Teresa McCormack, Christoph Hoerl, and Stephen Butterfill (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199571154
- eISBN:
- 9780191731259
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571154.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Developmental Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology
What cognitive abilities underpin the use of tools, and how are tools and their properties represented or understood by tool-users? Does the study of tool use provide us with a unique or distinctive ...
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What cognitive abilities underpin the use of tools, and how are tools and their properties represented or understood by tool-users? Does the study of tool use provide us with a unique or distinctive source of information about the causal cognition of tool-users? Tool use is a topic of major interest to all those interested in animal cognition, because it implies that the animal has knowledge of the relationship between objects and their effects. There are countless examples of animals developing tools to achieve some goal — chimps sharpening sticks to use as spears, bonobos using sticks to fish for termites, and New Caledonian crows developing complex tools to extracts insects from logs. Studies of tool use have been used to examine an exceptionally wide range of aspects of cognition, such as planning, problem-solving and insight, naive physics, and social relationship between action and perception. A key debate in recent research on animal cognition concerns the level of cognitive sophistication that is implied by animal tool use, and developmental psychologists have been addressing related questions regarding the processes through which children acquire the ability to use tools. In neuropsychology, patterns of impairments in tool use due to brain damage, and studies of neural changes associated with tool use, have also led to debates about the different types of cognitive abilities that might underpin tool use, and about how tool use may change the way space or the body is represented.Less
What cognitive abilities underpin the use of tools, and how are tools and their properties represented or understood by tool-users? Does the study of tool use provide us with a unique or distinctive source of information about the causal cognition of tool-users? Tool use is a topic of major interest to all those interested in animal cognition, because it implies that the animal has knowledge of the relationship between objects and their effects. There are countless examples of animals developing tools to achieve some goal — chimps sharpening sticks to use as spears, bonobos using sticks to fish for termites, and New Caledonian crows developing complex tools to extracts insects from logs. Studies of tool use have been used to examine an exceptionally wide range of aspects of cognition, such as planning, problem-solving and insight, naive physics, and social relationship between action and perception. A key debate in recent research on animal cognition concerns the level of cognitive sophistication that is implied by animal tool use, and developmental psychologists have been addressing related questions regarding the processes through which children acquire the ability to use tools. In neuropsychology, patterns of impairments in tool use due to brain damage, and studies of neural changes associated with tool use, have also led to debates about the different types of cognitive abilities that might underpin tool use, and about how tool use may change the way space or the body is represented.
Peter Carruthers
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199207077
- eISBN:
- 9780191708909
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207077.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book is a comprehensive development and defence of one of the guiding assumptions of evolutionary psychology: that the human mind is composed of a large number of semi-independent modules. One ...
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This book is a comprehensive development and defence of one of the guiding assumptions of evolutionary psychology: that the human mind is composed of a large number of semi-independent modules. One goal is to argue for massive cognitive modularity. Another is to show that the approach has the resources to explain the distinctive powers of the human mind. A third goal is to show how the various components of the mind are likely to be linked and interact with one another. The book outlines and defends the basic framework of a perception/belief/desire/planning/motor-control architecture (which is common to all animal cognition), embedded within which is a distinctively human language faculty. The flexibility and creativity of the human mind (together with its characteristic capacities for science and sophisticated forms of planning) are then explained as utilizing mental rehearsal of actions (including inner speech), with the results being globally broadcast to the full range of central modules.Less
This book is a comprehensive development and defence of one of the guiding assumptions of evolutionary psychology: that the human mind is composed of a large number of semi-independent modules. One goal is to argue for massive cognitive modularity. Another is to show that the approach has the resources to explain the distinctive powers of the human mind. A third goal is to show how the various components of the mind are likely to be linked and interact with one another. The book outlines and defends the basic framework of a perception/belief/desire/planning/motor-control architecture (which is common to all animal cognition), embedded within which is a distinctively human language faculty. The flexibility and creativity of the human mind (together with its characteristic capacities for science and sophisticated forms of planning) are then explained as utilizing mental rehearsal of actions (including inner speech), with the results being globally broadcast to the full range of central modules.
Christopher Gauker
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199599462
- eISBN:
- 9780191729225
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599462.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
A great deal of cognitive problem solving takes the form of thinking in mental imagery. This chapter illustrates these capacities and analyzes imagistic cognition into several aspects: object ...
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A great deal of cognitive problem solving takes the form of thinking in mental imagery. This chapter illustrates these capacities and analyzes imagistic cognition into several aspects: object tracking, imagistic representation of causation, and perceptual similarity spaces, which include acquired dimensions grounded in representations of particular objects. The chapter also argues that the cognitive powers of nonhuman animals and prelinguistic human infants are limited to imagistic cognition. As case studies, the chapter examines the achievements of infants in Paul C. Quinn's experiments and the achievements of chimpanzees in Sue Savage‐Rumbaugh's experiments and argues that they can be explained in terms of imagistic cognition.Less
A great deal of cognitive problem solving takes the form of thinking in mental imagery. This chapter illustrates these capacities and analyzes imagistic cognition into several aspects: object tracking, imagistic representation of causation, and perceptual similarity spaces, which include acquired dimensions grounded in representations of particular objects. The chapter also argues that the cognitive powers of nonhuman animals and prelinguistic human infants are limited to imagistic cognition. As case studies, the chapter examines the achievements of infants in Paul C. Quinn's experiments and the achievements of chimpanzees in Sue Savage‐Rumbaugh's experiments and argues that they can be explained in terms of imagistic cognition.
Isabelle Peretz
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199553426
- eISBN:
- 9780191731020
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199553426.003.0032
- Subject:
- Psychology, Music Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter presents a response to the commentaries in Chapters 28–31. It addresses the four points raised by Besson and Schön on their comments questioning the usefulness of the modularity frame. ...
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This chapter presents a response to the commentaries in Chapters 28–31. It addresses the four points raised by Besson and Schön on their comments questioning the usefulness of the modularity frame. Skoe and Kraus provide a useful reminder and compelling case for considering that cortical modules do not function in isolation from subcortical neural systems. They remind us of the importance of top-down processing or corticofugal influences on the early tuning of brainstem responses to auditory input. Goswami draws attention to the role of prosody and rhythm in both music and speech from development and animal cognition. This chapter thanks Goswami for bringing to attention a study in which auditory chimera were created by interchanging sentences for melodies in using the envelope of one sentence or melody and the fine time structure of another.Less
This chapter presents a response to the commentaries in Chapters 28–31. It addresses the four points raised by Besson and Schön on their comments questioning the usefulness of the modularity frame. Skoe and Kraus provide a useful reminder and compelling case for considering that cortical modules do not function in isolation from subcortical neural systems. They remind us of the importance of top-down processing or corticofugal influences on the early tuning of brainstem responses to auditory input. Goswami draws attention to the role of prosody and rhythm in both music and speech from development and animal cognition. This chapter thanks Goswami for bringing to attention a study in which auditory chimera were created by interchanging sentences for melodies in using the envelope of one sentence or melody and the fine time structure of another.
Gary E. Varner
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199758784
- eISBN:
- 9780199949465
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199758784.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
“Near-persons” are like persons insofar as they have a robust, conscious sense of their past and future, and this ability gives their lives special moral significance in comparison to “merely ...
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“Near-persons” are like persons insofar as they have a robust, conscious sense of their past and future, and this ability gives their lives special moral significance in comparison to “merely sentient” individuals which lack this ability. This chapter surveys the available scientific evidence for episodic memory, mirror self-recognition, and the use of a theory of mind and certain other kinds of planning in a range of non-human animals. This chapter concludes that while “the usual suspects” (great apes, elephants, and cetaceans) are good candidates for near-personhood, there is at least one surprising “contender” (scrub jays) and that we may one day have strong evidence for a much wider range of mammals and birds.Less
“Near-persons” are like persons insofar as they have a robust, conscious sense of their past and future, and this ability gives their lives special moral significance in comparison to “merely sentient” individuals which lack this ability. This chapter surveys the available scientific evidence for episodic memory, mirror self-recognition, and the use of a theory of mind and certain other kinds of planning in a range of non-human animals. This chapter concludes that while “the usual suspects” (great apes, elephants, and cetaceans) are good candidates for near-personhood, there is at least one surprising “contender” (scrub jays) and that we may one day have strong evidence for a much wider range of mammals and birds.
Euan Macphail
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198503248
- eISBN:
- 9780191686481
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198503248.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Are non-human animals conscious? When do babies begin to feel pain? What function is served by consciousness? What evidence could resolve these issues? These questions are tackled by exploring ...
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Are non-human animals conscious? When do babies begin to feel pain? What function is served by consciousness? What evidence could resolve these issues? These questions are tackled by exploring psychologists' findings on topics as diverse as: animal cognition, unconscious learning and perception in humans, infantile amnesia, theory of mind in primates, and the nature of pleasure and pain. Experimental results are placed in theoretical context by tracing the development of concepts of consciousness in animals and humans (from Plato to Penrose). Two themes emerge: first, the capacity for language marks a fundamental difference between humans and nonhumans; second, there is neither proof that any nonhuman species is conscious, nor any convincing function to be found for consciousness. Finally, a sketch is offered of a novel functionalist theory, according to which the developing capacity for language allows the creation by infants of a 'self', which may be a precondition for consciousness.Less
Are non-human animals conscious? When do babies begin to feel pain? What function is served by consciousness? What evidence could resolve these issues? These questions are tackled by exploring psychologists' findings on topics as diverse as: animal cognition, unconscious learning and perception in humans, infantile amnesia, theory of mind in primates, and the nature of pleasure and pain. Experimental results are placed in theoretical context by tracing the development of concepts of consciousness in animals and humans (from Plato to Penrose). Two themes emerge: first, the capacity for language marks a fundamental difference between humans and nonhumans; second, there is neither proof that any nonhuman species is conscious, nor any convincing function to be found for consciousness. Finally, a sketch is offered of a novel functionalist theory, according to which the developing capacity for language allows the creation by infants of a 'self', which may be a precondition for consciousness.
Jeffrey R. Stevens and Andrew J. King
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780195388435
- eISBN:
- 9780199950089
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388435.003.0015
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Why do animals attend to the lives of others? Social situations have provided important pressures in the evolution of behavior. In fact, some have argued that the complexities of social life require ...
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Why do animals attend to the lives of others? Social situations have provided important pressures in the evolution of behavior. In fact, some have argued that the complexities of social life require sophisticated mental abilities such that individuals of highly social species will evolve intelligent ways to cope with this complexity. The chapter explores three key components critical for social decision making. First, although the social milieu might be complex and ever changing, the use of simple decision mechanisms such as heuristics or “rules of thumb” may allow animals to navigate this complexity. Simple rules can provide good responses to complex problems. Reasonable decision mechanisms cannot be developed without considering the requisite cognitive capacities needed to implement these mechanisms. For example, investigating these cognitive capacities has been useful in reassessing the decision mechanisms used in cooperative situations. Finally, the animal literature is particularly useful for testing questions of ecological rationality—where decision rules are adapted to the structure of the physical and social environment—because different species have evolved in different environments. Each species' environment may uniquely shape its decision processes, and the social environment is a particularly important selective force on decision making. In summary, decision mechanisms, cognitive capacities, and the environment of a species must be investigated to understand properly its decisions. This perspective integrates the evolutionary and cognitive study of decision making to explore how animals navigate the complexities of their social worlds.Less
Why do animals attend to the lives of others? Social situations have provided important pressures in the evolution of behavior. In fact, some have argued that the complexities of social life require sophisticated mental abilities such that individuals of highly social species will evolve intelligent ways to cope with this complexity. The chapter explores three key components critical for social decision making. First, although the social milieu might be complex and ever changing, the use of simple decision mechanisms such as heuristics or “rules of thumb” may allow animals to navigate this complexity. Simple rules can provide good responses to complex problems. Reasonable decision mechanisms cannot be developed without considering the requisite cognitive capacities needed to implement these mechanisms. For example, investigating these cognitive capacities has been useful in reassessing the decision mechanisms used in cooperative situations. Finally, the animal literature is particularly useful for testing questions of ecological rationality—where decision rules are adapted to the structure of the physical and social environment—because different species have evolved in different environments. Each species' environment may uniquely shape its decision processes, and the social environment is a particularly important selective force on decision making. In summary, decision mechanisms, cognitive capacities, and the environment of a species must be investigated to understand properly its decisions. This perspective integrates the evolutionary and cognitive study of decision making to explore how animals navigate the complexities of their social worlds.
Dorothy L. Cheney
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262016636
- eISBN:
- 9780262298988
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262016636.003.0016
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
It has long been hypothesized that the demands of establishing and maintaining social relationships in complex societies place strong selective pressures on cognition and intelligence. What has been ...
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It has long been hypothesized that the demands of establishing and maintaining social relationships in complex societies place strong selective pressures on cognition and intelligence. What has been less clear is whether these relationships, and the skills they require, confer any reproductive benefits, and whether such benefits vary across individuals. Over the last few years, much progress has been made in resolving some of these questions. There is now evidence from a variety of species that animals are motivated to establish close, long-term bonds with specific partners, and that these bonds enhance longevity and offspring survival. The cognitive and emotional mechanisms underlying cooperation, however, are still not understood. Most investigations with captive primates indicate that cooperation is seldom contingency-based; however, several experiments conducted under more natural conditions suggest that animals do take into account recent interactions when supporting others. Pairs with strong bonds have strongly reciprocal interactions over extended time periods. These results suggest that the apparent rarity of contingent cooperation in animals may not stem from cognitive constraints. Instead, animals may tolerate short-term inequities in favors given and received because most cooperation occurs among long-term reciprocating partners.Less
It has long been hypothesized that the demands of establishing and maintaining social relationships in complex societies place strong selective pressures on cognition and intelligence. What has been less clear is whether these relationships, and the skills they require, confer any reproductive benefits, and whether such benefits vary across individuals. Over the last few years, much progress has been made in resolving some of these questions. There is now evidence from a variety of species that animals are motivated to establish close, long-term bonds with specific partners, and that these bonds enhance longevity and offspring survival. The cognitive and emotional mechanisms underlying cooperation, however, are still not understood. Most investigations with captive primates indicate that cooperation is seldom contingency-based; however, several experiments conducted under more natural conditions suggest that animals do take into account recent interactions when supporting others. Pairs with strong bonds have strongly reciprocal interactions over extended time periods. These results suggest that the apparent rarity of contingent cooperation in animals may not stem from cognitive constraints. Instead, animals may tolerate short-term inequities in favors given and received because most cooperation occurs among long-term reciprocating partners.
William A. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195377804
- eISBN:
- 9780199848461
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377804.003.0009
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Human language and cognition are often described as having the property of displacement. Displacement may be both temporal and spatial. Thus, we ...
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Human language and cognition are often described as having the property of displacement. Displacement may be both temporal and spatial. Thus, we may think or communicate about events that occurred at some time in the past or that will occur at some time in the future. This ability is referred to as cognitive time travel, and memories of personal events that occurred at specific times in the past are referred to as episodic memories. People also can think or communicate about places distant from their current location, and we might call this cognitive spatial travel. This chapter examines whether these displacement abilities of humans can be found in animals. With regard to the temporal displacement question, it considers the hypothesis that animals are “stuck in time.” A parallel “stuck-in-space” hypothesis may be advanced regarding spatial displacement. This chapter reviews some of the evidence on the stuck-in-time hypothesis concerning both the possibility of episodic memory in animals and the anticipation of future events. The questions of temporal and spatial displacement in animal cognition are discussed.Less
Human language and cognition are often described as having the property of displacement. Displacement may be both temporal and spatial. Thus, we may think or communicate about events that occurred at some time in the past or that will occur at some time in the future. This ability is referred to as cognitive time travel, and memories of personal events that occurred at specific times in the past are referred to as episodic memories. People also can think or communicate about places distant from their current location, and we might call this cognitive spatial travel. This chapter examines whether these displacement abilities of humans can be found in animals. With regard to the temporal displacement question, it considers the hypothesis that animals are “stuck in time.” A parallel “stuck-in-space” hypothesis may be advanced regarding spatial displacement. This chapter reviews some of the evidence on the stuck-in-time hypothesis concerning both the possibility of episodic memory in animals and the anticipation of future events. The questions of temporal and spatial displacement in animal cognition are discussed.
Herbert S. Terrace and Janet Metcalfe (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195161564
- eISBN:
- 9780199848386
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161564.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
How do we develop self-awareness, or a sense of self? One of the most popular theories is that language plays a major role: language and the narrative form allow us to develop a sense of self because ...
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How do we develop self-awareness, or a sense of self? One of the most popular theories is that language plays a major role: language and the narrative form allow us to develop a sense of self because this sense is dependent upon representational thought and the psychological manipulation of representations. Some argue against this theory, claiming that more than language and representational thought is needed. Comparing human and animal cognition is a particularly powerful way of examining this disagreement; if animals possess self-awareness without having the representational linguistic capabilities of humans, then the comparison will provide significant evidence for the argument that language and narrative form do not play the only role, and that researchers may have overlooked a cognitive link. This book brings together the work of a group of researchers, who show that self-awareness, metacognitions, and representational thought are unique to humans, and others who believe that precursors to self-reflective consciousness exist in non-human primates.Less
How do we develop self-awareness, or a sense of self? One of the most popular theories is that language plays a major role: language and the narrative form allow us to develop a sense of self because this sense is dependent upon representational thought and the psychological manipulation of representations. Some argue against this theory, claiming that more than language and representational thought is needed. Comparing human and animal cognition is a particularly powerful way of examining this disagreement; if animals possess self-awareness without having the representational linguistic capabilities of humans, then the comparison will provide significant evidence for the argument that language and narrative form do not play the only role, and that researchers may have overlooked a cognitive link. This book brings together the work of a group of researchers, who show that self-awareness, metacognitions, and representational thought are unique to humans, and others who believe that precursors to self-reflective consciousness exist in non-human primates.
Jose Luis Bermudez
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195159691
- eISBN:
- 9780199849598
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195159691.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter outlines the different types of question posed by the forms of psychological explanations of the behavior of nonlinguistic creatures given in various parts of the cognitive and ...
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This chapter outlines the different types of question posed by the forms of psychological explanations of the behavior of nonlinguistic creatures given in various parts of the cognitive and behavioral sciences. Due to the cognitive turn in the behavioral and cognitive sciences in the modern age, high-level cognitive abilities are being investigated in an ever-increasing number of species and at earliest stages of human development. This chapter explores the development in the scientific study of human characteristics and animal behavior. The new discipline of cognitive ethology is essential in the study of the mental states of animals and of how those mental states manifest themselves in behavior. The three areas of cognitive ethology, developmental, psychological, and cognitive archaeology are becoming ever more closely integrated. Research into animal cognition is now employing the dishabituation paradigm.Less
This chapter outlines the different types of question posed by the forms of psychological explanations of the behavior of nonlinguistic creatures given in various parts of the cognitive and behavioral sciences. Due to the cognitive turn in the behavioral and cognitive sciences in the modern age, high-level cognitive abilities are being investigated in an ever-increasing number of species and at earliest stages of human development. This chapter explores the development in the scientific study of human characteristics and animal behavior. The new discipline of cognitive ethology is essential in the study of the mental states of animals and of how those mental states manifest themselves in behavior. The three areas of cognitive ethology, developmental, psychological, and cognitive archaeology are becoming ever more closely integrated. Research into animal cognition is now employing the dishabituation paradigm.
Endel Tulving
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195161564
- eISBN:
- 9780199848386
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161564.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
The chapter tackles the placement of self-reflective consciousness amongst the numberless gradations by Darwin. Discussions of self-consciousness inevitably lead to Descartes' dictum, “I think, ...
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The chapter tackles the placement of self-reflective consciousness amongst the numberless gradations by Darwin. Discussions of self-consciousness inevitably lead to Descartes' dictum, “I think, therefore I am”. The goal is a rapprochement between this view and the Cartesian view, emphasizing this kind of consciousness applicable only to humans. Descartes maintained that animals are unable to engage in self-reflection. Negative results of various ape language projects and broad advances in animal cognition suggest that Descartes was right about the uniqueness of language but that he was wrong about animal's capacity for thought and self-reflection. There is abundant evidence that nonhuman pirates can form representations and use them to solve problems. The concept of autonoetic consciousness, as Tulving calls it, seemed close to the construct of self-reflective consciousness and metacognition which was the concern. Thus, instead of focusing on language, more fundamental capabilities are considered—the origins of self-reflective consciousness.Less
The chapter tackles the placement of self-reflective consciousness amongst the numberless gradations by Darwin. Discussions of self-consciousness inevitably lead to Descartes' dictum, “I think, therefore I am”. The goal is a rapprochement between this view and the Cartesian view, emphasizing this kind of consciousness applicable only to humans. Descartes maintained that animals are unable to engage in self-reflection. Negative results of various ape language projects and broad advances in animal cognition suggest that Descartes was right about the uniqueness of language but that he was wrong about animal's capacity for thought and self-reflection. There is abundant evidence that nonhuman pirates can form representations and use them to solve problems. The concept of autonoetic consciousness, as Tulving calls it, seemed close to the construct of self-reflective consciousness and metacognition which was the concern. Thus, instead of focusing on language, more fundamental capabilities are considered—the origins of self-reflective consciousness.
Euan M. Macphail
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198503248
- eISBN:
- 9780191686481
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198503248.003.0005
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Part of the rationale for this chapter was that the exploration of animal cognition might give some insight into such questions as whether some animals might be conscious, and some not, and whether ...
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Part of the rationale for this chapter was that the exploration of animal cognition might give some insight into such questions as whether some animals might be conscious, and some not, and whether some animals might be more conscious than others. It is seen that associative processes are ubiquitous in animals, and have been unable to find evidence for a significant ‘leap’ in cognition between one animal species and another — with one exception. If there is a strong link between consciousness and cognition, this suggests a difference in consciousness between animals and humans. But whether cognition is related to consciousness is an interesting question. Is language merely a cognitive leap, or is it the Rubicon between unconsciousness and consciousness? This is the central question that this chapter attempts to explore.Less
Part of the rationale for this chapter was that the exploration of animal cognition might give some insight into such questions as whether some animals might be conscious, and some not, and whether some animals might be more conscious than others. It is seen that associative processes are ubiquitous in animals, and have been unable to find evidence for a significant ‘leap’ in cognition between one animal species and another — with one exception. If there is a strong link between consciousness and cognition, this suggests a difference in consciousness between animals and humans. But whether cognition is related to consciousness is an interesting question. Is language merely a cognitive leap, or is it the Rubicon between unconsciousness and consciousness? This is the central question that this chapter attempts to explore.
Bridget D. Samuels
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199694358
- eISBN:
- 9780191731891
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694358.003.0003
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Phonetics / Phonology, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics
‘Phonology in Evolutionary Perspective’ discusses the evolution of language, the properties of phonological computation, and the linguistic externalization system, using animal cognition studies to ...
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‘Phonology in Evolutionary Perspective’ discusses the evolution of language, the properties of phonological computation, and the linguistic externalization system, using animal cognition studies to identify which components of phonology may not be unique to humans and/or to language. It demonstrates on the basis of behavioral and physiological studies on primates, songbirds, and a wide variety of other species that the cognitive abilities underlying human phonological representations and operations are present in creatures other than humans and in domains other than language.Less
‘Phonology in Evolutionary Perspective’ discusses the evolution of language, the properties of phonological computation, and the linguistic externalization system, using animal cognition studies to identify which components of phonology may not be unique to humans and/or to language. It demonstrates on the basis of behavioral and physiological studies on primates, songbirds, and a wide variety of other species that the cognitive abilities underlying human phonological representations and operations are present in creatures other than humans and in domains other than language.
Alan C. Kamil and Alan B. Bond
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195377804
- eISBN:
- 9780199848461
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377804.003.0007
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter discusses the results of experiments that investigated animal cognition in an integrative fashion by combining the methodology and ...
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This chapter discusses the results of experiments that investigated animal cognition in an integrative fashion by combining the methodology and insights of experimental psychology and evolutionary biology. This combination can be extraordinarily fruitful, yielding novel perspectives that can be applied broadly to the study of animal learning and memory. The chapter focuses on selective attention, priming, and foraging behavior in animals, along with spatial cognition and transitive inference. Considerations of how foraging animals might use selective attention while searching for cryptic prey have resulted in interesting questions that focus on the mechanisms of selective attention. Two naturally occurring foraging patterns, hunting by expectation and searching image, are related to two phenomena studied under laboratory conditions, associative priming and sequential priming.Less
This chapter discusses the results of experiments that investigated animal cognition in an integrative fashion by combining the methodology and insights of experimental psychology and evolutionary biology. This combination can be extraordinarily fruitful, yielding novel perspectives that can be applied broadly to the study of animal learning and memory. The chapter focuses on selective attention, priming, and foraging behavior in animals, along with spatial cognition and transitive inference. Considerations of how foraging animals might use selective attention while searching for cryptic prey have resulted in interesting questions that focus on the mechanisms of selective attention. Two naturally occurring foraging patterns, hunting by expectation and searching image, are related to two phenomena studied under laboratory conditions, associative priming and sequential priming.
Niki Harré, Taciano L. Milfont, William Helton, and Andrea Mead
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199794942
- eISBN:
- 9780199914500
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794942.003.0057
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
The current ecological crisis is of enormous relevance to psychology teaching, as it is essentially a problem of human behaviour. Despite this, psychology has been slow to contribute. As a result, ...
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The current ecological crisis is of enormous relevance to psychology teaching, as it is essentially a problem of human behaviour. Despite this, psychology has been slow to contribute. As a result, our environmental problems deepen, while our knowledge, skills and values as teachers of psychology remain largely untapped. This chapter urges psychology educators to consider how they can nurture the psychologically literate citizen through a focus on ecological sustainability. We present four case studies from New Zealand psychology departments. Two are laboratory exercises, one based on a social dilemma, the Tragedy of the Commons, and the other on perceptions of animal cognition. The third is a fourth year class that is open to students from different disciplines. The final case study is an action research and teaching project designed to create a sustainable school. Participating in these experiences highlights for students the ecological issues faced by people everywhere, how to cooperate in the sustainable and equitable use of resources, how cognitions and moral reasoning are affected by culture and how to use one’s psychological literacy to effect social change.Less
The current ecological crisis is of enormous relevance to psychology teaching, as it is essentially a problem of human behaviour. Despite this, psychology has been slow to contribute. As a result, our environmental problems deepen, while our knowledge, skills and values as teachers of psychology remain largely untapped. This chapter urges psychology educators to consider how they can nurture the psychologically literate citizen through a focus on ecological sustainability. We present four case studies from New Zealand psychology departments. Two are laboratory exercises, one based on a social dilemma, the Tragedy of the Commons, and the other on perceptions of animal cognition. The third is a fourth year class that is open to students from different disciplines. The final case study is an action research and teaching project designed to create a sustainable school. Participating in these experiences highlights for students the ecological issues faced by people everywhere, how to cooperate in the sustainable and equitable use of resources, how cognitions and moral reasoning are affected by culture and how to use one’s psychological literacy to effect social change.
John M.C. Hutchinson and Gerd Gigerenzer
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199744282
- eISBN:
- 9780199894727
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744282.003.0005
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Human-Technology Interaction
The Centre for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition (ABC) has hypothesized that much human decision making can be described by simple algorithmic process models (heuristics). This chapter explains this ...
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The Centre for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition (ABC) has hypothesized that much human decision making can be described by simple algorithmic process models (heuristics). This chapter explains this approach and relates it to research in biology on rules of thumb, which we also review. As an example of a simple heuristic, consider the lexicographic strategy of take-the-best for choosing between two alternatives: Cues are searched in turn until one discriminates, then search stops and all other cues are ignored. Heuristics consist of building blocks, and building blocks exploit evolved or learned abilities such as recognition memory; it is the complexity of these abilities that allows the heuristics to be simple. Simple heuristics have an advantage in making decisions fast and with little information, and in avoiding overfitting. Furthermore, humans are observed to use simple heuristics. Simulations show that the statistical structures of different environments affect which heuristics perform better, a relationship referred to as ecological rationality. We contrast ecological rationality with the stronger claim of adaptation. Rules of thumb from biology provide clearer examples of adaptation because animals can be studied in the environments in which they evolved. The range of examples is also much more diverse. To investigate them, biologists have sometimes used similar simulation techniques to ABC, but many examples depend on empirically driven approaches. ABC's theoretical framework can be useful in connecting some of these examples, particularly the scattered literature on how information from different cues is integrated. Optimality modeling is usually used to explain less detailed aspects of behavior but might more often be redirected to investigate rules of thumb.Less
The Centre for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition (ABC) has hypothesized that much human decision making can be described by simple algorithmic process models (heuristics). This chapter explains this approach and relates it to research in biology on rules of thumb, which we also review. As an example of a simple heuristic, consider the lexicographic strategy of take-the-best for choosing between two alternatives: Cues are searched in turn until one discriminates, then search stops and all other cues are ignored. Heuristics consist of building blocks, and building blocks exploit evolved or learned abilities such as recognition memory; it is the complexity of these abilities that allows the heuristics to be simple. Simple heuristics have an advantage in making decisions fast and with little information, and in avoiding overfitting. Furthermore, humans are observed to use simple heuristics. Simulations show that the statistical structures of different environments affect which heuristics perform better, a relationship referred to as ecological rationality. We contrast ecological rationality with the stronger claim of adaptation. Rules of thumb from biology provide clearer examples of adaptation because animals can be studied in the environments in which they evolved. The range of examples is also much more diverse. To investigate them, biologists have sometimes used similar simulation techniques to ABC, but many examples depend on empirically driven approaches. ABC's theoretical framework can be useful in connecting some of these examples, particularly the scattered literature on how information from different cues is integrated. Optimality modeling is usually used to explain less detailed aspects of behavior but might more often be redirected to investigate rules of thumb.
Herbert Terrace
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195377804
- eISBN:
- 9780199848461
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377804.003.0026
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Serial learning is one of the oldest and most widely studied phenomena of experimental psychology. Lashley argued that chaining theory could not ...
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Serial learning is one of the oldest and most widely studied phenomena of experimental psychology. Lashley argued that chaining theory could not account for knowledge of relationships between non-adjacent items in serially organized behavior. Hierarchical organization, a level of complexity that cannot be derived from chaining theory, is central to the concept of chunking and contemporary theories of language. Because Lashley did not use examples of animal behavior in his critique of chaining theory, its implication for animal cognition is less clear than it is for human cognition. Recent advances in our understanding of serially organized behavior in animals have confirmed that Lashley's critique of chaining theory applies with the same force to sequence learning by animals as it does to sequence learning by humans. Maze learning is the classic example of sequential learning by animals. This chapter discusses simultaneous chains and compares them with cognitive maps. It presents results of experiments that studied serially organized behavior in pigeons and monkeys.Less
Serial learning is one of the oldest and most widely studied phenomena of experimental psychology. Lashley argued that chaining theory could not account for knowledge of relationships between non-adjacent items in serially organized behavior. Hierarchical organization, a level of complexity that cannot be derived from chaining theory, is central to the concept of chunking and contemporary theories of language. Because Lashley did not use examples of animal behavior in his critique of chaining theory, its implication for animal cognition is less clear than it is for human cognition. Recent advances in our understanding of serially organized behavior in animals have confirmed that Lashley's critique of chaining theory applies with the same force to sequence learning by animals as it does to sequence learning by humans. Maze learning is the classic example of sequential learning by animals. This chapter discusses simultaneous chains and compares them with cognitive maps. It presents results of experiments that studied serially organized behavior in pigeons and monkeys.
Colin Allen
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198528272
- eISBN:
- 9780191689529
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528272.003.0007
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter compares cognitive and associative accounts of behaviour by animals on transitive inference tasks. It explains that transitive ...
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This chapter compares cognitive and associative accounts of behaviour by animals on transitive inference tasks. It explains that transitive relationships are often important to animals and that transitive inference would permit an animal to behave in a way appropriate to the dominance relation between other animals even if their relationship has not been directly ascertained. It illustrates a more general methodological dispute between ethological and experimental approaches to animal cognition.Less
This chapter compares cognitive and associative accounts of behaviour by animals on transitive inference tasks. It explains that transitive relationships are often important to animals and that transitive inference would permit an animal to behave in a way appropriate to the dominance relation between other animals even if their relationship has not been directly ascertained. It illustrates a more general methodological dispute between ethological and experimental approaches to animal cognition.
J. Gregor Fetterman
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195377804
- eISBN:
- 9780199848461
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377804.003.0016
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
The resurgence of interest in animal cognition was accompanied by the use of increasingly complex stimulus arrangements such as temporal events ...
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The resurgence of interest in animal cognition was accompanied by the use of increasingly complex stimulus arrangements such as temporal events and numerosities. The renewed emphasis on cognitive constructs and theories in animal learning resulted from a dynamic interplay of a set of variables, including the “paradigm shift” in the study of human learning and memory that preceded changes in the approaches to learning in nonhumans by 20 years or more. This chapter reviews research and theory on the ability of nonhuman animals to learn, remember, and discriminate between events that differ in duration and between those that differ in number — in each case, events with temporal extension. This property of time-based and number-based discriminations raises interesting questions for research and theories of the underlying mechanisms, such as the role of memory and the weighting of events early in the sequence versus those that occur later. The chapter begins with a brief history of attempts to understand how nonhuman animals discriminate temporal intervals and moves to a brief presentation of how animals discriminate numerosities.Less
The resurgence of interest in animal cognition was accompanied by the use of increasingly complex stimulus arrangements such as temporal events and numerosities. The renewed emphasis on cognitive constructs and theories in animal learning resulted from a dynamic interplay of a set of variables, including the “paradigm shift” in the study of human learning and memory that preceded changes in the approaches to learning in nonhumans by 20 years or more. This chapter reviews research and theory on the ability of nonhuman animals to learn, remember, and discriminate between events that differ in duration and between those that differ in number — in each case, events with temporal extension. This property of time-based and number-based discriminations raises interesting questions for research and theories of the underlying mechanisms, such as the role of memory and the weighting of events early in the sequence versus those that occur later. The chapter begins with a brief history of attempts to understand how nonhuman animals discriminate temporal intervals and moves to a brief presentation of how animals discriminate numerosities.
