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Conclusion: Politics, Ideology, and Old Comedy

I. A. Ruffell

in Politics and Anti-Realism in Athenian Old Comedy: The Art of the Impossible

This conclusion brings together the three strands of the book and their related forms of anti-realism to argue that Old Comedy constructs its arguments, involves its audience, and seeks ... More

This conclusion brings together the three strands of the book and their related forms of anti-realism to argue that Old Comedy constructs its arguments, involves its audience, and seeks to maintain its cultural authority through the impossible and absurd. Humour and impossibility are central to how Old Comedy makes its political and ideological interventions.Less

Summary and Conclusion

Neil Tennant

in The Taming of the True

This concluding chapter sums up the key findings of this study on realist views of meaning and truth. The findings suggest that moderate anti-realism is well-motivated, internally coherent, and ... More

This concluding chapter sums up the key findings of this study on realist views of meaning and truth. The findings suggest that moderate anti-realism is well-motivated, internally coherent, and methodologically adequate, and it can be characterized by means of certain platitudes and key theses. This chapter also describes the development of an account of constructive falsifiability that complements the proof-theoretic account of constructive truth and validity.Less

Fitch's Paradox of Knowability

Michael Dummett

in New Essays on the Knowability Paradox

This chapter defends p→¬¬Kp as the best expression of semantic antirealism.

What's Paradoxical?

Jonathan L. Kvanvig

in The Knowability Paradox

This chapter explores the different grounds for accepting the claim that all truths are knowable, the assumption central to the derivation of Fitch’s result. It argues that although there is no ... More

This chapter explores the different grounds for accepting the claim that all truths are knowable, the assumption central to the derivation of Fitch’s result. It argues that although there is no compelling argument for holding that all truths are knowable, there are various positions in which this feature of semantic anti-realism fits naturally; rejecting this puts serious tension into a broad range of philosophical outlooks, including theism and physicalism. In the end, the paradox should be felt by everyone, even those who do not accept the knowability claim, because the heart of the paradox is not simply in what is implied by the knowability claim, but in a lost logical distinction between what is actual and what is possible.Less

Syntactic Restriction Strategies

Jonathan L. Kvanvig

in The Knowability Paradox

This chapter examines approaches to the paradox that wish to save anti-realism from the paradox by denying that the knowability assumption is a commitment of anti-realism. Such approaches contend ... More

This chapter examines approaches to the paradox that wish to save anti-realism from the paradox by denying that the knowability assumption is a commitment of anti-realism. Such approaches contend that the claim that all truths are knowable must be restricted in some way to express an anti-realist commitment. All examples of such an approach are rejected, and it is argued that even if there was a successful restriction strategy, the paradox would remain untouched.Less

 A Coherent Common Sense View

Amie L. Thomasson

in Ordinary Objects

This chapter begins by bringing out three common mistakes that lie behind the various arguments against ordinary objects discussed in this book. It goes on to suggest that all of these mistakes may ... More

This chapter begins by bringing out three common mistakes that lie behind the various arguments against ordinary objects discussed in this book. It goes on to suggest that all of these mistakes may be avoided by adopting a unified picture, based on the thesis that our singular and general nominative terms have a basic conceptual content in the form of frame-level conditions of application and coapplication collectively established by competent speakers. It shows how to develop a workable ontology of ordinary objects — one that can avoid all of the standard arguments against such objects — from that basis, and defends the claim that this provides a common sense view. The closing sections consider some prominent objections to the positive view, including that it posits too many objects and that it leads to some form of anti-realism.Less

 Handling Existence Questions

Amie L. Thomasson

in Ordinary Objects

This chapter investigates what is involved in asking general ontological questions such as: “what exists?” and “how many things are there?” It is argued that well-formed existence and counting ... More

This chapter investigates what is involved in asking general ontological questions such as: “what exists?” and “how many things are there?” It is argued that well-formed existence and counting questions are “specific” existence questions that specify a certain category or sort of entity enquired about. Purely “generic” existence and counting questions (asking about “anything whatsoever”, where “thing” is not used sortally) are ill-formed unanswerable questions. This gives us reason to think that quantificational claims likewise presuppose certain categories of entity quantified over. It also suggests that many of the questions driving ontological debates are based on pseudo-questions, and does so without subscribing to anti-realism or quantifier variance. The chapter closes by considering whether we can revive a form of universal quantification by way of a “covering” use of “thing” that generalizes over a range of category-specific terms.Less

Ethics Dehumanized

Panayot Butchvarov

in Metaethics after Moore

This chapter advocates a return to Moorean independence. One dominant metaethical trend is moral epistemology naturalized. Another metaethical trend has been conceptual analysis, often called ... More

This chapter advocates a return to Moorean independence. One dominant metaethical trend is moral epistemology naturalized. Another metaethical trend has been conceptual analysis, often called ‘analytic ethics’. It is argued that both trends are philosophically misguided. Ethics naturalized is un-philosophical in lacking the kind of supreme generality and abstractness that is distinctive of philosophical inquiry; it takes human beings to occupy moral centre stage. By contrast, we find in Moore a kind of cosmological ethics, focused on the value of all things in the universe as a basis for ethical inquiry. Moreover, ethics naturalized lacks competence in that its scientific pretensions are at odds with how philosophers go about their business. Analytic ethics, on the other hand, which is explicitly concerned with armchair, intuitive judgments about meanings, cannot overcome the lack of competence signaled by the philosophical lessons about conceptual analysis found in Kant, Quine, and Wittgenstein. In light of these failures, the chapter advocates returning to the cosmological orientation of Moore's ethics, which can be properly understood as avoiding the traditional metaethical debate between realism and anti-realism, as well as avoiding the battery of objections to the effect that Moore's ethics is not relevant to action. Such a return to a Moorean view of ethics would represent a version of ‘ethics dehumanized’: cosmological in its focus and thus properly philosophical.Less

Set Theory and The Philosophy of Mathematics

Graham Priest

in In Contradiction

This chapter discusses certain aspects of naive set theory, that is, set theory in which the abstraction scheme holds for all formulas of the language of set theory, and some of its implications for ... More

This chapter discusses certain aspects of naive set theory, that is, set theory in which the abstraction scheme holds for all formulas of the language of set theory, and some of its implications for the philosophy of mathematics. Substitutional semantics, analyticity and paradoxicality, mathematical realism and anti-realism, and cardinality and syntax are discussed.Less

The Type/Token Theory Introduced

Julian Dodd

in Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology

This chapter makes the case for the claim that the type/token theory is the prima facie answer to the categorial question: that is, the account that must be accepted unless it is defeated. This it ... More

This chapter makes the case for the claim that the type/token theory is the prima facie answer to the categorial question: that is, the account that must be accepted unless it is defeated. This it does by arguing that the type/token theory gives natural and convincing explanations of two phenomena: the fact that musical works are repeatable (i.e., susceptible of multiple occurrence), and the fact that we listen to a work by listening to one of its occurrences. The effective way in which the type/token theory provides explanations of these phenomena is favourably contrasted with the attempted explanations offered by its standard competitors: the conception of musical works as sets of sound-sequence-events, the view of such works as properties of such events, nominalist theories, and anti-realist accounts.Less

Philosophy and Theology After Foundationalism

Randal Rauser

in Theology in Search of Foundations

At its heart non‐foundationalism entails a denial of epistemic foundations, but token versions of non‐foundationalism also frequently reject metaphysical realism, the correspondence theory of truth, ... More

At its heart non‐foundationalism entails a denial of epistemic foundations, but token versions of non‐foundationalism also frequently reject metaphysical realism, the correspondence theory of truth, and the primacy of thought over language. Non‐foundationalists are typically concerned about the problem of scepticism, and seek to address it in a variety of ways. Richard Rorty defends a form of alethic apathy, while Hilary Putnam defends a theory of mind externalism. Non‐foundationalists also redefine epistemic justification and truth, occasionally to the point of embracing alethic or metaphysical anti‐realism. Rorty rejects metaphysical realism, while Putnam defines reality relative to a conceptual scheme. Within theology, Stanley Grenz's non‐foundationalism builds on Wolfhart Pannenberg's theology to develop a form of eschatological realism, while Nancey Murphy's proposal evinces a strong holism and fallibilism reflective of W. V. O. Quine.Less

A Critique of Non‐foundationalism

Randal Rauser

in Theology in Search of Foundations

Philosophically, anti‐realist forms of non‐foundationalism face a number of difficulties: Richard Rorty's alethic apathy must be rejected, since truth is by definition important, while Hilary ... More

Philosophically, anti‐realist forms of non‐foundationalism face a number of difficulties: Richard Rorty's alethic apathy must be rejected, since truth is by definition important, while Hilary Putnam's internal realism fails because not everything can be relativized to one's conceptual scheme. Unqualified alethic anti‐realism also faces difficulties and must be rejected. The metaphysical anti‐realism that non‐foundationalists often hold is ambiguous and can be interpreted in terms of Kantian anti‐realism, causal anti‐realism, trivialism, or constitutive anti‐realism. Unfortunately, none of these interpretations is non‐trivial, coherent, and plausible. Similar problems accompany theological forms of non‐foundationalism. Grenz's eschatological realism is incoherent, or at least very implausible, and it collapses into a metaphysical account of present reality. Murphy's strong commitment to fallibilism undermines necessary theological claims and devolves into scepticism.Less

The Fictional and the Real

John Gibson

in Fiction and the Weave of Life

This chapter presents some general observations on the notion of fiction. It uses a discussion of two positions from extreme corners of currently fashionable theories of fiction as an occasion for ... More

This chapter presents some general observations on the notion of fiction. It uses a discussion of two positions from extreme corners of currently fashionable theories of fiction as an occasion for these reflections. These are poststructuralist anti-realism or ‘textualism’, and the ‘mimesis as make-believe’ theory that is so influential in analytical aesthetics. These positions were chosen because they are considered excellent representatives of two popular ways of approaching the relationship between reality and fiction: the ‘radical’ one of dismissing the distinction altogether and the ‘conservative’ one of accepting it wholeheartedly and then going on to contrast them such that fiction is turned into an imaginary version of the real world. In explaining why these two approaches are inadequate, the chapter brings into view a few basic constraints on how to explain what we are saying when we describe a work of literature as fictional. It concludes with a call to ‘openness’ in the theory of fiction — that is, with an invitation to explore the various ways in which the frame of the fictional can be, or should be, understood to keep open a window on the real.Less

Aesthetic Realism and Emotional Qualities of Music

Malcolm Budd

in Aesthetic Essays

This chapter considers whether the emotional qualities of music should be understood in a realistic or anti-realistic fashion. It argues that Roger Scruton's principal argument against realism is ... More

This chapter considers whether the emotional qualities of music should be understood in a realistic or anti-realistic fashion. It argues that Roger Scruton's principal argument against realism is unsound and cannot be repaired. Although this argument is unsound, it is based on a commonly recognised insight into the character of these emotional qualities. Nick Zangwill's realist conception of these qualities is faulted because, amongst other things, it fails to do justice to this insight. The chapter concludes that, if the emotional qualities of music should be understood in an anti-realistic way, this must be a different form of anti-realism to Scruton's.Less

The Intersubjective Validity of Aesthetic Judgements

Malcolm Budd

in Aesthetic Essays

The chapter attempts to articulate the various kinds of content of aesthetic judgements, and so reveal the nature of their claim to intersubjective validity. It begins with descriptive aesthetic ... More

The chapter attempts to articulate the various kinds of content of aesthetic judgements, and so reveal the nature of their claim to intersubjective validity. It begins with descriptive aesthetic judgements, defines the issue of realism and anti-realism, and engages with the proper understanding of judgements which are expressed in sentences that are intended to be understood metaphorically. A short bridge passage identifies an aesthetic judgement whose content is indicative of the content of evaluative aesthetic judgements of all kinds, and in particular evaluative aesthetic judgements about works of art, which the second part of the chapter focusses on. An account of the aim of art is presented, defended against certain objections, and used to illuminate not just singular but also comparative judgements of artistic value. The chapter concludes with remarks about purely aesthetic and specifically artistic value, and evaluative aesthetic judgements of works of art and nature.Less