Mathew Humphrey
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242672
- eISBN:
- 9780191599514
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242674.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
Environmental political philosophy has generally been framed around the differing axiologies of ecocentrism (nature‐centred) and anthropocentric (human‐centred) forms of ethics. This book seeks to ...
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Environmental political philosophy has generally been framed around the differing axiologies of ecocentrism (nature‐centred) and anthropocentric (human‐centred) forms of ethics. This book seeks to challenge the political relevance of this philosophical dispute with respect to the problem of nature preservation as public policy. A detailed analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of both ecocentric and ‘ecological humanist’ positions shows that the ‘embedded humanism’ within ecocentric arguments offers an opportunity to move beyond the ecocentric‐anthropocentric divide. Furthermore, a principle of ‘strong irreplaceability’ with regard to natural goods can provide the basis for a political argument for nature preservation that is compatible with both human‐centred and nature‐centred concerns.Less
Environmental political philosophy has generally been framed around the differing axiologies of ecocentrism (nature‐centred) and anthropocentric (human‐centred) forms of ethics. This book seeks to challenge the political relevance of this philosophical dispute with respect to the problem of nature preservation as public policy. A detailed analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of both ecocentric and ‘ecological humanist’ positions shows that the ‘embedded humanism’ within ecocentric arguments offers an opportunity to move beyond the ecocentric‐anthropocentric divide. Furthermore, a principle of ‘strong irreplaceability’ with regard to natural goods can provide the basis for a political argument for nature preservation that is compatible with both human‐centred and nature‐centred concerns.
Andrew Dobson
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294955
- eISBN:
- 9780191599071
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294956.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
Three conceptions of environmental sustainability are described and assessed. These take the form of a typology produced by a survey of the different answers to the generic questions common to any ...
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Three conceptions of environmental sustainability are described and assessed. These take the form of a typology produced by a survey of the different answers to the generic questions common to any conception of environmental sustainability. One way of characterizing these conceptions is in terms of a spectrum running from anthropocentrism to ecocentrism. Sustainable development is presented as an anthropocentric version of environmental sustainability.Less
Three conceptions of environmental sustainability are described and assessed. These take the form of a typology produced by a survey of the different answers to the generic questions common to any conception of environmental sustainability. One way of characterizing these conceptions is in terms of a spectrum running from anthropocentrism to ecocentrism. Sustainable development is presented as an anthropocentric version of environmental sustainability.
Alan Holland
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294894
- eISBN:
- 9780191599064
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294891.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
Alan Holland asks whether ‘sustainability’ will deliver the protection of nature. As long as it is taken to mean the extending of human welfare into the future, it may not, he argues, since this does ...
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Alan Holland asks whether ‘sustainability’ will deliver the protection of nature. As long as it is taken to mean the extending of human welfare into the future, it may not, he argues, since this does not necessarily entail protecting nature. Holland argues against using ‘critical natural capital’ as a measure of sustainability since criticality is often regarded in anthropocentric terms. He argues instead for the protection of nature as ‘natural items themselves’, but recognizes that this objective may sometimes clash with satisfying human needs. Environmental sustainability and social justice, in other words, will not always pull in the same direction.Less
Alan Holland asks whether ‘sustainability’ will deliver the protection of nature. As long as it is taken to mean the extending of human welfare into the future, it may not, he argues, since this does not necessarily entail protecting nature. Holland argues against using ‘critical natural capital’ as a measure of sustainability since criticality is often regarded in anthropocentric terms. He argues instead for the protection of nature as ‘natural items themselves’, but recognizes that this objective may sometimes clash with satisfying human needs. Environmental sustainability and social justice, in other words, will not always pull in the same direction.
Wilfred Beckerman and Joanna Pasek
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245086
- eISBN:
- 9780191598784
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245088.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
Generations are not homogeneous entities and are composed of individuals and nations that have conflicting interests in the way in which resources are allocated among competing uses. This chapter ...
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Generations are not homogeneous entities and are composed of individuals and nations that have conflicting interests in the way in which resources are allocated among competing uses. This chapter discusses whether ‘the environment’, or ‘nature’, should enjoy special status in any allocation; whether the economist's approach is too anthropocentric; the concept of ‘intrinsic’ values; and the application of these concepts to environmental valuation. It is argued that while many environmental assets are ‘public goods’, so that the free market is unlikely to supply the socially optimal amount, the same applies to many other things, such as public health or education services or the arts, not to mention the fact that most people in the world are, anyway, in dire need of a simple increase in their ability to buy simple basic private goods. This means that the allocation of resources to environmental objectives ought to take into account some form of cost‐benefit analysis.Less
Generations are not homogeneous entities and are composed of individuals and nations that have conflicting interests in the way in which resources are allocated among competing uses. This chapter discusses whether ‘the environment’, or ‘nature’, should enjoy special status in any allocation; whether the economist's approach is too anthropocentric; the concept of ‘intrinsic’ values; and the application of these concepts to environmental valuation. It is argued that while many environmental assets are ‘public goods’, so that the free market is unlikely to supply the socially optimal amount, the same applies to many other things, such as public health or education services or the arts, not to mention the fact that most people in the world are, anyway, in dire need of a simple increase in their ability to buy simple basic private goods. This means that the allocation of resources to environmental objectives ought to take into account some form of cost‐benefit analysis.
Mathew Humphrey
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242672
- eISBN:
- 9780191599514
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242674.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
The ecocentric‐anthropocentric dichotomy is explored through the debate between social ecologists and ecocentrists. The critique of ecocentrism that comes from social ecology––that it is a thinly ...
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The ecocentric‐anthropocentric dichotomy is explored through the debate between social ecologists and ecocentrists. The critique of ecocentrism that comes from social ecology––that it is a thinly disguised form of misanthropy––is found to be based on a number of misrepresentations and misunderstandings of the ecocentric argument. Similarly, the counter‐critique––which argues that social ecology implies conscious control of the evolutionary process––is found to be similarly misguided. There are multiple ways of being humanist, in the sense in which ecologists use the term, and one can construct humanist arguments from either an ecocentric or anthropocentric starting point.Less
The ecocentric‐anthropocentric dichotomy is explored through the debate between social ecologists and ecocentrists. The critique of ecocentrism that comes from social ecology––that it is a thinly disguised form of misanthropy––is found to be based on a number of misrepresentations and misunderstandings of the ecocentric argument. Similarly, the counter‐critique––which argues that social ecology implies conscious control of the evolutionary process––is found to be similarly misguided. There are multiple ways of being humanist, in the sense in which ecologists use the term, and one can construct humanist arguments from either an ecocentric or anthropocentric starting point.
Mathew Humphrey
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242672
- eISBN:
- 9780191599514
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242674.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
Here the threads of the previous chapters are pulled together, and problems posed in the putative relationship between ontology and axiology are considered. A serious problem with ecocentric argument ...
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Here the threads of the previous chapters are pulled together, and problems posed in the putative relationship between ontology and axiology are considered. A serious problem with ecocentric argument is its attempt to eliminate political contingency from arguments for nature preservation, such contingency cannot be overcome by appeals to the existence of natural values. The argument is made that the ‘strong irreplaceability’ of natural entities provides sound (but not incontrovertible) grounds for nature preservation, and does so irrespective of any position with respect to the ecocentric‐anthropocentric divide in axiology.Less
Here the threads of the previous chapters are pulled together, and problems posed in the putative relationship between ontology and axiology are considered. A serious problem with ecocentric argument is its attempt to eliminate political contingency from arguments for nature preservation, such contingency cannot be overcome by appeals to the existence of natural values. The argument is made that the ‘strong irreplaceability’ of natural entities provides sound (but not incontrovertible) grounds for nature preservation, and does so irrespective of any position with respect to the ecocentric‐anthropocentric divide in axiology.
Ivan Kreilkamp
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780226576237
- eISBN:
- 9780226576404
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226576404.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century and Victorian Literature
In the nineteenth century, richly-drawn social fiction became one of England’s major cultural exports. At the same time, a surprising companion came to stand alongside the novel as a key embodiment ...
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In the nineteenth century, richly-drawn social fiction became one of England’s major cultural exports. At the same time, a surprising companion came to stand alongside the novel as a key embodiment of British identity: the domesticated pet. As England became known as a nation of shop-keepers, it was also preeminently associated with long novels and beloved pet animals, two cultural forms which, I argue in this book, developed not just in parallel but in tandem. Indeed, the history of English domestic fiction is deeply bound up with that of the domestic animal. In works by authors from Dickens to George Eliot, the Brontës to Olive Schreiner and Thomas Hardy, animals appeared as markers of domestic coziness and familial kindness. Yet for all their supposed significance, the animals in nineteenth-century fiction were never granted the same fullness of character or consciousness as their human masters: they remain secondary figures. Minor Creatures re-examines a slew of literary classics to show how Victorian notions of domesticity, sympathy, and individuality were shaped in response to the burgeoning pet class. The presence of beloved animals in the home led to a number of welfare-minded political movements, inspired in part by the Darwinian thought that began to sprout at the time. Nineteenth-century animals may not have been the heroes of their own lives but, as Kreilkamp shows, the history of domestic pets deeply influenced the history of the English novel.Less
In the nineteenth century, richly-drawn social fiction became one of England’s major cultural exports. At the same time, a surprising companion came to stand alongside the novel as a key embodiment of British identity: the domesticated pet. As England became known as a nation of shop-keepers, it was also preeminently associated with long novels and beloved pet animals, two cultural forms which, I argue in this book, developed not just in parallel but in tandem. Indeed, the history of English domestic fiction is deeply bound up with that of the domestic animal. In works by authors from Dickens to George Eliot, the Brontës to Olive Schreiner and Thomas Hardy, animals appeared as markers of domestic coziness and familial kindness. Yet for all their supposed significance, the animals in nineteenth-century fiction were never granted the same fullness of character or consciousness as their human masters: they remain secondary figures. Minor Creatures re-examines a slew of literary classics to show how Victorian notions of domesticity, sympathy, and individuality were shaped in response to the burgeoning pet class. The presence of beloved animals in the home led to a number of welfare-minded political movements, inspired in part by the Darwinian thought that began to sprout at the time. Nineteenth-century animals may not have been the heroes of their own lives but, as Kreilkamp shows, the history of domestic pets deeply influenced the history of the English novel.
Jerry L. Walls
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195113020
- eISBN:
- 9780199834815
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195113020.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
The first part of this introduction puts forward some examples of conflicting historical and contemporary views on Christian belief in heaven. The second part goes on to discuss the two basically ...
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The first part of this introduction puts forward some examples of conflicting historical and contemporary views on Christian belief in heaven. The second part goes on to discuss the two basically different images of heaven that have recurred down the ages: the theocentric view, which in its extreme version casts heaven as a timeless experience of contemplating God, and requires no human dimension; and the anthropocentric view, where the emphasis is on being reunited with family and friends, and heaven being essentially like this life, but without the evil and suffering. The third part discusses the question of why, though many still profess belief in heaven, this belief is now more vague and ambivalent than it has ever been, and has been entirely rejected by some on philosophical, cultural, intellectual, or moral grounds. The author believes that the transmutation of belief in heaven from a vitally positive, spiritual, and moral source into a decidedly negative one represents a religious and cultural shift of cosmic proportions, and that from this viewpoint alone, the doctrine is ripe for serious consideration.Less
The first part of this introduction puts forward some examples of conflicting historical and contemporary views on Christian belief in heaven. The second part goes on to discuss the two basically different images of heaven that have recurred down the ages: the theocentric view, which in its extreme version casts heaven as a timeless experience of contemplating God, and requires no human dimension; and the anthropocentric view, where the emphasis is on being reunited with family and friends, and heaven being essentially like this life, but without the evil and suffering. The third part discusses the question of why, though many still profess belief in heaven, this belief is now more vague and ambivalent than it has ever been, and has been entirely rejected by some on philosophical, cultural, intellectual, or moral grounds. The author believes that the transmutation of belief in heaven from a vitally positive, spiritual, and moral source into a decidedly negative one represents a religious and cultural shift of cosmic proportions, and that from this viewpoint alone, the doctrine is ripe for serious consideration.
Alexander Gillespie
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198298724
- eISBN:
- 9780191685514
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198298724.003.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Environmental and Energy Law
This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about the commonly used justifications for environmental protection in international environmental law. These justifications ...
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This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about the commonly used justifications for environmental protection in international environmental law. These justifications include anthropocentrism, self-interest, economic rationale, religious justification, land ethic, and respect for life. This book concludes that anthropocentrism is the central basis of international environmental law and this is deeply problematic because all justifications for environmental protection that spring from this mindset are either contradictory or plainly indefensible.Less
This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about the commonly used justifications for environmental protection in international environmental law. These justifications include anthropocentrism, self-interest, economic rationale, religious justification, land ethic, and respect for life. This book concludes that anthropocentrism is the central basis of international environmental law and this is deeply problematic because all justifications for environmental protection that spring from this mindset are either contradictory or plainly indefensible.
Catherine Osborne
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199282067
- eISBN:
- 9780191712944
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282067.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter looks at the idea that some beasts threaten human well being, while others are conducive towards it. The views of Hermarchus on the need to wage war on the undesirable creatures, and to ...
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This chapter looks at the idea that some beasts threaten human well being, while others are conducive towards it. The views of Hermarchus on the need to wage war on the undesirable creatures, and to protect those that are useful are examined, along with his and other ancient attempts to analyse morality as based on rules drawn up on anthropocentric utilitarian lines. This utilitarian account of morality is compared with that of Socrates to indicate why Socrates' claim that it is beneficial to the agent to act morally well is not a utilitarian account, because for Socrates the benefit is explained by the moral goodness, whereas for the Utilitarian the moral goodness is explained by the benefit.Less
This chapter looks at the idea that some beasts threaten human well being, while others are conducive towards it. The views of Hermarchus on the need to wage war on the undesirable creatures, and to protect those that are useful are examined, along with his and other ancient attempts to analyse morality as based on rules drawn up on anthropocentric utilitarian lines. This utilitarian account of morality is compared with that of Socrates to indicate why Socrates' claim that it is beneficial to the agent to act morally well is not a utilitarian account, because for Socrates the benefit is explained by the moral goodness, whereas for the Utilitarian the moral goodness is explained by the benefit.
Frederique Apffel-Marglin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199793853
- eISBN:
- 9780199919246
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199793853.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This book takes as a starting premise the insight that non-humans have agency, which was established predominantly in the field of science studies. It argues that rituals engage not “supernatural ...
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This book takes as a starting premise the insight that non-humans have agency, which was established predominantly in the field of science studies. It argues that rituals engage not “supernatural beings” but humans with other-than-humans. Other-than-humans are entities characterized by an entanglement of the human and the non-human aspects of the world. The book rejects the label “supernatural beings” since it implies a realm of nature as a pre-given universal reality outside and independent of human observation. These other-than-humans are entities stabilized through iterative ritual enactments that have acquired names, personalities and narratives that embody both aspects of the non-human place and aspects of the human collectivities in that place. Using the insights of one of the founding figures of quantum mechanics, Niels Bohr, and his theory of complementarity as interpreted by physicist-cum-philosopher Karen Barad, the book argues that neither time, space, or nature are universal pre-givens. Rather, these come into being through specific acts of observation. The book argues that rituals are akin to quantum experimental acts of observation insofar as they enact or perform a particular instance of the real. Ritual action is iterative because it aims at stabilizing enacted worlds that are inherently dynamic; rituals seek to establish the continuity of those enacted worlds as livable worlds. This view challenges the understanding of ritual as involving an imaginative projection on the part of humans onto the non-human and/or social human world, a move that is both anthropocentric and dualist. It also offers an alternative to the onto-epistemology of representationalism that divides the representing human mind from the represented world.Less
This book takes as a starting premise the insight that non-humans have agency, which was established predominantly in the field of science studies. It argues that rituals engage not “supernatural beings” but humans with other-than-humans. Other-than-humans are entities characterized by an entanglement of the human and the non-human aspects of the world. The book rejects the label “supernatural beings” since it implies a realm of nature as a pre-given universal reality outside and independent of human observation. These other-than-humans are entities stabilized through iterative ritual enactments that have acquired names, personalities and narratives that embody both aspects of the non-human place and aspects of the human collectivities in that place. Using the insights of one of the founding figures of quantum mechanics, Niels Bohr, and his theory of complementarity as interpreted by physicist-cum-philosopher Karen Barad, the book argues that neither time, space, or nature are universal pre-givens. Rather, these come into being through specific acts of observation. The book argues that rituals are akin to quantum experimental acts of observation insofar as they enact or perform a particular instance of the real. Ritual action is iterative because it aims at stabilizing enacted worlds that are inherently dynamic; rituals seek to establish the continuity of those enacted worlds as livable worlds. This view challenges the understanding of ritual as involving an imaginative projection on the part of humans onto the non-human and/or social human world, a move that is both anthropocentric and dualist. It also offers an alternative to the onto-epistemology of representationalism that divides the representing human mind from the represented world.
Eileen Crist
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780226596778
- eISBN:
- 9780226596945
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226596945.001.0001
- Subject:
- Environmental Science, Environmental Studies
Abundant Earth documents the loss of biodiversity underway and lays out the drivers of this destruction. It goes beyond the litany of causes—a growing population, rising livestock numbers, expanding ...
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Abundant Earth documents the loss of biodiversity underway and lays out the drivers of this destruction. It goes beyond the litany of causes—a growing population, rising livestock numbers, expanding economies and trade, and spreading infrastructures—to ask the question: Since it is well-understood that humanity’s expansionism is irreparably diminishing life’s richness, why are we not taking the needed steps to halt our expansionism? It argues that the worldview of human supremacy—the conviction that humans are superior to all other life-forms and entitled to use them and their places—stands in the way, for it normalizes humanity’s ongoing expansion. This worldview is an obstacle to recognizing that the conjoined strategy of scaling down the human enterprise and pulling back from expanses of land and seas is the means for addressing the ecological crisis and preempting the suffering and dislocations of both humans and nonhumans. Scaling down calls us to lower the global population within a human-rights framework, move toward deindustrializing food production, and work to localize economies and contract global trade. Pulling back is the project of restoring terrestrial and marine ecologies, so that life’s abundance may resurge. The book argues that humanity will not advance by entrenching its domination over the biosphere, but will stagnate in the debased identity of nature-colonizer and decline in the predicament of vying for “natural resources.” Instead, humanity can chart another course, choosing to live in fellowship with our Earthly wild and domestic cohort, within vibrant ecologies, nestling human inhabitation inside a biodiverse, living planet.Less
Abundant Earth documents the loss of biodiversity underway and lays out the drivers of this destruction. It goes beyond the litany of causes—a growing population, rising livestock numbers, expanding economies and trade, and spreading infrastructures—to ask the question: Since it is well-understood that humanity’s expansionism is irreparably diminishing life’s richness, why are we not taking the needed steps to halt our expansionism? It argues that the worldview of human supremacy—the conviction that humans are superior to all other life-forms and entitled to use them and their places—stands in the way, for it normalizes humanity’s ongoing expansion. This worldview is an obstacle to recognizing that the conjoined strategy of scaling down the human enterprise and pulling back from expanses of land and seas is the means for addressing the ecological crisis and preempting the suffering and dislocations of both humans and nonhumans. Scaling down calls us to lower the global population within a human-rights framework, move toward deindustrializing food production, and work to localize economies and contract global trade. Pulling back is the project of restoring terrestrial and marine ecologies, so that life’s abundance may resurge. The book argues that humanity will not advance by entrenching its domination over the biosphere, but will stagnate in the debased identity of nature-colonizer and decline in the predicament of vying for “natural resources.” Instead, humanity can chart another course, choosing to live in fellowship with our Earthly wild and domestic cohort, within vibrant ecologies, nestling human inhabitation inside a biodiverse, living planet.
Peter F. Cannavò and Joseph H. Lane Jr. (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780262028059
- eISBN:
- 9780262325264
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262028059.001.0001
- Subject:
- Environmental Science, Environmental Studies
Engaging Nature is an edited collection that explores how past political theorists conceptualized the natural world and humanity’s relationship with it. The theorists profiled are largely from the ...
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Engaging Nature is an edited collection that explores how past political theorists conceptualized the natural world and humanity’s relationship with it. The theorists profiled are largely from the Western canon, but other influential theorists have been included in order to bring in insights related to race, gender, and non-Western perspectives. The theorists covered in the book are: Plato, Aristotle, Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Edmund Burke, Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, W. E. B. Du Bois, Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, and Confucius. The essays also draw insights from these theorists into how we might address our contemporary environmental crisis. In many cases, the authors present unorthodox readings of particular theorists who have been pigeonholed as ‘anti-environmentalist’ or not recognized for their insights into nature and environmental issues. The essays also highlight the complexity of Western political thought in its approach to nature, as many individual theorists present perspectives that transcend anthropocentrism. In pursuing a chronological review of Western thinkers but then ending with Confucius, the editors also wish to highlight the importance of expanding the discussion beyond the Western canon. This book is intended for a fairly broad audience, from advanced undergraduates to mature scholars in both political theory and environmental studies.Less
Engaging Nature is an edited collection that explores how past political theorists conceptualized the natural world and humanity’s relationship with it. The theorists profiled are largely from the Western canon, but other influential theorists have been included in order to bring in insights related to race, gender, and non-Western perspectives. The theorists covered in the book are: Plato, Aristotle, Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Edmund Burke, Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, W. E. B. Du Bois, Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, and Confucius. The essays also draw insights from these theorists into how we might address our contemporary environmental crisis. In many cases, the authors present unorthodox readings of particular theorists who have been pigeonholed as ‘anti-environmentalist’ or not recognized for their insights into nature and environmental issues. The essays also highlight the complexity of Western political thought in its approach to nature, as many individual theorists present perspectives that transcend anthropocentrism. In pursuing a chronological review of Western thinkers but then ending with Confucius, the editors also wish to highlight the importance of expanding the discussion beyond the Western canon. This book is intended for a fairly broad audience, from advanced undergraduates to mature scholars in both political theory and environmental studies.
Monte Ransome Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199285303
- eISBN:
- 9780191603143
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199285306.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Aristotle is commonly considered the inventor of teleology, although the precise term originated in the eighteenth century. But if teleology means the use of ends or goals in natural science, then ...
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Aristotle is commonly considered the inventor of teleology, although the precise term originated in the eighteenth century. But if teleology means the use of ends or goals in natural science, then Aristotle was rather a critical innovator of teleological explanation. Teleological notions were widespread among Aristotle’s predecessors, but he rejected their conception of extrinsic causes such as intelligence or god as the primary cause for natural things. Instead, he considers nature itself as an internal principle of change and as an end, and his teleological explanations focus on what is intrinsically good for natural substances themselves. Aristotle’s philosophy was later conflated with the teleological proof for the existence of god, the anthropic cosmological principle, creationism, intelligent design, vitalism, animism, anthropocentrism, and opposition to materialism, evolution, and mechanism. But and examination of both his explicit methodology and the explanations actually offered in his scientific works (on physics, cosmology, theology, psychology, biology, and anthropology) shows that Aristotle’s aporetic approach to teleology drives a middle course through traditional oppositions between: causation and explanation, mechanism and materialism, naturalism and anthropocentrism, realism and instrumentalism.Less
Aristotle is commonly considered the inventor of teleology, although the precise term originated in the eighteenth century. But if teleology means the use of ends or goals in natural science, then Aristotle was rather a critical innovator of teleological explanation. Teleological notions were widespread among Aristotle’s predecessors, but he rejected their conception of extrinsic causes such as intelligence or god as the primary cause for natural things. Instead, he considers nature itself as an internal principle of change and as an end, and his teleological explanations focus on what is intrinsically good for natural substances themselves. Aristotle’s philosophy was later conflated with the teleological proof for the existence of god, the anthropic cosmological principle, creationism, intelligent design, vitalism, animism, anthropocentrism, and opposition to materialism, evolution, and mechanism. But and examination of both his explicit methodology and the explanations actually offered in his scientific works (on physics, cosmology, theology, psychology, biology, and anthropology) shows that Aristotle’s aporetic approach to teleology drives a middle course through traditional oppositions between: causation and explanation, mechanism and materialism, naturalism and anthropocentrism, realism and instrumentalism.
Monte Ransome Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199285303
- eISBN:
- 9780191603143
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199285306.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Aristotle’s cosmos consists of natural substances, each with its own proper functions, motions, and ends. To this extent, his cosmos is teleological. But there is no overall or cosmic teleology in a ...
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Aristotle’s cosmos consists of natural substances, each with its own proper functions, motions, and ends. To this extent, his cosmos is teleological. But there is no overall or cosmic teleology in a stronger sense, above and beyond the applicability of teleological explanations to each of the natural things. For the universe (or nature as a whole) does not have a proper function, or motions, goods or ends. The stars, elements, plants, animals and humans do, and nature is the principle of motion and the end for each of these. In the final chapter of Metaphysics XII (Lambda), Aristotle discusses an aporia about how the good exists in “the nature of the whole”. He ends not with a positive account, but with a criticism of his predecessors who have advanced an account of an extrinsic cause of the cosmos.Less
Aristotle’s cosmos consists of natural substances, each with its own proper functions, motions, and ends. To this extent, his cosmos is teleological. But there is no overall or cosmic teleology in a stronger sense, above and beyond the applicability of teleological explanations to each of the natural things. For the universe (or nature as a whole) does not have a proper function, or motions, goods or ends. The stars, elements, plants, animals and humans do, and nature is the principle of motion and the end for each of these. In the final chapter of Metaphysics XII (Lambda), Aristotle discusses an aporia about how the good exists in “the nature of the whole”. He ends not with a positive account, but with a criticism of his predecessors who have advanced an account of an extrinsic cause of the cosmos.
Monte Ransome Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199285303
- eISBN:
- 9780191603143
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199285306.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Teleology is central to Aristotle’s scientific method. He applies teleological explanations to many disciplines, including physics, cosmology, meteorology, theology, biology, zoology, anthropology, ...
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Teleology is central to Aristotle’s scientific method. He applies teleological explanations to many disciplines, including physics, cosmology, meteorology, theology, biology, zoology, anthropology, political science, and ethics. Although there has been much discussion of the role of teleology with respect to each of these specialized domains, there has been no comprehensive treatment of the issue. But a thoroughgoing investigation can tell us much about Aristotle’s philosophy, about Greek philosophy in general, and about our own natural philosophy.Less
Teleology is central to Aristotle’s scientific method. He applies teleological explanations to many disciplines, including physics, cosmology, meteorology, theology, biology, zoology, anthropology, political science, and ethics. Although there has been much discussion of the role of teleology with respect to each of these specialized domains, there has been no comprehensive treatment of the issue. But a thoroughgoing investigation can tell us much about Aristotle’s philosophy, about Greek philosophy in general, and about our own natural philosophy.
Monte Ransome Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199285303
- eISBN:
- 9780191603143
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199285306.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Humans are capable of intentionally pursuing goals that they consciously set for themselves, and thus a different order of teleology applies to them, one which places them in the domain of ethics and ...
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Humans are capable of intentionally pursuing goals that they consciously set for themselves, and thus a different order of teleology applies to them, one which places them in the domain of ethics and politics. Every inquiry, art, and science has a goal, and they can broadly be classified into the productive-practical on the one hand, and the theoretical, on the other. Practical knowledge aims at practical goods by grasping causes for the sake of producing effects, while theoretical knowledge aims at grasping causes for the sake of knowledge itself, an intrinsic good. The ultimate good for a human can be identified by a process of elimination: whatever is the highest good for another kind of organism cannot be the unique good for this kind of thing, and so the end of human life cannot be nutrition, reproduction, growth, perception or pleasure, for these are the proper goods of other kinds of organisms. This leaves knowledge, in particular theoretical knowledge. It is argued that Aristotelian teleology cannot be anthropocentric, or else it would be impossible to identify the unique human good by elimination, and the activity of the final good for humans (contemplation and knowledge of causes) would have no real object.Less
Humans are capable of intentionally pursuing goals that they consciously set for themselves, and thus a different order of teleology applies to them, one which places them in the domain of ethics and politics. Every inquiry, art, and science has a goal, and they can broadly be classified into the productive-practical on the one hand, and the theoretical, on the other. Practical knowledge aims at practical goods by grasping causes for the sake of producing effects, while theoretical knowledge aims at grasping causes for the sake of knowledge itself, an intrinsic good. The ultimate good for a human can be identified by a process of elimination: whatever is the highest good for another kind of organism cannot be the unique good for this kind of thing, and so the end of human life cannot be nutrition, reproduction, growth, perception or pleasure, for these are the proper goods of other kinds of organisms. This leaves knowledge, in particular theoretical knowledge. It is argued that Aristotelian teleology cannot be anthropocentric, or else it would be impossible to identify the unique human good by elimination, and the activity of the final good for humans (contemplation and knowledge of causes) would have no real object.
Mohan Matthen
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199268504
- eISBN:
- 9780191602283
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199268509.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Because of perceptual specialization in different species of animals, colour cannot be defined in terms of either the physical properties that human colour vision captures or the sense experiences ...
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Because of perceptual specialization in different species of animals, colour cannot be defined in terms of either the physical properties that human colour vision captures or the sense experiences that it produces in humans. Thus, there is no ecologically characterized class of properties such that colour vision must consist (in whatsoever kind of organism it may occur) in the capture of some or all of the members of this class. Nor is there any subjectively characterized class of experiences such that colour vision must consist (in whatsoever kind of organism it may occur) of having some or all of these experiences.Less
Because of perceptual specialization in different species of animals, colour cannot be defined in terms of either the physical properties that human colour vision captures or the sense experiences that it produces in humans. Thus, there is no ecologically characterized class of properties such that colour vision must consist (in whatsoever kind of organism it may occur) in the capture of some or all of the members of this class. Nor is there any subjectively characterized class of experiences such that colour vision must consist (in whatsoever kind of organism it may occur) of having some or all of these experiences.
Peter Szendy
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780823267057
- eISBN:
- 9780823272303
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823267057.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
The organological category of autophony has meant different things starting with Athanasius Kircher in 1650 and running through Curt Sachs and Erich von Hombostel. Autophony can open the way for an ...
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The organological category of autophony has meant different things starting with Athanasius Kircher in 1650 and running through Curt Sachs and Erich von Hombostel. Autophony can open the way for an organological thinking that breaks from anthropocentrism.Less
The organological category of autophony has meant different things starting with Athanasius Kircher in 1650 and running through Curt Sachs and Erich von Hombostel. Autophony can open the way for an organological thinking that breaks from anthropocentrism.
George Molnar
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199204175
- eISBN:
- 9780191695537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199204175.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses objectivity by using a necessary element called ‘necessary connection’. It explains that the issue is not just of powers but also of laws of nature and the causal relation ...
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This chapter discusses objectivity by using a necessary element called ‘necessary connection’. It explains that the issue is not just of powers but also of laws of nature and the causal relation itself. It defines the word ‘objective’ as mind-independence and gives details on the existence of things by suggesting mind-dependent and mind-independent objects. The chapter details the nature of anthropocentrism in the analysis of powers using Hume's anti-objectivism and his argument against strong connections. In the end, the chapter states that empirico-deductivism is a bus that does not stop before reaching its destination in subjective idealism.Less
This chapter discusses objectivity by using a necessary element called ‘necessary connection’. It explains that the issue is not just of powers but also of laws of nature and the causal relation itself. It defines the word ‘objective’ as mind-independence and gives details on the existence of things by suggesting mind-dependent and mind-independent objects. The chapter details the nature of anthropocentrism in the analysis of powers using Hume's anti-objectivism and his argument against strong connections. In the end, the chapter states that empirico-deductivism is a bus that does not stop before reaching its destination in subjective idealism.
