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Agent Causation and Control

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195159875
eISBN:
9780199835010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515987X.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Agent-causal accounts aim to secure greater control than can be secured by any event-causal libertarian account. Assuming that all it requires is possible, an integrated agent-causal view succeeds at ... More


An Integrated Agent‐Causal Account

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195159875
eISBN:
9780199835010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515987X.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter begins an assessment of agent-causal libertarian accounts, which require causation by agents, where this is construed as causation by enduring substances and not reducible to event ... More


Substance and Cause

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195159875
eISBN:
9780199835010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515987X.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The chief difficulty for agent-causal accounts lies in defending the notion of agent causation. Either of two types of realist account of causation can be drawn on to explicate the claim that ... More


The Freedom of Decisions and Other Actions

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195159875
eISBN:
9780199835010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515987X.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Libertarian accounts commonly hold that only certain acts of will, such as decisions (or choices), can be directly free, with the freedom of actions of other types—whether mental or overt, bodily ... More


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