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This chapter assesses the unlikely mutuality of two very different seventies formations: the mind-control cult and the libertarian movement that arose out of a longer and more conflicted tradition of anarchism. It demonstrates that the cult's principles converge with those of libertarianism, particularly with respect to the prestige both cultists and libertarians assigned to expanded consciousness. L. Ron Hubbard bases Scientology on a premise not unlike libertarian paternalism: “What is true is what is true for you. No one has any right to force data on you and command you to believe.” Hubbard embraces the computational theory of mind with a fundamentalist zeal. Just as Hubbard shows us that cult libertarianism pairs well with the decade's resurgent antifoundationalism, so Scientology's techno-fetishism and celebrity centers remind us that seventies cults, breaking with an earlier generation's despair about mass media's atomizing effects, go all in on the euphoria of togetherness.

The modern scholarly task of “biblical theology,” “theology of the Old Testament,” or “theology of the New Testament” may be historically traced from around 1800 and through the 20th century. Its goal was both to describe the theology contained in the Bible but also to use that historical construction as a foundation for modern Christian theological appropriation of the Bible. The task, though, led either to bad theology, bad historiography, or both. A robust, Christian, orthodox theology must move beyond the limits of modernism and practice more creative, innovative readings of scripture.

This chapter examines Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s argument about foundationalism and antifoundationalism in his Science of Logic, especially his insistence that the former is equivalent to the external reflection by which essence is distinguished in non-dialectical logics from its appearances or properties. After offering some general remarks about the ground, the chapter discusses Hegel’s repudiation of the two standard philosophical procedures of attempting to explain the world from the outside: first by means of a transcendent first principle or foundation, and second from the inside. It also expounds on Hegel’s acceptance of the traditional Parmenidean claim that being and thinking are the same. Finally, the chapter looks at the structure of the ground from two perspectives: as origin or process and as demonstrated within its product.

According to a general belief, it is a fundamental trait of modern philosophy to have articulated itself as a thinking grounded in the certitude of self-consciousness. Pioneered and launched by Descartes, this thinking is said to have climbed to its height with Kant and, more so, in Fichte’s philosophy. Romanticism has also been interpreted as part of this movement. However, since Dieter Henrich and his students published their investigations of previously unknown philosophical sources, it has become clear that these earlier interpretations are not entirely accurate. This chapter considers the constellation of early romantic philosophy, i.e., what was left out of Henrich’s research; or rather, it summarizes the results of Manfred Frank’s work over the last twenty-five years.

This chapter will attempt to resolve a dispute between Frederick Beiser and Manfred Frank about the relationship between romanticism and idealism. In German Idealism Beiser placed the romantics within the German idealist movement, seeing them as part of the same tradition as Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. This aroused the objection of Frank, which appears in his Auswege aus dem deutschen Idealismus, and others who follow him (viz., Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert in her Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of Romantic Philosophy). They claim that romanticism and idealism are opposed movements because idealist is foundationalist whereas romanticism is antifoundationalist. This chapter argues that this debate partly rests on a confusion between methodological and metaphysical issues: that the romantics had an idealist metaphysics even though they did not share the methodology of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. There are other issues causing confusion, viz., who precisely do we want to regard as a romantic, which the chapter also attempts to sort out.

This chapter contains a translation of chapter 5 (“Madhyamaka”) of Taktsang Lotsawa Sherab Rinchen’s doxographic work Freedom from Extremes Accomplished through Comprehensive Knowledge of Philosophy. It begins with a short biography, followed by an introduction to the philosophical issues at stake that situates the debate within the Buddhist history of ideas. It charts the fault lines in the debate and what is at stake for Buddhist thought and practice, particularly the problems raised by global error theory for any attempt to develop a coherent theory of knowledge. We discuss the Indian antecedents of the controversy, examining how disputes regarding the proper interpretation of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti unfolded in India and then were transmitted and expanded in Tibet. Most of this chapter comprises the translation of Comprehensive Knowledge of Philosophy.