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Al‐Qaeda, September 11, 2001

Stephen Holmes

in Making Sense of Suicide Missions

Many of the key actors in the 9/11 drama articulated their grievances using archaic religious language. But the very fact that the code involved is ancient while the behaviour that needs to be ... More

Many of the key actors in the 9/11 drama articulated their grievances using archaic religious language. But the very fact that the code involved is ancient while the behaviour that needs to be explained is recent suggests the inadequacy of causal theories that overemphasize the religious element. This chapter examines whether non-religious motives may well have been predominant in the 9/11 mission. To pursue this suggestion, the inquiry is divided into two parts, discussing first the perpetrators and then the instigators and supervisors of the plot.Less

 Religious Antiglobalism

Mark Juergensmeyer

in Religion in Global Civil Society

This essay explores the rise, characteristics, and agendas of religious antiglobalism movements. Using al-Qaeda and Ayatollah Khomeini as key examples, it describes how anti-secular, anti-Western ... More

This essay explores the rise, characteristics, and agendas of religious antiglobalism movements. Using al-Qaeda and Ayatollah Khomeini as key examples, it describes how anti-secular, anti-Western views merge with antiglobalism. It also highlights the ironic pairing, in some cases, of an antiglobal movement that relies on transnational networks. The essay concludes by projecting three possible futures of religious antiglobalism: one where religious and ethnic politics ignore globalization, another where they rail against it, and yet another where they envision their own transnational futures.Less

Religion and Terrorism: Misreading al Qaeda

Paul Marshall

in Blind Spot: When Journalists Don't Get Religion

This chapter describes Islamist terrorists’ developed ideology and how to them this explains and justifies their brutalities. It then contrasts their stated motives and rationales with press coverage ... More

This chapter describes Islamist terrorists’ developed ideology and how to them this explains and justifies their brutalities. It then contrasts their stated motives and rationales with press coverage of their attacks in Yemen, Bali, Iraq, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, seeking to show that both the terrorists’ goals and the identity of their victims are repeatedly misstated. Whereas Al Qaeda consistently describes its intended targets in religious loaded terms—as Christians, Jews, Crusaders, followers of the cross, Hindus, Buddhists, apostates, idolaters, infidels, and polytheists—and will frequently spare people, even Americans, if they are Muslims, many journalists consistently describe Al Qaeda strikes as attacks on “westerners,” “non-Arabs,” or “Americans” and their allies. Consequently, the connection between Australian and United Nations actions in East Timor and the bombings in Bali and of the UN compound in Baghdad were missed almost entirely.Less

Conclusion

Nadav Samin

in Of Sand or Soil: Genealogy and Tribal Belonging in Saudi Arabia

This concluding chapter examines the notion that a genealogical rule of governance pervades Saudi Arabia in relation to Wahhabism and Islam. It suggests that Saudi Arabia's modern genealogical ... More

This concluding chapter examines the notion that a genealogical rule of governance pervades Saudi Arabia in relation to Wahhabism and Islam. It suggests that Saudi Arabia's modern genealogical culture is a direct consequence of the rise of Salaf religiosity in the kingdom and that the acute genealogical consciousness of modern Saudi society is a form of bedouin tribal vengeance against modernity. Just as the economic paternalism of the Saudi state has influenced the discourse and strategies of al-Qaeda, the kingdom's economic model has played an important role in shaping its modern genealogical culture as well. The chapter also discusses Hamad al-Jāsir's genealogical project, which preceded the wholesale politicization of the Saudi oral culture, and argues that the attachment to the Arabian past that drove such project was real and visceral, rather than an ideological fetish encouraged or manufactured by the Saudi state.Less

Introduction

Alia Brahimi

in Jihad and Just War in the War on Terror

This introductory chapter begins with the observation that both ‘sides’ of the ‘war on terror’ claim to be fighting a just war. The Bush administration and al‐Qaeda have each deliberately invoked ... More

This introductory chapter begins with the observation that both ‘sides’ of the ‘war on terror’ claim to be fighting a just war. The Bush administration and al‐Qaeda have each deliberately invoked their respective just war traditions. Yet within each tradition, the arguments put forward for the resort to war and for the way in which war is fought have been feverishly contested. Hence, the normative clashes within the Western and Islamic worlds are as relevant as any supposed clash between them. The chapter also lays out the book's conceptual assumptions—that traditions are constantly evolving and that ideas are urgently relevant to understanding international relations—and offers an overview of the remainder of the book.Less

Jihad and Al‐Qaeda's Just Cause

Alia Brahimi

in Jihad and Just War in the War on Terror

This chapter begins with an overview of the development of the Islamic just war tradition (jihad). It then narrows the focus to the critical issue of just cause. Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman ... More

This chapter begins with an overview of the development of the Islamic just war tradition (jihad). It then narrows the focus to the critical issue of just cause. Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al‐Zawahiri, consistently maintain that aggression is both wrong and illegal, and that in using violence al‐Qaeda is merely repelling America's attacks. However, since the United States had launched no invasion of bin Laden's country before 11 September, be it Saudi Arabia, Sudan or Afghanistan, it was incumbent upon him to redefine the concept of ‘aggression’. This attempt was contested a series of Muslim leaders who described al‐Qaeda as the belligerent party on 9/11.Less

Jus Ad Bellum in Al Qaeda's Jihad

Alia Brahimi

in Jihad and Just War in the War on Terror

This chapter continues the discussion of the Islamic jus ad bellum by looking at Osama bin Laden's just war claims in three other areas: right authority, last resort, and reasonable hope of success. ... More

This chapter continues the discussion of the Islamic jus ad bellum by looking at Osama bin Laden's just war claims in three other areas: right authority, last resort, and reasonable hope of success. In setting out al‐Qaeda's case for war, bin Laden does not depend solely on faith‐based statements about good versus evil. Instead, he offers a series of sometimes intricate arguments that connect with the jihad tradition and endeavour to present al‐Qaeda's cause as authorized, necessary, and practical. Despite his best efforts, however, the legacy of bin Laden's case for the resort to war is that of innovation.Less

Jus in Bello, Suicide Bombing, and Killing Civilians

Alia Brahimi

in Jihad and Just War in the War on Terror

In the 1990s, Osama bin Laden observed proudly that the Afghan jihad against the Russians was unstained by the blood of innocents. Yet, since 1993, civilians have been al‐Qaeda's chosen targets. This ... More

In the 1990s, Osama bin Laden observed proudly that the Afghan jihad against the Russians was unstained by the blood of innocents. Yet, since 1993, civilians have been al‐Qaeda's chosen targets. This chapter explores issues raised by al‐Qaeda's conduct during its war against the United States in the light of Islamic ideas about jus in bello. The first section of this chapter briefly introduces the jus in bello tradition in Islam. The second section discusses the legitimacy of suicide attacks and the place of martyrdom in the Islamic tradition. The final section examines bin Laden's attempts to overturn the robust Islamic protections for civilians in war. Bin Laden himself subscribes to the principle of non‐combatant immunity and employs it in levelling virulent criticism against the US's policies—yet his acceptance of the principle leads him into an unclear and uncomfortable moral position with regard to al‐Qaeda's attacks.Less

Conclusion

Alia Brahimi

in Jihad and Just War in the War on Terror

This chapter synthesizes the discussion in the preceding chapters and offers some conclusions on moral traditions, on just war, on the ‘war on terror’, and on al‐Qaeda. It ends with the argument that ... More

This chapter synthesizes the discussion in the preceding chapters and offers some conclusions on moral traditions, on just war, on the ‘war on terror’, and on al‐Qaeda. It ends with the argument that al‐Qaeda both defines and empowers itself with moral reasoning. And to deny that Osama bin Laden possesses a moral project would be to deny ourselves the most powerful weapon in the campaign against al‐Qaeda: it is precisely because bin Laden invokes the Islamic jihad tradition and simultaneously pushes its moral boundaries that the main source of vulnerability for al‐Qaeda is created.Less

Epilogue

Lisa Hajjar

in Courting Conflict: The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza

On September 19, 2002, the author of this book spent her last day in an Israeli military court. She went with Andre Rosenthal, a leftist Jewish Israeli lawyer, to Erez, the court located in a base at ... More

On September 19, 2002, the author of this book spent her last day in an Israeli military court. She went with Andre Rosenthal, a leftist Jewish Israeli lawyer, to Erez, the court located in a base at the edge of the Gaza Strip. In the courtroom, waiting for the hearings to get underway, soldiers on guard duty kept instructing the five Gaza women and her not to talk or lean on the benches in front of them, and they periodically ordered one or another to move to a different spot. Rosenthal's first case was the high-profile and widely publicized “Palestinian from al-Qaeda.” Rosenthal pointed out a gap in logic between the charges and the confession. Here the author expresses how much she learned in an Israeli military court. In fact, she states that she not want to leave behind or turn away from the suffering and the struggles for rights and justice.Less

Transnational Terrorism

Patrick Stewart

in Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it has become commonplace to assert that weak states are ideal breeding grounds for transnational terrorism. This chapter reviews the evidence for ... More

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it has become commonplace to assert that weak states are ideal breeding grounds for transnational terrorism. This chapter reviews the evidence for the connection between state fragility and transnational terrorism, focusing on al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations, which pose the most acute global terrorist threat. It concludes that the links between these two phenomena are more complex and contingent than conventional wisdom would have us believe.Less

Al-Qaeda: Religious Ideology and Organizational Resilience

Jenna Jordan

in Leadership Decapitation: Strategic Targeting of Terrorist Organizations

Chapter 7 looks at the impact that decapitation attacks have had upon the operational capacity and organizational strength of al-Qaeda Central and al-Qaeda as a whole.

Conclusion

Jenna Jordan

in Leadership Decapitation: Strategic Targeting of Terrorist Organizations

The book concludes with a discussion of the overall findings and theoretical arguments regarding the efficacy of leadership targeting. It then examines 198 instances of targeting efforts against ISIS ... More

The book concludes with a discussion of the overall findings and theoretical arguments regarding the efficacy of leadership targeting. It then examines 198 instances of targeting efforts against ISIS leaders. The theory suggests that targeting is not likely to result in the demise or even a significant weakening of ISIS. It is an Islamist organization, bureaucratized, and with considerable amounts of communal support, albeit decentralized and in many cases coerced. Even if Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is captured or killed and the organization undergoes a brief period of disruption, given the group’s hierarchy of authority and chain of command, it should ultimately choose a successor easily and recover quickly. Furthermore, the statistical results regarding the resilience of large and Islamist organization is consistent with ISIS’s resilience. The chapter concludes with policy recommendations regarding the use and impact of leadership decapitation as a counterterrorism policy.Less

Helping a Friend in Afghanistan

Nigel D. White

in Democracy goes to War: British Military Deployments under International Law

The war on terrorism, starting in earnest with the military action in Afghanistan October 2001, involved British troops acting alongside the United States against al-Qaeda and the Taliban on the ... More

The war on terrorism, starting in earnest with the military action in Afghanistan October 2001, involved British troops acting alongside the United States against al-Qaeda and the Taliban on the basis of the right of self-defence, the same right that was invoked in the Falklands War. Was the British reliance on the right of self-defence controversial either domestically or internationally? Was the fact that the action seemed to have approval from the Security Council, as well as NATO, important? While the initial operation — Operation Enduring Freedom — was based upon article 51 of the UN Charter preserving the right of self-defence, once the Taliban had been removed and al-Qaeda routed, Britain led a Security Council authorized security presence in and around Kabul providing stability while a nascent Afghan government tried to assert authority over the country. Concern was expressed in parliament at ‘mission creep’ as the functions of the NATO force (ISAF) changed, and British troops faced a resurgent Taliban in Helmand province from 2006 onwards.Less

9. Extreme Times, Extreme Measures

David Fisher

in Morality and War: Can War Be Just in the Twenty-first Century?

Following the 9/11 attacks, al‐Qaeda and other terrorist groups pose a threat, operating with global networks and potentially armed with weapons of mass destruction. To counter these threats, US ... More

Following the 9/11 attacks, al‐Qaeda and other terrorist groups pose a threat, operating with global networks and potentially armed with weapons of mass destruction. To counter these threats, US policy‐makers argued that extreme times justify extreme measures. These include pre‐emptive military action to forestall terrorist attacks and new methods of interrogation to uncover them. Just‐war thinking would license neither the new US doctrine of pre‐emption nor the new interrogation techniques. For an absolutist torture is always wrong, but a consequentialist, such as Dershowitz, justifies torture if it could save lives. To understand why torture is wrong we need to deploy all the resources of virtuous consequentialism, attending not just to the consequences but the internal states and character of the torturer and his victim. We want our public servants to be virtuous. Yet we need our special interrogators to be men or women of vice.Less

Ideologies and U.S.-Saudi Relations after the Cold War’s End

Mark L. Haas

in The Clash of Ideologies: Middle Eastern Politics and American Security

This chapter examines the effects of ideologies on U.S.-Saudi relations. It is divided into two main sections. The first explores why the two states were able to establish a close alliance over many ... More

This chapter examines the effects of ideologies on U.S.-Saudi relations. It is divided into two main sections. The first explores why the two states were able to establish a close alliance over many decades during the Cold War despite large ideological differences. This outcome was due to a combination of a number of factors (not just oil) that other relationships rarely possess. These findings help us understand why some ideological enemies and not others are able to ally. The chapter’s second primary objective is to demonstrate how ideological calculations affected in major ways U.S.-Saudi relations after the Cold War’s end, and especially after 2001. The ideological gulf separating Saudi Arabia and the United States weakened the alliance in the 1990s and early 2000s, and mutual enmity against a shared ideological rival—dissident Islamists led by al Qaeda—played a critical role in resuscitating the alliance at a time when it was vulnerable.Less

All About Oil

David Harvey

in Title Pages

My aim is to look at the current condition of global capitalism and the role that a ‘new’ imperialism might be playing within it. I do so from the perspective of the ... More

My aim is to look at the current condition of global capitalism and the role that a ‘new’ imperialism might be playing within it. I do so from the perspective of the long durée and through the lens of what I call historical-geographical materialism. I seek to uncover some of the deeper transformations occurring beneath all the surface turbulence and volatility, and so open up a terrain of debate as to how we might best interpret and react to our present situation. The longest durée any of us can actually experience is, of course, a lifetime. My first understandings of the world were formed during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath. Then, the idea of the British empire still had resonance and meaning. The world seemed open to me because so many spaces on the world map were coloured red, an empire upon which the sun never set. If I needed any additional proof of ownership, I could turn to my stamp collection—the head of the British monarch was on stamps from India, Sarawak, Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Nigeria, Ceylon, Jamaica . . . But I soon had to recognize that British power was in decline. The empire was crumbling at an alarming rate. Britain had ceded global power to the United States and the map of the world started to change colour as decolonization gathered pace. The traumatic events of Indian independence and partition in 1947 signalled the beginning of the end. At first I was given to understand that the trauma was a typical example of what happens when ‘sensible’ and ‘fair’ British rule gets replaced by irrational native passions and reversions to ancient prejudices (a framework for understanding the world that was and is not confined to Britain and has exhibited remarkable durability). But as struggles around decolonization became fiercer, so the seamier and more nefarious side of imperial rule became more salient. This culminated, for me and for many others of my generation, in the Anglo-French attempt to take back the Suez Canal in 1956. Less