Bradley Monton (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199218844
- eISBN:
- 9780191711732
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218844.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This book contains thirteen specially written chapters which discuss topics from the work of Bas C. van Fraassen, one of the most important contemporary philosophers of science. The central and ...
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This book contains thirteen specially written chapters which discuss topics from the work of Bas C. van Fraassen, one of the most important contemporary philosophers of science. The central and unifying theme of the book is empiricism, an approach which van Fraassen developed most fully in The Scientific Image and The Empirical Stance. Thirteen experts examine van Fraassen's defence of scientific anti-realism (which he sees as a core tenet of empiricism), as well as his claim that adopting a philosophical position like empiricism does not consist of holding a particular set of beliefs, but is rather a matter of taking a stance. The book concludes with an extensive and intriguing reply by van Fraassen, in which he develops and corrects his old views, and offers new insights into the nature of science, empiricism, and philosophy itself.Less
This book contains thirteen specially written chapters which discuss topics from the work of Bas C. van Fraassen, one of the most important contemporary philosophers of science. The central and unifying theme of the book is empiricism, an approach which van Fraassen developed most fully in The Scientific Image and The Empirical Stance. Thirteen experts examine van Fraassen's defence of scientific anti-realism (which he sees as a core tenet of empiricism), as well as his claim that adopting a philosophical position like empiricism does not consist of holding a particular set of beliefs, but is rather a matter of taking a stance. The book concludes with an extensive and intriguing reply by van Fraassen, in which he develops and corrects his old views, and offers new insights into the nature of science, empiricism, and philosophy itself.
Bob Hale and Aviv Hoffmann (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199565818
- eISBN:
- 9780191722004
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The philosophy of modality investigates necessity and possibility, and related notions — are they objective features of mind-independent reality? If so, are they irreducible, or can modal facts be ...
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The philosophy of modality investigates necessity and possibility, and related notions — are they objective features of mind-independent reality? If so, are they irreducible, or can modal facts be explained in other terms? This book presents new work on modality by established leaders in the field and by up-and-coming philosophers. Between them, the chapters address fundamental questions concerning realism and anti-realism about modality, the nature and basis of facts about what is possible and what is necessary, the nature of modal knowledge, modal logic and its relations to necessary existence and to counterfactual reasoning. The general introduction locates the individual contributions in the wider context of the contemporary discussion of the metaphysics and epistemology of modality.Less
The philosophy of modality investigates necessity and possibility, and related notions — are they objective features of mind-independent reality? If so, are they irreducible, or can modal facts be explained in other terms? This book presents new work on modality by established leaders in the field and by up-and-coming philosophers. Between them, the chapters address fundamental questions concerning realism and anti-realism about modality, the nature and basis of facts about what is possible and what is necessary, the nature of modal knowledge, modal logic and its relations to necessary existence and to counterfactual reasoning. The general introduction locates the individual contributions in the wider context of the contemporary discussion of the metaphysics and epistemology of modality.
I. A. Ruffell
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199587216
- eISBN:
- 9780191731297
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587216.003.0010
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Plays and Playwrights: Classical, Early, and Medieval
This conclusion brings together the three strands of the book and their related forms of anti-realism to argue that Old Comedy constructs its arguments, involves its audience, and seeks ...
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This conclusion brings together the three strands of the book and their related forms of anti-realism to argue that Old Comedy constructs its arguments, involves its audience, and seeks to maintain its cultural authority through the impossible and absurd. Humour and impossibility are central to how Old Comedy makes its political and ideological interventions.Less
This conclusion brings together the three strands of the book and their related forms of anti-realism to argue that Old Comedy constructs its arguments, involves its audience, and seeks to maintain its cultural authority through the impossible and absurd. Humour and impossibility are central to how Old Comedy makes its political and ideological interventions.
Neil Tennant
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199251605
- eISBN:
- 9780191698057
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251605.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Language
This concluding chapter sums up the key findings of this study on realist views of meaning and truth. The findings suggest that moderate anti-realism is well-motivated, internally coherent, and ...
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This concluding chapter sums up the key findings of this study on realist views of meaning and truth. The findings suggest that moderate anti-realism is well-motivated, internally coherent, and methodologically adequate, and it can be characterized by means of certain platitudes and key theses. This chapter also describes the development of an account of constructive falsifiability that complements the proof-theoretic account of constructive truth and validity.Less
This concluding chapter sums up the key findings of this study on realist views of meaning and truth. The findings suggest that moderate anti-realism is well-motivated, internally coherent, and methodologically adequate, and it can be characterized by means of certain platitudes and key theses. This chapter also describes the development of an account of constructive falsifiability that complements the proof-theoretic account of constructive truth and validity.
Michael Dummett
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199285495
- eISBN:
- 9780191713972
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285495.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter defends p→¬¬Kp as the best expression of semantic antirealism.
This chapter defends p→¬¬Kp as the best expression of semantic antirealism.
Michael Dummett
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236214
- eISBN:
- 9780191597350
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236212.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The book contains articles in metaphysics and philosophy of language written between 1975 and 1992. Dummett defends the verificationist theory of meaning, according to which in order to know the ...
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The book contains articles in metaphysics and philosophy of language written between 1975 and 1992. Dummett defends the verificationist theory of meaning, according to which in order to know the meaning of a statement one must be in possession of a procedure to verify it. He also argues for the link between bivalence and the metaphysical doctrine of realism. Other topics discussed include refutation of instrumentalism, mathematical applicability, backward causation, and the analysis of the concept of existence.Less
The book contains articles in metaphysics and philosophy of language written between 1975 and 1992. Dummett defends the verificationist theory of meaning, according to which in order to know the meaning of a statement one must be in possession of a procedure to verify it. He also argues for the link between bivalence and the metaphysical doctrine of realism. Other topics discussed include refutation of instrumentalism, mathematical applicability, backward causation, and the analysis of the concept of existence.
Donald Davidson
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237532
- eISBN:
- 9780191597312
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237537.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This is the third volume of Donald Davidson's philosophical writings. In this selection of his work from the 1980s and the 90s, Davidson critically examines three types of propositional ...
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This is the third volume of Donald Davidson's philosophical writings. In this selection of his work from the 1980s and the 90s, Davidson critically examines three types of propositional knowledge—knowledge of one's own mind, knowledge of other people's minds, and knowledge of the external world—by working out the nature and status of each type, and the connections and differences among them. While his main concern remains the relation between language, thought, and reality, Davidson's discussions touch a vast variety of issues in analytic metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, including those of truth, human rationality, and facets of the realism–antirealism debate.Less
This is the third volume of Donald Davidson's philosophical writings. In this selection of his work from the 1980s and the 90s, Davidson critically examines three types of propositional knowledge—knowledge of one's own mind, knowledge of other people's minds, and knowledge of the external world—by working out the nature and status of each type, and the connections and differences among them. While his main concern remains the relation between language, thought, and reality, Davidson's discussions touch a vast variety of issues in analytic metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, including those of truth, human rationality, and facets of the realism–antirealism debate.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199282593
- eISBN:
- 9780191603587
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199282595.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter explores the different grounds for accepting the claim that all truths are knowable, the assumption central to the derivation of Fitch’s result. It argues that although there is no ...
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This chapter explores the different grounds for accepting the claim that all truths are knowable, the assumption central to the derivation of Fitch’s result. It argues that although there is no compelling argument for holding that all truths are knowable, there are various positions in which this feature of semantic anti-realism fits naturally; rejecting this puts serious tension into a broad range of philosophical outlooks, including theism and physicalism. In the end, the paradox should be felt by everyone, even those who do not accept the knowability claim, because the heart of the paradox is not simply in what is implied by the knowability claim, but in a lost logical distinction between what is actual and what is possible.Less
This chapter explores the different grounds for accepting the claim that all truths are knowable, the assumption central to the derivation of Fitch’s result. It argues that although there is no compelling argument for holding that all truths are knowable, there are various positions in which this feature of semantic anti-realism fits naturally; rejecting this puts serious tension into a broad range of philosophical outlooks, including theism and physicalism. In the end, the paradox should be felt by everyone, even those who do not accept the knowability claim, because the heart of the paradox is not simply in what is implied by the knowability claim, but in a lost logical distinction between what is actual and what is possible.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199282593
- eISBN:
- 9780191603587
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199282595.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter examines approaches to the paradox that wish to save anti-realism from the paradox by denying that the knowability assumption is a commitment of anti-realism. Such approaches contend ...
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This chapter examines approaches to the paradox that wish to save anti-realism from the paradox by denying that the knowability assumption is a commitment of anti-realism. Such approaches contend that the claim that all truths are knowable must be restricted in some way to express an anti-realist commitment. All examples of such an approach are rejected, and it is argued that even if there was a successful restriction strategy, the paradox would remain untouched.Less
This chapter examines approaches to the paradox that wish to save anti-realism from the paradox by denying that the knowability assumption is a commitment of anti-realism. Such approaches contend that the claim that all truths are knowable must be restricted in some way to express an anti-realist commitment. All examples of such an approach are rejected, and it is argued that even if there was a successful restriction strategy, the paradox would remain untouched.
Amie L. Thomasson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195319910
- eISBN:
- 9780199869602
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter begins by bringing out three common mistakes that lie behind the various arguments against ordinary objects discussed in this book. It goes on to suggest that all of these mistakes may ...
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This chapter begins by bringing out three common mistakes that lie behind the various arguments against ordinary objects discussed in this book. It goes on to suggest that all of these mistakes may be avoided by adopting a unified picture, based on the thesis that our singular and general nominative terms have a basic conceptual content in the form of frame-level conditions of application and coapplication collectively established by competent speakers. It shows how to develop a workable ontology of ordinary objects — one that can avoid all of the standard arguments against such objects — from that basis, and defends the claim that this provides a common sense view. The closing sections consider some prominent objections to the positive view, including that it posits too many objects and that it leads to some form of anti-realism.Less
This chapter begins by bringing out three common mistakes that lie behind the various arguments against ordinary objects discussed in this book. It goes on to suggest that all of these mistakes may be avoided by adopting a unified picture, based on the thesis that our singular and general nominative terms have a basic conceptual content in the form of frame-level conditions of application and coapplication collectively established by competent speakers. It shows how to develop a workable ontology of ordinary objects — one that can avoid all of the standard arguments against such objects — from that basis, and defends the claim that this provides a common sense view. The closing sections consider some prominent objections to the positive view, including that it posits too many objects and that it leads to some form of anti-realism.
Amie L. Thomasson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195319910
- eISBN:
- 9780199869602
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter investigates what is involved in asking general ontological questions such as: “what exists?” and “how many things are there?” It is argued that well-formed existence and counting ...
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This chapter investigates what is involved in asking general ontological questions such as: “what exists?” and “how many things are there?” It is argued that well-formed existence and counting questions are “specific” existence questions that specify a certain category or sort of entity enquired about. Purely “generic” existence and counting questions (asking about “anything whatsoever”, where “thing” is not used sortally) are ill-formed unanswerable questions. This gives us reason to think that quantificational claims likewise presuppose certain categories of entity quantified over. It also suggests that many of the questions driving ontological debates are based on pseudo-questions, and does so without subscribing to anti-realism or quantifier variance. The chapter closes by considering whether we can revive a form of universal quantification by way of a “covering” use of “thing” that generalizes over a range of category-specific terms.Less
This chapter investigates what is involved in asking general ontological questions such as: “what exists?” and “how many things are there?” It is argued that well-formed existence and counting questions are “specific” existence questions that specify a certain category or sort of entity enquired about. Purely “generic” existence and counting questions (asking about “anything whatsoever”, where “thing” is not used sortally) are ill-formed unanswerable questions. This gives us reason to think that quantificational claims likewise presuppose certain categories of entity quantified over. It also suggests that many of the questions driving ontological debates are based on pseudo-questions, and does so without subscribing to anti-realism or quantifier variance. The chapter closes by considering whether we can revive a form of universal quantification by way of a “covering” use of “thing” that generalizes over a range of category-specific terms.
Panayot Butchvarov
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter advocates a return to Moorean independence. One dominant metaethical trend is moral epistemology naturalized. Another metaethical trend has been conceptual analysis, often called ...
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This chapter advocates a return to Moorean independence. One dominant metaethical trend is moral epistemology naturalized. Another metaethical trend has been conceptual analysis, often called ‘analytic ethics’. It is argued that both trends are philosophically misguided. Ethics naturalized is un-philosophical in lacking the kind of supreme generality and abstractness that is distinctive of philosophical inquiry; it takes human beings to occupy moral centre stage. By contrast, we find in Moore a kind of cosmological ethics, focused on the value of all things in the universe as a basis for ethical inquiry. Moreover, ethics naturalized lacks competence in that its scientific pretensions are at odds with how philosophers go about their business. Analytic ethics, on the other hand, which is explicitly concerned with armchair, intuitive judgments about meanings, cannot overcome the lack of competence signaled by the philosophical lessons about conceptual analysis found in Kant, Quine, and Wittgenstein. In light of these failures, the chapter advocates returning to the cosmological orientation of Moore's ethics, which can be properly understood as avoiding the traditional metaethical debate between realism and anti-realism, as well as avoiding the battery of objections to the effect that Moore's ethics is not relevant to action. Such a return to a Moorean view of ethics would represent a version of ‘ethics dehumanized’: cosmological in its focus and thus properly philosophical.Less
This chapter advocates a return to Moorean independence. One dominant metaethical trend is moral epistemology naturalized. Another metaethical trend has been conceptual analysis, often called ‘analytic ethics’. It is argued that both trends are philosophically misguided. Ethics naturalized is un-philosophical in lacking the kind of supreme generality and abstractness that is distinctive of philosophical inquiry; it takes human beings to occupy moral centre stage. By contrast, we find in Moore a kind of cosmological ethics, focused on the value of all things in the universe as a basis for ethical inquiry. Moreover, ethics naturalized lacks competence in that its scientific pretensions are at odds with how philosophers go about their business. Analytic ethics, on the other hand, which is explicitly concerned with armchair, intuitive judgments about meanings, cannot overcome the lack of competence signaled by the philosophical lessons about conceptual analysis found in Kant, Quine, and Wittgenstein. In light of these failures, the chapter advocates returning to the cosmological orientation of Moore's ethics, which can be properly understood as avoiding the traditional metaethical debate between realism and anti-realism, as well as avoiding the battery of objections to the effect that Moore's ethics is not relevant to action. Such a return to a Moorean view of ethics would represent a version of ‘ethics dehumanized’: cosmological in its focus and thus properly philosophical.
Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199263301
- eISBN:
- 9780191718823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter discusses certain aspects of naive set theory, that is, set theory in which the abstraction scheme holds for all formulas of the language of set theory, and some of its implications for ...
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This chapter discusses certain aspects of naive set theory, that is, set theory in which the abstraction scheme holds for all formulas of the language of set theory, and some of its implications for the philosophy of mathematics. Substitutional semantics, analyticity and paradoxicality, mathematical realism and anti-realism, and cardinality and syntax are discussed.Less
This chapter discusses certain aspects of naive set theory, that is, set theory in which the abstraction scheme holds for all formulas of the language of set theory, and some of its implications for the philosophy of mathematics. Substitutional semantics, analyticity and paradoxicality, mathematical realism and anti-realism, and cardinality and syntax are discussed.
Julian Dodd
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199284375
- eISBN:
- 9780191713743
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284375.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This chapter makes the case for the claim that the type/token theory is the prima facie answer to the categorial question: that is, the account that must be accepted unless it is defeated. This it ...
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This chapter makes the case for the claim that the type/token theory is the prima facie answer to the categorial question: that is, the account that must be accepted unless it is defeated. This it does by arguing that the type/token theory gives natural and convincing explanations of two phenomena: the fact that musical works are repeatable (i.e., susceptible of multiple occurrence), and the fact that we listen to a work by listening to one of its occurrences. The effective way in which the type/token theory provides explanations of these phenomena is favourably contrasted with the attempted explanations offered by its standard competitors: the conception of musical works as sets of sound-sequence-events, the view of such works as properties of such events, nominalist theories, and anti-realist accounts.Less
This chapter makes the case for the claim that the type/token theory is the prima facie answer to the categorial question: that is, the account that must be accepted unless it is defeated. This it does by arguing that the type/token theory gives natural and convincing explanations of two phenomena: the fact that musical works are repeatable (i.e., susceptible of multiple occurrence), and the fact that we listen to a work by listening to one of its occurrences. The effective way in which the type/token theory provides explanations of these phenomena is favourably contrasted with the attempted explanations offered by its standard competitors: the conception of musical works as sets of sound-sequence-events, the view of such works as properties of such events, nominalist theories, and anti-realist accounts.
Randal Rauser
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199214600
- eISBN:
- 9780191706509
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214600.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
The justification of theology within the public square remains a matter of pressing concern. After the dissolution of Christendom, a number of Christian philosophers sought to justify theology ...
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The justification of theology within the public square remains a matter of pressing concern. After the dissolution of Christendom, a number of Christian philosophers sought to justify theology relative to a foundation of reason (René Descartes, John Locke) or primal experience (Immanuel Kant). While theologians widely accepted these preconditions and so sought to defend theology by appealing to proof and evidence or religious experience, these efforts more often distorted theology. In order to navigate this debate over theological justification one must understand central epistemological concepts, including faith and reason, justification and knowledge, and foundationalist and coherentist theories of noetic structure. Philosophically, the theory of classical foundationalism that has dominated in modernity has crucial, if not quite fatal, weaknesses. Recently many philosophers, like Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam, have embraced a non‐foundationalist epistemology. While philosophical non‐foundationalism has been appropriated by theologians like Stanley Grenz and Nancey Murphy as a way to ensure theological justification and autonomy, the anti‐realist non‐foundationalist themes are deeply problematic and impact adversely on Grenz's and Murphy's proposals. Bruce Marshall offers another way to appropriate non‐foundationalism that avoids anti‐realism while explaining justification and truth within a Trinitarian framework. Unfortunately, Marshall's theory also faces significant philosophical and theological objections. The failure of non‐foundationalism warrants a return to foundationalism, albeit in the moderate form proposed by Alvin Plantinga. While objections remain, Plantinga's proper‐function foundationalism provides the best account of theological rationality, justification, and knowledge, while grounding theological rigour, prima facie doctrinal conservatism, and the potential for a robust ecumenism.Less
The justification of theology within the public square remains a matter of pressing concern. After the dissolution of Christendom, a number of Christian philosophers sought to justify theology relative to a foundation of reason (René Descartes, John Locke) or primal experience (Immanuel Kant). While theologians widely accepted these preconditions and so sought to defend theology by appealing to proof and evidence or religious experience, these efforts more often distorted theology. In order to navigate this debate over theological justification one must understand central epistemological concepts, including faith and reason, justification and knowledge, and foundationalist and coherentist theories of noetic structure. Philosophically, the theory of classical foundationalism that has dominated in modernity has crucial, if not quite fatal, weaknesses. Recently many philosophers, like Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam, have embraced a non‐foundationalist epistemology. While philosophical non‐foundationalism has been appropriated by theologians like Stanley Grenz and Nancey Murphy as a way to ensure theological justification and autonomy, the anti‐realist non‐foundationalist themes are deeply problematic and impact adversely on Grenz's and Murphy's proposals. Bruce Marshall offers another way to appropriate non‐foundationalism that avoids anti‐realism while explaining justification and truth within a Trinitarian framework. Unfortunately, Marshall's theory also faces significant philosophical and theological objections. The failure of non‐foundationalism warrants a return to foundationalism, albeit in the moderate form proposed by Alvin Plantinga. While objections remain, Plantinga's proper‐function foundationalism provides the best account of theological rationality, justification, and knowledge, while grounding theological rigour, prima facie doctrinal conservatism, and the potential for a robust ecumenism.
Randal Rauser
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199214600
- eISBN:
- 9780191706509
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214600.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
At its heart non‐foundationalism entails a denial of epistemic foundations, but token versions of non‐foundationalism also frequently reject metaphysical realism, the correspondence theory of truth, ...
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At its heart non‐foundationalism entails a denial of epistemic foundations, but token versions of non‐foundationalism also frequently reject metaphysical realism, the correspondence theory of truth, and the primacy of thought over language. Non‐foundationalists are typically concerned about the problem of scepticism, and seek to address it in a variety of ways. Richard Rorty defends a form of alethic apathy, while Hilary Putnam defends a theory of mind externalism. Non‐foundationalists also redefine epistemic justification and truth, occasionally to the point of embracing alethic or metaphysical anti‐realism. Rorty rejects metaphysical realism, while Putnam defines reality relative to a conceptual scheme. Within theology, Stanley Grenz's non‐foundationalism builds on Wolfhart Pannenberg's theology to develop a form of eschatological realism, while Nancey Murphy's proposal evinces a strong holism and fallibilism reflective of W. V. O. Quine.Less
At its heart non‐foundationalism entails a denial of epistemic foundations, but token versions of non‐foundationalism also frequently reject metaphysical realism, the correspondence theory of truth, and the primacy of thought over language. Non‐foundationalists are typically concerned about the problem of scepticism, and seek to address it in a variety of ways. Richard Rorty defends a form of alethic apathy, while Hilary Putnam defends a theory of mind externalism. Non‐foundationalists also redefine epistemic justification and truth, occasionally to the point of embracing alethic or metaphysical anti‐realism. Rorty rejects metaphysical realism, while Putnam defines reality relative to a conceptual scheme. Within theology, Stanley Grenz's non‐foundationalism builds on Wolfhart Pannenberg's theology to develop a form of eschatological realism, while Nancey Murphy's proposal evinces a strong holism and fallibilism reflective of W. V. O. Quine.
Randal Rauser
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199214600
- eISBN:
- 9780191706509
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214600.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Philosophically, anti‐realist forms of non‐foundationalism face a number of difficulties: Richard Rorty's alethic apathy must be rejected, since truth is by definition important, while Hilary ...
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Philosophically, anti‐realist forms of non‐foundationalism face a number of difficulties: Richard Rorty's alethic apathy must be rejected, since truth is by definition important, while Hilary Putnam's internal realism fails because not everything can be relativized to one's conceptual scheme. Unqualified alethic anti‐realism also faces difficulties and must be rejected. The metaphysical anti‐realism that non‐foundationalists often hold is ambiguous and can be interpreted in terms of Kantian anti‐realism, causal anti‐realism, trivialism, or constitutive anti‐realism. Unfortunately, none of these interpretations is non‐trivial, coherent, and plausible. Similar problems accompany theological forms of non‐foundationalism. Grenz's eschatological realism is incoherent, or at least very implausible, and it collapses into a metaphysical account of present reality. Murphy's strong commitment to fallibilism undermines necessary theological claims and devolves into scepticism.Less
Philosophically, anti‐realist forms of non‐foundationalism face a number of difficulties: Richard Rorty's alethic apathy must be rejected, since truth is by definition important, while Hilary Putnam's internal realism fails because not everything can be relativized to one's conceptual scheme. Unqualified alethic anti‐realism also faces difficulties and must be rejected. The metaphysical anti‐realism that non‐foundationalists often hold is ambiguous and can be interpreted in terms of Kantian anti‐realism, causal anti‐realism, trivialism, or constitutive anti‐realism. Unfortunately, none of these interpretations is non‐trivial, coherent, and plausible. Similar problems accompany theological forms of non‐foundationalism. Grenz's eschatological realism is incoherent, or at least very implausible, and it collapses into a metaphysical account of present reality. Murphy's strong commitment to fallibilism undermines necessary theological claims and devolves into scepticism.
John Gibson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199299522
- eISBN:
- 9780191714900
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299522.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This chapter presents some general observations on the notion of fiction. It uses a discussion of two positions from extreme corners of currently fashionable theories of fiction as an occasion for ...
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This chapter presents some general observations on the notion of fiction. It uses a discussion of two positions from extreme corners of currently fashionable theories of fiction as an occasion for these reflections. These are poststructuralist anti-realism or ‘textualism’, and the ‘mimesis as make-believe’ theory that is so influential in analytical aesthetics. These positions were chosen because they are considered excellent representatives of two popular ways of approaching the relationship between reality and fiction: the ‘radical’ one of dismissing the distinction altogether and the ‘conservative’ one of accepting it wholeheartedly and then going on to contrast them such that fiction is turned into an imaginary version of the real world. In explaining why these two approaches are inadequate, the chapter brings into view a few basic constraints on how to explain what we are saying when we describe a work of literature as fictional. It concludes with a call to ‘openness’ in the theory of fiction — that is, with an invitation to explore the various ways in which the frame of the fictional can be, or should be, understood to keep open a window on the real.Less
This chapter presents some general observations on the notion of fiction. It uses a discussion of two positions from extreme corners of currently fashionable theories of fiction as an occasion for these reflections. These are poststructuralist anti-realism or ‘textualism’, and the ‘mimesis as make-believe’ theory that is so influential in analytical aesthetics. These positions were chosen because they are considered excellent representatives of two popular ways of approaching the relationship between reality and fiction: the ‘radical’ one of dismissing the distinction altogether and the ‘conservative’ one of accepting it wholeheartedly and then going on to contrast them such that fiction is turned into an imaginary version of the real world. In explaining why these two approaches are inadequate, the chapter brings into view a few basic constraints on how to explain what we are saying when we describe a work of literature as fictional. It concludes with a call to ‘openness’ in the theory of fiction — that is, with an invitation to explore the various ways in which the frame of the fictional can be, or should be, understood to keep open a window on the real.
Malcolm Budd
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199556175
- eISBN:
- 9780191721151
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556175.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter considers whether the emotional qualities of music should be understood in a realistic or anti-realistic fashion. It argues that Roger Scruton's principal argument against realism is ...
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This chapter considers whether the emotional qualities of music should be understood in a realistic or anti-realistic fashion. It argues that Roger Scruton's principal argument against realism is unsound and cannot be repaired. Although this argument is unsound, it is based on a commonly recognised insight into the character of these emotional qualities. Nick Zangwill's realist conception of these qualities is faulted because, amongst other things, it fails to do justice to this insight. The chapter concludes that, if the emotional qualities of music should be understood in an anti-realistic way, this must be a different form of anti-realism to Scruton's.Less
This chapter considers whether the emotional qualities of music should be understood in a realistic or anti-realistic fashion. It argues that Roger Scruton's principal argument against realism is unsound and cannot be repaired. Although this argument is unsound, it is based on a commonly recognised insight into the character of these emotional qualities. Nick Zangwill's realist conception of these qualities is faulted because, amongst other things, it fails to do justice to this insight. The chapter concludes that, if the emotional qualities of music should be understood in an anti-realistic way, this must be a different form of anti-realism to Scruton's.
Malcolm Budd
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199556175
- eISBN:
- 9780191721151
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556175.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The chapter attempts to articulate the various kinds of content of aesthetic judgements, and so reveal the nature of their claim to intersubjective validity. It begins with descriptive aesthetic ...
More
The chapter attempts to articulate the various kinds of content of aesthetic judgements, and so reveal the nature of their claim to intersubjective validity. It begins with descriptive aesthetic judgements, defines the issue of realism and anti-realism, and engages with the proper understanding of judgements which are expressed in sentences that are intended to be understood metaphorically. A short bridge passage identifies an aesthetic judgement whose content is indicative of the content of evaluative aesthetic judgements of all kinds, and in particular evaluative aesthetic judgements about works of art, which the second part of the chapter focusses on. An account of the aim of art is presented, defended against certain objections, and used to illuminate not just singular but also comparative judgements of artistic value. The chapter concludes with remarks about purely aesthetic and specifically artistic value, and evaluative aesthetic judgements of works of art and nature.Less
The chapter attempts to articulate the various kinds of content of aesthetic judgements, and so reveal the nature of their claim to intersubjective validity. It begins with descriptive aesthetic judgements, defines the issue of realism and anti-realism, and engages with the proper understanding of judgements which are expressed in sentences that are intended to be understood metaphorically. A short bridge passage identifies an aesthetic judgement whose content is indicative of the content of evaluative aesthetic judgements of all kinds, and in particular evaluative aesthetic judgements about works of art, which the second part of the chapter focusses on. An account of the aim of art is presented, defended against certain objections, and used to illuminate not just singular but also comparative judgements of artistic value. The chapter concludes with remarks about purely aesthetic and specifically artistic value, and evaluative aesthetic judgements of works of art and nature.
