Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199896134
- eISBN:
- 9780199949533
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199896134.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim ...
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People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim of this book is to explain why that happens. The first main item of business is to clarify the nature of backsliding – of actions that display some weakness of will. To this end, Mele uses traditional philosophical techniques dating back to Plato and Aristotle (whose work on weakness of will or “akrasia” he discusses) and some new studies in the emerging field of experimental philosophy. He then attacks the thesis that backsliding is an illusion because people never freely act contrary to what they judge best. Mele argues that it is extremely plausible that if people ever act freely, they sometimes backslide. The biggest challenge posed by backsliding is to explain why it happens. At the book’s heart is the development of a theoretical and empirical framework that sheds light both on backsliding and on exercises of self-control that prevent it. Here, Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable. He argues that backsliding is no illusion and our theories about the springs of action, the power of evaluative judgments, human agency, human rationality, practical reasoning, and motivation should accommodate backsliding.Less
People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim of this book is to explain why that happens. The first main item of business is to clarify the nature of backsliding – of actions that display some weakness of will. To this end, Mele uses traditional philosophical techniques dating back to Plato and Aristotle (whose work on weakness of will or “akrasia” he discusses) and some new studies in the emerging field of experimental philosophy. He then attacks the thesis that backsliding is an illusion because people never freely act contrary to what they judge best. Mele argues that it is extremely plausible that if people ever act freely, they sometimes backslide. The biggest challenge posed by backsliding is to explain why it happens. At the book’s heart is the development of a theoretical and empirical framework that sheds light both on backsliding and on exercises of self-control that prevent it. Here, Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable. He argues that backsliding is no illusion and our theories about the springs of action, the power of evaluative judgments, human agency, human rationality, practical reasoning, and motivation should accommodate backsliding.
L. Jonathan Cohen
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198236047
- eISBN:
- 9780191679179
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236047.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This study examines the tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. The book seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the ...
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This study examines the tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. The book seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied at its best in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily accept? And should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, this book examines issues in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.Less
This study examines the tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. The book seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied at its best in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily accept? And should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, this book examines issues in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195150438
- eISBN:
- 9780199869091
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195150430.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Explores the related topics of self‐control and personal autonomy. Self‐control is understood as the contrary of akrasia or weakness of will, and autonomy is placed in the family of metaphysical ...
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Explores the related topics of self‐control and personal autonomy. Self‐control is understood as the contrary of akrasia or weakness of will, and autonomy is placed in the family of metaphysical freedom concepts: most notably, free will, free choice, and free action. The book's first half develops an analysis of the nature of self‐control and explains the potential influence of self‐control on actions, beliefs, reasoning, emotions, and values. It also develops an account of an ideally self‐controlled person and argues that even such a person will fall short of autonomy. The second half of the book first asks what may be added to ideal self‐control to yield autonomy and then defends two distinctive answers, one for compatibilist believers in autonomy (believers in autonomy who see it as compatible with determinism) and another for libertarians (believers in autonomy who see it as incompatible with determinism). The compatibilist answer features an account of control and a sensitivity to agents’ histories, and the libertarian answer adds to this a kind of causal openness that does not require agent causation and that avoids the sort of luck that undermines autonomy and moral responsibility. It is argued that the disjunction of these two answers as applied to actual human beings is more credible than the thesis that there are no autonomous human beings. This is “agnostic autonomism”: the position is agnostic about whether the falsity of determinism is required for autonomy while asserting that it is more credible that there are autonomous human beings than there are not.Less
Explores the related topics of self‐control and personal autonomy. Self‐control is understood as the contrary of akrasia or weakness of will, and autonomy is placed in the family of metaphysical freedom concepts: most notably, free will, free choice, and free action. The book's first half develops an analysis of the nature of self‐control and explains the potential influence of self‐control on actions, beliefs, reasoning, emotions, and values. It also develops an account of an ideally self‐controlled person and argues that even such a person will fall short of autonomy. The second half of the book first asks what may be added to ideal self‐control to yield autonomy and then defends two distinctive answers, one for compatibilist believers in autonomy (believers in autonomy who see it as compatible with determinism) and another for libertarians (believers in autonomy who see it as incompatible with determinism). The compatibilist answer features an account of control and a sensitivity to agents’ histories, and the libertarian answer adds to this a kind of causal openness that does not require agent causation and that avoids the sort of luck that undermines autonomy and moral responsibility. It is argued that the disjunction of these two answers as applied to actual human beings is more credible than the thesis that there are no autonomous human beings. This is “agnostic autonomism”: the position is agnostic about whether the falsity of determinism is required for autonomy while asserting that it is more credible that there are autonomous human beings than there are not.
Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199257362
- eISBN:
- 9780191601842
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257361.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection give a rich overview of ...
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Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness of will and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. They also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. The essays advance two central tasks: exploration of the implications of akrasia and other putatively irrational phenomena for the nature of practical reason and rationality; and consideration of possible explanations for such phenomena. The former intersects with recent theorizing about the nature of practical reason in general, and the latter with work in the philosophy of mind about the kinds of mental states and entities we need to posit in order adequately to understand human action.Less
Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness of will and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. They also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. The essays advance two central tasks: exploration of the implications of akrasia and other putatively irrational phenomena for the nature of practical reason and rationality; and consideration of possible explanations for such phenomena. The former intersects with recent theorizing about the nature of practical reason in general, and the latter with work in the philosophy of mind about the kinds of mental states and entities we need to posit in order adequately to understand human action.
Neil Levy
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199601387
- eISBN:
- 9780191729256
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199601387.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility, yet participants in these debates have relied upon an intuitive notion of what luck is. This ...
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The concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility, yet participants in these debates have relied upon an intuitive notion of what luck is. This book develops an account of luck, which is then applied to the free will debate. It argues that the standard luck objection succeeds against common accounts of libertarian free will, event-causal and agent-causal, but that it is possible to amend libertarian accounts so that they are no more vulnerable to luck than is compatibilism. But the book also argues that compatibilist accounts of luck are themselves vulnerable to a powerful luck objection. Historical compatibilisms cannot satisfactorily explain how agents can take responsibility for their constitutive luck. Non-historical compatibilisms run into insurmountable difficulties with the epistemic condition on control over action. Because a failure to satisfy the epistemic condition on control is excusing, the book argues, if there are any actions for which agents are responsible, they are akratic actions; for non-akratic actions, agents either fail to satisfy the epistemic condition on moral responsibility or lack control in some other way. But akratic actions are themselves unacceptably subject to luck. The book ends with a discussion of recent non-historical compatibilisms. Some of these new compatibilisms hold that agents are morally responsible for actions just in case these actions express the agent's attitudes. The book argues that accounts of this type do not offer a viable alternative to control-based compatibilisms. Finally, the book argues that other kinds of non-historical compatibilism have no resources to deploy against the hard luck view because the latter does not entail that instant agents have a different degree of moral responsibility than agents who have a history.Less
The concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility, yet participants in these debates have relied upon an intuitive notion of what luck is. This book develops an account of luck, which is then applied to the free will debate. It argues that the standard luck objection succeeds against common accounts of libertarian free will, event-causal and agent-causal, but that it is possible to amend libertarian accounts so that they are no more vulnerable to luck than is compatibilism. But the book also argues that compatibilist accounts of luck are themselves vulnerable to a powerful luck objection. Historical compatibilisms cannot satisfactorily explain how agents can take responsibility for their constitutive luck. Non-historical compatibilisms run into insurmountable difficulties with the epistemic condition on control over action. Because a failure to satisfy the epistemic condition on control is excusing, the book argues, if there are any actions for which agents are responsible, they are akratic actions; for non-akratic actions, agents either fail to satisfy the epistemic condition on moral responsibility or lack control in some other way. But akratic actions are themselves unacceptably subject to luck. The book ends with a discussion of recent non-historical compatibilisms. Some of these new compatibilisms hold that agents are morally responsible for actions just in case these actions express the agent's attitudes. The book argues that accounts of this type do not offer a viable alternative to control-based compatibilisms. Finally, the book argues that other kinds of non-historical compatibilism have no resources to deploy against the hard luck view because the latter does not entail that instant agents have a different degree of moral responsibility than agents who have a history.
Richard Sorabji
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199256600
- eISBN:
- 9780191712609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.003.0021
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Plato's Socrates denies akrasia (wanting the course one thinks worse), but his Republic allows that Leontius did that, at the cost of revealing a divided soul, since one thing cannot simultaneously ...
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Plato's Socrates denies akrasia (wanting the course one thinks worse), but his Republic allows that Leontius did that, at the cost of revealing a divided soul, since one thing cannot simultaneously have opposite desires about the same thing. Pseudo-Plutarch protests one can have simultaneous opposite capacities. Plato becomes increasingly sensitive to different reasons why one can want the course one thinks worse, but Aristotle concedes Socrates' position that ignorance must be responsible, while explaining the ignorance as types of attention-failure, that allow violation of one's deliberate policy (prohairesis). Since Chrysippus denies Plato's division of the soul, he has to postulate that one's unitary reason oscillates between the better judgement and the worse. The Christians Origen and Augustine deny two souls in us, but accept two wills. One may act with less than one's full will. Christ engaged in a conditional willing comparable to Stoic willing with reservation.Less
Plato's Socrates denies akrasia (wanting the course one thinks worse), but his Republic allows that Leontius did that, at the cost of revealing a divided soul, since one thing cannot simultaneously have opposite desires about the same thing. Pseudo-Plutarch protests one can have simultaneous opposite capacities. Plato becomes increasingly sensitive to different reasons why one can want the course one thinks worse, but Aristotle concedes Socrates' position that ignorance must be responsible, while explaining the ignorance as types of attention-failure, that allow violation of one's deliberate policy (prohairesis). Since Chrysippus denies Plato's division of the soul, he has to postulate that one's unitary reason oscillates between the better judgement and the worse. The Christians Origen and Augustine deny two souls in us, but accept two wills. One may act with less than one's full will. Christ engaged in a conditional willing comparable to Stoic willing with reservation.
David Wolfsdorf
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195327328
- eISBN:
- 9780199870646
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327328.003.0002
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Ancient Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy
This chapter explains how arguments in Meno, Protagoras, and Lysis present a coherent conception of desire. Furthermore, it is argued that the much discussed passage at Gorgias 466–68 is ...
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This chapter explains how arguments in Meno, Protagoras, and Lysis present a coherent conception of desire. Furthermore, it is argued that the much discussed passage at Gorgias 466–68 is hermeneutically insignificant for the early dialogues' conception of desire. Finally, the chapter examines salient forms of antiphilosophical desire among the texts: philotimia (love of honor) and philhêdonia (love of pleasure).Less
This chapter explains how arguments in Meno, Protagoras, and Lysis present a coherent conception of desire. Furthermore, it is argued that the much discussed passage at Gorgias 466–68 is hermeneutically insignificant for the early dialogues' conception of desire. Finally, the chapter examines salient forms of antiphilosophical desire among the texts: philotimia (love of honor) and philhêdonia (love of pleasure).
C. C. W. Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199226399
- eISBN:
- 9780191710209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226399.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter reconsiders the question of whether Socrates is represented in the Protagoras as maintaining some version of hedonism in his own person, or merely arguing ad hominem that the sophists ...
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This chapter reconsiders the question of whether Socrates is represented in the Protagoras as maintaining some version of hedonism in his own person, or merely arguing ad hominem that the sophists and/or ordinary people are committed to hedonism. While the author had previously maintained the former, the present chapter argues — by close attention to the details of the text — that Plato deliberately leaves the question open. It is suggested that he does so because the cognitive theory of the early dialogues needs to be supplemented by an account of the good, and that he wished to explore the theory that pleasure is the good without explicitly endorsing it.Less
This chapter reconsiders the question of whether Socrates is represented in the Protagoras as maintaining some version of hedonism in his own person, or merely arguing ad hominem that the sophists and/or ordinary people are committed to hedonism. While the author had previously maintained the former, the present chapter argues — by close attention to the details of the text — that Plato deliberately leaves the question open. It is suggested that he does so because the cognitive theory of the early dialogues needs to be supplemented by an account of the good, and that he wished to explore the theory that pleasure is the good without explicitly endorsing it.
Joseph Heath
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195370294
- eISBN:
- 9780199871230
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370294.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The argument of the previous chapter suggests that, in general, people act in the way that they have best reason to act. This constitutes a tacit denial of the view that there is such a thing as ...
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The argument of the previous chapter suggests that, in general, people act in the way that they have best reason to act. This constitutes a tacit denial of the view that there is such a thing as intentional counterpreferential choice. The argument of this chapter makes this denial more plausible, by drawing out the philosophical implications of the phenomenon of hyperbolic discounting. The philosophical literature on weakness of will is marred by a failure to render explicit any assumptions that may be being made about individual time-preference. Incorporating an explicit discount rate resolves many of these issues, but also shows how many of the phenomena traditional classified as weakness of will can easily be given a rationalizing explanation, as temporary preference reversals.Less
The argument of the previous chapter suggests that, in general, people act in the way that they have best reason to act. This constitutes a tacit denial of the view that there is such a thing as intentional counterpreferential choice. The argument of this chapter makes this denial more plausible, by drawing out the philosophical implications of the phenomenon of hyperbolic discounting. The philosophical literature on weakness of will is marred by a failure to render explicit any assumptions that may be being made about individual time-preference. Incorporating an explicit discount rate resolves many of these issues, but also shows how many of the phenomena traditional classified as weakness of will can easily be given a rationalizing explanation, as temporary preference reversals.
Nigel Voak
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199260393
- eISBN:
- 9780191602146
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199260397.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Examines Hooker’s philosophy of action, and in particular his views on defective action and belief-formation, in order to understand how the mental faculties, examined in the previous chapter, ...
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Examines Hooker’s philosophy of action, and in particular his views on defective action and belief-formation, in order to understand how the mental faculties, examined in the previous chapter, interact together. It is argued that Hooker stresses the inherently voluntary nature of all sin, and humanity’s potential through diligence to know and choose the good. Attention is given to Hooker’s theory of certainty, which considers just how certain the reason must be in any given case in order to fulfil its responsibilities, and this also forms a fundamental basis for the discussion of religious authority to be found in ch. 4.Less
Examines Hooker’s philosophy of action, and in particular his views on defective action and belief-formation, in order to understand how the mental faculties, examined in the previous chapter, interact together. It is argued that Hooker stresses the inherently voluntary nature of all sin, and humanity’s potential through diligence to know and choose the good. Attention is given to Hooker’s theory of certainty, which considers just how certain the reason must be in any given case in order to fulfil its responsibilities, and this also forms a fundamental basis for the discussion of religious authority to be found in ch. 4.
Sarah Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195376685
- eISBN:
- 9780199776306
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376685.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter investigates whether procrastination is a species of weakness of will. Procrastination resembles weakness of will: the procrastinating agent is not doing x even though he in some sense ...
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This chapter investigates whether procrastination is a species of weakness of will. Procrastination resembles weakness of will: the procrastinating agent is not doing x even though he in some sense thinks he ought to be. However, the more precise characterizations of weakness of will that have been developed in the literature do not capture the full range of cases of procrastination. Is procrastination simply a variety of akrasia? No, because akrasia is a purely synchronic phenomenon, whereas procrastination is poor performance in the management of one’s agency over time. On a recent revisionist account from Holton and McIntyre, weakness of will centrally involves a failure to act on antecedently formed intentions. But this account, even though diachronic, cannot cover all cases of procrastination, either: weakness of will in this sense is exclusively a defect in plan implementation, whereas procrastination is sometimes constituted by defects in plan drafting and adoption.Less
This chapter investigates whether procrastination is a species of weakness of will. Procrastination resembles weakness of will: the procrastinating agent is not doing x even though he in some sense thinks he ought to be. However, the more precise characterizations of weakness of will that have been developed in the literature do not capture the full range of cases of procrastination. Is procrastination simply a variety of akrasia? No, because akrasia is a purely synchronic phenomenon, whereas procrastination is poor performance in the management of one’s agency over time. On a recent revisionist account from Holton and McIntyre, weakness of will centrally involves a failure to act on antecedently formed intentions. But this account, even though diachronic, cannot cover all cases of procrastination, either: weakness of will in this sense is exclusively a defect in plan implementation, whereas procrastination is sometimes constituted by defects in plan drafting and adoption.
Christopher Bobonich
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251438
- eISBN:
- 9780191597084
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251436.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Plato's psychology in the Phaedo and the Republic is committed to a partitioning thesis that partitions the individual human being into a compound of distinct agent‐like parts. This chapter argues ...
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Plato's psychology in the Phaedo and the Republic is committed to a partitioning thesis that partitions the individual human being into a compound of distinct agent‐like parts. This chapter argues that the Laws abandons the Republic's theory of parts of the soul. I examine the Laws’ new theory of akrasia (weakness of will) and some of the implications of the Laws’ new psychology for broader issues in Plato's ethics.Less
Plato's psychology in the Phaedo and the Republic is committed to a partitioning thesis that partitions the individual human being into a compound of distinct agent‐like parts. This chapter argues that the Laws abandons the Republic's theory of parts of the soul. I examine the Laws’ new theory of akrasia (weakness of will) and some of the implications of the Laws’ new psychology for broader issues in Plato's ethics.
Jessica Moss
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199656349
- eISBN:
- 9780191742156
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656349.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter focuses on phantasia’s role in appetites, and in particular in Aristotle’s account of akrasia, weakness of will (acting on appetite against rational desire). This chapter uses Chapter ...
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This chapter focuses on phantasia’s role in appetites, and in particular in Aristotle’s account of akrasia, weakness of will (acting on appetite against rational desire). This chapter uses Chapter 3’s analysis of the apparent good to show that the de Anima contains an overlooked account of akrasia: the akratic is torn between a rational desire for what she judges good, and an appetite for what appears good to her phantasia. The chapter then argues that recognizing this account helps us to solve the interpretative problems that have plagued the more famous account in the ethical works: once we realize that akrasia involves a cognitive conflict similar to that involved in optical illusions, we can use Aristotle’s discussion of illusion in the de Insomniis to show why and how phantasia sometimes wins out over intellect.Less
This chapter focuses on phantasia’s role in appetites, and in particular in Aristotle’s account of akrasia, weakness of will (acting on appetite against rational desire). This chapter uses Chapter 3’s analysis of the apparent good to show that the de Anima contains an overlooked account of akrasia: the akratic is torn between a rational desire for what she judges good, and an appetite for what appears good to her phantasia. The chapter then argues that recognizing this account helps us to solve the interpretative problems that have plagued the more famous account in the ethical works: once we realize that akrasia involves a cognitive conflict similar to that involved in optical illusions, we can use Aristotle’s discussion of illusion in the de Insomniis to show why and how phantasia sometimes wins out over intellect.
Joshua Wilburn
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199666164
- eISBN:
- 9780191751936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199666164.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This paper challenges the commonly held view that Plato acknowledges and accepts the possibility of akrasia in the Laws. It offers a new interpretation of the image of the divine puppet in Book 1 - ...
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This paper challenges the commonly held view that Plato acknowledges and accepts the possibility of akrasia in the Laws. It offers a new interpretation of the image of the divine puppet in Book 1 - the passage often read as an account of akratic action -- and shows that it is not intended as an illustration of akrasia at all. Rather, it provides the moral psychological background for the text by illustrating a broader notion of self-rule as a virtuous condition of the soul (and lack of self-rule as a vicious condition). The paper examines key discussions in the Laws in order to show how Plato makes use of this broader notion of self-rule throughout the dialogue, and argues that nothing Plato says in the Laws commits him to the possibility of akrasia. One significant consequence of this interpretation of the puppet passage is that it avoids the need to posit developmentalism in Plato's late views about the embodied human soul, as some recent commentators have done: the moral psychology of the Laws, on this reading, is not incompatible with the Republic's tripartite theory of the soul.Less
This paper challenges the commonly held view that Plato acknowledges and accepts the possibility of akrasia in the Laws. It offers a new interpretation of the image of the divine puppet in Book 1 - the passage often read as an account of akratic action -- and shows that it is not intended as an illustration of akrasia at all. Rather, it provides the moral psychological background for the text by illustrating a broader notion of self-rule as a virtuous condition of the soul (and lack of self-rule as a vicious condition). The paper examines key discussions in the Laws in order to show how Plato makes use of this broader notion of self-rule throughout the dialogue, and argues that nothing Plato says in the Laws commits him to the possibility of akrasia. One significant consequence of this interpretation of the puppet passage is that it avoids the need to posit developmentalism in Plato's late views about the embodied human soul, as some recent commentators have done: the moral psychology of the Laws, on this reading, is not incompatible with the Republic's tripartite theory of the soul.
Christopher Tilmouth
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199212378
- eISBN:
- 9780191707254
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199212378.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, 17th-century and Restoration Literature
This chapter explores the presentation of the passions in The Faerie Queene, arguing that Spenser treats these as hostile, morally disruptive forces within the soul, powers which reason must fight ...
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This chapter explores the presentation of the passions in The Faerie Queene, arguing that Spenser treats these as hostile, morally disruptive forces within the soul, powers which reason must fight against in a perpetual psychomachia. It examines the limits of Spenser's debt to Aristotle: Spenser mirrors Aristotle's idea that men are constantly prone to degenerate from a state of akrasia (weakness of will) into one of outright vice (a love of evil), but he does not match Aristotle's faith that characters can develop the other way too, towards moral perfection and consistently virtuous conduct. Afflicted by shame at their own weakness, Spenser's knights struggle to realize virtues such as temperance, often requiring the help of grace. However, important though that grace is, Spenser repeatedly affirms the primacy of reason in steering men's conduct towards goodness. Grace is an assistant power in the struggle for virtue; rational self-determination remains central.Less
This chapter explores the presentation of the passions in The Faerie Queene, arguing that Spenser treats these as hostile, morally disruptive forces within the soul, powers which reason must fight against in a perpetual psychomachia. It examines the limits of Spenser's debt to Aristotle: Spenser mirrors Aristotle's idea that men are constantly prone to degenerate from a state of akrasia (weakness of will) into one of outright vice (a love of evil), but he does not match Aristotle's faith that characters can develop the other way too, towards moral perfection and consistently virtuous conduct. Afflicted by shame at their own weakness, Spenser's knights struggle to realize virtues such as temperance, often requiring the help of grace. However, important though that grace is, Spenser repeatedly affirms the primacy of reason in steering men's conduct towards goodness. Grace is an assistant power in the struggle for virtue; rational self-determination remains central.
Matthew Evans
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195382440
- eISBN:
- 9780199870158
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195382440.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In a celebrated passage of Plato’s Protagoras (351b–58e) Socrates argues that it is impossible for us to do things that we know are better left undone. His claim, roughly put, is that we are capable ...
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In a celebrated passage of Plato’s Protagoras (351b–58e) Socrates argues that it is impossible for us to do things that we know are better left undone. His claim, roughly put, is that we are capable of acting incorrectly only if and only when we fail to recognize that we are acting incorrectly. Of all the counterintuitive arguments in the so-called Socratic dialogues, this one is probably the most famous. Historians have extensively examined its structure, its motivation, and its place within the broader sweep of Socratic and Platonic moral psychology. As a result of this, perhaps, many contemporary philosophers of action now feel compelled to mention it, if not to scrutinize it, when addressing themselves to the general topic of practical irrationality. But in recent years the historians and the philosophers have begun to diverge in their assessments of the argument’s intrinsic merit. While most of the philosophers have come to agree that it is implausible, either in whole or in part, many of the historians have defended it against this very charge, and have implied that the argument’s detractors are, as a rule, either exegetically misguided or philosophically shallow. Sadly, these two camps seem to have little if any sustained interaction with each other. So it is hardly surprising to find, in the recent literature on the subject, an unresolved and (largely) unengaged dispute between the majority of contemporary philosophers, on the one hand, and a cadre of devoted historians on the other. The purpose of this chapter is to get the dispute back on track, by providing both parties with a reliable guide to the issues that continue to divide them.Less
In a celebrated passage of Plato’s Protagoras (351b–58e) Socrates argues that it is impossible for us to do things that we know are better left undone. His claim, roughly put, is that we are capable of acting incorrectly only if and only when we fail to recognize that we are acting incorrectly. Of all the counterintuitive arguments in the so-called Socratic dialogues, this one is probably the most famous. Historians have extensively examined its structure, its motivation, and its place within the broader sweep of Socratic and Platonic moral psychology. As a result of this, perhaps, many contemporary philosophers of action now feel compelled to mention it, if not to scrutinize it, when addressing themselves to the general topic of practical irrationality. But in recent years the historians and the philosophers have begun to diverge in their assessments of the argument’s intrinsic merit. While most of the philosophers have come to agree that it is implausible, either in whole or in part, many of the historians have defended it against this very charge, and have implied that the argument’s detractors are, as a rule, either exegetically misguided or philosophically shallow. Sadly, these two camps seem to have little if any sustained interaction with each other. So it is hardly surprising to find, in the recent literature on the subject, an unresolved and (largely) unengaged dispute between the majority of contemporary philosophers, on the one hand, and a cadre of devoted historians on the other. The purpose of this chapter is to get the dispute back on track, by providing both parties with a reliable guide to the issues that continue to divide them.
Richard Holton
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199214570
- eISBN:
- 9780191706547
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214570.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Philosophical orthodoxy identifies weakness of will with akrasia: the weak willed person is someone who intentionally acts against their better judgment. This chapter argues that this is a mistake. ...
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Philosophical orthodoxy identifies weakness of will with akrasia: the weak willed person is someone who intentionally acts against their better judgment. This chapter argues that this is a mistake. Weakness of will consists in a quite different failing, namely an over-ready revision of one's resolution. A number of examples are then adduced showing how weakness of will, so understood, differs from akrasia.Less
Philosophical orthodoxy identifies weakness of will with akrasia: the weak willed person is someone who intentionally acts against their better judgment. This chapter argues that this is a mistake. Weakness of will consists in a quite different failing, namely an over-ready revision of one's resolution. A number of examples are then adduced showing how weakness of will, so understood, differs from akrasia.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199896134
- eISBN:
- 9780199949533
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199896134.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter identifies the book’s goal—to show that weak-willed action is possible and to explain why it happens. The chapter provides conceptual and historical background, including background on ...
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This chapter identifies the book’s goal—to show that weak-willed action is possible and to explain why it happens. The chapter provides conceptual and historical background, including background on skepticism about weakness of will. Concepts discussed include akrasia, better judgment, rationality, self-control, and weakness of will. Philosophers discussed include Plato, Aristotle, Donald Davidson, and Richard Hare. A definition of core akratic action is offered: it is free, sane, intentional action that, as the nondepressed agent consciously recognizes at the time of action, is contrary to his better judgment. The chapter sets the stage for the remainder of the book and provides a preview of what is to come.Less
This chapter identifies the book’s goal—to show that weak-willed action is possible and to explain why it happens. The chapter provides conceptual and historical background, including background on skepticism about weakness of will. Concepts discussed include akrasia, better judgment, rationality, self-control, and weakness of will. Philosophers discussed include Plato, Aristotle, Donald Davidson, and Richard Hare. A definition of core akratic action is offered: it is free, sane, intentional action that, as the nondepressed agent consciously recognizes at the time of action, is contrary to his better judgment. The chapter sets the stage for the remainder of the book and provides a preview of what is to come.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199896134
- eISBN:
- 9780199949533
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199896134.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
There is a voluminous philosophical literature on akrasia that at least purports to be about weakness of will. Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions that, as he ...
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There is a voluminous philosophical literature on akrasia that at least purports to be about weakness of will. Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions that, as he reports, departs from most of the literature on the subject. If his view is correct, much of what has been written about akrasia and akratic actions is not about weakness of will and weak-willed actions. This chapter argues that the author’s view of the nature of akratic actions in earlier work—a view that accommodates both core akratic actions and akratic actions of other kinds—fares considerably better in the sphere of weakness of will than Holton’s view does. The argument benefits from some studies of folk conceptions of weakness of will that employ techniques of experimental philosophy. The chapter’s aim is to clarify the nature of weak-willed actions.Less
There is a voluminous philosophical literature on akrasia that at least purports to be about weakness of will. Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions that, as he reports, departs from most of the literature on the subject. If his view is correct, much of what has been written about akrasia and akratic actions is not about weakness of will and weak-willed actions. This chapter argues that the author’s view of the nature of akratic actions in earlier work—a view that accommodates both core akratic actions and akratic actions of other kinds—fares considerably better in the sphere of weakness of will than Holton’s view does. The argument benefits from some studies of folk conceptions of weakness of will that employ techniques of experimental philosophy. The chapter’s aim is to clarify the nature of weak-willed actions.
Donald Davidson
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198237549
- eISBN:
- 9780191601378
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237545.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The author believes that large‐scale rationality on the part of the interpretant is essential to his interpretability, and therefore, in his view, to her having a mind. How, then are cases of ...
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The author believes that large‐scale rationality on the part of the interpretant is essential to his interpretability, and therefore, in his view, to her having a mind. How, then are cases of irrationality, such as akrasia or self‐deception, judged by the interpretant's own standards, possible? He proposes that, in order to resolve the apparent paradoxes, one must distinguish between accepting a contradictory proposition and accepting separately each of two contradictory propositions, which are held apart, which in turn requires to conceive of the mind as containing a number of semi‐independent structures of interlocking beliefs, desires, emotions, memories, and other mental states.Less
The author believes that large‐scale rationality on the part of the interpretant is essential to his interpretability, and therefore, in his view, to her having a mind. How, then are cases of irrationality, such as akrasia or self‐deception, judged by the interpretant's own standards, possible? He proposes that, in order to resolve the apparent paradoxes, one must distinguish between accepting a contradictory proposition and accepting separately each of two contradictory propositions, which are held apart, which in turn requires to conceive of the mind as containing a number of semi‐independent structures of interlocking beliefs, desires, emotions, memories, and other mental states.
