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In Defence of Normativism about the Aim of Belief

Pascal Engel

in The Aim of Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199672134
eISBN:
9780191759079
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Engel defends the normative interpretation of the aim of belief against the main criticisms and alternatives. According to this interpretation, belief aims at truth because truth is the most ... More


Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief

Daniel Whiting

in The Aim of Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199672134
eISBN:
9780191759079
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The claim that truth provides the standard for believing appears to be a platitude, one which dovetails with the idea that in some sense belief aims only at the truth. In recent years, however, an ... More


Truth as the Aim of Epistemic Justification

Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen

in The Aim of Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199672134
eISBN:
9780191759079
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A popular account of epistemic justification holds that justification, in essence, aims at truth. An influential objection against this account points out that it is committed to holding that only ... More


Introduction: Aiming at Truth

Timothy Chan

in The Aim of Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199672134
eISBN:
9780191759079
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

In this introductory chapter, the editor surveys the fundamental questions in current debates surrounding the aim of belief, and identifies the major theoretical approaches. The main arguments of the ... More


Against Belief Normativity

Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss

in The Aim of Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199672134
eISBN:
9780191759079
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Normativism about belief is a claim about the nature of belief: Belief is essentially norm- or rule-guided. This is standardly interpreted as requiring that belief formation be subject to genuine ... More


Non-Evidential Reasons to Believe

Jonathan Adler and Michael Hicks

in The Aim of Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199672134
eISBN:
9780191759079
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Evidentialism is the thesis that evidence or, more generally, epistemic reasons, exhausts the considerations relevant to whether one ought or ought not to believe. In this chapter Adler and Hicks ... More


Leaps of Knowledge

Andrew Reisner

in The Aim of Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199672134
eISBN:
9780191759079
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Direct doxastic voluntarism is commonly thought to be conceptually impossible owing to the way in which belief aims at truth. In this chapter, Reisner argues that the view that belief aims at truth ... More


Knowledge versus Truth

John Gibbons

in The Norm of Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199673391
eISBN:
9780191751684
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673391.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Part IV is an attempt to make my version of subjectivism work. One thing we need to do is to replace the teleological picture that sees rationality as a means to our more objective doxastic aims. We ... More


Why Only Evidential Considerations Can Justify Belief

Kate Nolfi

in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
March 2018
ISBN:
9780198758709
eISBN:
9780191818622
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198758709.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

At least when we restrict our attention to the epistemic domain, it seems clear that only considerations which bear on whether p can render a subject’s belief that p epistemically justified, by ... More


Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action*

Daniel Whiting

in Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
May 2014
ISBN:
9780199660025
eISBN:
9780191772672
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Subjects appear to take only evidential considerations to provide reason or justification for believing. That is to say that subjects do not take practical considerations—the kind of considerations ... More


Belief, Truth, and Blindspots

Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi

in The Aim of Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199672134
eISBN:
9780191759079
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

According to doxastic normativism, belief is essentially governed by a norm of correctness, which states, ‘Your belief that is correct if and only if is true’. The normativist further holds that this ... More


The Conventionalism Criticism

Christopher Cowie

in Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument From Analogy

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
December 2019
ISBN:
9780198842736
eISBN:
9780191878664
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

It is sometimes claimed that ‘belief aims at truth’ in a sense that explains the existence and nature of epistemic norms. Furthermore it is sometimes claimed that there is no analogous explanation of ... More


The Aim of Rationality: Correctness

Ralph Wedgwood

in The Value of Rationality

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
September 2017
ISBN:
9780198802693
eISBN:
9780191841972
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198802693.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

It is proposed that rationality has an external goal—thinking as correctly as possible. (For example, perhaps believing as correctly as possible is being maximally confident of the truth, and ... More


Epistemic Akrasia

Declan Smithies

in The Epistemic Role of Consciousness

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
August 2019
ISBN:
9780199917662
eISBN:
9780199345588
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199917662.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 9 argues that accessibilism is needed to explain the epistemic irrationality of epistemic akrasia—roughly, believing things you believe you shouldn’t believe. Section 9.1 defines epistemic ... More


The Right Thing to Believe

Ralph Wedgwood

in The Aim of Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199672134
eISBN:
9780191759079
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter explores the thesis that the fundamental constitutive norm applying to belief is the truth-norm—roughly, the principle that a belief is correct if and only if the proposition believed is ... More


Belief-Truth Norms

Paul Horwich

in The Aim of Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199672134
eISBN:
9780191759079
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter focuses on the principle, ‘We ought to want our beliefs to be true and ought not-want them to be false’. Horwich aims (a) to confirm that this candidate for our directly instructive ... More


There Are No Norms of Belief

David Papineau

in The Aim of Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199672134
eISBN:
9780191759079
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Papineau argues that there is no distinctive species of normativity attaching to beliefs: while there are indeed valid prescriptions about the adoption of beliefs, these are always prescriptions that ... More


The Aim of Belief

Timothy Chan (ed.)

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199672134
eISBN:
9780191759079
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

What is belief? ‘Beliefs aim at truth’ is commonly accepted as the starting point for philosophers who want to give an adequate account of this fundamental state of mind, but it raises as many ... More


A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief

Allan Hazlett

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199674800
eISBN:
9780191761164
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674800.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The value of true belief has played a central role in history of philosophy – consider Socrates’ slogan that the unexamined life is not worth living, and Aristotle’s claim that everyone naturally ... More


Understanding and Structure

Allan Hazlett

in Making Sense of the World: New Essays on the Philosophy of Understanding

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
November 2017
ISBN:
9780190469863
eISBN:
9780190469887
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190469863.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General

This chapter explores two claims about metaphysical structure: that “carving nature at the joints” is a valuable intellectual achievement and that understanding is constituted by a “grasp” of ... More


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