enforcement had little adverse impact on investments in innovation.Less
This paper observes that antitrust analysis has moved sharply to the conservative side and emphasizes the complexity of issues. First, it notes that the move toward less enforcement does not reflect just the influence of economists but also of lawyers, enforcement officials, and judges who believe in the precept that government is the problem and not the solution. Second, it observes that conservative approaches avoiding government intervention is not a consistent view of the Chicago School. It has advocated vigorous antitrust enforcement in the area of price-fixing among direct rivals (cartel policy) and occasionally advocated limits on the size of corporations. However, in recent years, extreme Chicago views have influenced enforcement, particularly during Republican administrations. Illustrations include declining enforcement efforts with respect to predatory pricing, concentrated (i.e., oligopoly) markets, and mergers. As an example of scholarship that argues that market forces will solve all problems, the paper cites an article by J. McGee to the effect that with the exception of industries where the state blocks entry “[t]here is the strongest presumption that the existing structure [of industry] is the efficient structure.” In a concluding section, the paper takes on a specific issue that has been advocated as a result of conservative economic analysis and has achieved substantial support. That view, virtually a consensus in terms of conservative economic analysis, is that government regulation of intellectual property—particularly mandatory licensing of patents as a remedy for wrong-doing—will reduce investments in innovation and, in the long run, injure consumers. That conclusion is inconsistent with a body of empirical evidence that antitrust enforcement had little adverse impact on investments in innovation.
Eleanor M. Fox
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195372823
- eISBN:
- 9780199871773
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372823.003.0007
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This paper defines various concepts of efficiency and then demonstrates how conservative economic approaches have led to wrong results in several important cases. It asks: What is efficiency? Can ...
More
This paper defines various concepts of efficiency and then demonstrates how conservative economic approaches have led to wrong results in several important cases. It asks: What is efficiency? Can antitrust law produce efficiency, and how does it try to do so? It observes that one way antitrust pursues efficiency is by choosing a proxy; notably, either trust in the dynamic of the competition process or trust in (even) the dominant firm. By case examples, it shows the effect of conservative economics in choosing as the proxy trust in the dominant firm. It argues that this phenomenon has produced the Efficiency Paradox: In the name of efficiency, conservative theories of antitrust cut off the most promising paths to efficiency. It is suggested that we can eliminate the Efficiency Paradox by readjusting the pendulum to give more regard to the incentives of mavericks and challengers and less regard to the freedom and autonomy of dominant firms.Less
This paper defines various concepts of efficiency and then demonstrates how conservative economic approaches have led to wrong results in several important cases. It asks: What is efficiency? Can antitrust law produce efficiency, and how does it try to do so? It observes that one way antitrust pursues efficiency is by choosing a proxy; notably, either trust in the dynamic of the competition process or trust in (even) the dominant firm. By case examples, it shows the effect of conservative economics in choosing as the proxy trust in the dominant firm. It argues that this phenomenon has produced the Efficiency Paradox: In the name of efficiency, conservative theories of antitrust cut off the most promising paths to efficiency. It is suggested that we can eliminate the Efficiency Paradox by readjusting the pendulum to give more regard to the incentives of mavericks and challengers and less regard to the freedom and autonomy of dominant firms.
