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This introductory chapter begins by defining the term altruism. Altruism, for the purposes of this volume, refers to a fundamental orientation of the agent that is primarily ‘other-regarding’, in contrast to one that is primarily self-regarding. Altruistic (benevolent, kind, compassionate, charitable) individuals, motivated with little or no interest in reciprocity or reputation gain, may enjoy enhanced health, broadly defined. An overview of the four parts of the book is also presented.

The more our power to act — including our power to prevent suffering — grows because of the advance of scientific technology, the more important it becomes to see the falsity of the act-omission doctrine, the doctrine that it is more difficult to justify morally causing harm than letting it occur, by omitting to prevent it. This doctrine, together with our limited altruism and incapacity to be proportionately altruistic with regard to larger groups of suffering people, explains why people in affluent nations have done so little in the last decades to mitigate global inequality. The problem of global inequality is not a main target of this book, but it is intimately connected to what is a main target, namely climate change and environmental destruction. This is because the problem of global inequality makes it more difficult to stop climate change and environmental destruction in a morally acceptable way.

This chapter examines the notorious issue of group selection in behavioural ecology, one of the mainstays of the traditional levels of selection debate. The history of the group selection controversy is briefly traced. The relationship between group selection, kin selection, and evolutionary game theory is discussed. An important debate between Sober and Wilson and Maynard Smith concerning the correct way to conceptualize group selection is explored. Lastly, some arguments of L. Nunney concerning the distinction between weak and strong altruism, and how individual and group selection should be defined, are examined.

This chapter examines the arguments about whether social citizenship can be based on an individual rational actor logic or requires a framework of normative principles, embedded in the institutions of social provision and in policy-making. The arguments of Titmuss, Le Grand, and others about blood donorship, social care, and other areas where altruistic and humane rather than self-regarding values appear to be central are considered. Individual rational actor approaches can explain how reciprocity and a limited social inclusion may be sustained, as Chapter 4 showed. Analysis of social psychological, sociological, and economic evidence shows that a full understanding of trust rests on both the alignment of interest that a rational actor logic can explain and also the recognition of values of commitment and care in the trusted person. These are contradicted when action is driven by externally imposed incentives. The trust deficit is a central issue in rational actor reform of social provision.

Finding an appropriate way of evaluating altruistic benevolence is a crucial test of a theory of virtue as a sort of intrinsic excellence. Some may think that altruism is sufficiently commended by its social benefits without any thought of such excellence. Consideration of Nietzsche's critique of altruism leads, however, to an argument that it is morally important that altruism be intrinsically excellent. This is followed by an argument that altruism has indeed such excellence. Not that altruism must (or indeed should) be unmixed with other motives. Relations between altruism and self-sacrifice on the one hand, and agent-centered or self-regarding motives such as conscientiousness and self-respect on the other, are explored.

This chapter examines the coevolution of two genetically transmitted individual traits, parochialism and altruism, each providing the conditions for the evolutionary success of the other, and both jointly explaining why warfare was so frequent and lethal among early humans. It first considers the tendency of parochial altruists to engage in combat before discussing the results of simulations showing that parochialism and altruism evolve because within-group interactions for which cooperation is possible are characterized by positive assortment, and not because the parochial altruists deliberately associate with like types. It also evaluates experimental evidence that provides a test of the simulation results regarding the coevolution of parochial altruism and war. It suggests that hostility toward outsiders and a warlike disposition could have strengthened the group competition processes essential to the evolution of altruistic cooperation.

This chapter presents an overview of the book. It argues that the metaphysical approach to ethics is a failure and that the time has come to take a scientific view of morality. A social contract is taken to be the set of common understandings that allow the citizens of a society to coordinate. Such social contracts are seen as the product of biological and cultural evolution. To survive, a social contract must therefore be an equilibrium in the repeated game of life played by a society. Since the folk theorem of repeated game theory says that there are large numbers of such equilibria, fairness norms then become explicable as an equilibrium selection device that selects one of the many efficient equilibria of a society's game of life. It is suggested that the deep structure of such fairness norms is captured by John Rawls' notion of the original position, and is therefore universal in the human species. On the other hand, the standard of interpersonal comparison needed as an input to the original position is culturally determined.

The folk theorem shows that cooperative behavior can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in indefinitely repeated games — a phenomenon known as reciprocal altruism. The same theorem offers a solution to various other social mysteries. Who guards the guardians? How are authority, blame, courtesy, dignity, envy, friendship, guilt, honor, integrity, justice, loyalty, modesty, ownership, pride, reputation, status, trust, virtue, and the like to be explained as emergent phenomena? How do beliefs that many people privately know to be false survive?

This chapter examines Aristotle's and Green's concern for the common good. It is argued that both Aristotle and Green have the analytic resources to provide a eudaimonist justification of interpersonal concern that is derivative but not instrumental. This is why Green views interpersonal love as the next best thing to immortality, and why Aristotle and Green both claim that a proper conception of how others figure in self-love undermines the popular contrast between self-love and altruism.

Much of what we want, such as food and entertainment and good company, we want for our own consumption or enjoyment; but we can also want those same sorts of things for other people. Indeed, if we love other people, we must want certain kinds of things not only for them, but for their sake. This raises the question of whether we, as egoists hold, rationally want something for others only so far as it will lead to something we want for ourselves? Another question is whether given an ordinary knowledge of how others are like us, a kind of altruism is rationally demanded of us. If it is, then practical reason provides at least a limited foundation for ethics, in the sense that a rational person will, under certain conditions, have adequate reason to treat others in accordance with some basic moral principles. This chapter examines this issue and presents the general account of rationality.

Selection is often generated by interaction with other organisms: neighbours, partners, or antagonists. The force and direction of selection in these social contexts is very generally influenced by the density and composition of the population. It may result in some degree of cooperation or helpfulness, rather than unrestricted competition among individuals. The first section here is called Selection within a single uniform population: density-dependent selection and details density regulation; density-dependent fitness; the principle of frugality; resource competition in continuous culture; r-K selection; r-K selection experiments; and selection in seasonal environments. The second section is called Selection within a single diverse population: frequency-dependent selection and describes GxG; frequency-dependent fitness; and also frequency-dependence in complex environments. The third section is about social behaviour and describes the phenotypic theory of aggression and exploitation; cross-feeding; selfish cooperation; the prisoners' dilemmas; intransitive social interactions; and time-lagged social interactions. The final section is called Kin selection and group selection and describes kin selection; kin proximity and kin choice; spite; group selection in structured populations; productivity and diversity; artificial group selection; and cultural evolution.