Alia Brahimi
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199562961
- eISBN:
- 9780191595059
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199562961.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
In the ‘war on terror’ both sides have taken great pains to justify their actions in moral terms. As force is employed so are sophisticated arguments which directly invoke the just war traditions of ...
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In the ‘war on terror’ both sides have taken great pains to justify their actions in moral terms. As force is employed so are sophisticated arguments which directly invoke the just war traditions of the West and Islam. This book explores the moral‐theological arguments for war offered by the George W. Bush administration and al‐Qaeda. It examines the way in which these actors have drawn upon key just war concepts and, in some cases, reconceptualized their scope and content. The book's principal contention is that, in significant ways, the just war arguments of Bush and bin Laden are inconsistent with the moral requirements of their respective just war traditions. In two parts, the book examines these arguments in relation to the body of thought which comprises the Western just war tradition and that of Islamic jihad, and assesses the consistency of Bush and bin Laden's claims. The central argument of the book—that the Bush administration and al‐Qaeda depart from important consensuses about justified warfare—contains within it an alternative way of understanding the war on terror. Rather than a clash between civilizations, it is suggested that the war on terror can be accounted for by a clash within civilizations: in resorting to violence, both sides have acted against their own traditions and contravened the requirements of their own civilizations.Less
In the ‘war on terror’ both sides have taken great pains to justify their actions in moral terms. As force is employed so are sophisticated arguments which directly invoke the just war traditions of the West and Islam. This book explores the moral‐theological arguments for war offered by the George W. Bush administration and al‐Qaeda. It examines the way in which these actors have drawn upon key just war concepts and, in some cases, reconceptualized their scope and content. The book's principal contention is that, in significant ways, the just war arguments of Bush and bin Laden are inconsistent with the moral requirements of their respective just war traditions. In two parts, the book examines these arguments in relation to the body of thought which comprises the Western just war tradition and that of Islamic jihad, and assesses the consistency of Bush and bin Laden's claims. The central argument of the book—that the Bush administration and al‐Qaeda depart from important consensuses about justified warfare—contains within it an alternative way of understanding the war on terror. Rather than a clash between civilizations, it is suggested that the war on terror can be accounted for by a clash within civilizations: in resorting to violence, both sides have acted against their own traditions and contravened the requirements of their own civilizations.
Stephen Holmes
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199276998
- eISBN:
- 9780191707735
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276998.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Many of the key actors in the 9/11 drama articulated their grievances using archaic religious language. But the very fact that the code involved is ancient while the behaviour that needs to be ...
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Many of the key actors in the 9/11 drama articulated their grievances using archaic religious language. But the very fact that the code involved is ancient while the behaviour that needs to be explained is recent suggests the inadequacy of causal theories that overemphasize the religious element. This chapter examines whether non-religious motives may well have been predominant in the 9/11 mission. To pursue this suggestion, the inquiry is divided into two parts, discussing first the perpetrators and then the instigators and supervisors of the plot.Less
Many of the key actors in the 9/11 drama articulated their grievances using archaic religious language. But the very fact that the code involved is ancient while the behaviour that needs to be explained is recent suggests the inadequacy of causal theories that overemphasize the religious element. This chapter examines whether non-religious motives may well have been predominant in the 9/11 mission. To pursue this suggestion, the inquiry is divided into two parts, discussing first the perpetrators and then the instigators and supervisors of the plot.
Patrick Stewart
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199751501
- eISBN:
- 9780199895366
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199751501.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it has become commonplace to assert that weak states are ideal breeding grounds for transnational terrorism. This chapter reviews the evidence for ...
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Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it has become commonplace to assert that weak states are ideal breeding grounds for transnational terrorism. This chapter reviews the evidence for the connection between state fragility and transnational terrorism, focusing on al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations, which pose the most acute global terrorist threat. It concludes that the links between these two phenomena are more complex and contingent than conventional wisdom would have us believe.Less
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it has become commonplace to assert that weak states are ideal breeding grounds for transnational terrorism. This chapter reviews the evidence for the connection between state fragility and transnational terrorism, focusing on al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations, which pose the most acute global terrorist threat. It concludes that the links between these two phenomena are more complex and contingent than conventional wisdom would have us believe.
Alia Brahimi
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199562961
- eISBN:
- 9780191595059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199562961.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter continues the discussion of the Islamic jus ad bellum by looking at Osama bin Laden's just war claims in three other areas: right authority, last resort, and reasonable hope of success. ...
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This chapter continues the discussion of the Islamic jus ad bellum by looking at Osama bin Laden's just war claims in three other areas: right authority, last resort, and reasonable hope of success. In setting out al‐Qaeda's case for war, bin Laden does not depend solely on faith‐based statements about good versus evil. Instead, he offers a series of sometimes intricate arguments that connect with the jihad tradition and endeavour to present al‐Qaeda's cause as authorized, necessary, and practical. Despite his best efforts, however, the legacy of bin Laden's case for the resort to war is that of innovation.Less
This chapter continues the discussion of the Islamic jus ad bellum by looking at Osama bin Laden's just war claims in three other areas: right authority, last resort, and reasonable hope of success. In setting out al‐Qaeda's case for war, bin Laden does not depend solely on faith‐based statements about good versus evil. Instead, he offers a series of sometimes intricate arguments that connect with the jihad tradition and endeavour to present al‐Qaeda's cause as authorized, necessary, and practical. Despite his best efforts, however, the legacy of bin Laden's case for the resort to war is that of innovation.
Diego Gambetta
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199276998
- eISBN:
- 9780191707735
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276998.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This book attempts to shed light on suicide missions and provide answers to the questions we all ask. Are these the actions of aggressive religious zealots and unbridled, irrational radicals or is ...
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This book attempts to shed light on suicide missions and provide answers to the questions we all ask. Are these the actions of aggressive religious zealots and unbridled, irrational radicals or is there a logic driving those behind them? Are their motivations religious or has Islam provided a language to express essentially political causes? How can the perpetrators remain so lucidly effective in the face of certain death? And do these disparate attacks have something like a common cause? It focuses on four main instances: the Kamikaze, missions carried out by the Tamil Tigers in the civil war in Sri Lanka, the Lebanese and Palestinian groups in the Middle East, and the al-Qaeda 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. For more than two years, the authors have pursued an unprejudiced inquiry, investigating organizers and perpetrators alike of this extraordinary social phenomenon. Close comparisons between a whole range of cases raise challenging further questions: If suicide missions are so effective, why are they not more common? If killing is what matters, why not stick to ‘ordinary’ violent means? Or, if dying is what matters, why kill in the process?Less
This book attempts to shed light on suicide missions and provide answers to the questions we all ask. Are these the actions of aggressive religious zealots and unbridled, irrational radicals or is there a logic driving those behind them? Are their motivations religious or has Islam provided a language to express essentially political causes? How can the perpetrators remain so lucidly effective in the face of certain death? And do these disparate attacks have something like a common cause? It focuses on four main instances: the Kamikaze, missions carried out by the Tamil Tigers in the civil war in Sri Lanka, the Lebanese and Palestinian groups in the Middle East, and the al-Qaeda 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. For more than two years, the authors have pursued an unprejudiced inquiry, investigating organizers and perpetrators alike of this extraordinary social phenomenon. Close comparisons between a whole range of cases raise challenging further questions: If suicide missions are so effective, why are they not more common? If killing is what matters, why not stick to ‘ordinary’ violent means? Or, if dying is what matters, why kill in the process?
Jason Ralph
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199214310
- eISBN:
- 9780191706615
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214310.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The evidence presented in previous chapters contributes to the general argument that the US defends the idea of a society of states because it is in the kind of society that America can preserve a ...
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The evidence presented in previous chapters contributes to the general argument that the US defends the idea of a society of states because it is in the kind of society that America can preserve a preferred self‐image and can best advance its particular interests. This chapter develops that argument one stage further by focusing on the US response to the terrorist attacks of 9–11. From the perspective of the Bush administration, only those fighting on behalf of sovereign states could claim a right to lawful belligerency and the right to protection under the laws of war. Dealing with the terrorist threat through the norms of the society of states, therefore, provided additional normative criteria to delegitimize Al Qaeda and it put the issue of counter‐terrorism in a legal and political setting the US could, as the most powerful state, more or less dictate. The chapter provides historical context to this policy by focusing on the US rejection of Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions and illustrates how US lawyers also used the concept of sovereignty in an attempt to escape the oversight of national as well as international courts.Less
The evidence presented in previous chapters contributes to the general argument that the US defends the idea of a society of states because it is in the kind of society that America can preserve a preferred self‐image and can best advance its particular interests. This chapter develops that argument one stage further by focusing on the US response to the terrorist attacks of 9–11. From the perspective of the Bush administration, only those fighting on behalf of sovereign states could claim a right to lawful belligerency and the right to protection under the laws of war. Dealing with the terrorist threat through the norms of the society of states, therefore, provided additional normative criteria to delegitimize Al Qaeda and it put the issue of counter‐terrorism in a legal and political setting the US could, as the most powerful state, more or less dictate. The chapter provides historical context to this policy by focusing on the US rejection of Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions and illustrates how US lawyers also used the concept of sovereignty in an attempt to escape the oversight of national as well as international courts.
Michael Ryan
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231163842
- eISBN:
- 9780231533270
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231163842.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This book provides an effective framework for analyzing al-Qaeda's plans against America and encourages strategists and researchers to devote greater attention to jihadi ideas rather than jihadist ...
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This book provides an effective framework for analyzing al-Qaeda's plans against America and encourages strategists and researchers to devote greater attention to jihadi ideas rather than jihadist military operations. It constructs a counter narrative to the West's supposed “war on Islam,” finding that jihadist terrorism strategy has more in common with the principles of Maoist guerrilla warfare than mainstream Islam. The book examines the Salafist roots of al-Qaeda ideology and the contributions of its most famous founders, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. It also looks at the Arabic-language works of lesser known theoreticians who have played an instrumental role in framing al-Qaeda's so-called war of the oppressed. It shows that these authors readily cite the guerrilla strategies of Mao, Che Guevara, and the mastermind of the Vietnam War, General Giap, and also shows that they incorporate the arguments of American theorists writing on “fourth-generation warfare.” The book argues that al-Qaeda's political-military strategy is a revolutionary and largely secular departure from the classic Muslim conception of jihad. In this way, the book adds new dimensions to the operational, psychological, and informational strategies already deployed by America's military in the region.Less
This book provides an effective framework for analyzing al-Qaeda's plans against America and encourages strategists and researchers to devote greater attention to jihadi ideas rather than jihadist military operations. It constructs a counter narrative to the West's supposed “war on Islam,” finding that jihadist terrorism strategy has more in common with the principles of Maoist guerrilla warfare than mainstream Islam. The book examines the Salafist roots of al-Qaeda ideology and the contributions of its most famous founders, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. It also looks at the Arabic-language works of lesser known theoreticians who have played an instrumental role in framing al-Qaeda's so-called war of the oppressed. It shows that these authors readily cite the guerrilla strategies of Mao, Che Guevara, and the mastermind of the Vietnam War, General Giap, and also shows that they incorporate the arguments of American theorists writing on “fourth-generation warfare.” The book argues that al-Qaeda's political-military strategy is a revolutionary and largely secular departure from the classic Muslim conception of jihad. In this way, the book adds new dimensions to the operational, psychological, and informational strategies already deployed by America's military in the region.
Jenna Jordan
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781503608245
- eISBN:
- 9781503610675
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9781503608245.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
Chapter 7 looks at the impact that decapitation attacks have had upon the operational capacity and organizational strength of al-Qaeda Central and al-Qaeda as a whole.
Chapter 7 looks at the impact that decapitation attacks have had upon the operational capacity and organizational strength of al-Qaeda Central and al-Qaeda as a whole.
Alia Brahimi
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199562961
- eISBN:
- 9780191595059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199562961.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter begins with an overview of the development of the Islamic just war tradition (jihad). It then narrows the focus to the critical issue of just cause. Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman ...
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This chapter begins with an overview of the development of the Islamic just war tradition (jihad). It then narrows the focus to the critical issue of just cause. Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al‐Zawahiri, consistently maintain that aggression is both wrong and illegal, and that in using violence al‐Qaeda is merely repelling America's attacks. However, since the United States had launched no invasion of bin Laden's country before 11 September, be it Saudi Arabia, Sudan or Afghanistan, it was incumbent upon him to redefine the concept of ‘aggression’. This attempt was contested a series of Muslim leaders who described al‐Qaeda as the belligerent party on 9/11.Less
This chapter begins with an overview of the development of the Islamic just war tradition (jihad). It then narrows the focus to the critical issue of just cause. Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al‐Zawahiri, consistently maintain that aggression is both wrong and illegal, and that in using violence al‐Qaeda is merely repelling America's attacks. However, since the United States had launched no invasion of bin Laden's country before 11 September, be it Saudi Arabia, Sudan or Afghanistan, it was incumbent upon him to redefine the concept of ‘aggression’. This attempt was contested a series of Muslim leaders who described al‐Qaeda as the belligerent party on 9/11.
Michael W. S. Ryan
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231163842
- eISBN:
- 9780231533270
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231163842.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter discusses al-Qaeda's chief strategists: Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi and Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin. Al-Qurashi, an advisor to Bin Laden, wrote a number of articles in military strategy in the online ...
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This chapter discusses al-Qaeda's chief strategists: Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi and Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin. Al-Qurashi, an advisor to Bin Laden, wrote a number of articles in military strategy in the online magazine Al-Ansar (2002–2003). He aimed to prove to other jihadists and potential recruits that al-Qaeda could defeat the U.S. To overcome the belief that a military victory over the United States was a highly improbable outcome, he emphasized real or imagined shortcomings of American power and prowess. In conjunction with al-Qurashi's efforts, al-Muqrin wrote the Practical Course for Guerrilla War, a concise account of al-Qaeda's tactics and strategy, specifically used to train the organization's members and recruits.Less
This chapter discusses al-Qaeda's chief strategists: Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi and Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin. Al-Qurashi, an advisor to Bin Laden, wrote a number of articles in military strategy in the online magazine Al-Ansar (2002–2003). He aimed to prove to other jihadists and potential recruits that al-Qaeda could defeat the U.S. To overcome the belief that a military victory over the United States was a highly improbable outcome, he emphasized real or imagined shortcomings of American power and prowess. In conjunction with al-Qurashi's efforts, al-Muqrin wrote the Practical Course for Guerrilla War, a concise account of al-Qaeda's tactics and strategy, specifically used to train the organization's members and recruits.
Alia Brahimi
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199562961
- eISBN:
- 9780191595059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199562961.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
In the 1990s, Osama bin Laden observed proudly that the Afghan jihad against the Russians was unstained by the blood of innocents. Yet, since 1993, civilians have been al‐Qaeda's chosen targets. This ...
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In the 1990s, Osama bin Laden observed proudly that the Afghan jihad against the Russians was unstained by the blood of innocents. Yet, since 1993, civilians have been al‐Qaeda's chosen targets. This chapter explores issues raised by al‐Qaeda's conduct during its war against the United States in the light of Islamic ideas about jus in bello. The first section of this chapter briefly introduces the jus in bello tradition in Islam. The second section discusses the legitimacy of suicide attacks and the place of martyrdom in the Islamic tradition. The final section examines bin Laden's attempts to overturn the robust Islamic protections for civilians in war. Bin Laden himself subscribes to the principle of non‐combatant immunity and employs it in levelling virulent criticism against the US's policies—yet his acceptance of the principle leads him into an unclear and uncomfortable moral position with regard to al‐Qaeda's attacks.Less
In the 1990s, Osama bin Laden observed proudly that the Afghan jihad against the Russians was unstained by the blood of innocents. Yet, since 1993, civilians have been al‐Qaeda's chosen targets. This chapter explores issues raised by al‐Qaeda's conduct during its war against the United States in the light of Islamic ideas about jus in bello. The first section of this chapter briefly introduces the jus in bello tradition in Islam. The second section discusses the legitimacy of suicide attacks and the place of martyrdom in the Islamic tradition. The final section examines bin Laden's attempts to overturn the robust Islamic protections for civilians in war. Bin Laden himself subscribes to the principle of non‐combatant immunity and employs it in levelling virulent criticism against the US's policies—yet his acceptance of the principle leads him into an unclear and uncomfortable moral position with regard to al‐Qaeda's attacks.
Paul Marshall
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195374360
- eISBN:
- 9780199871902
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195374360.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter describes Islamist terrorists’ developed ideology and how to them this explains and justifies their brutalities. It then contrasts their stated motives and rationales with press coverage ...
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This chapter describes Islamist terrorists’ developed ideology and how to them this explains and justifies their brutalities. It then contrasts their stated motives and rationales with press coverage of their attacks in Yemen, Bali, Iraq, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, seeking to show that both the terrorists’ goals and the identity of their victims are repeatedly misstated. Whereas Al Qaeda consistently describes its intended targets in religious loaded terms—as Christians, Jews, Crusaders, followers of the cross, Hindus, Buddhists, apostates, idolaters, infidels, and polytheists—and will frequently spare people, even Americans, if they are Muslims, many journalists consistently describe Al Qaeda strikes as attacks on “westerners,” “non-Arabs,” or “Americans” and their allies. Consequently, the connection between Australian and United Nations actions in East Timor and the bombings in Bali and of the UN compound in Baghdad were missed almost entirely.Less
This chapter describes Islamist terrorists’ developed ideology and how to them this explains and justifies their brutalities. It then contrasts their stated motives and rationales with press coverage of their attacks in Yemen, Bali, Iraq, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, seeking to show that both the terrorists’ goals and the identity of their victims are repeatedly misstated. Whereas Al Qaeda consistently describes its intended targets in religious loaded terms—as Christians, Jews, Crusaders, followers of the cross, Hindus, Buddhists, apostates, idolaters, infidels, and polytheists—and will frequently spare people, even Americans, if they are Muslims, many journalists consistently describe Al Qaeda strikes as attacks on “westerners,” “non-Arabs,” or “Americans” and their allies. Consequently, the connection between Australian and United Nations actions in East Timor and the bombings in Bali and of the UN compound in Baghdad were missed almost entirely.
Alia Brahimi
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199562961
- eISBN:
- 9780191595059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199562961.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter synthesizes the discussion in the preceding chapters and offers some conclusions on moral traditions, on just war, on the ‘war on terror’, and on al‐Qaeda. It ends with the argument that ...
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This chapter synthesizes the discussion in the preceding chapters and offers some conclusions on moral traditions, on just war, on the ‘war on terror’, and on al‐Qaeda. It ends with the argument that al‐Qaeda both defines and empowers itself with moral reasoning. And to deny that Osama bin Laden possesses a moral project would be to deny ourselves the most powerful weapon in the campaign against al‐Qaeda: it is precisely because bin Laden invokes the Islamic jihad tradition and simultaneously pushes its moral boundaries that the main source of vulnerability for al‐Qaeda is created.Less
This chapter synthesizes the discussion in the preceding chapters and offers some conclusions on moral traditions, on just war, on the ‘war on terror’, and on al‐Qaeda. It ends with the argument that al‐Qaeda both defines and empowers itself with moral reasoning. And to deny that Osama bin Laden possesses a moral project would be to deny ourselves the most powerful weapon in the campaign against al‐Qaeda: it is precisely because bin Laden invokes the Islamic jihad tradition and simultaneously pushes its moral boundaries that the main source of vulnerability for al‐Qaeda is created.
Michael W. S. Ryan
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231163842
- eISBN:
- 9780231533270
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231163842.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter focuses on the content and implications of Abu Bakr Naji's book, The Administration of Savagery—a concise account of al-Qaeda's regional insurgency in U.S. and its surrounding allies. ...
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This chapter focuses on the content and implications of Abu Bakr Naji's book, The Administration of Savagery—a concise account of al-Qaeda's regional insurgency in U.S. and its surrounding allies. The book expounds on the strategic political-military context of al-Muqrin's description of al-Qaeda's military doctrine, and examines al-Qaeda's jihad in Saudi Arabia or even the Arabian Peninsula as the top leadership's strategic guide to insurgency. It contains instructions on how al-Qaeda could defeat the U.S. by using a global strategy based on regional jihad, and details the most important rules and policies to facilitate an action plan for regional and administrative aggravation. Naji's book was used by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as a training tool for jihad within its cells both in Saudi Arabia and in Yemen.Less
This chapter focuses on the content and implications of Abu Bakr Naji's book, The Administration of Savagery—a concise account of al-Qaeda's regional insurgency in U.S. and its surrounding allies. The book expounds on the strategic political-military context of al-Muqrin's description of al-Qaeda's military doctrine, and examines al-Qaeda's jihad in Saudi Arabia or even the Arabian Peninsula as the top leadership's strategic guide to insurgency. It contains instructions on how al-Qaeda could defeat the U.S. by using a global strategy based on regional jihad, and details the most important rules and policies to facilitate an action plan for regional and administrative aggravation. Naji's book was used by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as a training tool for jihad within its cells both in Saudi Arabia and in Yemen.
Mark Juergensmeyer
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195188356
- eISBN:
- 9780199785247
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195188356.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This essay explores the rise, characteristics, and agendas of religious antiglobalism movements. Using al-Qaeda and Ayatollah Khomeini as key examples, it describes how anti-secular, anti-Western ...
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This essay explores the rise, characteristics, and agendas of religious antiglobalism movements. Using al-Qaeda and Ayatollah Khomeini as key examples, it describes how anti-secular, anti-Western views merge with antiglobalism. It also highlights the ironic pairing, in some cases, of an antiglobal movement that relies on transnational networks. The essay concludes by projecting three possible futures of religious antiglobalism: one where religious and ethnic politics ignore globalization, another where they rail against it, and yet another where they envision their own transnational futures.Less
This essay explores the rise, characteristics, and agendas of religious antiglobalism movements. Using al-Qaeda and Ayatollah Khomeini as key examples, it describes how anti-secular, anti-Western views merge with antiglobalism. It also highlights the ironic pairing, in some cases, of an antiglobal movement that relies on transnational networks. The essay concludes by projecting three possible futures of religious antiglobalism: one where religious and ethnic politics ignore globalization, another where they rail against it, and yet another where they envision their own transnational futures.
Alia Brahimi
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199562961
- eISBN:
- 9780191595059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199562961.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This introductory chapter begins with the observation that both ‘sides’ of the ‘war on terror’ claim to be fighting a just war. The Bush administration and al‐Qaeda have each deliberately invoked ...
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This introductory chapter begins with the observation that both ‘sides’ of the ‘war on terror’ claim to be fighting a just war. The Bush administration and al‐Qaeda have each deliberately invoked their respective just war traditions. Yet within each tradition, the arguments put forward for the resort to war and for the way in which war is fought have been feverishly contested. Hence, the normative clashes within the Western and Islamic worlds are as relevant as any supposed clash between them. The chapter also lays out the book's conceptual assumptions—that traditions are constantly evolving and that ideas are urgently relevant to understanding international relations—and offers an overview of the remainder of the book.Less
This introductory chapter begins with the observation that both ‘sides’ of the ‘war on terror’ claim to be fighting a just war. The Bush administration and al‐Qaeda have each deliberately invoked their respective just war traditions. Yet within each tradition, the arguments put forward for the resort to war and for the way in which war is fought have been feverishly contested. Hence, the normative clashes within the Western and Islamic worlds are as relevant as any supposed clash between them. The chapter also lays out the book's conceptual assumptions—that traditions are constantly evolving and that ideas are urgently relevant to understanding international relations—and offers an overview of the remainder of the book.
Richard Devetak
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199265206
- eISBN:
- 9780191601866
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199265208.003.0014
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
In his chapter on the rise of terrorism, the author points to two principal challenges to international society: first, terrorism challenges the state's monopoly of legitimate violence (which is also ...
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In his chapter on the rise of terrorism, the author points to two principal challenges to international society: first, terrorism challenges the state's monopoly of legitimate violence (which is also being eroded in a number of other ways); and second, the reaction that Al‐Qaeda has drawn from the USA threatens to create as significant a problem for international society as terrorism itself. The author opens his discussion with a brief survey of the nature of terrorism and the position it has held in the thought of the English School of International Relations: with only one or two minor exceptions, English School writers tended not to incorporate terrorism into their study despite the proliferation of terrorist incidents in the 1970s, and Hedley Bull identified terrorism as simply one of several types of ‘private international violence’. The author suggests two reasons for this apparent oversight: the School's state‐centrism and its resistance to presentism. After discussing the changing nature of terrorism in both its non‐state and state varieties, he moves on to address how terrorism poses a threat to contemporary international order, focusing in particular on terrorism as a breakdown of the state's monopoly on legitimate violence that is essential for the proper functioning of international society. The last part of the chapter describes the rise of the ‘new terrorism’ – which is characterized by religious motivation, greater lethality of attacks, greater technological and operational competence, and the desire to obtain weapons of mass destruction – and its impact on international society, and concludes by arguing that US attempts to tackle terrorism by undermining the basic principles of international society may only help to exacerbate the problem by casting further doubt on the relevance and legitimacy of international order.Less
In his chapter on the rise of terrorism, the author points to two principal challenges to international society: first, terrorism challenges the state's monopoly of legitimate violence (which is also being eroded in a number of other ways); and second, the reaction that Al‐Qaeda has drawn from the USA threatens to create as significant a problem for international society as terrorism itself. The author opens his discussion with a brief survey of the nature of terrorism and the position it has held in the thought of the English School of International Relations: with only one or two minor exceptions, English School writers tended not to incorporate terrorism into their study despite the proliferation of terrorist incidents in the 1970s, and Hedley Bull identified terrorism as simply one of several types of ‘private international violence’. The author suggests two reasons for this apparent oversight: the School's state‐centrism and its resistance to presentism. After discussing the changing nature of terrorism in both its non‐state and state varieties, he moves on to address how terrorism poses a threat to contemporary international order, focusing in particular on terrorism as a breakdown of the state's monopoly on legitimate violence that is essential for the proper functioning of international society. The last part of the chapter describes the rise of the ‘new terrorism’ – which is characterized by religious motivation, greater lethality of attacks, greater technological and operational competence, and the desire to obtain weapons of mass destruction – and its impact on international society, and concludes by arguing that US attempts to tackle terrorism by undermining the basic principles of international society may only help to exacerbate the problem by casting further doubt on the relevance and legitimacy of international order.
Fawaz A. Gerges
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- February 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199790654
- eISBN:
- 9780190252540
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199790654.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics, Comparative Politics
This chapter assesses the present state of the al-Qaeda organization. Al-Qaeda now consists of a collection of roving bands on the run, concentrated mainly on the Pakistan-Afghan border, its top ...
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This chapter assesses the present state of the al-Qaeda organization. Al-Qaeda now consists of a collection of roving bands on the run, concentrated mainly on the Pakistan-Afghan border, its top leaders are deep in hiding. While calling themselves al-Qaeda, local branches are pitted in a fierce local struggle for survival against the near enemy and are unable to coordinate their actions with the parent organization. Remnants of transnational jihad, including al-Qaeda, are in leaderless disarray and face a hostile environment at home and abroad. However, many terrorism experts belittle the debilitating crisis of legitimacy faced by al-Qaeda, as well as the erosion of Muslim support for transnational jihadism. They claim that al-Qaeda is on the rise and consider transnational jihadism a success story.Less
This chapter assesses the present state of the al-Qaeda organization. Al-Qaeda now consists of a collection of roving bands on the run, concentrated mainly on the Pakistan-Afghan border, its top leaders are deep in hiding. While calling themselves al-Qaeda, local branches are pitted in a fierce local struggle for survival against the near enemy and are unable to coordinate their actions with the parent organization. Remnants of transnational jihad, including al-Qaeda, are in leaderless disarray and face a hostile environment at home and abroad. However, many terrorism experts belittle the debilitating crisis of legitimacy faced by al-Qaeda, as well as the erosion of Muslim support for transnational jihadism. They claim that al-Qaeda is on the rise and consider transnational jihadism a success story.
Alex J. Bellamy
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199288427
- eISBN:
- 9780191745430
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288427.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics, Political Theory
This chapter examines the radical Islamist ideology of selective extermination espoused by Al Qaeda and the impact of the West's response on civilian immunity. The radical Islamist doctrine holds ...
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This chapter examines the radical Islamist ideology of selective extermination espoused by Al Qaeda and the impact of the West's response on civilian immunity. The radical Islamist doctrine holds that civilian immunity does not apply to non-believers or apostates and that members of these groups may be legitimately killed either as collective punishment for perceived wrongs inflicted on the Muslim world or as a necessary part of a war to establish a world Islamic state (caliphate). Rejected by most of the world's non-Muslims, the ideology is also hotly disputed within the Muslim world itself. The second part examines aspects of the US-led response to radical Islamism. Although the US and its allies have, in the main, attempted to comply with the norm of civilian immunity, some aspects of the War on Terror were conducted in ways that appeared to privilege necessity over civilian immunity. The 2004 assaults on Fallujah stand out in this regard.Less
This chapter examines the radical Islamist ideology of selective extermination espoused by Al Qaeda and the impact of the West's response on civilian immunity. The radical Islamist doctrine holds that civilian immunity does not apply to non-believers or apostates and that members of these groups may be legitimately killed either as collective punishment for perceived wrongs inflicted on the Muslim world or as a necessary part of a war to establish a world Islamic state (caliphate). Rejected by most of the world's non-Muslims, the ideology is also hotly disputed within the Muslim world itself. The second part examines aspects of the US-led response to radical Islamism. Although the US and its allies have, in the main, attempted to comply with the norm of civilian immunity, some aspects of the War on Terror were conducted in ways that appeared to privilege necessity over civilian immunity. The 2004 assaults on Fallujah stand out in this regard.
Fawaz A. Gerges
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- February 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199790654
- eISBN:
- 9780190252540
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199790654.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics, Comparative Politics
This book argues that Al-Qaeda has degenerated into a fractured, marginal body kept alive largely by the self-serving anti-terrorist bureaucracy it helped to spawn. The book argues that the Western ...
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This book argues that Al-Qaeda has degenerated into a fractured, marginal body kept alive largely by the self-serving anti-terrorist bureaucracy it helped to spawn. The book argues that the Western powers have become mired in a “terrorism narrative,” stemming from the mistaken belief that America is in danger of a devastating attack by a crippled al-Qaeda. To explain why al-Qaeda is no longer a threat, it provides a briskly written history of the organization, showing its emergence from the disintegrating local jihadist movements of the mid-1990s—not just the Afghan resistance of the 1980s, as many believe—in a desperate effort to rescue a sinking ship by altering its course. The book reveals that transnational jihad has attracted but a small minority within the Arab world and possesses no viable social and popular base. Furthermore, it shows that the attacks of September 11, 2001, were a major miscalculation—no “river” of fighters flooded from Arab countries to defend al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, as bin Laden expected. The democratic revolutions that swept the Middle East in early 2011 show that al-Qaeda today is a non-entity which exercises no influence over Arabs' political life. The text shows that there is a link between the new phenomenon of homegrown extremism in Western societies and the war on terror, particularly in Afghanistan-Pakistan, and that homegrown terror exposes the structural weakness, not strength, of bin Laden's al-Qaeda. The text concludes that the movement has splintered into feuding factions, neutralizing itself more effectively than any Predator drone.Less
This book argues that Al-Qaeda has degenerated into a fractured, marginal body kept alive largely by the self-serving anti-terrorist bureaucracy it helped to spawn. The book argues that the Western powers have become mired in a “terrorism narrative,” stemming from the mistaken belief that America is in danger of a devastating attack by a crippled al-Qaeda. To explain why al-Qaeda is no longer a threat, it provides a briskly written history of the organization, showing its emergence from the disintegrating local jihadist movements of the mid-1990s—not just the Afghan resistance of the 1980s, as many believe—in a desperate effort to rescue a sinking ship by altering its course. The book reveals that transnational jihad has attracted but a small minority within the Arab world and possesses no viable social and popular base. Furthermore, it shows that the attacks of September 11, 2001, were a major miscalculation—no “river” of fighters flooded from Arab countries to defend al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, as bin Laden expected. The democratic revolutions that swept the Middle East in early 2011 show that al-Qaeda today is a non-entity which exercises no influence over Arabs' political life. The text shows that there is a link between the new phenomenon of homegrown extremism in Western societies and the war on terror, particularly in Afghanistan-Pakistan, and that homegrown terror exposes the structural weakness, not strength, of bin Laden's al-Qaeda. The text concludes that the movement has splintered into feuding factions, neutralizing itself more effectively than any Predator drone.
