Jeffrey C. King
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199226061
- eISBN:
- 9780191710377
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226061.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, ...
More
Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ has Glenn, the loving relation, and Tracy as constituents. What is it, then, that binds these constituents together and imposes structure on them? And if the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ is distinct from the proposition that ‘Tracy loves Glenn’ yet both have the same constituents, what is it about the way these constituents are structured or bound together that makes them two different propositions? This book formulates an account of the metaphysical nature of propositions, and provides fresh answers to the above questions. In addition to explaining what it is that binds together the constituents of structured propositions and imposes structure on them, the book deals with some of the standard objections to accounts of propositions: it shows that there is no mystery about what propositions are; that given certain minimal assumptions, it follows that they exist; and that on this approach, we can see how and why propositions manage to have truth conditions and represent the world as being a certain way. The book also contains a detailed account of the nature of tense and modality, and provides a solution to the paradox of analysis.Less
Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ has Glenn, the loving relation, and Tracy as constituents. What is it, then, that binds these constituents together and imposes structure on them? And if the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ is distinct from the proposition that ‘Tracy loves Glenn’ yet both have the same constituents, what is it about the way these constituents are structured or bound together that makes them two different propositions? This book formulates an account of the metaphysical nature of propositions, and provides fresh answers to the above questions. In addition to explaining what it is that binds together the constituents of structured propositions and imposes structure on them, the book deals with some of the standard objections to accounts of propositions: it shows that there is no mystery about what propositions are; that given certain minimal assumptions, it follows that they exist; and that on this approach, we can see how and why propositions manage to have truth conditions and represent the world as being a certain way. The book also contains a detailed account of the nature of tense and modality, and provides a solution to the paradox of analysis.
P. F. Strawson
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198751182
- eISBN:
- 9780191695032
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198751182.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Metaphysics/Epistemology
All developed human beings possess a practical mastery of a vast range of concepts, including such basic structural notions as those of identity, truth, existence, material objects, mental states, ...
More
All developed human beings possess a practical mastery of a vast range of concepts, including such basic structural notions as those of identity, truth, existence, material objects, mental states, space, and time; but a practical mastery does not entail theoretical understanding. It is that understanding which philosophy seeks to achieve. This book sets out to explain and illustrate a certain conception of the nature of analytical philosophy. The author draws on his many years of teaching at Oxford University, during which he refined and developed his route to understanding the fundamental structure of human thinking. Among the distinctive features of his exposition are the displacement of an older, reductive conception of philosophical method (the ideal of ‘analysing’ complex ideas into simpler elements) in favour of elucidating the interconnections between the complex but irreducible notions which form the basic structure of our thinking; and the demonstration that the three traditionally distinguished departments of metaphysics (ontology), epistemology, and logic are but three aspects of one unified enquiry.Less
All developed human beings possess a practical mastery of a vast range of concepts, including such basic structural notions as those of identity, truth, existence, material objects, mental states, space, and time; but a practical mastery does not entail theoretical understanding. It is that understanding which philosophy seeks to achieve. This book sets out to explain and illustrate a certain conception of the nature of analytical philosophy. The author draws on his many years of teaching at Oxford University, during which he refined and developed his route to understanding the fundamental structure of human thinking. Among the distinctive features of his exposition are the displacement of an older, reductive conception of philosophical method (the ideal of ‘analysing’ complex ideas into simpler elements) in favour of elucidating the interconnections between the complex but irreducible notions which form the basic structure of our thinking; and the demonstration that the three traditionally distinguished departments of metaphysics (ontology), epistemology, and logic are but three aspects of one unified enquiry.
Denise Meyerson
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198248194
- eISBN:
- 9780191681073
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248194.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This book is concerned with both analytical philosophy of mind and Marxist philosophy. Marxists see pervasive irrationality in the conduct of human affairs, and claim that people in a class-divided ...
More
This book is concerned with both analytical philosophy of mind and Marxist philosophy. Marxists see pervasive irrationality in the conduct of human affairs, and claim that people in a class-divided society are prone to a variety of misconceptions. They say that we can suffer from ‘false consciousness’ in our views about what inspires our behaviour and in our judgements about what is good for us. This book uses the techniques of analytical philosophy to investigate this picture. It argues that Marxism is committed to the idea of motivated belief, and that the idea is philosophically defensible. The book shows that there are other philosophically defensible claims which are congenial to Marxism: that there are facts about interests that are not based on wants; that a desire can be contaminated by its history; that our judgements about our interests do not automatically motivate us; and that beliefs can survive the evidence that they are false. In doing so this book throws light on certain puzzling psychological phenomena, which confront everyone in their everyday political experience.Less
This book is concerned with both analytical philosophy of mind and Marxist philosophy. Marxists see pervasive irrationality in the conduct of human affairs, and claim that people in a class-divided society are prone to a variety of misconceptions. They say that we can suffer from ‘false consciousness’ in our views about what inspires our behaviour and in our judgements about what is good for us. This book uses the techniques of analytical philosophy to investigate this picture. It argues that Marxism is committed to the idea of motivated belief, and that the idea is philosophically defensible. The book shows that there are other philosophically defensible claims which are congenial to Marxism: that there are facts about interests that are not based on wants; that a desire can be contaminated by its history; that our judgements about our interests do not automatically motivate us; and that beliefs can survive the evidence that they are false. In doing so this book throws light on certain puzzling psychological phenomena, which confront everyone in their everyday political experience.
Marcel van Ackeren (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780197266298
- eISBN:
- 9780191872891
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197266298.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Since the rise of analytical philosophy, the relation of philosophy and its past is more hotly debated among philosophers than ever. Some scholars analyse historical texts without reference to ...
More
Since the rise of analytical philosophy, the relation of philosophy and its past is more hotly debated among philosophers than ever. Some scholars analyse historical texts without reference to current debates and their terminology, while others pursue first-order philosophy by focusing on problems instead of doxography—that is, without reference to their predecessors. A growing group, though, doubts that philosophy can be studied effectively on the basis of this sharp division. But does the study of the history of philosophy contribute to current philosophy? And, if it does, what precisely is the contribution? Does making such a contribution depend on using a specific method which determines how the historical perspective is related to systematic philosophy and philosophy in general? More generally, how do our assumptions about the relationship between historical and systematic perspectives affect our methodology and metaphilosophy or philosophy of philosophy? This volume presents and debates answers to these questions, which deserve to be addressed in their own right and not just as an adjunct to other discussions. The contributors of this volume provide diverse answers based on historical references, stretching from ancient philosophy to the most current debates, and also refer to various philosophical sub-disciplines.Less
Since the rise of analytical philosophy, the relation of philosophy and its past is more hotly debated among philosophers than ever. Some scholars analyse historical texts without reference to current debates and their terminology, while others pursue first-order philosophy by focusing on problems instead of doxography—that is, without reference to their predecessors. A growing group, though, doubts that philosophy can be studied effectively on the basis of this sharp division. But does the study of the history of philosophy contribute to current philosophy? And, if it does, what precisely is the contribution? Does making such a contribution depend on using a specific method which determines how the historical perspective is related to systematic philosophy and philosophy in general? More generally, how do our assumptions about the relationship between historical and systematic perspectives affect our methodology and metaphilosophy or philosophy of philosophy? This volume presents and debates answers to these questions, which deserve to be addressed in their own right and not just as an adjunct to other discussions. The contributors of this volume provide diverse answers based on historical references, stretching from ancient philosophy to the most current debates, and also refer to various philosophical sub-disciplines.
P. F. Strawson
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198751182
- eISBN:
- 9780191695032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198751182.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses the two types of philosophy, natural and analytical. Natural philosophy, now called natural science or simply science, deals with things found in nature and it does not require ...
More
This chapter discusses the two types of philosophy, natural and analytical. Natural philosophy, now called natural science or simply science, deals with things found in nature and it does not require much exercise of the imagination. Analytical philosophy, on the other hand, deals with conceptual analysis. It often involves the intellectual taking to pieces of concepts or ideas, discovering the elements and components of an idea or concept and examination of how they are related. There are different perceptions of an analytical philosopher including one involved in conceptual geography or conceptual mapping or charting, and one involved in therapy to cure certain characteristic kinds of intellectual disorder.Less
This chapter discusses the two types of philosophy, natural and analytical. Natural philosophy, now called natural science or simply science, deals with things found in nature and it does not require much exercise of the imagination. Analytical philosophy, on the other hand, deals with conceptual analysis. It often involves the intellectual taking to pieces of concepts or ideas, discovering the elements and components of an idea or concept and examination of how they are related. There are different perceptions of an analytical philosopher including one involved in conceptual geography or conceptual mapping or charting, and one involved in therapy to cure certain characteristic kinds of intellectual disorder.
Eric Schliesser
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199857142
- eISBN:
- 9780199345427
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199857142.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This paper argues that historians of philosophy must coin concepts that disclose the near or distant past and create a shared horizon for our philosophical future. Two concepts are introduced: ...
More
This paper argues that historians of philosophy must coin concepts that disclose the near or distant past and create a shared horizon for our philosophical future. Two concepts are introduced: “Newton’s challenge to philosophy” and “philosophic prophecy.” “Newton’s challenge to philosophy” explains that from about 1700 onward, “natural science” is increasingly taken to be authoritative in settling debates within philosophy. “Philosophic prophecy,” comprises the structured ways in which concept formation by philosophers can shape possible futures, including that of philosophy. The second half of the paper offers a fresh narrative about the shared origins of analytical philosophy and analytical history of philosophy in the anti-Spinozistic writings of George Boole and Bertrand Russell. Ernest Nagel is treated as the philosophic prophet of analytical philosophy his views are compared to those of Moritz Schlick.Less
This paper argues that historians of philosophy must coin concepts that disclose the near or distant past and create a shared horizon for our philosophical future. Two concepts are introduced: “Newton’s challenge to philosophy” and “philosophic prophecy.” “Newton’s challenge to philosophy” explains that from about 1700 onward, “natural science” is increasingly taken to be authoritative in settling debates within philosophy. “Philosophic prophecy,” comprises the structured ways in which concept formation by philosophers can shape possible futures, including that of philosophy. The second half of the paper offers a fresh narrative about the shared origins of analytical philosophy and analytical history of philosophy in the anti-Spinozistic writings of George Boole and Bertrand Russell. Ernest Nagel is treated as the philosophic prophet of analytical philosophy his views are compared to those of Moritz Schlick.
P. F. Strawson
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198751182
- eISBN:
- 9780191695032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198751182.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses the different forms or objectives of a positive systematic analytical theory or conceptual analysis. Based on analogy with chemical and syntactical analyses, it appears that ...
More
This chapter discusses the different forms or objectives of a positive systematic analytical theory or conceptual analysis. Based on analogy with chemical and syntactical analyses, it appears that the task of analytical philosophy is to find ideas that are completely simple and free from internal conceptual complexity, and to demonstrate how the more or less complex ideas that are of interest to philosophers can be assembled by a kind of logical or conceptual construction out of the simple elements. From this, it can be said that the role of an analytical philosopher is to get a clear grasp of complex meanings through reduction, which seems a rather implausible task.Less
This chapter discusses the different forms or objectives of a positive systematic analytical theory or conceptual analysis. Based on analogy with chemical and syntactical analyses, it appears that the task of analytical philosophy is to find ideas that are completely simple and free from internal conceptual complexity, and to demonstrate how the more or less complex ideas that are of interest to philosophers can be assembled by a kind of logical or conceptual construction out of the simple elements. From this, it can be said that the role of an analytical philosopher is to get a clear grasp of complex meanings through reduction, which seems a rather implausible task.
Nicola Lacey
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199202775
- eISBN:
- 9780191705953
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199202775.003.0008
- Subject:
- Law, Legal History
This chapter focuses on H. L. A. Hart's experiences as Chair of Jurisprudence at University College. Herbert's inaugural lecture as Professor of Jurisprudence, ‘Definition and Theory in ...
More
This chapter focuses on H. L. A. Hart's experiences as Chair of Jurisprudence at University College. Herbert's inaugural lecture as Professor of Jurisprudence, ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’, delivered in 1953, which laid out the positive and substantive agenda which he saw as defining the autonomous terrain of a jurisprudence informed by analytical philosophy. The lecture set out Herbert's stall as a linguistic philosopher prepared both to bring the insights of philosophy to law, and to exploit his legal understanding to generate a fund of examples suitable for philosophical analysis.Less
This chapter focuses on H. L. A. Hart's experiences as Chair of Jurisprudence at University College. Herbert's inaugural lecture as Professor of Jurisprudence, ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’, delivered in 1953, which laid out the positive and substantive agenda which he saw as defining the autonomous terrain of a jurisprudence informed by analytical philosophy. The lecture set out Herbert's stall as a linguistic philosopher prepared both to bring the insights of philosophy to law, and to exploit his legal understanding to generate a fund of examples suitable for philosophical analysis.
Jonathan Wolff
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691149004
- eISBN:
- 9781400848713
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691149004.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter presents a memoir of G. A. Cohen, who died on August 5, 2009. Cohen was born on April 14, 1941, into a Jewish Marxist family, and his life and character were woven into his philosophical ...
More
This chapter presents a memoir of G. A. Cohen, who died on August 5, 2009. Cohen was born on April 14, 1941, into a Jewish Marxist family, and his life and character were woven into his philosophical work in an unusual way. His upbringing, his family, his Jewishness (as distinct from Judaism), and his need to position his own beliefs in relation to Karl Marx and to Soviet Communism all played central roles in his life and work. Armed with the techniques of analytical philosophy, Cohen began his earliest project, resulting in Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence, in which he sets out a clear account of the core of Marx's theory of history. This chapter considers Cohen's other writings which articulate his views on subjects ranging from capitalism and socialism to freedom and the nature and consequences of the thesis of self-ownership.Less
This chapter presents a memoir of G. A. Cohen, who died on August 5, 2009. Cohen was born on April 14, 1941, into a Jewish Marxist family, and his life and character were woven into his philosophical work in an unusual way. His upbringing, his family, his Jewishness (as distinct from Judaism), and his need to position his own beliefs in relation to Karl Marx and to Soviet Communism all played central roles in his life and work. Armed with the techniques of analytical philosophy, Cohen began his earliest project, resulting in Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence, in which he sets out a clear account of the core of Marx's theory of history. This chapter considers Cohen's other writings which articulate his views on subjects ranging from capitalism and socialism to freedom and the nature and consequences of the thesis of self-ownership.
Kerwin Lee Klein
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520268814
- eISBN:
- 9780520948297
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520268814.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, Historiography
This chapter begins with a discussion of the New Cultural History, a movement commonly described as history's response to the growing influence of radical, continental conceptions of language. It ...
More
This chapter begins with a discussion of the New Cultural History, a movement commonly described as history's response to the growing influence of radical, continental conceptions of language. It argues that cultural history's reception of French structural linguistics and post-structuralism was shaped by earlier linguistic turns in American anthropology and analytic philosophy. It notes that language, along with culture, perhaps the most important keyword of the human sciences in the twentieth century, had a lengthy history in North America, where academic and popular studies of linguistics were strongly formed by ethnographic encounters with racial difference. It discusses that some of the most radical renditions of language came not from the deconstructive inclinations of literary critics but from analytical philosophy's encounters with popular anthropology. As a result, when historians began to borrow idioms and phrases from anthropology, they entered a semantic field in which language, art, and racial difference had grown tightly together.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of the New Cultural History, a movement commonly described as history's response to the growing influence of radical, continental conceptions of language. It argues that cultural history's reception of French structural linguistics and post-structuralism was shaped by earlier linguistic turns in American anthropology and analytic philosophy. It notes that language, along with culture, perhaps the most important keyword of the human sciences in the twentieth century, had a lengthy history in North America, where academic and popular studies of linguistics were strongly formed by ethnographic encounters with racial difference. It discusses that some of the most radical renditions of language came not from the deconstructive inclinations of literary critics but from analytical philosophy's encounters with popular anthropology. As a result, when historians began to borrow idioms and phrases from anthropology, they entered a semantic field in which language, art, and racial difference had grown tightly together.
Vittorio Hösle
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780691167190
- eISBN:
- 9781400883042
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691167190.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book provides an original history of German-language philosophy from the Middle Ages to today. In an accessible narrative that explains complex ideas in clear language, the book traces the ...
More
This book provides an original history of German-language philosophy from the Middle Ages to today. In an accessible narrative that explains complex ideas in clear language, the book traces the evolution of German philosophy and describes its central influence on other aspects of German culture, including literature, politics, and science. Starting with the medieval mystic Meister Eckhart, the book addresses the philosophical changes brought about by Luther's Reformation, and then presents a detailed account of the classical age of German philosophy, including the work of Leibniz and Kant; the rise of a new form of humanities in Lessing, Hamann, Herder, and Schiller; the early Romantics; and the Idealists Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The following chapters investigate the collapse of the German synthesis in Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, Marx, and Nietzsche. Turning to the twentieth century, the book explores the rise of analytical philosophy in Frege and the Vienna and Berlin circles; the foundation of the historical sciences in Neo-Kantianism and Dilthey; Husserl's phenomenology and its radical alteration by Heidegger; the Nazi philosophers Gehlen and Schmitt; and the main West German philosophers, including Gadamer, Jonas, and those of the two Frankfurt schools. Arguing that there was a distinctive German philosophical tradition from the mid-eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, the book closes by examining why that tradition largely ended in the decades after World War II.Less
This book provides an original history of German-language philosophy from the Middle Ages to today. In an accessible narrative that explains complex ideas in clear language, the book traces the evolution of German philosophy and describes its central influence on other aspects of German culture, including literature, politics, and science. Starting with the medieval mystic Meister Eckhart, the book addresses the philosophical changes brought about by Luther's Reformation, and then presents a detailed account of the classical age of German philosophy, including the work of Leibniz and Kant; the rise of a new form of humanities in Lessing, Hamann, Herder, and Schiller; the early Romantics; and the Idealists Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The following chapters investigate the collapse of the German synthesis in Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, Marx, and Nietzsche. Turning to the twentieth century, the book explores the rise of analytical philosophy in Frege and the Vienna and Berlin circles; the foundation of the historical sciences in Neo-Kantianism and Dilthey; Husserl's phenomenology and its radical alteration by Heidegger; the Nazi philosophers Gehlen and Schmitt; and the main West German philosophers, including Gadamer, Jonas, and those of the two Frankfurt schools. Arguing that there was a distinctive German philosophical tradition from the mid-eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, the book closes by examining why that tradition largely ended in the decades after World War II.
Steven R. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9781847426079
- eISBN:
- 9781447302209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Policy Press
- DOI:
- 10.1332/policypress/9781847426079.003.0007
- Subject:
- Sociology, Social Stratification, Inequality, and Mobility
This chapter argues that establishing reciprocal relations accommodates a philosophically coherent and politically plausible response to the conflicts between the values of equality and diversity ...
More
This chapter argues that establishing reciprocal relations accommodates a philosophically coherent and politically plausible response to the conflicts between the values of equality and diversity when promoting radical causes. This recognises that there is no rational or complete answer to the various paradoxes of human experience and agency, the unpredictable and nuanced ways in which individuals become attached to valued objects, and the subsequent development and shaping of their identities. The main claim of this chapter is that the conflict between the values of equality and diversity reflect four normative paradoxes in social relations that have been explored and outlined throughout the book. These paradoxes expose normative tensions or contradictions in the way individuals and group members place value on particular ‘objects’, based on empirical assumptions about the identity of these individuals and group members, and the specific manner in which persons relate to each other in any given community. The chapter also argues that these tensions are specifically apparent in those societies that allow the equal right to choose diverse objects of value, making them apparent in liberal communities. This chapter begins by outlining four paradoxes. It then outlines how the divide between the analytical and non-analytical philosophy before turning to how these paradoxes can be solved or unravelled.Less
This chapter argues that establishing reciprocal relations accommodates a philosophically coherent and politically plausible response to the conflicts between the values of equality and diversity when promoting radical causes. This recognises that there is no rational or complete answer to the various paradoxes of human experience and agency, the unpredictable and nuanced ways in which individuals become attached to valued objects, and the subsequent development and shaping of their identities. The main claim of this chapter is that the conflict between the values of equality and diversity reflect four normative paradoxes in social relations that have been explored and outlined throughout the book. These paradoxes expose normative tensions or contradictions in the way individuals and group members place value on particular ‘objects’, based on empirical assumptions about the identity of these individuals and group members, and the specific manner in which persons relate to each other in any given community. The chapter also argues that these tensions are specifically apparent in those societies that allow the equal right to choose diverse objects of value, making them apparent in liberal communities. This chapter begins by outlining four paradoxes. It then outlines how the divide between the analytical and non-analytical philosophy before turning to how these paradoxes can be solved or unravelled.
M. Chirimuuta
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029087
- eISBN:
- 9780262327435
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029087.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Is color real or illusory, mind independent or mind dependent? The metaphysical debate over color has gone on at least since the seventeenth century. In this book, M. Chirimuuta draws on contemporary ...
More
Is color real or illusory, mind independent or mind dependent? The metaphysical debate over color has gone on at least since the seventeenth century. In this book, M. Chirimuuta draws on contemporary perceptual science to address these questions. Her account integrates historical philosophical debates, contemporary work in the philosophy of color, and recent findings in neuroscience and vision science to propose a novel theory of the relationship between color and physical reality. Chirimuuta offers an overview of philosophy’s approach to the problem of color, finds the origins of much of the familiar conception of color in Aristotelian theories of perception, and describes the assumptions that have shaped contemporary philosophy of color. She then reviews recent work in perceptual science that challenges philosophers’ accounts of color experience. Finally, she offers a pragmatic alternative whereby perceptual states are understood primarily as action-guiding interactions between a perceiver and the environment. The fact that perceptual states are shaped in idiosyncratic ways by the needs and interests of the perceiver does not render the states illusory. Colors are perceiver-dependent properties, and yet our awareness of them does not mislead us about the world. Colors force us to reconsider what we mean by accurately presenting external reality, and, as this book demonstrates, thinking about color has important consequences for the philosophy of perception and, more generally, for the philosophy of mind.Less
Is color real or illusory, mind independent or mind dependent? The metaphysical debate over color has gone on at least since the seventeenth century. In this book, M. Chirimuuta draws on contemporary perceptual science to address these questions. Her account integrates historical philosophical debates, contemporary work in the philosophy of color, and recent findings in neuroscience and vision science to propose a novel theory of the relationship between color and physical reality. Chirimuuta offers an overview of philosophy’s approach to the problem of color, finds the origins of much of the familiar conception of color in Aristotelian theories of perception, and describes the assumptions that have shaped contemporary philosophy of color. She then reviews recent work in perceptual science that challenges philosophers’ accounts of color experience. Finally, she offers a pragmatic alternative whereby perceptual states are understood primarily as action-guiding interactions between a perceiver and the environment. The fact that perceptual states are shaped in idiosyncratic ways by the needs and interests of the perceiver does not render the states illusory. Colors are perceiver-dependent properties, and yet our awareness of them does not mislead us about the world. Colors force us to reconsider what we mean by accurately presenting external reality, and, as this book demonstrates, thinking about color has important consequences for the philosophy of perception and, more generally, for the philosophy of mind.
Stanley Rosen
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780226065885
- eISBN:
- 9780226065915
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226065915.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book offers a new interpretation of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Science of Logic in order to elucidate the problem that underlies Hegel’s critique of traditional rationalism. It examines ...
More
This book offers a new interpretation of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Science of Logic in order to elucidate the problem that underlies Hegel’s critique of traditional rationalism. It examines issues such as Hegelian dialectical ontology and its relation to the broader theoretical doctrines of post-Tractarian analytical philosophy, or whether modern science is itself dialectical. It analyzes Hegel’s dialectico-speculative logic and his rejection of formalism, along with his attitude towards metaphilosophy in the context of philosophy. It discusses three main problems, central to the history of Western philosophy, which Hegel claims to solve without resorting to traditional or nondialectical thinking: the problem of analysis, the problem of reference, and whether there is a logic that is appropriate to the conceptualization of the unity of the process of life. These three problems can be reformulated into one general problem: how to overcome the nihilism resulting from Eleatic monism on one hand, and of Platonic-Aristotelian dualism on the other.Less
This book offers a new interpretation of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Science of Logic in order to elucidate the problem that underlies Hegel’s critique of traditional rationalism. It examines issues such as Hegelian dialectical ontology and its relation to the broader theoretical doctrines of post-Tractarian analytical philosophy, or whether modern science is itself dialectical. It analyzes Hegel’s dialectico-speculative logic and his rejection of formalism, along with his attitude towards metaphilosophy in the context of philosophy. It discusses three main problems, central to the history of Western philosophy, which Hegel claims to solve without resorting to traditional or nondialectical thinking: the problem of analysis, the problem of reference, and whether there is a logic that is appropriate to the conceptualization of the unity of the process of life. These three problems can be reformulated into one general problem: how to overcome the nihilism resulting from Eleatic monism on one hand, and of Platonic-Aristotelian dualism on the other.
Frederic R. Kellogg
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780226523903
- eISBN:
- 9780226524061
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226524061.003.0011
- Subject:
- Law, Legal History
Does Holmes’s social inductivism have an account of validation, or the justification of legal knowledge? Holmes viewed struggle as inevitable. Conflicts of principle imply social problems, which must ...
More
Does Holmes’s social inductivism have an account of validation, or the justification of legal knowledge? Holmes viewed struggle as inevitable. Conflicts of principle imply social problems, which must somehow be resolved. War was the result of failure of resolution by consensual means. This implies a radical dialectic in the growth of human knowledge. Unlike Hegel, and analytical pragmatist writers like Robert Brandom, Holmes fully naturalizes the dialectic. Validation is radically inductive; it lies in the growth of knowledge by empirical and cooperative solution of human problems. Holmes is among the few writers who have elaborated the relevance of conflict to human knowledge, and is the first to introduce a conflict model of empiricism and logical induction. His famous skepticism adds a cautionary realism to Mill’s meliorism, emphasizing the precarious nature of the human endeavor. Its meliorist dimension lies in the insight that human conflict is not inherently violent and grounded in vengeance, but has itself been subject to transformation, as reflected in the evolution of liability in English common law. Restraint and humility in the face of yet-incomplete experience provides the only reliable path for judges in intractable controversies, and ultimately for the survival and flourishing of the human race.Less
Does Holmes’s social inductivism have an account of validation, or the justification of legal knowledge? Holmes viewed struggle as inevitable. Conflicts of principle imply social problems, which must somehow be resolved. War was the result of failure of resolution by consensual means. This implies a radical dialectic in the growth of human knowledge. Unlike Hegel, and analytical pragmatist writers like Robert Brandom, Holmes fully naturalizes the dialectic. Validation is radically inductive; it lies in the growth of knowledge by empirical and cooperative solution of human problems. Holmes is among the few writers who have elaborated the relevance of conflict to human knowledge, and is the first to introduce a conflict model of empiricism and logical induction. His famous skepticism adds a cautionary realism to Mill’s meliorism, emphasizing the precarious nature of the human endeavor. Its meliorist dimension lies in the insight that human conflict is not inherently violent and grounded in vengeance, but has itself been subject to transformation, as reflected in the evolution of liability in English common law. Restraint and humility in the face of yet-incomplete experience provides the only reliable path for judges in intractable controversies, and ultimately for the survival and flourishing of the human race.
Andrei Marmor
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199675517
- eISBN:
- 9780191757280
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675517.003.0010
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter attempts to establish the thesis that analytical legal philosophy is not an exercise in conceptual analysis. While conceptual analysis may have played some role in H. L. A. Hart's ...
More
This chapter attempts to establish the thesis that analytical legal philosophy is not an exercise in conceptual analysis. While conceptual analysis may have played some role in H. L. A. Hart's jurisprudence, it was rather tangential to the main project of his theory. Hart's main objective in The Concept of Law was not essentially different from that of Austin, namely, to provide a reductionist theory of law. The main purpose of Hart's theory was to offer an explanation of law in terms of something more foundational in nature, that is, in terms of social facts, which, in turn, can be explained by reference to people's actual conduct, beliefs, and attitudes. Hart's objection to Austin's reductionism was not to the idea of reduction but to the particular building blocks that Austin used in articulating his theory. The chapter argues that the main methodological thrust of legal positivism is reductionism, not conceptual analysis. And the main objections to legal positivism are best seen as a denial of the possibility of such a reduction.Less
This chapter attempts to establish the thesis that analytical legal philosophy is not an exercise in conceptual analysis. While conceptual analysis may have played some role in H. L. A. Hart's jurisprudence, it was rather tangential to the main project of his theory. Hart's main objective in The Concept of Law was not essentially different from that of Austin, namely, to provide a reductionist theory of law. The main purpose of Hart's theory was to offer an explanation of law in terms of something more foundational in nature, that is, in terms of social facts, which, in turn, can be explained by reference to people's actual conduct, beliefs, and attitudes. Hart's objection to Austin's reductionism was not to the idea of reduction but to the particular building blocks that Austin used in articulating his theory. The chapter argues that the main methodological thrust of legal positivism is reductionism, not conceptual analysis. And the main objections to legal positivism are best seen as a denial of the possibility of such a reduction.
John McCumber
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780226396385
- eISBN:
- 9780226396415
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226396415.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
While Cold War philosophy itself was relatively short lived, its repercussions continued in American intellectual life, Later representatives of analytical philosophy such as Donald Davidson, David ...
More
While Cold War philosophy itself was relatively short lived, its repercussions continued in American intellectual life, Later representatives of analytical philosophy such as Donald Davidson, David Lewis, and W. V. O. Quine appropriated insights from it piecemeal into their own programs; others, such as John Rawls, gave it a more central place. But it was never faced and critically discussed as a whole, which meant that some of its basic premises stayed in place. As the academy at large emerged from the Sixties, Cold War philosophy’s dispassionate and ahistorical view of reason came under attack in from feminists and members of minority groups, who asserted that their particular identities went all the way to their cores; reason was not merely mathematical but to some degree partisan. A quote from UCLA chancellor Franklin Murphy shows how the departments of American universities, shaped by Cold War philosophy, were unable to accommodate this, resulting in a proliferation of programs such as those in African-American, Chicano, LGBT, and Women’s Studies, as women and minorities sought places to articulate their standpoints.Less
While Cold War philosophy itself was relatively short lived, its repercussions continued in American intellectual life, Later representatives of analytical philosophy such as Donald Davidson, David Lewis, and W. V. O. Quine appropriated insights from it piecemeal into their own programs; others, such as John Rawls, gave it a more central place. But it was never faced and critically discussed as a whole, which meant that some of its basic premises stayed in place. As the academy at large emerged from the Sixties, Cold War philosophy’s dispassionate and ahistorical view of reason came under attack in from feminists and members of minority groups, who asserted that their particular identities went all the way to their cores; reason was not merely mathematical but to some degree partisan. A quote from UCLA chancellor Franklin Murphy shows how the departments of American universities, shaped by Cold War philosophy, were unable to accommodate this, resulting in a proliferation of programs such as those in African-American, Chicano, LGBT, and Women’s Studies, as women and minorities sought places to articulate their standpoints.
Michael Della Rocca
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- October 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199928903
- eISBN:
- 9780190268923
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199928903.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This paper explains and defends F.H. Bradley’s central argument in Appearance and Reality, i.e. his infinite regress argument concerning relations. Relata depend on other relata which depend on other ...
More
This paper explains and defends F.H. Bradley’s central argument in Appearance and Reality, i.e. his infinite regress argument concerning relations. Relata depend on other relata which depend on other relata and so on. Since Bradley’s argument claims that relations have to be grounded, and he can find no rational grounding given such regress and circularity of relations, he concludes relations are not real. Bradley thus emerges as an idealist and a monist; like the ancient philosopher Parmenides and many succeeding philosophers, he rejects diversity and multiplicity in favor of an underlying unity. Bradley’s central argument is strong and therefore the founding story of analytical philosophy, according to which Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore vanquished the hapless Bradley, is nothing more than a founding myth.Less
This paper explains and defends F.H. Bradley’s central argument in Appearance and Reality, i.e. his infinite regress argument concerning relations. Relata depend on other relata which depend on other relata and so on. Since Bradley’s argument claims that relations have to be grounded, and he can find no rational grounding given such regress and circularity of relations, he concludes relations are not real. Bradley thus emerges as an idealist and a monist; like the ancient philosopher Parmenides and many succeeding philosophers, he rejects diversity and multiplicity in favor of an underlying unity. Bradley’s central argument is strong and therefore the founding story of analytical philosophy, according to which Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore vanquished the hapless Bradley, is nothing more than a founding myth.
Michael Butter and Peter Knight
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- December 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190844073
- eISBN:
- 9780190909611
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics, Comparative Politics
How has academic research into conspiracy theories developed over time? This chapter demonstrates that scholarly interest only emerged in the 1930s as part of psychohistorical explorations into the ...
More
How has academic research into conspiracy theories developed over time? This chapter demonstrates that scholarly interest only emerged in the 1930s as part of psychohistorical explorations into the origins of totalitarianism. This line of research continued into the 1950s and influenced public opinion on the subject matter, as it received a lot of media attention. The common denominator of these earliest studies is that they pathologize conspiracy theories and those who believe in them. This tendency is to a certain degree still palpable in the most recent research in social psychology and political science which employs sophisticated quantitative methodologies.Less
How has academic research into conspiracy theories developed over time? This chapter demonstrates that scholarly interest only emerged in the 1930s as part of psychohistorical explorations into the origins of totalitarianism. This line of research continued into the 1950s and influenced public opinion on the subject matter, as it received a lot of media attention. The common denominator of these earliest studies is that they pathologize conspiracy theories and those who believe in them. This tendency is to a certain degree still palpable in the most recent research in social psychology and political science which employs sophisticated quantitative methodologies.
Ji Zhang
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- November 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780824835545
- eISBN:
- 9780824871291
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Hawai'i Press
- DOI:
- 10.21313/hawaii/9780824835545.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies
This chapter examines the historical connections between Plato and the pre-Socratics through the study of the Parmenides. Among all of Plato's dialogues, Parmenides is traditionally regarded as one ...
More
This chapter examines the historical connections between Plato and the pre-Socratics through the study of the Parmenides. Among all of Plato's dialogues, Parmenides is traditionally regarded as one of the most difficult books for two main reasons: Plato's employment of the Parmenidean logic, and his hidden intention in writing the book, which has been interpreted from being a masterpiece of metaphysics to a humbling self-criticism. Against this complex background, the starting point is to understand the philosopher Parmenides in the pre-Socratic debate of the one and the many, and his influence on Plato that led to the book Parmenides. Under the influence of analytical philosophy, Platonic scholarship tends to treat the “one and the many” as a logical problem and pays great attention to the logical aspect of the ontological problem.Less
This chapter examines the historical connections between Plato and the pre-Socratics through the study of the Parmenides. Among all of Plato's dialogues, Parmenides is traditionally regarded as one of the most difficult books for two main reasons: Plato's employment of the Parmenidean logic, and his hidden intention in writing the book, which has been interpreted from being a masterpiece of metaphysics to a humbling self-criticism. Against this complex background, the starting point is to understand the philosopher Parmenides in the pre-Socratic debate of the one and the many, and his influence on Plato that led to the book Parmenides. Under the influence of analytical philosophy, Platonic scholarship tends to treat the “one and the many” as a logical problem and pays great attention to the logical aspect of the ontological problem.
