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This chapter focuses not on Baqir al-Sadr as scholar of fiqh and usul al-fiqh, but on Baqir al-Sadr the philosopher. Khomeini was also a philosopher, yet Khomeini's influence in this domain has not been felt. Rather, his legalistic and political ideas have survived him. The philosophical ideas of Baqir al-Sadr, on the other hand, have spread beyond the Shiʿism into Sunni communities throughout the world. Baqir al-Sadr engaged Western philosophical ideas, not to discredit them but to challenge them when he saw fit and to incorporate them into his own system when appropriate. Baqir al-Sadr's goals are ultimately religious. He wished to show that religious knowledge was not the antithesis of scientific knowledge, but that the two are actually in the same category, thereby addressing issues of paramount concern to Muslim intellectuals.

This chapter examines how genealogy may be used for writing about the past by focusing on the family of the Prophet Muhammad and the evidence that genealogies provide regarding marriage alliances and strategies. In particular, it considers the question of endogamy, or marriage within the ‘family’. It shows that genealogical data are useful for writing the history of one branch of the Prophet's family, the al-Sadr, in today's Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran. The chapter begins with an overview of the al-Sadr family before turning to a discussion of the 'Alids' marriage strategy. Based on works of prosopography and extensive fieldwork, the chapter analyses sensitive data involving women of the Prophet's family to illustrate how this branch has followed a strategy of endogamy involving both the family and non-'Alid members of ‘the Shi'i religious establishment’. It also shows that the families with whom members of the al-Sadr family have established marriage bonds are very important for defining the social status of the al-Sadr.

This chapter argues that jurists can employ various tools like public welfare and the principle of no harm to either modify earlier legal enactments or formulate new ones. It contends that these devices can provide only partial and temporary amendments to existing legal injunctions. The chapter also examines the role of custom (‘urf) in the reformation process and shows that the Qur’an presumes that its legal rulings will be understood based on prevalent customary practices and values. Contemporary jurists who insist on enforcing earlier edicts are, in effect, validating pre-Islamic Arabian cultural values and imposing them on contemporary Muslims. The chapter also argues that some of the laws that were instituted in a distinct cultural context will have to be revised especially when they encounter a different cultural framework. It also explores how local custom that is endorsed by people of sound mind can legislate laws in today’s diasporic context.

Chapter One explores the ways in which the ayatollahs adapted politically to survive after 2003. The power vacuum created a space for new social actors to challenge their status and position, in intellectual, social and material terms. One challenge came from Sunni Islamists, ranging from efforts to form a Sunni marja‘iyyato the sectarian terror of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia and, eventually, ISIS. Lay Shiite groups offered Shiites an alternative to the traditional clerical model, and appealed especially to the urban poor. The most important of these groups formed under the leadership of Muqtada al-Sadr. In response to this existential threat, the ayatollahs worked to maintain their position as the most legitimate religious voices at the grassroots level.

This chapter fleshes out the logic underlying the layers of activism by the ayatollahs after 2003 on the debate between quietism and activism. It adds nuance to the concept of clerical activism—which does not have to be velayat-e faqih or nothing. In fact, Iraqi ayatollahs have a long history of engagement with the state, but their engagement defies any neat categorization. They are keen, strategic political actors with strong ties to society and a newly evolving role as public intellectuals. The ayatollahs have proven flexible and extremely adaptable to political context. Their political savvy deters them from imposing their will or forcing a one-size-fits-all solution on the people. Yet their declaration that they should hold no political positions does not make them apolitical. Rather, their activism should be understood as a reinvented activism. The chapter contains analysis of the statements of Ayatollahs Baqir al-Hakim, Sistani, Fayyad and Najafi.

In this chapter, Hayder Hamid Jawad, Luay Ali Hussein, and Adel Rasheed Majeed talk about their experiences during the Iraq war. In 1988 Hayder Hamid Jawad moved from Baghdad to Kirkuk, which has long been home to Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. Around this time Saddam Hussein was undertaking a campaign to increase the Arab population in the city in an apparent effort to edge out the Kurdish population. A simmering dispute chiefly between Kurds and Arabs over control of the city began to boil over shortly after the U.S. invasion. Luay Ali Hussein, a Shi'ite, was working as a blacksmith in Fallujah's industrial sector as insurgents began to gather in the city following the invasion. In 2004, U.S. forces launched a counterinsurgency offensive in Fallujah following the public slaying of four Blackwater security contractors in the spring of that year. Adel Rasheed Majeed, a carpenter and lifelong Baghdad resident, was among those who supported Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Mahdi Army militia, in the fight against the Americans in August of 2004 in Najaf.