Sydney Finkelstein, Donald C. Hambrick, and Albert A. Cannella
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195162073
- eISBN:
- 9780199867332
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195162073.003.0011
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Strategy
The consequences of executive pay are complex and particularly rich in a theoretical and practical sense. This chapter examines one of the most fundamental questions in this regard: Does executive ...
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The consequences of executive pay are complex and particularly rich in a theoretical and practical sense. This chapter examines one of the most fundamental questions in this regard: Does executive pay affect firm performance? The evidence is decidedly mixed, but raises key questions about pay as a motivator, and the different ways in which executive pay can influence strategic and organizational choices as well as firm performance. This chapter also considers the burgeoning literature on behavioral agency theory, which leads naturally to a comparison of the effects of different types of compensation, especially stock options. A significant part of this chapter is dedicated to an analysis of the determinants and consequences of pay differentials among top management teams, another area of great theoretical interest. Studying pay differentials (or pay dispersion), as well as the pattern of compensation in place among the CEO and other top managers, yields fascinating insights that have important consequences for teamwork, perceived fairness of pay, strategic decision making, and firm performance.Less
The consequences of executive pay are complex and particularly rich in a theoretical and practical sense. This chapter examines one of the most fundamental questions in this regard: Does executive pay affect firm performance? The evidence is decidedly mixed, but raises key questions about pay as a motivator, and the different ways in which executive pay can influence strategic and organizational choices as well as firm performance. This chapter also considers the burgeoning literature on behavioral agency theory, which leads naturally to a comparison of the effects of different types of compensation, especially stock options. A significant part of this chapter is dedicated to an analysis of the determinants and consequences of pay differentials among top management teams, another area of great theoretical interest. Studying pay differentials (or pay dispersion), as well as the pattern of compensation in place among the CEO and other top managers, yields fascinating insights that have important consequences for teamwork, perceived fairness of pay, strategic decision making, and firm performance.
Jochen Prantl
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287680
- eISBN:
- 9780191603723
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287686.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter introduces and defines the terms ‘informal groups of states’, ‘groups of friends’, and ‘contact groups’. It develops a synergistic analytical framework, identifying the causal mechanisms ...
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This chapter introduces and defines the terms ‘informal groups of states’, ‘groups of friends’, and ‘contact groups’. It develops a synergistic analytical framework, identifying the causal mechanisms that contribute to the formation of informal groups of states by borrowing from insights of theories of agency and delegation. It challenges the proposition that centralization and independence are key functional characteristics of international organizations which enhance efficiency. Instead, it argues that decentralization via informal groups of states allows the achievement of policy goals that would be unattainable in a centralized setting. The typology of exit, voice, and loyalty is incorporated into analytical framework to explain the dynamics between informal groups and the Security Council. Such an approach provides substantial explanatory leverage to explain the institutional effects of the Security Council under conditions of systemic change. The chapter concludes with an outline of the book’s contents.Less
This chapter introduces and defines the terms ‘informal groups of states’, ‘groups of friends’, and ‘contact groups’. It develops a synergistic analytical framework, identifying the causal mechanisms that contribute to the formation of informal groups of states by borrowing from insights of theories of agency and delegation. It challenges the proposition that centralization and independence are key functional characteristics of international organizations which enhance efficiency. Instead, it argues that decentralization via informal groups of states allows the achievement of policy goals that would be unattainable in a centralized setting. The typology of exit, voice, and loyalty is incorporated into analytical framework to explain the dynamics between informal groups and the Security Council. Such an approach provides substantial explanatory leverage to explain the institutional effects of the Security Council under conditions of systemic change. The chapter concludes with an outline of the book’s contents.
Robert Hanna
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199285549
- eISBN:
- 9780191713965
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter explores the same basic Kantian presuppositional links with respect to causation. It begins by unpacking the basics of Kant's metaphysics of causation, with special reference to the ...
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This chapter explores the same basic Kantian presuppositional links with respect to causation. It begins by unpacking the basics of Kant's metaphysics of causation, with special reference to the three Analogies of Experience and the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason. It then analyzes the problem of free will and works out a new version of Kant's theory of freedom, called the Embodied Agency Theory. Some of the intimate Kantian links between freedom and nature are explored, and a biological interpretation of the Embodied Agency Theory is developed. It is argued that for Kant, the irreversibility of time — ‘Time's Arrow’ — entails a necessary connection between naturally mechanized causation and the possibility of human practical causation.Less
This chapter explores the same basic Kantian presuppositional links with respect to causation. It begins by unpacking the basics of Kant's metaphysics of causation, with special reference to the three Analogies of Experience and the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason. It then analyzes the problem of free will and works out a new version of Kant's theory of freedom, called the Embodied Agency Theory. Some of the intimate Kantian links between freedom and nature are explored, and a biological interpretation of the Embodied Agency Theory is developed. It is argued that for Kant, the irreversibility of time — ‘Time's Arrow’ — entails a necessary connection between naturally mechanized causation and the possibility of human practical causation.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195156171
- eISBN:
- 9780199833467
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515617X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
What is motivation, and what is its place in the lives of intelligent agents? This is Mele's guiding question. His search for an answer is sensitive to the theoretical concerns of philosophers of ...
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What is motivation, and what is its place in the lives of intelligent agents? This is Mele's guiding question. His search for an answer is sensitive to the theoretical concerns of philosophers of mind and action and moral philosophers, and is informed by empirical work in psychology. Mele defends answers to a web of questions about motivation and human agency, including the following: Will an acceptable moral theory make warranted conceptual or metaphysical demands of Kantian or other kinds on a theory of human motivation? Where does the motivational power of practical reasoning lie? How are reasons for action related to motivation? What do motivational explanations of different kinds have in common? What room will an acceptable view of the connection between motivational strength and intentional action leave for self‐control? Will a proper account of motivated, goal‐directed action be a causal account, and can a causal theory of the nature and explanation of action accommodate human agency par excellence? His answers collectively provide a distinctive, detailed, comprehensive, causal theory of human agency.Less
What is motivation, and what is its place in the lives of intelligent agents? This is Mele's guiding question. His search for an answer is sensitive to the theoretical concerns of philosophers of mind and action and moral philosophers, and is informed by empirical work in psychology. Mele defends answers to a web of questions about motivation and human agency, including the following: Will an acceptable moral theory make warranted conceptual or metaphysical demands of Kantian or other kinds on a theory of human motivation? Where does the motivational power of practical reasoning lie? How are reasons for action related to motivation? What do motivational explanations of different kinds have in common? What room will an acceptable view of the connection between motivational strength and intentional action leave for self‐control? Will a proper account of motivated, goal‐directed action be a causal account, and can a causal theory of the nature and explanation of action accommodate human agency par excellence? His answers collectively provide a distinctive, detailed, comprehensive, causal theory of human agency.
Anna Grandori
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199269761
- eISBN:
- 9780191710087
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269761.003.0001
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Corporate Governance and Accountability
This introductory chapter outlines the features of the new approach to CG that can be built by integrating the insights from the different contributions gathered in the book. Further specific theses ...
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This introductory chapter outlines the features of the new approach to CG that can be built by integrating the insights from the different contributions gathered in the book. Further specific theses advanced in this chapter are that the ‘shareholder view’ and the unabashed recommendation of pay for performance misapply agency and property right theories themselves; that CG design should be grounded in an empirically-based appreciation of preferences and motivation; that the portfolio of governance mechanisms should be enlarged to include organizational mechanisms such as negotiation, social control, and community governance; and that, contrary to common wisdom, an economic and organizational efficiency view of CG should lead to differentiated rather than homogeneous solutions, while institutional isomorphism and legitimacy may lead to inefficient convergence.Less
This introductory chapter outlines the features of the new approach to CG that can be built by integrating the insights from the different contributions gathered in the book. Further specific theses advanced in this chapter are that the ‘shareholder view’ and the unabashed recommendation of pay for performance misapply agency and property right theories themselves; that CG design should be grounded in an empirically-based appreciation of preferences and motivation; that the portfolio of governance mechanisms should be enlarged to include organizational mechanisms such as negotiation, social control, and community governance; and that, contrary to common wisdom, an economic and organizational efficiency view of CG should lead to differentiated rather than homogeneous solutions, while institutional isomorphism and legitimacy may lead to inefficient convergence.
Craig T. Borowiak
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199778256
- eISBN:
- 9780199919086
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199778256.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter argues that contemporary social scientific discourse has become dominated by a narrow, disciplinary model of accountability typified by the widespread use of the principal–agent ...
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This chapter argues that contemporary social scientific discourse has become dominated by a narrow, disciplinary model of accountability typified by the widespread use of the principal–agent framework. Within this model, accountability is treated as involving citizen “principals” holding representative “agents” to account in order to compel the agent to uphold the principal’s interests. Accountability becomes equated with punishability. The model has the benefit of illuminating how conflicting interests and informational constraints can confound the effects of electoral accountability. Nonetheless, when it comes to gaining a full picture of what democratic accountability entails, this approach has several shortcomings. It is too bound to institutional hierarchies at the expense of horizontal forms of accountability. It is too focused on disciplining officials according to the principal’s preferences, at the expense of accountability’s role in generating preferences and new forms of solidarity. It also reflects a conservative bias that favors formal institutions and that discounts accountability initiatives coming from outside established institutional structures.Less
This chapter argues that contemporary social scientific discourse has become dominated by a narrow, disciplinary model of accountability typified by the widespread use of the principal–agent framework. Within this model, accountability is treated as involving citizen “principals” holding representative “agents” to account in order to compel the agent to uphold the principal’s interests. Accountability becomes equated with punishability. The model has the benefit of illuminating how conflicting interests and informational constraints can confound the effects of electoral accountability. Nonetheless, when it comes to gaining a full picture of what democratic accountability entails, this approach has several shortcomings. It is too bound to institutional hierarchies at the expense of horizontal forms of accountability. It is too focused on disciplining officials according to the principal’s preferences, at the expense of accountability’s role in generating preferences and new forms of solidarity. It also reflects a conservative bias that favors formal institutions and that discounts accountability initiatives coming from outside established institutional structures.
Philip Stiles and Bernard Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199258161
- eISBN:
- 9780191718342
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199258161.003.0002
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Corporate Governance and Accountability
How boards of directors influence organisational performance has been a central topic of corporate governance literature. This chapter outlines the major theoretical issues pertaining to research on ...
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How boards of directors influence organisational performance has been a central topic of corporate governance literature. This chapter outlines the major theoretical issues pertaining to research on the contribution of the boards of directors in running an organisation. Six major theories on boards of directors are discussed: agency theory, transaction-cost economics, stewardship theory, resource-dependence theory, class-hegemony theory, and managerial-hegemony theory. This chapter argues that much of the empirical work supporting the theories sheds little light on the actual operations of the board. Based primarily on secondary data or anecdotal evidence, these studies eschew detailed analysis of what directors do and how they conceive of their influence. This chapter also contends that the theories themselves may not be mutually exclusive and that there is strong potential for synthesis.Less
How boards of directors influence organisational performance has been a central topic of corporate governance literature. This chapter outlines the major theoretical issues pertaining to research on the contribution of the boards of directors in running an organisation. Six major theories on boards of directors are discussed: agency theory, transaction-cost economics, stewardship theory, resource-dependence theory, class-hegemony theory, and managerial-hegemony theory. This chapter argues that much of the empirical work supporting the theories sheds little light on the actual operations of the board. Based primarily on secondary data or anecdotal evidence, these studies eschew detailed analysis of what directors do and how they conceive of their influence. This chapter also contends that the theories themselves may not be mutually exclusive and that there is strong potential for synthesis.
Michael E. Bratman
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195187717
- eISBN:
- 9780199893058
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195187717.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This is a collection of published and unpublished chapters by distinguished philosopher Michael E. Bratman of Stanford University. They revolve around his influential theory, known as the “planning ...
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This is a collection of published and unpublished chapters by distinguished philosopher Michael E. Bratman of Stanford University. They revolve around his influential theory, known as the “planning theory of intention and agency.” Bratman's primary concern is with what he calls “strong” forms of human agency—including forms of human agency that are the target of our talk about self-determination, self-government, and autonomy.Less
This is a collection of published and unpublished chapters by distinguished philosopher Michael E. Bratman of Stanford University. They revolve around his influential theory, known as the “planning theory of intention and agency.” Bratman's primary concern is with what he calls “strong” forms of human agency—including forms of human agency that are the target of our talk about self-determination, self-government, and autonomy.
Anna Grandori and Giuseppe Soda
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199269761
- eISBN:
- 9780191710087
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269761.003.0004
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Corporate Governance and Accountability
This chapter broadens current agency approaches by exploring the possible consequences of optimizing CG structures with ‘multiple principals’ and multiple governance and organizational mechanisms. It ...
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This chapter broadens current agency approaches by exploring the possible consequences of optimizing CG structures with ‘multiple principals’ and multiple governance and organizational mechanisms. It uses an analytical framework and an empirical study conducted in Italy, which gathers empirically the actual preferences of two samples, representative of the providers of financial and human capital, over varying policies on a variety of governance and organizational mechanisms (e.g., low to high pay for performance; low to high teamwork; low to high managerial representation in boards etc.). Preferences are cluster-analyzed and compared with actually implemented policies. Results indicate that actors' preferences converge more than conventionally expected, while they differ sharply from actually implemented policies, thereby indicating opportunities for the Pareto-improvement of CG structures.Less
This chapter broadens current agency approaches by exploring the possible consequences of optimizing CG structures with ‘multiple principals’ and multiple governance and organizational mechanisms. It uses an analytical framework and an empirical study conducted in Italy, which gathers empirically the actual preferences of two samples, representative of the providers of financial and human capital, over varying policies on a variety of governance and organizational mechanisms (e.g., low to high pay for performance; low to high teamwork; low to high managerial representation in boards etc.). Preferences are cluster-analyzed and compared with actually implemented policies. Results indicate that actors' preferences converge more than conventionally expected, while they differ sharply from actually implemented policies, thereby indicating opportunities for the Pareto-improvement of CG structures.
H. Kent Baker, J. Clay Singleton, and E. Theodore Veit
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195340372
- eISBN:
- 9780199894215
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195340372.003.0006
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
Although corporate payout policy is one of the most researched areas in the finance literature, the question of why firms pay dividends and investors want them remains one of the important unsolved ...
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Although corporate payout policy is one of the most researched areas in the finance literature, the question of why firms pay dividends and investors want them remains one of the important unsolved puzzles in finance. The chapter compares the survey findings to various theories, models, and explanations for paying dividends found in the finance literature. Such explanations include the bird-in-the-hand theory, residual dividend theory, taxes and clientele effects, asymmetric information and signaling theory, the agency and behavioral explanations, firm life cycle theory, and catering theory. The chapter also chronicles how perspectives on corporate dividend policy have changed over time. The chapter documents the perceptions of corporate managers and those of institutional and individual investors about dividend policy. The chapter investigates several key issues such as whether managers perceive that dividend policy creates shareholder value and the factors that influence a firm's dividend policy. By focusing on those studies that attempt to describe dividend policy in practice, this chapter shows how survey research contributes to resolving the dividend puzzle. Finally, the chapter provides a synthesis of U.S, non-U.S., and cross-country studies.Less
Although corporate payout policy is one of the most researched areas in the finance literature, the question of why firms pay dividends and investors want them remains one of the important unsolved puzzles in finance. The chapter compares the survey findings to various theories, models, and explanations for paying dividends found in the finance literature. Such explanations include the bird-in-the-hand theory, residual dividend theory, taxes and clientele effects, asymmetric information and signaling theory, the agency and behavioral explanations, firm life cycle theory, and catering theory. The chapter also chronicles how perspectives on corporate dividend policy have changed over time. The chapter documents the perceptions of corporate managers and those of institutional and individual investors about dividend policy. The chapter investigates several key issues such as whether managers perceive that dividend policy creates shareholder value and the factors that influence a firm's dividend policy. By focusing on those studies that attempt to describe dividend policy in practice, this chapter shows how survey research contributes to resolving the dividend puzzle. Finally, the chapter provides a synthesis of U.S, non-U.S., and cross-country studies.
George A. Aragon
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195305968
- eISBN:
- 9780199867844
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305968.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
This book provides a framework for the study of financial ethics built on a broad review of research published in finance and economics journals. This book demonstrates that ethics is already an ...
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This book provides a framework for the study of financial ethics built on a broad review of research published in finance and economics journals. This book demonstrates that ethics is already an important part of financial research, and therefore the approach taken here is more of a “rediscovery” of the ethical dimension of financial economics. The book adopts a positivist framework for the field of financial ethics within which it is proposed that many “finance” problems are actually “ethics” problems; and that many economic phenomena can be explained as mechanisms for controlling moral risks. The text discusses several examples in which an ethics-centered approach to understanding economic phenomena is similar in spirit to other frameworks which have been applied in positive financial research including: the framework used for understanding corporate governance mechanisms as devices for mitigating agency costs and “moral hazards” in contractual relationships; the transaction “governance structure” framework that can explain the existence of hierarchies relative to markets when opportunistic behavior is assumed; and the roles of reputation and corporate culture in making credible commitments of trust in exchange. The book argues that these “financial ethical technologies” are not mutually exclusive but, rather, mutually enriching ways to deepen our understanding of the same economic phenomena. They are financial technologies because they enhance economic value; and, they are ethical technologies because their value enhancing contributions are produced by mitigating moral risks in exchange.Less
This book provides a framework for the study of financial ethics built on a broad review of research published in finance and economics journals. This book demonstrates that ethics is already an important part of financial research, and therefore the approach taken here is more of a “rediscovery” of the ethical dimension of financial economics. The book adopts a positivist framework for the field of financial ethics within which it is proposed that many “finance” problems are actually “ethics” problems; and that many economic phenomena can be explained as mechanisms for controlling moral risks. The text discusses several examples in which an ethics-centered approach to understanding economic phenomena is similar in spirit to other frameworks which have been applied in positive financial research including: the framework used for understanding corporate governance mechanisms as devices for mitigating agency costs and “moral hazards” in contractual relationships; the transaction “governance structure” framework that can explain the existence of hierarchies relative to markets when opportunistic behavior is assumed; and the roles of reputation and corporate culture in making credible commitments of trust in exchange. The book argues that these “financial ethical technologies” are not mutually exclusive but, rather, mutually enriching ways to deepen our understanding of the same economic phenomena. They are financial technologies because they enhance economic value; and, they are ethical technologies because their value enhancing contributions are produced by mitigating moral risks in exchange.
James Woodward
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195155273
- eISBN:
- 9780199835089
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195155270.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter clarifies the notion of an intervention and compares my version of this notion to the characterizations provided by other writers such as Glymour and Pearl. Very roughly, an intervention ...
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This chapter clarifies the notion of an intervention and compares my version of this notion to the characterizations provided by other writers such as Glymour and Pearl. Very roughly, an intervention on a variable X with respect to a second variable Y is a special sort of causal process that changes the value of X in such a way that any change in the value of Y can occur only as a result of the change in Y. The chapter also discusses the relata of the causal relationship, causal realism, agency theories of causation, and the relationship between my account of causation and that of David Lewis.Less
This chapter clarifies the notion of an intervention and compares my version of this notion to the characterizations provided by other writers such as Glymour and Pearl. Very roughly, an intervention on a variable X with respect to a second variable Y is a special sort of causal process that changes the value of X in such a way that any change in the value of Y can occur only as a result of the change in Y. The chapter also discusses the relata of the causal relationship, causal realism, agency theories of causation, and the relationship between my account of causation and that of David Lewis.
John Child, David Faulkner, and Stephen B. Tallman
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199266241
- eISBN:
- 9780191699139
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266241.003.0002
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Strategy, Organization Studies
The justification attributed to cooperative strategy may be based on several different economic theories and as such, this chapter attempts to take on an economic perspective in examining a company's ...
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The justification attributed to cooperative strategy may be based on several different economic theories and as such, this chapter attempts to take on an economic perspective in examining a company's actions and strategies. Although none of the theories discussed in this chapter are sufficient enough to be able to explain competitive advantage, usefulness, and credibility alone, the chapter is able to look into the features of each theory and how these may contribute to the strategy and operations of a particular organization. It attempts to look into the following economic theories and explains how each of these theories may be applied: market-power theory; transaction-cost analysis; agency theory; resource-based theory; transaction-value theory; real-options theory; and increasing-returns theory.Less
The justification attributed to cooperative strategy may be based on several different economic theories and as such, this chapter attempts to take on an economic perspective in examining a company's actions and strategies. Although none of the theories discussed in this chapter are sufficient enough to be able to explain competitive advantage, usefulness, and credibility alone, the chapter is able to look into the features of each theory and how these may contribute to the strategy and operations of a particular organization. It attempts to look into the following economic theories and explains how each of these theories may be applied: market-power theory; transaction-cost analysis; agency theory; resource-based theory; transaction-value theory; real-options theory; and increasing-returns theory.
Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199251346
- eISBN:
- 9780191602634
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251347.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Discusses the role of the theory of agency and additional constraints in the radical interpreter’s procedure. These are holism about attitude content, constraints on logical form in the object ...
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Discusses the role of the theory of agency and additional constraints in the radical interpreter’s procedure. These are holism about attitude content, constraints on logical form in the object language, constraints that come from seeing a speaker as a member of a particular linguistic community, and the role of empirical constraints in the radical interpreter’s procedure.Less
Discusses the role of the theory of agency and additional constraints in the radical interpreter’s procedure. These are holism about attitude content, constraints on logical form in the object language, constraints that come from seeing a speaker as a member of a particular linguistic community, and the role of empirical constraints in the radical interpreter’s procedure.
Jon Williamson
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198530794
- eISBN:
- 9780191712982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198530794.003.0007
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
This chapter provides an overview of the principal philosophical accounts of the nature of causality, including the mechanistic, probabilistic, counterfactual, and agency accounts.
This chapter provides an overview of the principal philosophical accounts of the nature of causality, including the mechanistic, probabilistic, counterfactual, and agency accounts.
Stephen W Smith
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199545520
- eISBN:
- 9780191721113
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545520.003.0011
- Subject:
- Law, Medical Law
This chapter presents a possible personhood theory that shifts the burden of proof away from the entity under consideration. It argues that we ought to exercise caution when making determinations ...
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This chapter presents a possible personhood theory that shifts the burden of proof away from the entity under consideration. It argues that we ought to exercise caution when making determinations about personhood and holds that things are persons when we are unsure, as opposed to determining that they are not. This way is likely to provide an ethical system with fewer bad results and one that is ultimately more consistent with the viewpoint of the average member of the moral community. This provides the added benefit of increasing the potential pool of persons to include entities such as foetuses, newborns, and those in persistent vegetative states (PVS) states while not taking away any rights from existing persons.Less
This chapter presents a possible personhood theory that shifts the burden of proof away from the entity under consideration. It argues that we ought to exercise caution when making determinations about personhood and holds that things are persons when we are unsure, as opposed to determining that they are not. This way is likely to provide an ethical system with fewer bad results and one that is ultimately more consistent with the viewpoint of the average member of the moral community. This provides the added benefit of increasing the potential pool of persons to include entities such as foetuses, newborns, and those in persistent vegetative states (PVS) states while not taking away any rights from existing persons.
Edward Craig
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236825
- eISBN:
- 9780191597244
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236824.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Chapter 5 aims to understand the contemporary philosophical climate in terms of a dominant philosophy, and argues that it is found in the ‘Agency Theory’, or ‘Practice Ideal’: the thesis that we are ...
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Chapter 5 aims to understand the contemporary philosophical climate in terms of a dominant philosophy, and argues that it is found in the ‘Agency Theory’, or ‘Practice Ideal’: the thesis that we are the creators of our own environment and values, that the realities which we meet with are the works of man. Craig argues that from about 1780, ‘activity’, ‘practice’ and similar concepts began to come to the fore, and provided new solutions of metaphysical and epistemological problems. The idea was to some extent anticipated in writers of the eighteenth century: in Pascal’s famous wager on the existence of God the value of truth has receded, and considerations of what serves a certain purpose have come to regulate belief; Hume saw in our imagination, not in our reason, the governing, and essentially active, principle that supports our beliefs; finally Kant’s transcendental idealism not only provided the key concept of ‘the world as we experience it’ that incorporated both concepts and impressions, but amounted to the claim that the world of our experience is of our own making. But the real rise of the Agency Theory took place in the nineteenth century: Marx and Engels, rejecting both theistic and idealist metaphysics, set up a new ideal for man, who was to be the free architect and builder of his own social world, in virtue of his grasp of the laws governing society and the processes of social change; following Peirce, William James and other American Pragmatists argued that belief is primarily an instrument for the attainment of our goals, and that man is fully autonomous, his creations subject to no controls or standards other than those which he himself imposes; Nietzsche, the most vociferous champion of agency and creativity, affirmed the idea, and constructed his account of reality, truth, and knowledge, and his aspirations for man around it.Less
Chapter 5 aims to understand the contemporary philosophical climate in terms of a dominant philosophy, and argues that it is found in the ‘Agency Theory’, or ‘Practice Ideal’: the thesis that we are the creators of our own environment and values, that the realities which we meet with are the works of man. Craig argues that from about 1780, ‘activity’, ‘practice’ and similar concepts began to come to the fore, and provided new solutions of metaphysical and epistemological problems. The idea was to some extent anticipated in writers of the eighteenth century: in Pascal’s famous wager on the existence of God the value of truth has receded, and considerations of what serves a certain purpose have come to regulate belief; Hume saw in our imagination, not in our reason, the governing, and essentially active, principle that supports our beliefs; finally Kant’s transcendental idealism not only provided the key concept of ‘the world as we experience it’ that incorporated both concepts and impressions, but amounted to the claim that the world of our experience is of our own making. But the real rise of the Agency Theory took place in the nineteenth century: Marx and Engels, rejecting both theistic and idealist metaphysics, set up a new ideal for man, who was to be the free architect and builder of his own social world, in virtue of his grasp of the laws governing society and the processes of social change; following Peirce, William James and other American Pragmatists argued that belief is primarily an instrument for the attainment of our goals, and that man is fully autonomous, his creations subject to no controls or standards other than those which he himself imposes; Nietzsche, the most vociferous champion of agency and creativity, affirmed the idea, and constructed his account of reality, truth, and knowledge, and his aspirations for man around it.
Roderick Martin, Peter D. Casson, and Tahir M. Nisar
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199202607
- eISBN:
- 9780191707896
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199202607.003.0002
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Finance, Accounting, and Banking
Investor engagement ranges across a spectrum, from indirect/laissez-faire relations to direct investor involvement in specific areas of management practice. The methods of engagement range from ...
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Investor engagement ranges across a spectrum, from indirect/laissez-faire relations to direct investor involvement in specific areas of management practice. The methods of engagement range from informal discussion, the preferred mode of engagement, through to formal methods, such as shareholder resolutions. Investor engagement is placed in the context of other influences on management behaviour. Strategy and innovation are two areas of management practice where investors have especially high incentives to intervene.Less
Investor engagement ranges across a spectrum, from indirect/laissez-faire relations to direct investor involvement in specific areas of management practice. The methods of engagement range from informal discussion, the preferred mode of engagement, through to formal methods, such as shareholder resolutions. Investor engagement is placed in the context of other influences on management behaviour. Strategy and innovation are two areas of management practice where investors have especially high incentives to intervene.
Rowland Stout
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240631
- eISBN:
- 9780191680212
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240631.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
One way one has of explaining things is to say that they happen because they should happen. Certain stories suggest the thought that it is only by being able to explain one's activity in terms of a ...
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One way one has of explaining things is to say that they happen because they should happen. Certain stories suggest the thought that it is only by being able to explain one's activity in terms of a practical justification that one can claim to be a real agent at all. This chapter develops this thought into a fully blown theory of agency. The theory the books wants to develop is not just a theory of action; it is also an account of those intentional mental states and processes, such as believing and intending, which are essential to agency. It is an account of these things entirely in terms of explanations and potential explanations of activity by practical justifications.Less
One way one has of explaining things is to say that they happen because they should happen. Certain stories suggest the thought that it is only by being able to explain one's activity in terms of a practical justification that one can claim to be a real agent at all. This chapter develops this thought into a fully blown theory of agency. The theory the books wants to develop is not just a theory of action; it is also an account of those intentional mental states and processes, such as believing and intending, which are essential to agency. It is an account of these things entirely in terms of explanations and potential explanations of activity by practical justifications.
Jacob N. Shapiro
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691157214
- eISBN:
- 9781400848645
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691157214.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This concluding chapter reviews the evidence, comments on U.S. government counterterrorism policies in light of the agency theory perspective on terrorist organizations, and offers a series of policy ...
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This concluding chapter reviews the evidence, comments on U.S. government counterterrorism policies in light of the agency theory perspective on terrorist organizations, and offers a series of policy recommendations that flow directly from the organizational analysis. One potential criticism of this analysis is that it focuses too heavily on organizational outcomes while ignoring the kinds of behavioral outcomes of greatest interest to policy makers: who gets attacked, when, and by which method. The policy recommendations show this concern to be misplaced by demonstrating how systematically taking terrorists' organizational challenges into account can yield better counterterrorism policy. In particular, there are subtle ways to push groups into adopting security-reducing management practices that will work against some groups, but not all.Less
This concluding chapter reviews the evidence, comments on U.S. government counterterrorism policies in light of the agency theory perspective on terrorist organizations, and offers a series of policy recommendations that flow directly from the organizational analysis. One potential criticism of this analysis is that it focuses too heavily on organizational outcomes while ignoring the kinds of behavioral outcomes of greatest interest to policy makers: who gets attacked, when, and by which method. The policy recommendations show this concern to be misplaced by demonstrating how systematically taking terrorists' organizational challenges into account can yield better counterterrorism policy. In particular, there are subtle ways to push groups into adopting security-reducing management practices that will work against some groups, but not all.
