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This chapter discusses ancient philosophy as a way of life. It first considers the ties linking popular ideas about philosophy to the subject of study that is pursued and taught in philosophy departments by professional philosophers. One aspect of ancient philosophy as a way of life has survived intact in philosophy until today is the prominence among philosophy's varied subfields of ethics or moral philosophy. It argues that the ancient philosophers propose that we live our lives from some set of argued through, rationally worked out, rationally grasped, and rationally defended, reasoned ideas about the world and one's own place within it. To live a life of philosophy is to live committed to following philosophical reason wherever it may lead. The promise is that by doing so—but only by doing so—one will achieve the best possible human life.

The aim of this chapter is to approach Cicero's philosophical work by studying his assessments and use of Plato and Aristotle. It is argued that there is more to Cicero's Plato and Aristotle than can be ascertained from his purely philosophical background and sympathies. Cicero was not a purist in philosophy. His philosophical interests and judgements were constantly influenced by his Roman identity as an orator, statesman, and consistent supporter of themos maiorum. Cicero's use of Plato, i.e., his interest in identifiable material from Plato's dialogues; and his appeal to Aristotle and the Academic tradition for the methodology of pro and contra argument (in utramque partem dicere) are analyzed.

This chapter deals with what is termed Hume's ‘natural history of philosophy’, as contained in the two brief sections on the ancient and the modern philosophies. It also contains a comparison of the therapeutic function of philosophical critique, which Hume assumes in these sections, with Kant's account of the therapeutic function of a critique of pure reason in the Transcendental Dialectic of the first Critique. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first discusses Hume's account of the ancient philosophy, which he presents in proto-psychoanalytic terms. The second discusses the modern philosophy and its pretension to be the ‘true philosophy’. It is argued that underlying both is a futile quest for explanatory completeness or closure, which is described as a ‘philosophical neurosis’. The third section spells out the comparison with Kant, for whom an analogous unattainable quest for closure (the ‘unconditioned’) is seen to underlie traditional metaphysics.

John Lloyd Ackrill (1921–2007), a Fellow of the British Academy, had a powerful and far-reaching influence on the way ancient philosophy is done in the English-speaking world and beyond. In his first article, he interpreted Plato's claim at Sophist 259e, in the process confronting what would have been at the time the authoritative interpretation, that of W. D. Ross. Ackrill was born in Reading to Frederick William Ackrill and Jessie Anne Ackrill. He was educated at Reading School and at St John's College in the University of Oxford; his philosophy tutors at St John's were Paul Grice and John Mabbott. Ackrill's first book was Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione. He also published a pair of seminal articles on Plato's Sophist. Perhaps the most important aspect of Ackrill's enduring influence was his editorship of the Clarendon Aristotle Series.

Hilary Armstrong changed the subject of ancient philosophy by devoting much of his long life to promoting the study of the Neoplatonist philosopher Plotinus. When Armstrong graduated from Cambridge University in 1932, Plotinus was widely regarded in the English speaking world as an obscurely mystical thinker, a minority interest at best, and certainly not a philosopher remotely comparable in intellect and rigour to Plato and Aristotle. Today, thanks to Armstrong's prolific output, especially his seven-volume text and translation of the Enneads, no serious scholar of ancient philosophy can afford to neglect Plotinus. As well as being a leading scholar of ancient philosophy, Armstrong was a devout, active, and increasingly idiosyncratic Christian; or perhaps better, a free-thinking Christian Platonist. His religious outlook consistently informed his view of Plotinus. As he grew older, he became increasingly ecumenical, critical of ecclesiastical hierarchy, and sympathetic to the religious experience of other faiths. He published extensively both on contemporary theological issues and also on early Christian thought and its relation to Greek philosophy, especially Platonism.

This chapter discusses the Socratic way of life. For Socrates, philosophical reflection and analysis concerning the human good, as well as concerning human deficiencies, dictate a particular way of life. This way of life is, practically speaking, the best for a human being. It is a life in which the practice of philosophical discussion is itself the central activity. Although in principle the best life is one in which we possess and live on the basis of wisdom, in practice the best human life—the best life any actual human being is ever going to live—is the one in which, like Socrates, we constantly and ceaselessly pursue wisdom through philosophical inquiry and discussion. The practically best human life is a life, not of wisdom (sophia), but of philosophy (philosophia), wisdom's love and pursuit.

The chapter shows how the dialogue with ancient moral philosophy prompted John Stuart Mill's reflection on modernity. To cultivate the “quality of life”—a Millian expression that echoes Aristotle's care for the good life—the moderns ought to be equally attentive to virtues as they are to norms. Ancient moral philosophy, he thought, embodied an idea of happiness that is quite in disagreement with the functionalist logic of modern society, yet not impossible for the moderns to appropriate in their own way. His attempt to link virtues and norms explains his dissatisfaction with both utilitarianism and the idea of well-being purported by classical economy and his positive view of a stationary state of society as an opportunity for inaugurating a new social order, a “liberal social utopia.”

This chapter discusses the Epicurean and Pyrrhonian skeptic ways of life. It argues that the Epicurean life, however much grounded in the results of philosophical analysis and argument, and however much the psychological motivation provided by firm belief in these results steers Epicureans in living their life, that life cannot be said to involve, in any essential way, the practice of philosophy, that is, of philosophical reflection, analysis, discussion, and argument. The skeptic life, however, beyond its conformism so far as issues of daily life, morality, religion, politics, and so on, may go, also includes a devotion to philosophical discussion and investigation. Skeptics appear to live their lives in a very delicate balance between living as Sextus describes, following his fourfold direction (and also devoting lots of attention to philosophy), and worrying about what would happen to their lives if ever their skill of counterbalancing arguments should fail to undermine an argument of philosophy.

This introductory chapter argues that studying Plutarch's interpretations of the philosophy of his past not only allows us to assess his reliability as a source of information for ancient Greek philosophy, but also provides us with valuable and philosophically engaging contextual readings of ancient philosophical theories. The best way to approach Plutarch as a historian of philosophy is by focussing on the Adversus Colotem, a unique text which offers a systematic critical discussion of a number of philosophical theories from the past in the form of a response to Colotes' general polemic against the great Greek philosophers. Despite being itself a polemic against Epicurean philosophy, the Adversus Colotem is a good specimen of a type of philosophical writing in antiquity that operated as a vehicle for conducting the history of philosophy.

This chapter examines the philosophy of Plotinus. It argues that philosophy, and only philosophy, can prepare us adequately for our true life, a life consisting of contemplation of Forms, in self-absorption into Intellect and into Intellect's own origin, the One. Furthermore, this very contemplation, which constitutes both our natural good and our true life, is an exercise of completely achieved philosophical understanding. For Plotinus, and the late ancient Platonists in general, philosophy is the sole road to happiness, and also its very essence. Thus, the Platonist way of life is doubly a philosophical life. The practice of philosophy is the sole necessary means to happiness. Moreover, the highest level of active philosophical understanding is happiness. It is the very essence of happiness.

This chapter challenges those claims of philosophy to change the powerful and empower the powerless. It argues that philosophy failed half the human race. It raises the possibility that philosophy was thought to be too exalted, or too disruptive, for study by anyone except the elite male. On the other hand, it questions whether it was in any way truly subversive or made people reassess the system in which they lived; whether its effect was ever more than patchy; whether philosophy ever caused anyone to act differently, and whether it ever told anyone what to do. The chapter surveys the effect of philosophy on Greek and Roman women — who were excluded both from the high ground of intellectual debate and from official power — and finds among women perhaps one philosopher, but no historians. Some women got some education, some were even described as philosophers, but overall, ‘ancient philosophy and philosophers failed women’.

This chapter presents a commentary on Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus (Vita Plotini; hereafter VP). It begins with a description of Porphyry, his times, and his work. It then discusses the composition and character of the VP. As appears from its title and final phrases, the VP was written as an introduction to the edition of the Enneads, P.’s complete written work, organized by Porphyry in a systematic manner according to themes. The chapter then describes the organization and sources of the VP, and the chronological system of the VP. It presents a table that outlines all of the chronological data contained in the VP, followed by maps, and other testimonies on Life of Plotinus.