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Precautionary Reasoning in Determining Moral Worth

Stephen W Smith

in Law and Bioethics: Current Legal Issues Volume 11

This chapter presents a possible personhood theory that shifts the burden of proof away from the entity under consideration. It argues that we ought to exercise caution when making determinations ... More

This chapter presents a possible personhood theory that shifts the burden of proof away from the entity under consideration. It argues that we ought to exercise caution when making determinations about personhood and holds that things are persons when we are unsure, as opposed to determining that they are not. This way is likely to provide an ethical system with fewer bad results and one that is ultimately more consistent with the viewpoint of the average member of the moral community. This provides the added benefit of increasing the potential pool of persons to include entities such as foetuses, newborns, and those in persistent vegetative states (PVS) states while not taking away any rights from existing persons.Less

Executive Compensation: Consequences and Distributions

Sydney Finkelstein, Donald C. Hambrick, and Albert A. Cannella

in Strategic Leadership: Theory and Research on Executives, Top Management Teams, and Boards

The consequences of executive pay are complex and particularly rich in a theoretical and practical sense. This chapter examines one of the most fundamental questions in this regard: Does executive ... More

The consequences of executive pay are complex and particularly rich in a theoretical and practical sense. This chapter examines one of the most fundamental questions in this regard: Does executive pay affect firm performance? The evidence is decidedly mixed, but raises key questions about pay as a motivator, and the different ways in which executive pay can influence strategic and organizational choices as well as firm performance. This chapter also considers the burgeoning literature on behavioral agency theory, which leads naturally to a comparison of the effects of different types of compensation, especially stock options. A significant part of this chapter is dedicated to an analysis of the determinants and consequences of pay differentials among top management teams, another area of great theoretical interest. Studying pay differentials (or pay dispersion), as well as the pattern of compensation in place among the CEO and other top managers, yields fascinating insights that have important consequences for teamwork, perceived fairness of pay, strategic decision making, and firm performance.Less

Introduction

Jochen Prantl

in The UN Security Council and Informal Groups of States

This chapter introduces and defines the terms ‘informal groups of states’, ‘groups of friends’, and ‘contact groups’. It develops a synergistic analytical framework, identifying the causal mechanisms ... More

This chapter introduces and defines the terms ‘informal groups of states’, ‘groups of friends’, and ‘contact groups’. It develops a synergistic analytical framework, identifying the causal mechanisms that contribute to the formation of informal groups of states by borrowing from insights of theories of agency and delegation. It challenges the proposition that centralization and independence are key functional characteristics of international organizations which enhance efficiency. Instead, it argues that decentralization via informal groups of states allows the achievement of policy goals that would be unattainable in a centralized setting. The typology of exit, voice, and loyalty is incorporated into analytical framework to explain the dynamics between informal groups and the Security Council. Such an approach provides substantial explanatory leverage to explain the institutional effects of the Security Council under conditions of systemic change. The chapter concludes with an outline of the book’s contents.Less

Where There's a Will There's a Way: Causation and Freedom

Robert Hanna

in Kant, Science, and Human Nature

This chapter explores the same basic Kantian presuppositional links with respect to causation. It begins by unpacking the basics of Kant's metaphysics of causation, with special reference to the ... More

This chapter explores the same basic Kantian presuppositional links with respect to causation. It begins by unpacking the basics of Kant's metaphysics of causation, with special reference to the three Analogies of Experience and the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason. It then analyzes the problem of free will and works out a new version of Kant's theory of freedom, called the Embodied Agency Theory. Some of the intimate Kantian links between freedom and nature are explored, and a biological interpretation of the Embodied Agency Theory is developed. It is argued that for Kant, the irreversibility of time — ‘Time's Arrow’ — entails a necessary connection between naturally mechanized causation and the possibility of human practical causation.Less

Introduction: Reframing Corporate Governance: Behavioral Assumptions, Governance Mechanisms, and Institutional Dynamics

Anna Grandori

in Corporate Governance and Firm Organization: Microfoundations and Structural Forms

This introductory chapter outlines the features of the new approach to CG that can be built by integrating the insights from the different contributions gathered in the book. Further specific theses ... More

This introductory chapter outlines the features of the new approach to CG that can be built by integrating the insights from the different contributions gathered in the book. Further specific theses advanced in this chapter are that the ‘shareholder view’ and the unabashed recommendation of pay for performance misapply agency and property right theories themselves; that CG design should be grounded in an empirically-based appreciation of preferences and motivation; that the portfolio of governance mechanisms should be enlarged to include organizational mechanisms such as negotiation, social control, and community governance; and that, contrary to common wisdom, an economic and organizational efficiency view of CG should lead to differentiated rather than homogeneous solutions, while institutional isomorphism and legitimacy may lead to inefficient convergence.Less

Disciplining Democracy: The Principal–Agent Model of Accountability

Craig T. Borowiak

in Accountability and Democracy: The Pitfalls and Promise of Popular Control

This chapter argues that contemporary social scientific discourse has become dominated by a narrow, disciplinary model of accountability typified by the widespread use of the principal–agent ... More

This chapter argues that contemporary social scientific discourse has become dominated by a narrow, disciplinary model of accountability typified by the widespread use of the principal–agent framework. Within this model, accountability is treated as involving citizen “principals” holding representative “agents” to account in order to compel the agent to uphold the principal’s interests. Accountability becomes equated with punishability. The model has the benefit of illuminating how conflicting interests and informational constraints can confound the effects of electoral accountability. Nonetheless, when it comes to gaining a full picture of what democratic accountability entails, this approach has several shortcomings. It is too bound to institutional hierarchies at the expense of horizontal forms of accountability. It is too focused on disciplining officials according to the principal’s preferences, at the expense of accountability’s role in generating preferences and new forms of solidarity. It also reflects a conservative bias that favors formal institutions and that discounts accountability initiatives coming from outside established institutional structures.Less

Perspectives on the Contribution of Boards of Directors

Philip Stiles and Bernard Taylor

in Boards at Work: How Directors View their Roles and Responsibilities

How boards of directors influence organisational performance has been a central topic of corporate governance literature. This chapter outlines the major theoretical issues pertaining to research on ... More

How boards of directors influence organisational performance has been a central topic of corporate governance literature. This chapter outlines the major theoretical issues pertaining to research on the contribution of the boards of directors in running an organisation. Six major theories on boards of directors are discussed: agency theory, transaction-cost economics, stewardship theory, resource-dependence theory, class-hegemony theory, and managerial-hegemony theory. This chapter argues that much of the empirical work supporting the theories sheds little light on the actual operations of the board. Based primarily on secondary data or anecdotal evidence, these studies eschew detailed analysis of what directors do and how they conceive of their influence. This chapter also contends that the theories themselves may not be mutually exclusive and that there is strong potential for synthesis.Less

Governing with Multiple Principals: An Empirically-Based Analysis of Capital Providers' Preferences and Superior Governance Structures

Anna Grandori and Giuseppe Soda

in Corporate Governance and Firm Organization: Microfoundations and Structural Forms

This chapter broadens current agency approaches by exploring the possible consequences of optimizing CG structures with ‘multiple principals’ and multiple governance and organizational mechanisms. It ... More

This chapter broadens current agency approaches by exploring the possible consequences of optimizing CG structures with ‘multiple principals’ and multiple governance and organizational mechanisms. It uses an analytical framework and an empirical study conducted in Italy, which gathers empirically the actual preferences of two samples, representative of the providers of financial and human capital, over varying policies on a variety of governance and organizational mechanisms (e.g., low to high pay for performance; low to high teamwork; low to high managerial representation in boards etc.). Preferences are cluster-analyzed and compared with actually implemented policies. Results indicate that actors' preferences converge more than conventionally expected, while they differ sharply from actually implemented policies, thereby indicating opportunities for the Pareto-improvement of CG structures.Less

Dividends and Dividend Policy

H. Kent Baker, J. Clay Singleton, and E. Theodore Veit

in Survey Research in Corporate Finance: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice

Although corporate payout policy is one of the most researched areas in the finance literature, the question of why firms pay dividends and investors want them remains one of the important unsolved ... More

Although corporate payout policy is one of the most researched areas in the finance literature, the question of why firms pay dividends and investors want them remains one of the important unsolved puzzles in finance. The chapter compares the survey findings to various theories, models, and explanations for paying dividends found in the finance literature. Such explanations include the bird-in-the-hand theory, residual dividend theory, taxes and clientele effects, asymmetric information and signaling theory, the agency and behavioral explanations, firm life cycle theory, and catering theory. The chapter also chronicles how perspectives on corporate dividend policy have changed over time. The chapter documents the perceptions of corporate managers and those of institutional and individual investors about dividend policy. The chapter investigates several key issues such as whether managers perceive that dividend policy creates shareholder value and the factors that influence a firm's dividend policy. By focusing on those studies that attempt to describe dividend policy in practice, this chapter shows how survey research contributes to resolving the dividend puzzle. Finally, the chapter provides a synthesis of U.S, non-U.S., and cross-country studies.Less

Interventions, Agency, and Counterfactuals

James Woodward

in Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation

This chapter clarifies the notion of an intervention and compares my version of this notion to the characterizations provided by other writers such as Glymour and Pearl. Very roughly, an intervention ... More

This chapter clarifies the notion of an intervention and compares my version of this notion to the characterizations provided by other writers such as Glymour and Pearl. Very roughly, an intervention on a variable X with respect to a second variable Y is a special sort of causal process that changes the value of X in such a way that any change in the value of Y can occur only as a result of the change in Y. The chapter also discusses the relata of the causal relationship, causal realism, agency theories of causation, and the relationship between my account of causation and that of David Lewis.Less

Economic perspectives

John Child, David Faulkner, and Stephen B. Tallman

in Cooperative Strategy: Managing Alliances, Networks, and Joint Ventures

The justification attributed to cooperative strategy may be based on several different economic theories and as such, this chapter attempts to take on an economic perspective in examining a company's ... More

The justification attributed to cooperative strategy may be based on several different economic theories and as such, this chapter attempts to take on an economic perspective in examining a company's actions and strategies. Although none of the theories discussed in this chapter are sufficient enough to be able to explain competitive advantage, usefulness, and credibility alone, the chapter is able to look into the features of each theory and how these may contribute to the strategy and operations of a particular organization. It attempts to look into the following economic theories and explains how each of these theories may be applied: market-power theory; transaction-cost analysis; agency theory; resource-based theory; transaction-value theory; real-options theory; and increasing-returns theory.Less

CAUSALITY

Jon Williamson

in Bayesian Nets and Causality: Philosophical and Computational Foundations

This chapter provides an overview of the principal philosophical accounts of the nature of causality, including the mechanistic, probabilistic, counterfactual, and agency accounts.

The Theory of Agency and Additional Constraints

Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig

in Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality

Discusses the role of the theory of agency and additional constraints in the radical interpreter’s procedure. These are holism about attitude content, constraints on logical form in the object ... More

Discusses the role of the theory of agency and additional constraints in the radical interpreter’s procedure. These are holism about attitude content, constraints on logical form in the object language, constraints that come from seeing a speaker as a member of a particular linguistic community, and the role of empirical constraints in the radical interpreter’s procedure.Less

Investor Engagement

Roderick Martin, Peter D. Casson, and Tahir M. Nisar

in Investor Engagement: Investors and Management Practice under Shareholder Value

Investor engagement ranges across a spectrum, from indirect/laissez-faire relations to direct investor involvement in specific areas of management practice. The methods of engagement range from ... More

Investor engagement ranges across a spectrum, from indirect/laissez-faire relations to direct investor involvement in specific areas of management practice. The methods of engagement range from informal discussion, the preferred mode of engagement, through to formal methods, such as shareholder resolutions. Investor engagement is placed in the context of other influences on management behaviour. Strategy and innovation are two areas of management practice where investors have especially high incentives to intervene.Less

Conclusion and Recommendations

Jacob N. Shapiro

in The Terrorist's Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations

This concluding chapter reviews the evidence, comments on U.S. government counterterrorism policies in light of the agency theory perspective on terrorist organizations, and offers a series of policy ... More

This concluding chapter reviews the evidence, comments on U.S. government counterterrorism policies in light of the agency theory perspective on terrorist organizations, and offers a series of policy recommendations that flow directly from the organizational analysis. One potential criticism of this analysis is that it focuses too heavily on organizational outcomes while ignoring the kinds of behavioral outcomes of greatest interest to policy makers: who gets attacked, when, and by which method. The policy recommendations show this concern to be misplaced by demonstrating how systematically taking terrorists' organizational challenges into account can yield better counterterrorism policy. In particular, there are subtle ways to push groups into adopting security-reducing management practices that will work against some groups, but not all.Less