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Ugly Analyses and Value

Michael R. DePaul

in Epistemic Value

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199231188
eISBN:
9780191710827
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter examines an argument that a number of philosophers have recently employed to show that something ordinarily considered valuable is not, in fact, valuable. The argument begins by ... More


Is There a Value Problem?

Jason Baehr

in Epistemic Value

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199231188
eISBN:
9780191710827
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, General

According to the ‘value problem’ in epistemology, any plausible analysis of knowledge must imply that knowledge is always more valuable than mere true belief. In this chapter it is argued that the ... More


Intrinsic Assessability

Michael Morris

in The Good and the True

Published in print:
1992
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198239444
eISBN:
9780191679919
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239444.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

This chapter defines intrinsic assessability and discusses non-arbitrary assessability. An account of intrinsic assessability is expected to yield an account of knowledge which will be helpful to the ... More


Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue

Jason Baehr

in The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199604074
eISBN:
9780191729300
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The guiding question of this chapter is whether the concept of intellectual virtue merits a central and fundamental role within traditional epistemology. It is argued, first, that the answer to this ... More


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