Charles Kurzman
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199766871
- eISBN:
- 9780199897414
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766871.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
Why are there so few Muslim terrorists? With more than a billion Muslims in the world—many of whom supposedly hate the West and ardently desire martyrdom—why don't we see terrorist attacks every day? ...
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Why are there so few Muslim terrorists? With more than a billion Muslims in the world—many of whom supposedly hate the West and ardently desire martyrdom—why don't we see terrorist attacks every day? Where are the missing martyrs? This counterintuitive book demonstrates that terrorist groups are thoroughly marginal in the Muslim world. Drawing on government sources, public opinion surveys, election results, and in-depth interviews with Muslims in the Middle East and around the world, the book finds that young Muslims are indeed angry with what they see as imperialism—and especially at Western support for local dictatorships. But revolutionary Islamists such as al-Qaida and the Taliban have failed to reach them, as can be seen from the terrorists' own websites and publications, which constantly bemoan the dearth of willing recruits. It takes only a small cadre of committed killers to wreak unspeakable havoc. But as easy as terrorism is to commit, few Muslims turn to violence. With each bombing, the terrorists lose support among Muslims. The threat of Islamist terrorism is real, but its dimensions are, so far, tightly confined.Less
Why are there so few Muslim terrorists? With more than a billion Muslims in the world—many of whom supposedly hate the West and ardently desire martyrdom—why don't we see terrorist attacks every day? Where are the missing martyrs? This counterintuitive book demonstrates that terrorist groups are thoroughly marginal in the Muslim world. Drawing on government sources, public opinion surveys, election results, and in-depth interviews with Muslims in the Middle East and around the world, the book finds that young Muslims are indeed angry with what they see as imperialism—and especially at Western support for local dictatorships. But revolutionary Islamists such as al-Qaida and the Taliban have failed to reach them, as can be seen from the terrorists' own websites and publications, which constantly bemoan the dearth of willing recruits. It takes only a small cadre of committed killers to wreak unspeakable havoc. But as easy as terrorism is to commit, few Muslims turn to violence. With each bombing, the terrorists lose support among Muslims. The threat of Islamist terrorism is real, but its dimensions are, so far, tightly confined.
Richard English (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780197265901
- eISBN:
- 9780191772047
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197265901.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Terrorism and counter-terrorism represent enduringly and globally important phenomena, and the mutually shaping relationship between non-state terrorism and state counter-terrorism continues to shape ...
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Terrorism and counter-terrorism represent enduringly and globally important phenomena, and the mutually shaping relationship between non-state terrorism and state counter-terrorism continues to shape world politics. Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism brings together leading scholars in the field to analyse this relationship, and to do so in a distinctive manner. The book sustainedly assesses the interaction of terrorism and counter-terrorism through drawing simultaneously on a range of academic disciplines in dialogue with one another; it addresses the dynamics of counter-terrorism more interrogatively and concentratedly than is common in much of the scholarly literature; and it highlights a theme that is all too rarely considered in the field: namely, the shared and mutually echoing failings and illusions involved in the politics of terrorism and counter-terrorism alike. Chapters analyse post-9/11 counter-terrorism, the ongoing evolution of al-Qaida, the imperatives and challenges and global context of western counter-terrorist efforts, and the reasons behind terrorist campaigns sometimes enduring and sometimes coming to an end. Candid and wide-ranging, Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism offers rigorous and original argument on a subject of the highest significance.Less
Terrorism and counter-terrorism represent enduringly and globally important phenomena, and the mutually shaping relationship between non-state terrorism and state counter-terrorism continues to shape world politics. Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism brings together leading scholars in the field to analyse this relationship, and to do so in a distinctive manner. The book sustainedly assesses the interaction of terrorism and counter-terrorism through drawing simultaneously on a range of academic disciplines in dialogue with one another; it addresses the dynamics of counter-terrorism more interrogatively and concentratedly than is common in much of the scholarly literature; and it highlights a theme that is all too rarely considered in the field: namely, the shared and mutually echoing failings and illusions involved in the politics of terrorism and counter-terrorism alike. Chapters analyse post-9/11 counter-terrorism, the ongoing evolution of al-Qaida, the imperatives and challenges and global context of western counter-terrorist efforts, and the reasons behind terrorist campaigns sometimes enduring and sometimes coming to an end. Candid and wide-ranging, Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism offers rigorous and original argument on a subject of the highest significance.
Alia Brahimi
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780197265901
- eISBN:
- 9780191772047
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197265901.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The declaration of a Caliphate in June 2014 by an al-Qaida offshoot implied a strong sense of political–religious unity, but, in reality, the announcement reflected deep division at the heart of ...
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The declaration of a Caliphate in June 2014 by an al-Qaida offshoot implied a strong sense of political–religious unity, but, in reality, the announcement reflected deep division at the heart of radical Islam. This article critically assesses al-Qaida’s progress on its four main objectives over the course of the 9/11 decade, and suggests that its principal setbacks were due to the fragmentation of Islamic authority. In particular, Osama bin Laden’s inability to reverse the misguided focus, by some affiliated groups, on the ‘nearer enemy’, began to portend al-Qaida’s downfall. However, after the Arab Spring, in the chokeholds of strong states and the chaos of weak states al-Qaida found advantage. Furthermore, with the rise of groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, a new pattern of radicalism emerged, in which the threat to ‘far enemy’, ‘near enemy’ and ‘nearer enemy’ were combined.Less
The declaration of a Caliphate in June 2014 by an al-Qaida offshoot implied a strong sense of political–religious unity, but, in reality, the announcement reflected deep division at the heart of radical Islam. This article critically assesses al-Qaida’s progress on its four main objectives over the course of the 9/11 decade, and suggests that its principal setbacks were due to the fragmentation of Islamic authority. In particular, Osama bin Laden’s inability to reverse the misguided focus, by some affiliated groups, on the ‘nearer enemy’, began to portend al-Qaida’s downfall. However, after the Arab Spring, in the chokeholds of strong states and the chaos of weak states al-Qaida found advantage. Furthermore, with the rise of groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, a new pattern of radicalism emerged, in which the threat to ‘far enemy’, ‘near enemy’ and ‘nearer enemy’ were combined.
Rashmi Singh
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780197265901
- eISBN:
- 9780191772047
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197265901.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter assesses the US-led counter-terrorism response to the September 2001 attacks on the American homeland in order to gauge the successes and failures of the Global War on Terror. It ...
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This chapter assesses the US-led counter-terrorism response to the September 2001 attacks on the American homeland in order to gauge the successes and failures of the Global War on Terror. It concludes that successes against transnational terrorist threats, as represented by al-Qaida and its affiliates, have been few and far between. Instead, the past decade has been marked by a failure to meet set goals for a number of reasons, including but not limited to: the shifting character of war, the unintended fallouts of the counter-terrorism policies adopted, and an inadvertent strengthening of al-Qaida’s material and ideological capabilities through the US macro-securitisation of the Global War on Terror–all of which point to the absence of a long-term strategic vision. However, our counter-terrorism failures hold crucial lessons for the future and the chapter concludes by outlining how they can enable us to translate our past failures into future successes.Less
This chapter assesses the US-led counter-terrorism response to the September 2001 attacks on the American homeland in order to gauge the successes and failures of the Global War on Terror. It concludes that successes against transnational terrorist threats, as represented by al-Qaida and its affiliates, have been few and far between. Instead, the past decade has been marked by a failure to meet set goals for a number of reasons, including but not limited to: the shifting character of war, the unintended fallouts of the counter-terrorism policies adopted, and an inadvertent strengthening of al-Qaida’s material and ideological capabilities through the US macro-securitisation of the Global War on Terror–all of which point to the absence of a long-term strategic vision. However, our counter-terrorism failures hold crucial lessons for the future and the chapter concludes by outlining how they can enable us to translate our past failures into future successes.
David Omand
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780197265901
- eISBN:
- 9780191772047
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197265901.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
How governments understand and thus come to conceptualise and explain current and future threats and the calibration of their response across all the levers open to government at home and abroad is ...
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How governments understand and thus come to conceptualise and explain current and future threats and the calibration of their response across all the levers open to government at home and abroad is seen as key to sound strategy. The prevailing approach to domestic security planning after 9/11 as part of the British counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, is seen as heavily influenced by the growing application of risk management as a planning tool in government generally and is contrasted with the US approach. The influence of unrelated external events, including the revelations of Edward Snowden, is examined as a factor disturbing the domestic calculus of the ‘thermodynamics’ of counter-terrorism: how the government can best exercise its primary duty to protect the public in the face of a severe terrorist threat and yet maintain civic harmony and uphold democratic values and the rule of law at home and internationally. This chapter argues that the overall challenge for the future is to maintain public confidence that it is possible for government having absorbed such lessons to discharge its responsibilities for public safety and security whilst behaving ethically in accordance with modern views of human rights, including personal privacy, in a world where deference to authority and automatic acceptance of the confidentiality of government business no longer holds sway.Less
How governments understand and thus come to conceptualise and explain current and future threats and the calibration of their response across all the levers open to government at home and abroad is seen as key to sound strategy. The prevailing approach to domestic security planning after 9/11 as part of the British counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, is seen as heavily influenced by the growing application of risk management as a planning tool in government generally and is contrasted with the US approach. The influence of unrelated external events, including the revelations of Edward Snowden, is examined as a factor disturbing the domestic calculus of the ‘thermodynamics’ of counter-terrorism: how the government can best exercise its primary duty to protect the public in the face of a severe terrorist threat and yet maintain civic harmony and uphold democratic values and the rule of law at home and internationally. This chapter argues that the overall challenge for the future is to maintain public confidence that it is possible for government having absorbed such lessons to discharge its responsibilities for public safety and security whilst behaving ethically in accordance with modern views of human rights, including personal privacy, in a world where deference to authority and automatic acceptance of the confidentiality of government business no longer holds sway.
Audrey Kurth Cronin
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780197265901
- eISBN:
- 9780191772047
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197265901.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
In order to assess terrorist groups within a broad historical and strategic framework, it is vital to assess how and why terrorist campaigns end. Moreover, if effective counter-terrorism is to be ...
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In order to assess terrorist groups within a broad historical and strategic framework, it is vital to assess how and why terrorist campaigns end. Moreover, if effective counter-terrorism is to be developed, then serious reflection is required regarding what happens during the final phase of terrorist campaigns, and why. This chapter therefore: first, analyses four classic strategies of terrorism and considers why Western democracies have particular difficulty responding to them; second, it reviews six historical patterns of endings for terrorist organisations that have emerged from scholarly research on hundreds of groups; third, it assesses (in light of these six patterns) which counter-terrorism policies have hastened al-Qaida’s demise and which have not, while also reflecting upon the rise of ISIS and its potential future significance.Less
In order to assess terrorist groups within a broad historical and strategic framework, it is vital to assess how and why terrorist campaigns end. Moreover, if effective counter-terrorism is to be developed, then serious reflection is required regarding what happens during the final phase of terrorist campaigns, and why. This chapter therefore: first, analyses four classic strategies of terrorism and considers why Western democracies have particular difficulty responding to them; second, it reviews six historical patterns of endings for terrorist organisations that have emerged from scholarly research on hundreds of groups; third, it assesses (in light of these six patterns) which counter-terrorism policies have hastened al-Qaida’s demise and which have not, while also reflecting upon the rise of ISIS and its potential future significance.
Noam Lubell
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199584840
- eISBN:
- 9780191594540
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199584840.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration, Public International Law
This chapter begins the examination of whether international humanitarian law is an appropriate legal framework that can be applied to extraterritorial force against non-state actors. This includes ...
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This chapter begins the examination of whether international humanitarian law is an appropriate legal framework that can be applied to extraterritorial force against non-state actors. This includes both the possibilities of such measures being categorised as international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. The notion of non-international conflicts as including extra-territorial circumstances is considered, as are the criteria for determination of such conflicts, including threshold of violence and identification of the parties to the conflict.Less
This chapter begins the examination of whether international humanitarian law is an appropriate legal framework that can be applied to extraterritorial force against non-state actors. This includes both the possibilities of such measures being categorised as international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. The notion of non-international conflicts as including extra-territorial circumstances is considered, as are the criteria for determination of such conflicts, including threshold of violence and identification of the parties to the conflict.
Noam Lubell
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199584840
- eISBN:
- 9780191594540
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199584840.003.0011
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration, Public International Law
This chapter utilises the analysis conducted throughout the book, and applies it in the context of two cases. The first is the conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah in the summer of 2006. The ...
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This chapter utilises the analysis conducted throughout the book, and applies it in the context of two cases. The first is the conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah in the summer of 2006. The second is the targeted killings conducted by the US in Yemen and Pakistan. The rules of the ius ad bellum are examined, as are the rules regulating the use of force, whether human rights law or international humanitarian law. The chapter concludes with a summary of the analysis and identification of the challenges yet to be resolved.Less
This chapter utilises the analysis conducted throughout the book, and applies it in the context of two cases. The first is the conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah in the summer of 2006. The second is the targeted killings conducted by the US in Yemen and Pakistan. The rules of the ius ad bellum are examined, as are the rules regulating the use of force, whether human rights law or international humanitarian law. The chapter concludes with a summary of the analysis and identification of the challenges yet to be resolved.
Charles Kurzman
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199766871
- eISBN:
- 9780199897414
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766871.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
Yasmin, in Cairo, heard about the attacks of 9/11 and felt fleeting satisfaction at the idea of America receiving its comeuppance. Zuhra, in Islamabad, considered Bin Laden larger than life. Murat, ...
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Yasmin, in Cairo, heard about the attacks of 9/11 and felt fleeting satisfaction at the idea of America receiving its comeuppance. Zuhra, in Islamabad, considered Bin Laden larger than life. Murat, in Istanbul, blamed America for the attacks. “How could a person in a cave in Afghanistan have planned such an attack as 9/11?” These views are evidence of “radical sheik”—a play on Tom Wolfe's phrase “radical chic,” expressions of sympathy for revolutionaries as anti-establishment heroes—without actually wanting these movements to succeed. This sort of symbolic endorsement does not translate into support for revolutionary goals or potential collaboration with terrorism.Less
Yasmin, in Cairo, heard about the attacks of 9/11 and felt fleeting satisfaction at the idea of America receiving its comeuppance. Zuhra, in Islamabad, considered Bin Laden larger than life. Murat, in Istanbul, blamed America for the attacks. “How could a person in a cave in Afghanistan have planned such an attack as 9/11?” These views are evidence of “radical sheik”—a play on Tom Wolfe's phrase “radical chic,” expressions of sympathy for revolutionaries as anti-establishment heroes—without actually wanting these movements to succeed. This sort of symbolic endorsement does not translate into support for revolutionary goals or potential collaboration with terrorism.
Charles Kurzman
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199766871
- eISBN:
- 9780199897414
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766871.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
Outsiders often confuse al-Qaida with the Taliban, but these two organizations represent distinct revolutionary movements that are often at odds with each other, despite similarities in their Islamic ...
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Outsiders often confuse al-Qaida with the Taliban, but these two organizations represent distinct revolutionary movements that are often at odds with each other, despite similarities in their Islamic world-view. The Taliban are a local movement that draws on poorly educated villagers, while al-Qaida is a global movement that draws on relatively well-educated cosmopolitans, who speak European languages and are eager to adopt modern technology. Technology is not the only modern aspect of these global revolutionaries. They also seek to dismantle tribal hierarchies and monarchical government—not in the name of the West, but in opposition to the West.Less
Outsiders often confuse al-Qaida with the Taliban, but these two organizations represent distinct revolutionary movements that are often at odds with each other, despite similarities in their Islamic world-view. The Taliban are a local movement that draws on poorly educated villagers, while al-Qaida is a global movement that draws on relatively well-educated cosmopolitans, who speak European languages and are eager to adopt modern technology. Technology is not the only modern aspect of these global revolutionaries. They also seek to dismantle tribal hierarchies and monarchical government—not in the name of the West, but in opposition to the West.
John B. Bellinger
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199795208
- eISBN:
- 9780199919307
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199795208.003.0041
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
This chapter presents John Bellinger's speech on legal views and policy decisions with respect to the detention and treatment of terrorists, as these have evolved in the United States since September ...
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This chapter presents John Bellinger's speech on legal views and policy decisions with respect to the detention and treatment of terrorists, as these have evolved in the United States since September 11. His aim is to convey a sense of how far they have progressed in addressing the threat posed by al-Qaida as a legal matter. He says that just as the United States strengthens and clarifies its laws at home, now is the time for the international community to construct a common foundation to defend our nations and protect our freedoms. The bedrock of that foundation is an appreciation of the magnitude of the threat posed by al-Qaida, and the need, in some instances, to use military force to combat that threat. Domestic criminal law does not itself adequately address the threat posed by this enemy. Military force is not the right answer against all enemies everywhere. In the face of a threat as grave as that of al-Qaida, appreciating that military force can be appropriate may pave the way for an intensified dialogue as we move forward.Less
This chapter presents John Bellinger's speech on legal views and policy decisions with respect to the detention and treatment of terrorists, as these have evolved in the United States since September 11. His aim is to convey a sense of how far they have progressed in addressing the threat posed by al-Qaida as a legal matter. He says that just as the United States strengthens and clarifies its laws at home, now is the time for the international community to construct a common foundation to defend our nations and protect our freedoms. The bedrock of that foundation is an appreciation of the magnitude of the threat posed by al-Qaida, and the need, in some instances, to use military force to combat that threat. Domestic criminal law does not itself adequately address the threat posed by this enemy. Military force is not the right answer against all enemies everywhere. In the face of a threat as grave as that of al-Qaida, appreciating that military force can be appropriate may pave the way for an intensified dialogue as we move forward.
Aurélie Daher
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190495893
- eISBN:
- 9780190943004
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190495893.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Middle Eastern Politics
While the Lebanese use the term "party" ("hizb") as a practical category for referring to the country's various political groups, in public law the only collective action structure, political or ...
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While the Lebanese use the term "party" ("hizb") as a practical category for referring to the country's various political groups, in public law the only collective action structure, political or otherwise, is that of the "association" ("jamiyya"). However, despite its concern for acting within the law, Hezbollah is not listed with the Ministry of Interior under this rubric. The reason is simple: Hezbollah does not present itself as an association, but as a group of networked institutions. The party's institutional oddity is heightened by the hybrid nature of the ideological and cultural roots of its institutions as well as of its organizational functioning. Hezbollah is usually understood as an Islamist group, but its structure is nothing like that of the Muslim Brotherhood or Sunni al-Qaida. Admittedly, an Islamic version of the decision-making process is to some extent reflected by the collegial command structure ("shura"). But the organization at heart is not Islamic. Indeed, Hezbollah's structure and its internal operations owe a good deal to communist and socialist models.Less
While the Lebanese use the term "party" ("hizb") as a practical category for referring to the country's various political groups, in public law the only collective action structure, political or otherwise, is that of the "association" ("jamiyya"). However, despite its concern for acting within the law, Hezbollah is not listed with the Ministry of Interior under this rubric. The reason is simple: Hezbollah does not present itself as an association, but as a group of networked institutions. The party's institutional oddity is heightened by the hybrid nature of the ideological and cultural roots of its institutions as well as of its organizational functioning. Hezbollah is usually understood as an Islamist group, but its structure is nothing like that of the Muslim Brotherhood or Sunni al-Qaida. Admittedly, an Islamic version of the decision-making process is to some extent reflected by the collegial command structure ("shura"). But the organization at heart is not Islamic. Indeed, Hezbollah's structure and its internal operations owe a good deal to communist and socialist models.
Tilman Rodenhäuser
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198821946
- eISBN:
- 9780191861109
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198821946.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
Chapter 3 suggests that IHL requires non-state entities to fulfil three criteria to form a party to a non-international armed conflict: a group needs to be (1) a collective entity with (2) the ...
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Chapter 3 suggests that IHL requires non-state entities to fulfil three criteria to form a party to a non-international armed conflict: a group needs to be (1) a collective entity with (2) the ability to ensure respect for basic humanitarian norms, and (3) the capacity to engage in sufficiently intense violence. This chapter discusses how these broad criteria have been interpreted and also develops new ways of how they should be understood in light of the variety of groups engaged in contemporary armed conflicts and the increasing fragmentation of groups. Instead of simply recounting factors established in international jurisprudence, this chapter reconsiders these factors’ actual relevance and shows how they can be helpful in proving the three identified criteria. In its final part, Chapter 3 applies the identified criteria to two specific cases: transnational armed groups such as the Islamic State Group, and cyber groups such as Anonymous.Less
Chapter 3 suggests that IHL requires non-state entities to fulfil three criteria to form a party to a non-international armed conflict: a group needs to be (1) a collective entity with (2) the ability to ensure respect for basic humanitarian norms, and (3) the capacity to engage in sufficiently intense violence. This chapter discusses how these broad criteria have been interpreted and also develops new ways of how they should be understood in light of the variety of groups engaged in contemporary armed conflicts and the increasing fragmentation of groups. Instead of simply recounting factors established in international jurisprudence, this chapter reconsiders these factors’ actual relevance and shows how they can be helpful in proving the three identified criteria. In its final part, Chapter 3 applies the identified criteria to two specific cases: transnational armed groups such as the Islamic State Group, and cyber groups such as Anonymous.
Samuel Helfont
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- April 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190843311
- eISBN:
- 9780190843342
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190843311.003.0014
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter discusses how the breakdown of the Iraqi regime in 2003 led to religious insurgencies in Iraq. Sunni Islamists and jihadists were given the space and opportunity to organize in a way ...
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This chapter discusses how the breakdown of the Iraqi regime in 2003 led to religious insurgencies in Iraq. Sunni Islamists and jihadists were given the space and opportunity to organize in a way that would have been unthinkable prior to 2003. Within the Shi’i community, Islamists from the Sadrist trend in Iraq, and Iranian backed religious actors, emerged in southern Iraq and in Baghdad. Over the previous decade, religious institutions had begun to play important roles in education, politics, and security. They continued playing this role post-2003; but because the authoritarian controls of the former regime no longer existed, these institutions were often controlled by extremist and sectarian actors. The result was insurgencies launched by the Sadrists, Sunni Islamists, al-Qaida, and eventually the Islamic State.Less
This chapter discusses how the breakdown of the Iraqi regime in 2003 led to religious insurgencies in Iraq. Sunni Islamists and jihadists were given the space and opportunity to organize in a way that would have been unthinkable prior to 2003. Within the Shi’i community, Islamists from the Sadrist trend in Iraq, and Iranian backed religious actors, emerged in southern Iraq and in Baghdad. Over the previous decade, religious institutions had begun to play important roles in education, politics, and security. They continued playing this role post-2003; but because the authoritarian controls of the former regime no longer existed, these institutions were often controlled by extremist and sectarian actors. The result was insurgencies launched by the Sadrists, Sunni Islamists, al-Qaida, and eventually the Islamic State.
