Albert Casullo
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195115055
- eISBN:
- 9780199786190
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195115058.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter provides a taxonomy of widely endorsed conditions on a priori justification. The conditions fall into two broad categories: epistemic, which includes defeasibility, strength, and source ...
More
This chapter provides a taxonomy of widely endorsed conditions on a priori justification. The conditions fall into two broad categories: epistemic, which includes defeasibility, strength, and source conditions; and nonepistemic, which involves the concepts of analyticity or necessity. Two major claims are argued: (1) nonepistemic conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for a priori justification, and (2) if a theory imposes epistemic conditions on the a priori that differ from those it imposes on the a posteriori, they must be supported by independent argument or rejected as ad hoc. Two defensible conditions on a priori justification emerge: justification by a nonexperiential source, and justification that is not defeasible by experience.Less
This chapter provides a taxonomy of widely endorsed conditions on a priori justification. The conditions fall into two broad categories: epistemic, which includes defeasibility, strength, and source conditions; and nonepistemic, which involves the concepts of analyticity or necessity. Two major claims are argued: (1) nonepistemic conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for a priori justification, and (2) if a theory imposes epistemic conditions on the a priori that differ from those it imposes on the a posteriori, they must be supported by independent argument or rejected as ad hoc. Two defensible conditions on a priori justification emerge: justification by a nonexperiential source, and justification that is not defeasible by experience.
Amie L. Thomasson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195319910
- eISBN:
- 9780199869602
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Arguments that ordinary inanimate objects such as tables and chairs, sticks and stones, simply do not exist have become increasingly common. Some arguments for eliminativism are based on demands for ...
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Arguments that ordinary inanimate objects such as tables and chairs, sticks and stones, simply do not exist have become increasingly common. Some arguments for eliminativism are based on demands for parsimony or for a non-arbitrary answer to the special composition question; others arise from prohibitions against causal redundancy, ontological vagueness, or colocation; and others still come from worries that a common sense ontology would be a rival to a scientific one. This book makes the case that the mistakes behind all of these superficially diverse eliminativist arguments may be traced to a common source, and may be successfully resisted by adopting a small cluster of interrelated and independently plausible theses about reference, analyticity, and modality. By adopting these theses, we can make sense of our common sense world view without internal contradiction, violation of plausible metaphysical principles, or rivalry with a scientific ontology. In the end, however, the most important result of addressing these eliminativist arguments is not merely avoiding their conclusions. It also leads to important metaontological results, bringing into question widely held assumptions about which uses of metaphysical principles are appropriate, which metaphysical demands are answerable, and how we incur ontological commitments. As a result, the work of this book hopes to provide not only the route to a reflective understanding of our unreflective common sense world view, but also a better understanding of the proper methods and limits of metaphysics.Less
Arguments that ordinary inanimate objects such as tables and chairs, sticks and stones, simply do not exist have become increasingly common. Some arguments for eliminativism are based on demands for parsimony or for a non-arbitrary answer to the special composition question; others arise from prohibitions against causal redundancy, ontological vagueness, or colocation; and others still come from worries that a common sense ontology would be a rival to a scientific one. This book makes the case that the mistakes behind all of these superficially diverse eliminativist arguments may be traced to a common source, and may be successfully resisted by adopting a small cluster of interrelated and independently plausible theses about reference, analyticity, and modality. By adopting these theses, we can make sense of our common sense world view without internal contradiction, violation of plausible metaphysical principles, or rivalry with a scientific ontology. In the end, however, the most important result of addressing these eliminativist arguments is not merely avoiding their conclusions. It also leads to important metaontological results, bringing into question widely held assumptions about which uses of metaphysical principles are appropriate, which metaphysical demands are answerable, and how we incur ontological commitments. As a result, the work of this book hopes to provide not only the route to a reflective understanding of our unreflective common sense world view, but also a better understanding of the proper methods and limits of metaphysics.
Jerry A. Fodor
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236368
- eISBN:
- 9780191597404
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236360.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have ...
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Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been seriously mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, and maintains that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. He starts by demolishing the rival theories that have prevailed in recent years—that concepts are definitions, that they are prototypes or stereotypes, that they are abstractions from belief systems, etc. He argues that all such theories are radically unsatisfactory for two closely related reasons: they hold that the content of a concept is determined, at least in part, by its inferential role; and they hold that typical concepts are structurally complex. Empirical and philosophical arguments against each of these claims are elaborated. Fodor then develops his alternative account, arguing that conceptual content is determined entirely by informational (mind—world) relations, and that typical concepts are atomic. The implications of this ‘informational atomism’ are considered in respect of issues in psychology, lexical semantics, and metaphysics, with particular attention to the relation between informational atomism and innateness.Less
Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been seriously mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, and maintains that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. He starts by demolishing the rival theories that have prevailed in recent years—that concepts are definitions, that they are prototypes or stereotypes, that they are abstractions from belief systems, etc. He argues that all such theories are radically unsatisfactory for two closely related reasons: they hold that the content of a concept is determined, at least in part, by its inferential role; and they hold that typical concepts are structurally complex. Empirical and philosophical arguments against each of these claims are elaborated. Fodor then develops his alternative account, arguing that conceptual content is determined entirely by informational (mind—world) relations, and that typical concepts are atomic. The implications of this ‘informational atomism’ are considered in respect of issues in psychology, lexical semantics, and metaphysics, with particular attention to the relation between informational atomism and innateness.
Gilbert Harman
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238027
- eISBN:
- 9780191597633
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238029.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Many themes in the papers collected here are negative: there is no a priori knowledge or analytic truth; logic is not a theory of reasoning; a theory of truth conditions is not a theory of meaning; a ...
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Many themes in the papers collected here are negative: there is no a priori knowledge or analytic truth; logic is not a theory of reasoning; a theory of truth conditions is not a theory of meaning; a purely objective account of meaning or mind cannot say what words mean or what it is like to see things in colour. Other themes are positive: theoretical reasoning has important practical aspects; meaning depends on how words are used to think with i.e. on how concepts function in reasoning, perception and action; the relevant uses or functions relate concepts to aspects of the environment and other things in the world; translation plays a central role in any adequate account of mind or meaning.Less
Many themes in the papers collected here are negative: there is no a priori knowledge or analytic truth; logic is not a theory of reasoning; a theory of truth conditions is not a theory of meaning; a purely objective account of meaning or mind cannot say what words mean or what it is like to see things in colour. Other themes are positive: theoretical reasoning has important practical aspects; meaning depends on how words are used to think with i.e. on how concepts function in reasoning, perception and action; the relevant uses or functions relate concepts to aspects of the environment and other things in the world; translation plays a central role in any adequate account of mind or meaning.
Daniel Stoljar
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195306583
- eISBN:
- 9780199786619
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195306589.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this chapter, an analogous argument in the case of the a priori entailment view is advanced. On the one hand, the mere idea of priori entailment will not answer the argument — further material ...
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In this chapter, an analogous argument in the case of the a priori entailment view is advanced. On the one hand, the mere idea of priori entailment will not answer the argument — further material needs to be added. On the other hand, an examination of what this further material might be yields the result that either the a priori entailment view has no answer to the arguments, or else collapses into the epistemic view.Less
In this chapter, an analogous argument in the case of the a priori entailment view is advanced. On the one hand, the mere idea of priori entailment will not answer the argument — further material needs to be added. On the other hand, an examination of what this further material might be yields the result that either the a priori entailment view has no answer to the arguments, or else collapses into the epistemic view.
Gilbert Harman
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238027
- eISBN:
- 9780191597633
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238029.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
A response to a paper by Frank Jackson. Although philosophers sometimes defend certain ‘analyses’ as analytic or a priori truths, such analyses are far from obviously true and are defended ...
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A response to a paper by Frank Jackson. Although philosophers sometimes defend certain ‘analyses’ as analytic or a priori truths, such analyses are far from obviously true and are defended inductively. Contrary to Jackson's claim, the rejection of analyticity is based on consideration of central cases.Less
A response to a paper by Frank Jackson. Although philosophers sometimes defend certain ‘analyses’ as analytic or a priori truths, such analyses are far from obviously true and are defended inductively. Contrary to Jackson's claim, the rejection of analyticity is based on consideration of central cases.
Albert Casullo
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195115055
- eISBN:
- 9780199786190
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195115058.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter provides a taxonomy of widely endorsed conditions on a priori justification. The conditions fall into two broad categories: epistemic, which includes defeasibility, strength, and source ...
More
This chapter provides a taxonomy of widely endorsed conditions on a priori justification. The conditions fall into two broad categories: epistemic, which includes defeasibility, strength, and source conditions; and nonepistemic, which involves the concepts of analyticity or necessity. Two major claims are argued: (1) nonepistemic conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for a priori justification, and (2) if a theory imposes epistemic conditions on the a priori that differ from those it imposes on the a posteriori, they must be supported by independent argument or rejected as ad hoc. Two defensible conditions on a priori justification emerge; justification by a nonexperiential source, and justification that is not defeasible by experience.Less
This chapter provides a taxonomy of widely endorsed conditions on a priori justification. The conditions fall into two broad categories: epistemic, which includes defeasibility, strength, and source conditions; and nonepistemic, which involves the concepts of analyticity or necessity. Two major claims are argued: (1) nonepistemic conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for a priori justification, and (2) if a theory imposes epistemic conditions on the a priori that differ from those it imposes on the a posteriori, they must be supported by independent argument or rejected as ad hoc. Two defensible conditions on a priori justification emerge; justification by a nonexperiential source, and justification that is not defeasible by experience.
Gillian Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199232192
- eISBN:
- 9780191715907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
A final problem left over from the previous chapter is that of substantive necessity. How are we to distinguish substantively necessary sentences from analytic ones? This problem arises because we ...
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A final problem left over from the previous chapter is that of substantive necessity. How are we to distinguish substantively necessary sentences from analytic ones? This problem arises because we have attempted to characterise analyticity in modal terms. This chapter proposes a more fine-grained ‘metaphysical picture’ of analyticity to underlie the rougher modal approximation developed in Chapter 2.Less
A final problem left over from the previous chapter is that of substantive necessity. How are we to distinguish substantively necessary sentences from analytic ones? This problem arises because we have attempted to characterise analyticity in modal terms. This chapter proposes a more fine-grained ‘metaphysical picture’ of analyticity to underlie the rougher modal approximation developed in Chapter 2.
Michael Potter
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199252619
- eISBN:
- 9780191712647
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252619.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
If our ability to count depends on the structure of space and time, this may explain its applicability to the things we intuit in space and time, but it will also limit its applicability to just ...
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If our ability to count depends on the structure of space and time, this may explain its applicability to the things we intuit in space and time, but it will also limit its applicability to just those things: we shall, in short, be left without the ability to count anything that is not made up of spatio-temporal elements. This evidently did not bother Kant, but it has seemed implausible to many subsequent thinkers. The most notable of these was Frege, who published Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (The Foundations of Arithmetic), a book arguing against Kant's conclusion, in 1884. Frege was the first to put forward the thesis, now known as logicism, that logic is capable of grounding mathematical truths without thereby rendering them wholly trivial.Less
If our ability to count depends on the structure of space and time, this may explain its applicability to the things we intuit in space and time, but it will also limit its applicability to just those things: we shall, in short, be left without the ability to count anything that is not made up of spatio-temporal elements. This evidently did not bother Kant, but it has seemed implausible to many subsequent thinkers. The most notable of these was Frege, who published Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (The Foundations of Arithmetic), a book arguing against Kant's conclusion, in 1884. Frege was the first to put forward the thesis, now known as logicism, that logic is capable of grounding mathematical truths without thereby rendering them wholly trivial.
Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199263301
- eISBN:
- 9780191718823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter discusses certain aspects of naive set theory, that is, set theory in which the abstraction scheme holds for all formulas of the language of set theory, and some of its implications for ...
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This chapter discusses certain aspects of naive set theory, that is, set theory in which the abstraction scheme holds for all formulas of the language of set theory, and some of its implications for the philosophy of mathematics. Substitutional semantics, analyticity and paradoxicality, mathematical realism and anti-realism, and cardinality and syntax are discussed.Less
This chapter discusses certain aspects of naive set theory, that is, set theory in which the abstraction scheme holds for all formulas of the language of set theory, and some of its implications for the philosophy of mathematics. Substitutional semantics, analyticity and paradoxicality, mathematical realism and anti-realism, and cardinality and syntax are discussed.
Robert L. Bryant
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199534920
- eISBN:
- 9780191716010
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534920.003.0017
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Geometry / Topology
In the early analyses of metrics with special holonomy in dimensions 7 and 8, particularly in regards to their existence and generality, heavy use was made of the Cartan–Kähler theorem, essentially ...
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In the early analyses of metrics with special holonomy in dimensions 7 and 8, particularly in regards to their existence and generality, heavy use was made of the Cartan–Kähler theorem, essentially because the analyses were reduced to the study of overdetermined PDE systems whose natures were complicated by their diffeomorphism invariance. The Cartan–Kähler theory is well suited for the study of such systems and the local properties of their solutions. However, the Cartan–Kähler theory is not particularly well suited for studies of global problems for two reasons: first, it is an approach to PDE that relies entirely on the local solvability of initial value problems and, second, the Cartan–Kähler theory is only applicable in the real-analytic category. Nevertheless, when there are no other adequate methods for analyzing the local generality of such systems, the Cartan–Kähler theory is a useful tool and it has the effect of focusing attention on the initial value problem as an interesting problem in its own right. This chapter clarifies some of the existence issues involved in applying the initial value problem to the problem of constructing metrics with special holonomy. In particular, it discusses the role of the assumption of real-analyticity and presents examples to show that one cannot generally avoid such assumptions in the initial value formulations of these problems.Less
In the early analyses of metrics with special holonomy in dimensions 7 and 8, particularly in regards to their existence and generality, heavy use was made of the Cartan–Kähler theorem, essentially because the analyses were reduced to the study of overdetermined PDE systems whose natures were complicated by their diffeomorphism invariance. The Cartan–Kähler theory is well suited for the study of such systems and the local properties of their solutions. However, the Cartan–Kähler theory is not particularly well suited for studies of global problems for two reasons: first, it is an approach to PDE that relies entirely on the local solvability of initial value problems and, second, the Cartan–Kähler theory is only applicable in the real-analytic category. Nevertheless, when there are no other adequate methods for analyzing the local generality of such systems, the Cartan–Kähler theory is a useful tool and it has the effect of focusing attention on the initial value problem as an interesting problem in its own right. This chapter clarifies some of the existence issues involved in applying the initial value problem to the problem of constructing metrics with special holonomy. In particular, it discusses the role of the assumption of real-analyticity and presents examples to show that one cannot generally avoid such assumptions in the initial value formulations of these problems.
Mary Leng
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199280797
- eISBN:
- 9780191723452
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280797.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter sums up the argument of the book, and ties up a few loose ends. In particular, it considers Michael Resnik's alternative ‘pragmatic’ version of the indispensability argument, and shows ...
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This chapter sums up the argument of the book, and ties up a few loose ends. In particular, it considers Michael Resnik's alternative ‘pragmatic’ version of the indispensability argument, and shows how this argument, while not relying on confirmational holism, can be responded to from the fictionalist perspective developed in this book. It also considers the question of whether one should reject the existence of mathematical objects or merely remain agnostic about their existence, and argues for the stronger position which rejects the existence of such things. Finally, it considers a sense in which the view of the axioms of set theory with non‐mathematical objects as urelements as generative of a fiction can be considered to be a revival of a version of conventionalism about our mathematical hypotheses, as analytic ‘truths’ which are not in fact truths.Less
This chapter sums up the argument of the book, and ties up a few loose ends. In particular, it considers Michael Resnik's alternative ‘pragmatic’ version of the indispensability argument, and shows how this argument, while not relying on confirmational holism, can be responded to from the fictionalist perspective developed in this book. It also considers the question of whether one should reject the existence of mathematical objects or merely remain agnostic about their existence, and argues for the stronger position which rejects the existence of such things. Finally, it considers a sense in which the view of the axioms of set theory with non‐mathematical objects as urelements as generative of a fiction can be considered to be a revival of a version of conventionalism about our mathematical hypotheses, as analytic ‘truths’ which are not in fact truths.
Gillian Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199232192
- eISBN:
- 9780191715907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter introduces and motivates study of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and provides a brief history of that distinction. It also contains some preliminaries which will be of use in the ...
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This chapter introduces and motivates study of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and provides a brief history of that distinction. It also contains some preliminaries which will be of use in the rest of the book.Less
This chapter introduces and motivates study of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and provides a brief history of that distinction. It also contains some preliminaries which will be of use in the rest of the book.
Brian Leftow
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199263356
- eISBN:
- 9780191741777
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263356.003.0021
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
On the book’s view, there is one entity with primitive, unexplained causal-modal attributes: God, who has natural powers. The books explains God’s non-natural powers, and in so doing explains all ...
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On the book’s view, there is one entity with primitive, unexplained causal-modal attributes: God, who has natural powers. The books explains God’s non-natural powers, and in so doing explains all modal status other than God’s possibility, which it treats reductively. This chapter compares the book’s account of secular modal status to some ‘explanationist’ rivals. It emerges that its main competition comes from explanations of states of affairs’ modal status by their intrinsic content. It argues against several versions of this which involve analyticity or kindred notions. It also considers the extent to which the book’s view involves brute necessities.Less
On the book’s view, there is one entity with primitive, unexplained causal-modal attributes: God, who has natural powers. The books explains God’s non-natural powers, and in so doing explains all modal status other than God’s possibility, which it treats reductively. This chapter compares the book’s account of secular modal status to some ‘explanationist’ rivals. It emerges that its main competition comes from explanations of states of affairs’ modal status by their intrinsic content. It argues against several versions of this which involve analyticity or kindred notions. It also considers the extent to which the book’s view involves brute necessities.
Gary Kemp
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695621
- eISBN:
- 9780191738524
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695621.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The final chapter examines and dissipates certain pressures that are often felt to afflict Quine or his views. These include the charge that any such view, being a view of anti‐realism about meaning, ...
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The final chapter examines and dissipates certain pressures that are often felt to afflict Quine or his views. These include the charge that any such view, being a view of anti‐realism about meaning, is self-refuting, as according to a well‐known argument by Paul Boghossian; and worries that the view cannot account for normativity or apparent analyticities. The book closes with a discussion of what might called the world-view of naturalism—the place of vagueness, of intuition, and of the role of regimented language.Less
The final chapter examines and dissipates certain pressures that are often felt to afflict Quine or his views. These include the charge that any such view, being a view of anti‐realism about meaning, is self-refuting, as according to a well‐known argument by Paul Boghossian; and worries that the view cannot account for normativity or apparent analyticities. The book closes with a discussion of what might called the world-view of naturalism—the place of vagueness, of intuition, and of the role of regimented language.
Penelope Maddy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199273669
- eISBN:
- 9780191706264
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273669.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Here the book turns to doing, rather than describing, Second Philosophy. In preparation for the philosophy of mathematics in Part IV, Part III takes up the question of the nature of logical truth. In ...
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Here the book turns to doing, rather than describing, Second Philosophy. In preparation for the philosophy of mathematics in Part IV, Part III takes up the question of the nature of logical truth. In this chapter, several naturalistic possibilities are surveyed and critiqued: psychologism, empiricism, conventionalism and analyticity. This sets the stage for a distinctive second-philosophical account.Less
Here the book turns to doing, rather than describing, Second Philosophy. In preparation for the philosophy of mathematics in Part IV, Part III takes up the question of the nature of logical truth. In this chapter, several naturalistic possibilities are surveyed and critiqued: psychologism, empiricism, conventionalism and analyticity. This sets the stage for a distinctive second-philosophical account.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199596218
- eISBN:
- 9780191595783
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596218.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
What we experience of the world—for example, that pig on the lawn—does not bear logical relations to thoughts, or propositions. That pig on the lawn is not of the form of a proposition. Logical ...
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What we experience of the world—for example, that pig on the lawn—does not bear logical relations to thoughts, or propositions. That pig on the lawn is not of the form of a proposition. Logical relations relate thoughts, or propositions, to one another. Quine thus correctly notes that one could, on no pain of contradiction, respond to any experience with any constellation of beliefs. He incorrectly takes this to mean that any constellation of beliefs could be consistent with one's having experienced what he did. Revision can come anywhere; if it does not, this merely reflects the ways of our people. This is a mistake, and in fact destroys the very possibility of judgement. Quine has given us no reason (even if, in fact, there is one) to think that any proposition may (not incorrectly) be held to have been falsified by experience. So goes the present argument.Less
What we experience of the world—for example, that pig on the lawn—does not bear logical relations to thoughts, or propositions. That pig on the lawn is not of the form of a proposition. Logical relations relate thoughts, or propositions, to one another. Quine thus correctly notes that one could, on no pain of contradiction, respond to any experience with any constellation of beliefs. He incorrectly takes this to mean that any constellation of beliefs could be consistent with one's having experienced what he did. Revision can come anywhere; if it does not, this merely reflects the ways of our people. This is a mistake, and in fact destroys the very possibility of judgement. Quine has given us no reason (even if, in fact, there is one) to think that any proposition may (not incorrectly) be held to have been falsified by experience. So goes the present argument.
Neil Tennant
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199251605
- eISBN:
- 9780191698057
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251605.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Language
This chapter re-examines the much maligned notion of analyticity. It suggests that a major reason why various philosophers have had trouble applying the analytic-synthetic distinction is that they ...
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This chapter re-examines the much maligned notion of analyticity. It suggests that a major reason why various philosophers have had trouble applying the analytic-synthetic distinction is that they have been affected by an unarticulated dogma. It contends that once this dogma is challenged and its contradictory asserted, light can be shed once again and the equilibrium of analytic empiricism can be restored.Less
This chapter re-examines the much maligned notion of analyticity. It suggests that a major reason why various philosophers have had trouble applying the analytic-synthetic distinction is that they have been affected by an unarticulated dogma. It contends that once this dogma is challenged and its contradictory asserted, light can be shed once again and the equilibrium of analytic empiricism can be restored.
Herman Cappelen
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199644865
- eISBN:
- 9780191739026
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Those who think philosophers appeal to intuitions when they make judgments about cases also tend to see philosophers as engaged in conceptual analysis when they appeal to cases and vice versa. The ...
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Those who think philosophers appeal to intuitions when they make judgments about cases also tend to see philosophers as engaged in conceptual analysis when they appeal to cases and vice versa. The case studies considered in Chapter 8 can be used to show that both views are mistaken. Recognition of the marginal (or non-existent) role of intuitions in philosophical practice goes hand in hand with recognition of the marginal (or non-existent) role of anything reasonably labeled ‘conceptual analysis’ in philosophy. This chapter spells out some of the difficulties associated with the view that philosophy involves conceptual analysis and related notions such as conceptual modality. It criticizes possible justifications for being interested in concepts such as their alleged connections to metaphysical necessity and apriority. A number of assumptions needed to reach the conclusion that intuitions are required to engage in conceptual analysis are called into question.Less
Those who think philosophers appeal to intuitions when they make judgments about cases also tend to see philosophers as engaged in conceptual analysis when they appeal to cases and vice versa. The case studies considered in Chapter 8 can be used to show that both views are mistaken. Recognition of the marginal (or non-existent) role of intuitions in philosophical practice goes hand in hand with recognition of the marginal (or non-existent) role of anything reasonably labeled ‘conceptual analysis’ in philosophy. This chapter spells out some of the difficulties associated with the view that philosophy involves conceptual analysis and related notions such as conceptual modality. It criticizes possible justifications for being interested in concepts such as their alleged connections to metaphysical necessity and apriority. A number of assumptions needed to reach the conclusion that intuitions are required to engage in conceptual analysis are called into question.
Herman Cappelen
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199644865
- eISBN:
- 9780191739026
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Lessons Learned, Replies to Objections and Comparison to Williamson Generalizations about thought experiments are drawn, which underscore the diversity of roles they play in philosophy, and it is ...
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Lessons Learned, Replies to Objections and Comparison to Williamson Generalizations about thought experiments are drawn, which underscore the diversity of roles they play in philosophy, and it is argued that philosophers do not implicitly rely on intuitions when they make judgments about cases. It is shown that there is no such thing as ‘the method of cases’. Replies are then presented to a number of objections. The case studies in the previous chapter support the claim that even if there are conceptual a priori truths such as ‘All vixens are female foxes’, they are not relevant to understanding the epistemology of philosophy. This argument contrasts to Williamson’s argument for the same conclusion, which rests on an argument for the claim that there are no epistemically analytic truths. Pace Williamson, the case studies provide no evidence of philosophers “psychologizing the evidence”.Less
Lessons Learned, Replies to Objections and Comparison to Williamson Generalizations about thought experiments are drawn, which underscore the diversity of roles they play in philosophy, and it is argued that philosophers do not implicitly rely on intuitions when they make judgments about cases. It is shown that there is no such thing as ‘the method of cases’. Replies are then presented to a number of objections. The case studies in the previous chapter support the claim that even if there are conceptual a priori truths such as ‘All vixens are female foxes’, they are not relevant to understanding the epistemology of philosophy. This argument contrasts to Williamson’s argument for the same conclusion, which rests on an argument for the claim that there are no epistemically analytic truths. Pace Williamson, the case studies provide no evidence of philosophers “psychologizing the evidence”.