Paul Bartha
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195325539
- eISBN:
- 9780199776313
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195325539.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book proposes a theory of analogical arguments, with special focus on analogies in mathematics and science. The core principle of the theory is that a good analogical argument must articulate a ...
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This book proposes a theory of analogical arguments, with special focus on analogies in mathematics and science. The core principle of the theory is that a good analogical argument must articulate a clear relationship capable of generalization. This idea leads to a set of distinct models for the critical analysis of prominent forms of analogical argument, corresponding to different logical, causal and probabilistic relationships that occur in scientific reasoning. The same principle allows us to relate analogical reasoning to broad norms and values of scientific practice, such as symmetry and unification. Elaborating this principle, the book raises questions and proposes answers regarding (1) criteria for evaluating analogical arguments, (2) the philosophical justification for analogical reasoning, and (3) the place of scientific analogies in the context of theoretical confirmation.Less
This book proposes a theory of analogical arguments, with special focus on analogies in mathematics and science. The core principle of the theory is that a good analogical argument must articulate a clear relationship capable of generalization. This idea leads to a set of distinct models for the critical analysis of prominent forms of analogical argument, corresponding to different logical, causal and probabilistic relationships that occur in scientific reasoning. The same principle allows us to relate analogical reasoning to broad norms and values of scientific practice, such as symmetry and unification. Elaborating this principle, the book raises questions and proposes answers regarding (1) criteria for evaluating analogical arguments, (2) the philosophical justification for analogical reasoning, and (3) the place of scientific analogies in the context of theoretical confirmation.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195078640
- eISBN:
- 9780199872213
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195078640.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this chapter, I continue my explanation of how my account of warrant works in the main areas of our cognitive life, here examining how warrant works with respect to beliefs about other persons (or ...
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In this chapter, I continue my explanation of how my account of warrant works in the main areas of our cognitive life, here examining how warrant works with respect to beliefs about other persons (or other minds) and beliefs furnished by testimony. As regards the first topic, I am concerned with the question of how our beliefs ascribing mental states to others acquire warrant. I examine three possible answers to this question, namely, (1) that such beliefs acquire warrant by means of analogical arguments, (2) that they do so by way of being (or being like) scientific hypotheses, or (3) that they do so by means of Wittgensteinian criteria. I argue that none of these answers is correct, and then suggest an answer that is both closer to the truth and more in line with the general theory of warrant I propose. Turning next to testimony, I explore some of its salient characteristics, argue that testimonial evidence is a basic sort of evidence for us (the warrant furnished by testimony is not and could not be furnished by induction, analogy, or abduction) and, finally, show how my account deals with Gettier problems (or semi‐Gettier problems) involving testimony.Less
In this chapter, I continue my explanation of how my account of warrant works in the main areas of our cognitive life, here examining how warrant works with respect to beliefs about other persons (or other minds) and beliefs furnished by testimony. As regards the first topic, I am concerned with the question of how our beliefs ascribing mental states to others acquire warrant. I examine three possible answers to this question, namely, (1) that such beliefs acquire warrant by means of analogical arguments, (2) that they do so by way of being (or being like) scientific hypotheses, or (3) that they do so by means of Wittgensteinian criteria. I argue that none of these answers is correct, and then suggest an answer that is both closer to the truth and more in line with the general theory of warrant I propose. Turning next to testimony, I explore some of its salient characteristics, argue that testimonial evidence is a basic sort of evidence for us (the warrant furnished by testimony is not and could not be furnished by induction, analogy, or abduction) and, finally, show how my account deals with Gettier problems (or semi‐Gettier problems) involving testimony.
Martin Warner
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198737117
- eISBN:
- 9780191800658
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198737117.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Language
When we reason by means of parallels the modes of argument and imagination tend to be interdependent. Analogical argument may be either inductive or a priori, while the proportional relation may ...
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When we reason by means of parallels the modes of argument and imagination tend to be interdependent. Analogical argument may be either inductive or a priori, while the proportional relation may ground argumentative use of both example and, in the latter case, metaphor. This illuminates a certain Wittgensteinean use of analogy whereby a “picture” from one domain is projected onto another, thereby modifying our understanding of the domain under investigation. Similar considerations apply with respect to narrative, which can be a powerful tool when we attempt to bring theoretical or practical claims to the bar of human experience, hence its prominent role in parable. This opens the way to the relevance of criteria drawn from the study of literature and, more generally, from aesthetics to the assessment of an argument’s dialectical (not only rhetorical) force, and its relevance to our own experience.Less
When we reason by means of parallels the modes of argument and imagination tend to be interdependent. Analogical argument may be either inductive or a priori, while the proportional relation may ground argumentative use of both example and, in the latter case, metaphor. This illuminates a certain Wittgensteinean use of analogy whereby a “picture” from one domain is projected onto another, thereby modifying our understanding of the domain under investigation. Similar considerations apply with respect to narrative, which can be a powerful tool when we attempt to bring theoretical or practical claims to the bar of human experience, hence its prominent role in parable. This opens the way to the relevance of criteria drawn from the study of literature and, more generally, from aesthetics to the assessment of an argument’s dialectical (not only rhetorical) force, and its relevance to our own experience.
Joseph Raz
- Published in print:
- 2022
- Published Online:
- February 2022
- ISBN:
- 9780192847003
- eISBN:
- 9780191939419
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780192847003.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter considers the main arguments against the possibility that basic normative principles can change, and finds them wanting. The principal argument discussed derives from the claim that ...
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This chapter considers the main arguments against the possibility that basic normative principles can change, and finds them wanting. The principal argument discussed derives from the claim that normative considerations are intelligible, and therefore that they can be explained, and their explanations presuppose the prior existence of basic normative principles. The intelligibility thesis is affirmed but the implication that basic change is impossible is denied. Subsumptive explanations are contrasted with explanations by analogy. Later in the chapter, other objections are considered more briefly: that normative properties are queer, that they are unconnected to the rest of reality, and therefore cannot play an explanatory role, etc.Less
This chapter considers the main arguments against the possibility that basic normative principles can change, and finds them wanting. The principal argument discussed derives from the claim that normative considerations are intelligible, and therefore that they can be explained, and their explanations presuppose the prior existence of basic normative principles. The intelligibility thesis is affirmed but the implication that basic change is impossible is denied. Subsumptive explanations are contrasted with explanations by analogy. Later in the chapter, other objections are considered more briefly: that normative properties are queer, that they are unconnected to the rest of reality, and therefore cannot play an explanatory role, etc.
Robert J. Fogelin
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- August 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190673505
- eISBN:
- 9780190673536
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190673505.003.0018
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Don Garrett explains what Hume means by “true religion,” a doctrine, enunciated by Philo, that Hume regarded as true in an epistemic sense, not evaluative. Philo’s concluding assessment of the ...
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Don Garrett explains what Hume means by “true religion,” a doctrine, enunciated by Philo, that Hume regarded as true in an epistemic sense, not evaluative. Philo’s concluding assessment of the argument from design is transparently epistemic: “The cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence.” The level of probability may be low, the content ambiguous, but it is a genuine probabilistic assessment with some evidential and analogical support. We are left with an anemic deity no theist would find acceptable.Less
Don Garrett explains what Hume means by “true religion,” a doctrine, enunciated by Philo, that Hume regarded as true in an epistemic sense, not evaluative. Philo’s concluding assessment of the argument from design is transparently epistemic: “The cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence.” The level of probability may be low, the content ambiguous, but it is a genuine probabilistic assessment with some evidential and analogical support. We are left with an anemic deity no theist would find acceptable.
