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In all processes of political change the emerging regime must face the difficult task of deciding what to do with the legacies of the former dictatorship, which people were working for the previous civil and military administration preserve, and whether or not to put on trial those responsible for having violated human rights under the previous regime. This chapter analyses what was done, and what was deliberately put aside in the Spanish case. The Spanish transition to democracy has been praised as mainly exemplary, and as demonstrating success in the stabilization of the new democratic regime. However, the final positive result should not obscure the fact that, because of the correlation of forces of the transitional period, and also because of the traumatic collective memory of the Spanish civil war, the victims of the Francoist repression were not properly rehabilitated and the dictatorship was not condemned in the Spanish parliament until 2002. In fact, a very broad Amnesty Law was passed in 1977 that not only allowed all ETA prisoners to get out of jail, but also impeded the judicial revision of the dictatorial past. None of these limitations have impeded the consolidation of democracy in Spain, but some important sectors of society feel that justice has not been done, which explains the very recent political, social and even cultural initiatives to face the authoritarian past.

The chapter applies the theoretical model to Rwanda. The perplexing features of the 1994 genocide include its speed, its widespread support among the Hutu majority, and the absence of widespread remorse among the perpetrators. This emotional anomaly in terms of inter-group relationships from colonial to post-colonial development and the role of massacres in political struggles from the inception of Rwanda are examined. The 1963 amnesty laws put complicity in mass violence beyond the rule of law, and created expectations that politically directed violence could be undertaken without emotional baggage. The concept of administrative closure describes a political system designed to harness the populace in a tightly managed system of control, i.e. ‘over-control’. Racial closure was an ideology designed to extinguish amity along lineage lines when social control valorized Tutsi exclusion. Politically motivated inter-lineage murders had been effectively decriminalized, and were undertaken with little apprehension of guilt by their perpetrators.

This chapter discusses Paulo Freire's return to Brazil while it was still run by the military. At the time, Brazil was also experiencing “a concrete opening.” Freire felt that he had to “take advantage of the existence of this space.” The amnesty law of 1979 had made it possible for him and his family to make a life once again in his native land. After his return, Freire found it necessary, as he frequently noted, to “relearn Brazil” while responding to abundant invitations to speak throughout the country. Brazil had undergone significant social and economic change since his departure in 1964, but these changes were not yet reflected in the political system. Its transition to democracy would take most of the following decade, and Freire would play a role in the democratization process.

Chapter 6 tells the story of Rodríguez’s move to democratic political leadership. Victory for the FMLN meant that they could now finally participate politically and bring necessary changes via the ballot box. Rodríguez tried to return to the church but conditions were placed on his that he found unacceptable and thus he returned to the FMLN to help establish it as a legal political party. Owing to his popularity and his longstanding struggles representing the interests of the campesinos, Rodríguez was nominated as a candidate for a legislative seat in the Department of La Paz, which was part of the diocese of San Vicente, a region in which he was well-known. He was elected in 1997 and re-elected in 2000; and then again in 2009 and in 2012, meaning that he will serve as a legislator until 2015. This chapter will highlight the difficulties in trying to bring structural changes to El Salvador via the electoral process. Part of the problem lies in the leaders themselves, who often become complacent once they win political office.