Ken Binmore
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195178111
- eISBN:
- 9780199783670
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178111.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This book attempts to create an evolutionary theory of fairness. Sharing food is commonplace in the animal kingdom because it insures animals that share against hunger. Anthropologists report that ...
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This book attempts to create an evolutionary theory of fairness. Sharing food is commonplace in the animal kingdom because it insures animals that share against hunger. Anthropologists report that hunter-gatherer societies which survived into the 20th century shared on a very egalitarian basis. What can such information tell us about the sense of fairness with which modern man is born? Using game theory as a basic tool, the book argues that fairness norms should be seen as a device for selecting an efficient equilibrium in the human game of life. Evolutionary arguments are then used to argue that the deep structure of this device resembles the original position formulated by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice. Such an evolutionary framework allows problems over welfare comparison and norm enforcement to be tackled in a manner that resolves the long debate between utilitarianism and egalitarianism.Less
This book attempts to create an evolutionary theory of fairness. Sharing food is commonplace in the animal kingdom because it insures animals that share against hunger. Anthropologists report that hunter-gatherer societies which survived into the 20th century shared on a very egalitarian basis. What can such information tell us about the sense of fairness with which modern man is born? Using game theory as a basic tool, the book argues that fairness norms should be seen as a device for selecting an efficient equilibrium in the human game of life. Evolutionary arguments are then used to argue that the deep structure of this device resembles the original position formulated by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice. Such an evolutionary framework allows problems over welfare comparison and norm enforcement to be tackled in a manner that resolves the long debate between utilitarianism and egalitarianism.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195158427
- eISBN:
- 9780199871407
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195158427.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The literature on theoretical reason has been dominated by epistemological concerns, treatments of practical reason by ethical concerns. This book overcomes the limitations of dealing with each ...
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The literature on theoretical reason has been dominated by epistemological concerns, treatments of practical reason by ethical concerns. This book overcomes the limitations of dealing with each separately. It sets out a comprehensive theory of rationality applicable to both practical and theoretical reason. In both domains, the book explains how experience grounds rationality, delineates the structure of central elements, and attacks the egocentric conception of rationality. It establishes the rationality of altruism and thereby supports major moral principles. The concluding part describes the pluralism and relativity the book's conception of rationality accommodates and, taking the unified account of theoretical and practical rationality in that light, constructs a theory of global rationality — the overall rationality of persons.Less
The literature on theoretical reason has been dominated by epistemological concerns, treatments of practical reason by ethical concerns. This book overcomes the limitations of dealing with each separately. It sets out a comprehensive theory of rationality applicable to both practical and theoretical reason. In both domains, the book explains how experience grounds rationality, delineates the structure of central elements, and attacks the egocentric conception of rationality. It establishes the rationality of altruism and thereby supports major moral principles. The concluding part describes the pluralism and relativity the book's conception of rationality accommodates and, taking the unified account of theoretical and practical rationality in that light, constructs a theory of global rationality — the overall rationality of persons.
Stephen G. Post
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195182910
- eISBN:
- 9780199786794
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195182910.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Health Psychology
This introductory chapter begins by defining the term altruism. Altruism, for the purposes of this volume, refers to a fundamental orientation of the agent that is primarily ‘other-regarding’, in ...
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This introductory chapter begins by defining the term altruism. Altruism, for the purposes of this volume, refers to a fundamental orientation of the agent that is primarily ‘other-regarding’, in contrast to one that is primarily self-regarding. Altruistic (benevolent, kind, compassionate, charitable) individuals, motivated with little or no interest in reciprocity or reputation gain, may enjoy enhanced health, broadly defined. An overview of the four parts of the book is also presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins by defining the term altruism. Altruism, for the purposes of this volume, refers to a fundamental orientation of the agent that is primarily ‘other-regarding’, in contrast to one that is primarily self-regarding. Altruistic (benevolent, kind, compassionate, charitable) individuals, motivated with little or no interest in reciprocity or reputation gain, may enjoy enhanced health, broadly defined. An overview of the four parts of the book is also presented.
Julian Le Grand
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199266999
- eISBN:
- 9780191600869
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199266999.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
Can we rely on the public service ethos to deliver high quality public services? Are professionals such as doctors and teachers really public‐spirited altruists—knights—or self‐interested ...
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Can we rely on the public service ethos to deliver high quality public services? Are professionals such as doctors and teachers really public‐spirited altruists—knights—or self‐interested egoists—knaves? And how should the recipients of those services, patients, parents, and pupils, be treated? As passive recipients—pawns—or as active consumers—queens?This book offers answers to these questions. It argues that the original welfare state was designed on the assumptions that those who worked within it were basically altruists or knights and that the beneficiaries were passive recipients or pawns. In consequence, services were often of low quality, delivered in a patronising fashion and inequitable in outcome. However, services designed on an opposite set of assumptions—that public service professionals are knaves and that users should be queens—also face problems: exploitation by unscrupulous professionals, and overuse by demanding consumers, especially middle class ones.The book draws on evidence from Britain and abroad to show that, in fact, public policies designed on the basis that professionals are a mixture of knight and knave and recipients a mixture of pawn and queen deliver better quality and greater equity than policies based on more simplistic assumptions about motivation and agency. In particular, contrary to popular mythology, the book shows that policies that offer choice and competition within public services such as education and health care can deliver both excellence and equity. And policies aimed at building up individual assets and wealth ownership can empower the poor and powerless more effectively than those aimed simply at bolstering their current income.Less
Can we rely on the public service ethos to deliver high quality public services? Are professionals such as doctors and teachers really public‐spirited altruists—knights—or self‐interested egoists—knaves? And how should the recipients of those services, patients, parents, and pupils, be treated? As passive recipients—pawns—or as active consumers—queens?
This book offers answers to these questions. It argues that the original welfare state was designed on the assumptions that those who worked within it were basically altruists or knights and that the beneficiaries were passive recipients or pawns. In consequence, services were often of low quality, delivered in a patronising fashion and inequitable in outcome. However, services designed on an opposite set of assumptions—that public service professionals are knaves and that users should be queens—also face problems: exploitation by unscrupulous professionals, and overuse by demanding consumers, especially middle class ones.
The book draws on evidence from Britain and abroad to show that, in fact, public policies designed on the basis that professionals are a mixture of knight and knave and recipients a mixture of pawn and queen deliver better quality and greater equity than policies based on more simplistic assumptions about motivation and agency. In particular, contrary to popular mythology, the book shows that policies that offer choice and competition within public services such as education and health care can deliver both excellence and equity. And policies aimed at building up individual assets and wealth ownership can empower the poor and powerless more effectively than those aimed simply at bolstering their current income.
Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199653645
- eISBN:
- 9780191742033
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653645.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
The more our power to act — including our power to prevent suffering — grows because of the advance of scientific technology, the more important it becomes to see the falsity of the act-omission ...
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The more our power to act — including our power to prevent suffering — grows because of the advance of scientific technology, the more important it becomes to see the falsity of the act-omission doctrine, the doctrine that it is more difficult to justify morally causing harm than letting it occur, by omitting to prevent it. This doctrine, together with our limited altruism and incapacity to be proportionately altruistic with regard to larger groups of suffering people, explains why people in affluent nations have done so little in the last decades to mitigate global inequality. The problem of global inequality is not a main target of this book, but it is intimately connected to what is a main target, namely climate change and environmental destruction. This is because the problem of global inequality makes it more difficult to stop climate change and environmental destruction in a morally acceptable way.Less
The more our power to act — including our power to prevent suffering — grows because of the advance of scientific technology, the more important it becomes to see the falsity of the act-omission doctrine, the doctrine that it is more difficult to justify morally causing harm than letting it occur, by omitting to prevent it. This doctrine, together with our limited altruism and incapacity to be proportionately altruistic with regard to larger groups of suffering people, explains why people in affluent nations have done so little in the last decades to mitigate global inequality. The problem of global inequality is not a main target of this book, but it is intimately connected to what is a main target, namely climate change and environmental destruction. This is because the problem of global inequality makes it more difficult to stop climate change and environmental destruction in a morally acceptable way.
Samir Okasha
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199267972
- eISBN:
- 9780191708275
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267972.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter examines the notorious issue of group selection in behavioural ecology, one of the mainstays of the traditional levels of selection debate. The history of the group selection controversy ...
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This chapter examines the notorious issue of group selection in behavioural ecology, one of the mainstays of the traditional levels of selection debate. The history of the group selection controversy is briefly traced. The relationship between group selection, kin selection, and evolutionary game theory is discussed. An important debate between Sober and Wilson and Maynard Smith concerning the correct way to conceptualize group selection is explored. Lastly, some arguments of L. Nunney concerning the distinction between weak and strong altruism, and how individual and group selection should be defined, are examined.Less
This chapter examines the notorious issue of group selection in behavioural ecology, one of the mainstays of the traditional levels of selection debate. The history of the group selection controversy is briefly traced. The relationship between group selection, kin selection, and evolutionary game theory is discussed. An important debate between Sober and Wilson and Maynard Smith concerning the correct way to conceptualize group selection is explored. Lastly, some arguments of L. Nunney concerning the distinction between weak and strong altruism, and how individual and group selection should be defined, are examined.
Brian Feltham and John Cottingham (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199579952
- eISBN:
- 9780191595233
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579952.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
What is owed to others that I may not keep for myself? What may I keep for myself, even when others are in need? These transparently moral questions may immediately invite knee-jerk moralistic ...
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What is owed to others that I may not keep for myself? What may I keep for myself, even when others are in need? These transparently moral questions may immediately invite knee-jerk moralistic answers; or else be selfishly dismissed. And if we feel a tension between the duty to help others and what we want for ourselves, we might see it as a straightforward division between morally virtuous altruism and simple self-interest. Yet does morality really require us always to put those less fortunate before ourselves, our loved ones, even our own children, in every way? And does self-interest really offer a simple division between what is good for oneself and what is good for others? Such questions are of great importance in both moral and political theory. They are in the first place substantive questions regarding the demands that the needs and interests of others place upon us, but they broaden out into more abstract questions about the impartiality of ethical reasoning itself. A central question for this volume is whether impartiality and partiality are really opposed dimensions or if they can be harmoniously reconciled in one picture. From a variety of theoretical perspectives, the chapters in this volume explore such issues as the demandingness of morality, the nature of value and reasons, practical reasoning, and the fundamental nature of morality itself.Less
What is owed to others that I may not keep for myself? What may I keep for myself, even when others are in need? These transparently moral questions may immediately invite knee-jerk moralistic answers; or else be selfishly dismissed. And if we feel a tension between the duty to help others and what we want for ourselves, we might see it as a straightforward division between morally virtuous altruism and simple self-interest. Yet does morality really require us always to put those less fortunate before ourselves, our loved ones, even our own children, in every way? And does self-interest really offer a simple division between what is good for oneself and what is good for others? Such questions are of great importance in both moral and political theory. They are in the first place substantive questions regarding the demands that the needs and interests of others place upon us, but they broaden out into more abstract questions about the impartiality of ethical reasoning itself. A central question for this volume is whether impartiality and partiality are really opposed dimensions or if they can be harmoniously reconciled in one picture. From a variety of theoretical perspectives, the chapters in this volume explore such issues as the demandingness of morality, the nature of value and reasons, practical reasoning, and the fundamental nature of morality itself.
A. W. Price
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198248996
- eISBN:
- 9780191681172
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248996.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book fully explores for the first time an idea common to Plato and Aristotle, which unites their treatments—otherwise very different—of love and friendship. The idea is that although persons are ...
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This book fully explores for the first time an idea common to Plato and Aristotle, which unites their treatments—otherwise very different—of love and friendship. The idea is that although persons are separate, their lives need not be. One person's life may overflow into another's, and as such, helping another person is a way of serving oneself. The book shows how their view of love and friendship, within not only personal relationships, but also the household and even the city-state, promises to resolve the old dichotomy between egoism and altruism.Less
This book fully explores for the first time an idea common to Plato and Aristotle, which unites their treatments—otherwise very different—of love and friendship. The idea is that although persons are separate, their lives need not be. One person's life may overflow into another's, and as such, helping another person is a way of serving oneself. The book shows how their view of love and friendship, within not only personal relationships, but also the household and even the city-state, promises to resolve the old dichotomy between egoism and altruism.
Robert Merrihew Adams
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199207510
- eISBN:
- 9780191708824
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207510.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book offers a systematic, comprehensive framework for thinking about the moral evaluation of character. Many recent attempts to stake out a place in moral philosophy for this concern define ...
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This book offers a systematic, comprehensive framework for thinking about the moral evaluation of character. Many recent attempts to stake out a place in moral philosophy for this concern define virtue in terms of its benefits for the virtuous person or for human society more generally. Part One of this book presents and defends a conception of virtue as intrinsic excellence of character, worth prizing for its own sake and not only for its benefits. The other two parts address two challenges to the ancient idea of excellence of character. One challenge arises from the importance of altruism in modern ethical thought, and the question of what altruism has to do with intrinsic excellence. Part Two argues that altruistic benevolence has indeed a crucial place in excellence of character, but that moral virtue should also be expected to involve excellence in being for other goods besides the well-being (and the rights) of other persons. It explores relations among cultural goods, personal relationships, one's own good, and the good of others, as objects of excellent motives. The other challenge is typified by doubts about the reality of moral virtue, arising from experiments and conclusions in social psychology. Part Three of the book explores in detail the prospects for an empirically realistic conception of excellence of character as an object of moral aspiration, endeavour, and education. It argues that such a conception will involve renunciation of the ancient thesis of the unity or mutual implication of all virtues, and acknowledgement of sufficient ‘moral luck’ in the development of any individual's character to make virtue very largely a gift, rather than an individual achievement, though nonetheless excellent and admirable for that.Less
This book offers a systematic, comprehensive framework for thinking about the moral evaluation of character. Many recent attempts to stake out a place in moral philosophy for this concern define virtue in terms of its benefits for the virtuous person or for human society more generally. Part One of this book presents and defends a conception of virtue as intrinsic excellence of character, worth prizing for its own sake and not only for its benefits. The other two parts address two challenges to the ancient idea of excellence of character. One challenge arises from the importance of altruism in modern ethical thought, and the question of what altruism has to do with intrinsic excellence. Part Two argues that altruistic benevolence has indeed a crucial place in excellence of character, but that moral virtue should also be expected to involve excellence in being for other goods besides the well-being (and the rights) of other persons. It explores relations among cultural goods, personal relationships, one's own good, and the good of others, as objects of excellent motives. The other challenge is typified by doubts about the reality of moral virtue, arising from experiments and conclusions in social psychology. Part Three of the book explores in detail the prospects for an empirically realistic conception of excellence of character as an object of moral aspiration, endeavour, and education. It argues that such a conception will involve renunciation of the ancient thesis of the unity or mutual implication of all virtues, and acknowledgement of sufficient ‘moral luck’ in the development of any individual's character to make virtue very largely a gift, rather than an individual achievement, though nonetheless excellent and admirable for that.
A. W. Price
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198248996
- eISBN:
- 9780191681172
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248996.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The character of life that has permitted people to unite egoism and altruism to a certain degree is that which is called moral fecundity. It is necessary that individual life should diffuse itself ...
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The character of life that has permitted people to unite egoism and altruism to a certain degree is that which is called moral fecundity. It is necessary that individual life should diffuse itself for another, in another, and if need be, give itself. This diffusion is not contrary to nature, in fact, it is according to nature, and as such, it is the very condition of true life. This same concept is true of intelligence no less than of the body as it is impossible to confine intelligence within itself as it is like a flame that is made to radiate. There is the same diffusive force in people's sensibility, such as having to share joy and share grief. It is the whole nature that is sociable.Less
The character of life that has permitted people to unite egoism and altruism to a certain degree is that which is called moral fecundity. It is necessary that individual life should diffuse itself for another, in another, and if need be, give itself. This diffusion is not contrary to nature, in fact, it is according to nature, and as such, it is the very condition of true life. This same concept is true of intelligence no less than of the body as it is impossible to confine intelligence within itself as it is like a flame that is made to radiate. There is the same diffusive force in people's sensibility, such as having to share joy and share grief. It is the whole nature that is sociable.
Peter Taylor‐Gooby
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199546701
- eISBN:
- 9780191720420
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546701.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Economy
This chapter examines the arguments about whether social citizenship can be based on an individual rational actor logic or requires a framework of normative principles, embedded in the institutions ...
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This chapter examines the arguments about whether social citizenship can be based on an individual rational actor logic or requires a framework of normative principles, embedded in the institutions of social provision and in policy-making. The arguments of Titmuss, Le Grand, and others about blood donorship, social care, and other areas where altruistic and humane rather than self-regarding values appear to be central are considered. Individual rational actor approaches can explain how reciprocity and a limited social inclusion may be sustained, as Chapter 4 showed. Analysis of social psychological, sociological, and economic evidence shows that a full understanding of trust rests on both the alignment of interest that a rational actor logic can explain and also the recognition of values of commitment and care in the trusted person. These are contradicted when action is driven by externally imposed incentives. The trust deficit is a central issue in rational actor reform of social provision.Less
This chapter examines the arguments about whether social citizenship can be based on an individual rational actor logic or requires a framework of normative principles, embedded in the institutions of social provision and in policy-making. The arguments of Titmuss, Le Grand, and others about blood donorship, social care, and other areas where altruistic and humane rather than self-regarding values appear to be central are considered. Individual rational actor approaches can explain how reciprocity and a limited social inclusion may be sustained, as Chapter 4 showed. Analysis of social psychological, sociological, and economic evidence shows that a full understanding of trust rests on both the alignment of interest that a rational actor logic can explain and also the recognition of values of commitment and care in the trusted person. These are contradicted when action is driven by externally imposed incentives. The trust deficit is a central issue in rational actor reform of social provision.
Robert Merrihew Adams
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199207510
- eISBN:
- 9780191708824
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207510.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Finding an appropriate way of evaluating altruistic benevolence is a crucial test of a theory of virtue as a sort of intrinsic excellence. Some may think that altruism is sufficiently commended by ...
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Finding an appropriate way of evaluating altruistic benevolence is a crucial test of a theory of virtue as a sort of intrinsic excellence. Some may think that altruism is sufficiently commended by its social benefits without any thought of such excellence. Consideration of Nietzsche's critique of altruism leads, however, to an argument that it is morally important that altruism be intrinsically excellent. This is followed by an argument that altruism has indeed such excellence. Not that altruism must (or indeed should) be unmixed with other motives. Relations between altruism and self-sacrifice on the one hand, and agent-centered or self-regarding motives such as conscientiousness and self-respect on the other, are explored.Less
Finding an appropriate way of evaluating altruistic benevolence is a crucial test of a theory of virtue as a sort of intrinsic excellence. Some may think that altruism is sufficiently commended by its social benefits without any thought of such excellence. Consideration of Nietzsche's critique of altruism leads, however, to an argument that it is morally important that altruism be intrinsically excellent. This is followed by an argument that altruism has indeed such excellence. Not that altruism must (or indeed should) be unmixed with other motives. Relations between altruism and self-sacrifice on the one hand, and agent-centered or self-regarding motives such as conscientiousness and self-respect on the other, are explored.
Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151250
- eISBN:
- 9781400838837
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151250.003.0008
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought
This chapter examines the coevolution of two genetically transmitted individual traits, parochialism and altruism, each providing the conditions for the evolutionary success of the other, and both ...
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This chapter examines the coevolution of two genetically transmitted individual traits, parochialism and altruism, each providing the conditions for the evolutionary success of the other, and both jointly explaining why warfare was so frequent and lethal among early humans. It first considers the tendency of parochial altruists to engage in combat before discussing the results of simulations showing that parochialism and altruism evolve because within-group interactions for which cooperation is possible are characterized by positive assortment, and not because the parochial altruists deliberately associate with like types. It also evaluates experimental evidence that provides a test of the simulation results regarding the coevolution of parochial altruism and war. It suggests that hostility toward outsiders and a warlike disposition could have strengthened the group competition processes essential to the evolution of altruistic cooperation.Less
This chapter examines the coevolution of two genetically transmitted individual traits, parochialism and altruism, each providing the conditions for the evolutionary success of the other, and both jointly explaining why warfare was so frequent and lethal among early humans. It first considers the tendency of parochial altruists to engage in combat before discussing the results of simulations showing that parochialism and altruism evolve because within-group interactions for which cooperation is possible are characterized by positive assortment, and not because the parochial altruists deliberately associate with like types. It also evaluates experimental evidence that provides a test of the simulation results regarding the coevolution of parochial altruism and war. It suggests that hostility toward outsiders and a warlike disposition could have strengthened the group competition processes essential to the evolution of altruistic cooperation.
Ken Binmore
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195178111
- eISBN:
- 9780199783670
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178111.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter presents an overview of the book. It argues that the metaphysical approach to ethics is a failure and that the time has come to take a scientific view of morality. A social contract is ...
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This chapter presents an overview of the book. It argues that the metaphysical approach to ethics is a failure and that the time has come to take a scientific view of morality. A social contract is taken to be the set of common understandings that allow the citizens of a society to coordinate. Such social contracts are seen as the product of biological and cultural evolution. To survive, a social contract must therefore be an equilibrium in the repeated game of life played by a society. Since the folk theorem of repeated game theory says that there are large numbers of such equilibria, fairness norms then become explicable as an equilibrium selection device that selects one of the many efficient equilibria of a society's game of life. It is suggested that the deep structure of such fairness norms is captured by John Rawls' notion of the original position, and is therefore universal in the human species. On the other hand, the standard of interpersonal comparison needed as an input to the original position is culturally determined.Less
This chapter presents an overview of the book. It argues that the metaphysical approach to ethics is a failure and that the time has come to take a scientific view of morality. A social contract is taken to be the set of common understandings that allow the citizens of a society to coordinate. Such social contracts are seen as the product of biological and cultural evolution. To survive, a social contract must therefore be an equilibrium in the repeated game of life played by a society. Since the folk theorem of repeated game theory says that there are large numbers of such equilibria, fairness norms then become explicable as an equilibrium selection device that selects one of the many efficient equilibria of a society's game of life. It is suggested that the deep structure of such fairness norms is captured by John Rawls' notion of the original position, and is therefore universal in the human species. On the other hand, the standard of interpersonal comparison needed as an input to the original position is culturally determined.
Ken Binmore
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195178111
- eISBN:
- 9780199783670
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178111.003.0005
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
The folk theorem shows that cooperative behavior can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in indefinitely repeated games — a phenomenon known as reciprocal altruism. The same theorem offers a solution ...
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The folk theorem shows that cooperative behavior can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in indefinitely repeated games — a phenomenon known as reciprocal altruism. The same theorem offers a solution to various other social mysteries. Who guards the guardians? How are authority, blame, courtesy, dignity, envy, friendship, guilt, honor, integrity, justice, loyalty, modesty, ownership, pride, reputation, status, trust, virtue, and the like to be explained as emergent phenomena? How do beliefs that many people privately know to be false survive?Less
The folk theorem shows that cooperative behavior can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in indefinitely repeated games — a phenomenon known as reciprocal altruism. The same theorem offers a solution to various other social mysteries. Who guards the guardians? How are authority, blame, courtesy, dignity, envy, friendship, guilt, honor, integrity, justice, loyalty, modesty, ownership, pride, reputation, status, trust, virtue, and the like to be explained as emergent phenomena? How do beliefs that many people privately know to be false survive?
James P. Sterba
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199580767
- eISBN:
- 9780191745836
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580767.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Most contemporary moral and political philosophers would like to have an argument showing that morality is rationally required. This book provides just such an argument and further show that ...
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Most contemporary moral and political philosophers would like to have an argument showing that morality is rationally required. This book provides just such an argument and further show that morality, so justified, leads to substantial equality. The argument from rationality to morality is based on the principle of non-question-beggingness and it has two forms. The first assumes that the egoist is willing to argue for egoism non-question-beggingly, and the second only assumes that the egoist is willing to assent to premises she actually needs to achieve her egoistic goals. Either way, it is argued, morality is rationally (i.e., non-question-beggingly) preferable to egoism. The argument from morality to equality also non-question-beggingly starts with assumptions that are acceptable from a libertarian perspective, the view that appears to endorse the least enforcement of morality, and then shows that this perspective requires a right to welfare, and that further, when this right is extended to distant peoples and future generations, it leads to substantial equality. The strategy is to find conflicts of (negative) liberty within a libertarian perspective, and then argue that when these conflicts are appropriately resolved, they favor an allocation of liberty that supports a right to welfare that, in turn, when fully implemented, leads to substantial equality. The book also defends thus two-part argument against recent critics and further show how the argument is preferable to alternative attempts to justify morality as well as alternative attempts to show that morality leads to a right to welfare and/or to equality.Less
Most contemporary moral and political philosophers would like to have an argument showing that morality is rationally required. This book provides just such an argument and further show that morality, so justified, leads to substantial equality. The argument from rationality to morality is based on the principle of non-question-beggingness and it has two forms. The first assumes that the egoist is willing to argue for egoism non-question-beggingly, and the second only assumes that the egoist is willing to assent to premises she actually needs to achieve her egoistic goals. Either way, it is argued, morality is rationally (i.e., non-question-beggingly) preferable to egoism. The argument from morality to equality also non-question-beggingly starts with assumptions that are acceptable from a libertarian perspective, the view that appears to endorse the least enforcement of morality, and then shows that this perspective requires a right to welfare, and that further, when this right is extended to distant peoples and future generations, it leads to substantial equality. The strategy is to find conflicts of (negative) liberty within a libertarian perspective, and then argue that when these conflicts are appropriately resolved, they favor an allocation of liberty that supports a right to welfare that, in turn, when fully implemented, leads to substantial equality. The book also defends thus two-part argument against recent critics and further show how the argument is preferable to alternative attempts to justify morality as well as alternative attempts to show that morality leads to a right to welfare and/or to equality.
David Miller
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198278641
- eISBN:
- 9780191599903
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198278640.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Libertarians argue that altruistic concern for the poor should be channelled through private charity rather than through a (compulsory) welfare state. Altruism, however, is a complex idea. Should it ...
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Libertarians argue that altruistic concern for the poor should be channelled through private charity rather than through a (compulsory) welfare state. Altruism, however, is a complex idea. Should it be directed at satisfying preferences or at meeting needs? We also need to distinguish between calculating altruists, who are concerned only about collective outcomes and would prefer not to contribute themselves; reciprocal altruists, who are willing to contribute so long as others do too; and conscientious altruists, who are willing to contribute their share regardless of how other people behave. Both calculating and reciprocal altruists have good reason to prefer the welfare state to private charity as a way of meeting their concern for the badly off.Less
Libertarians argue that altruistic concern for the poor should be channelled through private charity rather than through a (compulsory) welfare state. Altruism, however, is a complex idea. Should it be directed at satisfying preferences or at meeting needs? We also need to distinguish between calculating altruists, who are concerned only about collective outcomes and would prefer not to contribute themselves; reciprocal altruists, who are willing to contribute so long as others do too; and conscientious altruists, who are willing to contribute their share regardless of how other people behave. Both calculating and reciprocal altruists have good reason to prefer the welfare state to private charity as a way of meeting their concern for the badly off.
David O. Brink
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199266401
- eISBN:
- 9780191600906
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199266409.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter examines Aristotle's and Green's concern for the common good. It is argued that both Aristotle and Green have the analytic resources to provide a eudaimonist justification of ...
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This chapter examines Aristotle's and Green's concern for the common good. It is argued that both Aristotle and Green have the analytic resources to provide a eudaimonist justification of interpersonal concern that is derivative but not instrumental. This is why Green views interpersonal love as the next best thing to immortality, and why Aristotle and Green both claim that a proper conception of how others figure in self-love undermines the popular contrast between self-love and altruism.Less
This chapter examines Aristotle's and Green's concern for the common good. It is argued that both Aristotle and Green have the analytic resources to provide a eudaimonist justification of interpersonal concern that is derivative but not instrumental. This is why Green views interpersonal love as the next best thing to immortality, and why Aristotle and Green both claim that a proper conception of how others figure in self-love undermines the popular contrast between self-love and altruism.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195158427
- eISBN:
- 9780199871407
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195158427.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Much of what we want, such as food and entertainment and good company, we want for our own consumption or enjoyment; but we can also want those same sorts of things for other people. Indeed, if we ...
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Much of what we want, such as food and entertainment and good company, we want for our own consumption or enjoyment; but we can also want those same sorts of things for other people. Indeed, if we love other people, we must want certain kinds of things not only for them, but for their sake. This raises the question of whether we, as egoists hold, rationally want something for others only so far as it will lead to something we want for ourselves? Another question is whether given an ordinary knowledge of how others are like us, a kind of altruism is rationally demanded of us. If it is, then practical reason provides at least a limited foundation for ethics, in the sense that a rational person will, under certain conditions, have adequate reason to treat others in accordance with some basic moral principles. This chapter examines this issue and presents the general account of rationality.Less
Much of what we want, such as food and entertainment and good company, we want for our own consumption or enjoyment; but we can also want those same sorts of things for other people. Indeed, if we love other people, we must want certain kinds of things not only for them, but for their sake. This raises the question of whether we, as egoists hold, rationally want something for others only so far as it will lead to something we want for ourselves? Another question is whether given an ordinary knowledge of how others are like us, a kind of altruism is rationally demanded of us. If it is, then practical reason provides at least a limited foundation for ethics, in the sense that a rational person will, under certain conditions, have adequate reason to treat others in accordance with some basic moral principles. This chapter examines this issue and presents the general account of rationality.
Graham Bell
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198569725
- eISBN:
- 9780191717741
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198569725.003.0010
- Subject:
- Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
Selection is often generated by interaction with other organisms: neighbours, partners, or antagonists. The force and direction of selection in these social contexts is very generally influenced by ...
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Selection is often generated by interaction with other organisms: neighbours, partners, or antagonists. The force and direction of selection in these social contexts is very generally influenced by the density and composition of the population. It may result in some degree of cooperation or helpfulness, rather than unrestricted competition among individuals. The first section here is called Selection within a single uniform population: density-dependent selection and details density regulation; density-dependent fitness; the principle of frugality; resource competition in continuous culture; r-K selection; r-K selection experiments; and selection in seasonal environments. The second section is called Selection within a single diverse population: frequency-dependent selection and describes GxG; frequency-dependent fitness; and also frequency-dependence in complex environments. The third section is about social behaviour and describes the phenotypic theory of aggression and exploitation; cross-feeding; selfish cooperation; the prisoners' dilemmas; intransitive social interactions; and time-lagged social interactions. The final section is called Kin selection and group selection and describes kin selection; kin proximity and kin choice; spite; group selection in structured populations; productivity and diversity; artificial group selection; and cultural evolution.Less
Selection is often generated by interaction with other organisms: neighbours, partners, or antagonists. The force and direction of selection in these social contexts is very generally influenced by the density and composition of the population. It may result in some degree of cooperation or helpfulness, rather than unrestricted competition among individuals. The first section here is called Selection within a single uniform population: density-dependent selection and details density regulation; density-dependent fitness; the principle of frugality; resource competition in continuous culture; r-K selection; r-K selection experiments; and selection in seasonal environments. The second section is called Selection within a single diverse population: frequency-dependent selection and describes GxG; frequency-dependent fitness; and also frequency-dependence in complex environments. The third section is about social behaviour and describes the phenotypic theory of aggression and exploitation; cross-feeding; selfish cooperation; the prisoners' dilemmas; intransitive social interactions; and time-lagged social interactions. The final section is called Kin selection and group selection and describes kin selection; kin proximity and kin choice; spite; group selection in structured populations; productivity and diversity; artificial group selection; and cultural evolution.
