David Kyuman Kim
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195319828
- eISBN:
- 9780199785667
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319828.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Why does agency — the capacity to make choices and to act in the world — matter to us? Why is it meaningful that our intentions have effects in the world, that they reflect our sense of identity, ...
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Why does agency — the capacity to make choices and to act in the world — matter to us? Why is it meaningful that our intentions have effects in the world, that they reflect our sense of identity, that they embody what we value? What kinds of motivations are available for political agency and judgment in an age that lacks the enthusiasm associated with the great emancipatory movements for civil rights and gender equality? What are the conditions for the possibility of being an effective agent when the meaning of democracy has become less transparent? This book addresses these crucial questions by uncovering the political, moral, philosophical, and religious dimensions of human agency. The book treats agency as a form of religious experience that reflects implicit and explicit notions of the good. Of particular concern are the moral, political, and religious motivations that underpin an understanding of agency as meaningful action. Through a critical engagement with the work of theorists such as Judith Butler, Charles Taylor, and Stanley Cavell, this book argues that late modern and postmodern agency is found most effectively at work in “projects of regenerating agency” or critical and strategic responses to loss. Agency as melancholic freedom begins and endures, this text maintains, through the moral and psychic losses associated with a broad range of experiences, including the moral identities shaped by secularized modernity and the multi-fold forms of alienation experienced by those who suffer the indignities of racial, gender, class, and sexuality discrimination and oppression. This book calls for renewing the sense of urgency in our political and moral engagements by seeing agency as a vocation, where the aspiration for self-transformation and the human need for hope are fundamental concerns.Less
Why does agency — the capacity to make choices and to act in the world — matter to us? Why is it meaningful that our intentions have effects in the world, that they reflect our sense of identity, that they embody what we value? What kinds of motivations are available for political agency and judgment in an age that lacks the enthusiasm associated with the great emancipatory movements for civil rights and gender equality? What are the conditions for the possibility of being an effective agent when the meaning of democracy has become less transparent? This book addresses these crucial questions by uncovering the political, moral, philosophical, and religious dimensions of human agency. The book treats agency as a form of religious experience that reflects implicit and explicit notions of the good. Of particular concern are the moral, political, and religious motivations that underpin an understanding of agency as meaningful action. Through a critical engagement with the work of theorists such as Judith Butler, Charles Taylor, and Stanley Cavell, this book argues that late modern and postmodern agency is found most effectively at work in “projects of regenerating agency” or critical and strategic responses to loss. Agency as melancholic freedom begins and endures, this text maintains, through the moral and psychic losses associated with a broad range of experiences, including the moral identities shaped by secularized modernity and the multi-fold forms of alienation experienced by those who suffer the indignities of racial, gender, class, and sexuality discrimination and oppression. This book calls for renewing the sense of urgency in our political and moral engagements by seeing agency as a vocation, where the aspiration for self-transformation and the human need for hope are fundamental concerns.
Michelle Kosch
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199289110
- eISBN:
- 9780191604003
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199289115.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book traces a complex of issues surrounding moral agency from Kant through Schelling to Kierkegaard. There are two complementary projects. The first is to clarify the contours of German idealism ...
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This book traces a complex of issues surrounding moral agency from Kant through Schelling to Kierkegaard. There are two complementary projects. The first is to clarify the contours of German idealism as a philosophical movement by examining the motivations not only of its beginning, but also of its end. In tracing the motivations for the transition to mid-19th century post-idealism to Schelling’s middle and late periods and, ultimately, back to a problem originally presented in Kant, it shows the causes of the demise of that movement to be the same as the causes of its rise. In the process, it presents the most detailed discussion to date of the moral psychology and moral epistemology of Schelling’s work after 1809. The second project — which is simply the first viewed from a different angle — is to trace the sources of Kierkegaard’s theory of agency and his criticism of philosophical ethics to this same complex of issues in Kant and post-Kantian idealism. In the process, it is argued that Schelling’s influence on Kierkegaard was greater than has been thought, and builds a new understanding of Kierkegaard’s project in his pseudonymous works on the basis of this revised picture of their historical background.Less
This book traces a complex of issues surrounding moral agency from Kant through Schelling to Kierkegaard. There are two complementary projects. The first is to clarify the contours of German idealism as a philosophical movement by examining the motivations not only of its beginning, but also of its end. In tracing the motivations for the transition to mid-19th century post-idealism to Schelling’s middle and late periods and, ultimately, back to a problem originally presented in Kant, it shows the causes of the demise of that movement to be the same as the causes of its rise. In the process, it presents the most detailed discussion to date of the moral psychology and moral epistemology of Schelling’s work after 1809. The second project — which is simply the first viewed from a different angle — is to trace the sources of Kierkegaard’s theory of agency and his criticism of philosophical ethics to this same complex of issues in Kant and post-Kantian idealism. In the process, it is argued that Schelling’s influence on Kierkegaard was greater than has been thought, and builds a new understanding of Kierkegaard’s project in his pseudonymous works on the basis of this revised picture of their historical background.
Stephen W Smith
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199545520
- eISBN:
- 9780191721113
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545520.003.0011
- Subject:
- Law, Medical Law
This chapter presents a possible personhood theory that shifts the burden of proof away from the entity under consideration. It argues that we ought to exercise caution when making determinations ...
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This chapter presents a possible personhood theory that shifts the burden of proof away from the entity under consideration. It argues that we ought to exercise caution when making determinations about personhood and holds that things are persons when we are unsure, as opposed to determining that they are not. This way is likely to provide an ethical system with fewer bad results and one that is ultimately more consistent with the viewpoint of the average member of the moral community. This provides the added benefit of increasing the potential pool of persons to include entities such as foetuses, newborns, and those in persistent vegetative states (PVS) states while not taking away any rights from existing persons.Less
This chapter presents a possible personhood theory that shifts the burden of proof away from the entity under consideration. It argues that we ought to exercise caution when making determinations about personhood and holds that things are persons when we are unsure, as opposed to determining that they are not. This way is likely to provide an ethical system with fewer bad results and one that is ultimately more consistent with the viewpoint of the average member of the moral community. This provides the added benefit of increasing the potential pool of persons to include entities such as foetuses, newborns, and those in persistent vegetative states (PVS) states while not taking away any rights from existing persons.
Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199269679
- eISBN:
- 9780191604096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926967X.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter discusses the way in which ‘agency’ bargains need to be understood in their rather specific meaning under the law of agency. It then discusses under what circumstances democratic ...
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This chapter discusses the way in which ‘agency’ bargains need to be understood in their rather specific meaning under the law of agency. It then discusses under what circumstances democratic political systems favour agency-type bargains. Agency bargains vary on two key dimensions: on the extent of specific direction under which public servants operate, and on whether delegated agency bargains are single- or multiple-principle. Four variants of agency bargains are explored, namely serial and personal loyalist variants of agency bargains, and simple and complex forms of delegated agency bargains.Less
This chapter discusses the way in which ‘agency’ bargains need to be understood in their rather specific meaning under the law of agency. It then discusses under what circumstances democratic political systems favour agency-type bargains. Agency bargains vary on two key dimensions: on the extent of specific direction under which public servants operate, and on whether delegated agency bargains are single- or multiple-principle. Four variants of agency bargains are explored, namely serial and personal loyalist variants of agency bargains, and simple and complex forms of delegated agency bargains.
Jochen Prantl
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287680
- eISBN:
- 9780191603723
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287686.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter introduces and defines the terms ‘informal groups of states’, ‘groups of friends’, and ‘contact groups’. It develops a synergistic analytical framework, identifying the causal mechanisms ...
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This chapter introduces and defines the terms ‘informal groups of states’, ‘groups of friends’, and ‘contact groups’. It develops a synergistic analytical framework, identifying the causal mechanisms that contribute to the formation of informal groups of states by borrowing from insights of theories of agency and delegation. It challenges the proposition that centralization and independence are key functional characteristics of international organizations which enhance efficiency. Instead, it argues that decentralization via informal groups of states allows the achievement of policy goals that would be unattainable in a centralized setting. The typology of exit, voice, and loyalty is incorporated into analytical framework to explain the dynamics between informal groups and the Security Council. Such an approach provides substantial explanatory leverage to explain the institutional effects of the Security Council under conditions of systemic change. The chapter concludes with an outline of the book’s contents.Less
This chapter introduces and defines the terms ‘informal groups of states’, ‘groups of friends’, and ‘contact groups’. It develops a synergistic analytical framework, identifying the causal mechanisms that contribute to the formation of informal groups of states by borrowing from insights of theories of agency and delegation. It challenges the proposition that centralization and independence are key functional characteristics of international organizations which enhance efficiency. Instead, it argues that decentralization via informal groups of states allows the achievement of policy goals that would be unattainable in a centralized setting. The typology of exit, voice, and loyalty is incorporated into analytical framework to explain the dynamics between informal groups and the Security Council. Such an approach provides substantial explanatory leverage to explain the institutional effects of the Security Council under conditions of systemic change. The chapter concludes with an outline of the book’s contents.
Vernon Bogdanor (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197263334
- eISBN:
- 9780191734564
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197263334.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics
Drawing together work presented at a conference held at the British Academy, this book provides a broad overview of one of the most significant aspects of modern government. Joined-up government is a ...
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Drawing together work presented at a conference held at the British Academy, this book provides a broad overview of one of the most significant aspects of modern government. Joined-up government is a key theme of modern government. The Labour government, first elected in 1997, decided that intractable problems such as social exclusion, drug addiction and crime could not be resolved by any single department of government. Instead, such problems had to be made the object of a concerted attack using all the arms of government — central and local government and public agencies, as well as the private and voluntary sectors. This book seeks to analyse ‘joined-up government’, to consider its history, and to evaluate its consequences for British institutions such as the Cabinet, the civil service and local authorities. Is joined-up government a new idea, or merely a new label for a very old idea? What lessons can be learnt from previous attempts at joined-up government? How does it affect our traditional constitutional conceptions relating to Cabinet government, a politically neutral and non-partisan civil service, and an independent system of local government? Will it lead to the concentration of power in 10 Downing Street or is it compatible with a political system based on checks and balances?Less
Drawing together work presented at a conference held at the British Academy, this book provides a broad overview of one of the most significant aspects of modern government. Joined-up government is a key theme of modern government. The Labour government, first elected in 1997, decided that intractable problems such as social exclusion, drug addiction and crime could not be resolved by any single department of government. Instead, such problems had to be made the object of a concerted attack using all the arms of government — central and local government and public agencies, as well as the private and voluntary sectors. This book seeks to analyse ‘joined-up government’, to consider its history, and to evaluate its consequences for British institutions such as the Cabinet, the civil service and local authorities. Is joined-up government a new idea, or merely a new label for a very old idea? What lessons can be learnt from previous attempts at joined-up government? How does it affect our traditional constitutional conceptions relating to Cabinet government, a politically neutral and non-partisan civil service, and an independent system of local government? Will it lead to the concentration of power in 10 Downing Street or is it compatible with a political system based on checks and balances?
Ilkka Pyysiäinen
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195380026
- eISBN:
- 9780199869046
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195380026.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This book provides a cognitive scientific perspective to beliefs about supernatural agents. First, human intuitions about agents, agency, and counterintuitive concepts are outlined and explained. ...
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This book provides a cognitive scientific perspective to beliefs about supernatural agents. First, human intuitions about agents, agency, and counterintuitive concepts are outlined and explained. Second, various kinds of folk beliefs and theological doctrines about souls and spirits are analyzed in the light of the human cognitive architecture, using descriptions of spirit possession and shamanism as materials. Third, scholastic discussions of God’s cognitive capacities as well as folk-psychological God beliefs are analyzed. This analysis combines with a discussion of Buddhist ideas of soullesness and of buddhahood in textual traditions and in folk beliefs. Beliefs about God and buddhas are shown to rest on the same cognitive capacities of understanding agency and intentionality that underlie spirit beliefs. The Buddhist doctrine of soullessness was originally a denial of the self as a separate spiritual entity, not a denial of personal agency. God and buddhas differ from ordinary agents in that they are believed to have open access to all minds. Therefore, they can serve as means of representing what persons believe others to believe. Such divine minds are also used as an explanation for the fact that the whole of reality is intuitively experienced as if intentionally directed by a personal will. The book ends with a discussion of the future of religion and atheism.Less
This book provides a cognitive scientific perspective to beliefs about supernatural agents. First, human intuitions about agents, agency, and counterintuitive concepts are outlined and explained. Second, various kinds of folk beliefs and theological doctrines about souls and spirits are analyzed in the light of the human cognitive architecture, using descriptions of spirit possession and shamanism as materials. Third, scholastic discussions of God’s cognitive capacities as well as folk-psychological God beliefs are analyzed. This analysis combines with a discussion of Buddhist ideas of soullesness and of buddhahood in textual traditions and in folk beliefs. Beliefs about God and buddhas are shown to rest on the same cognitive capacities of understanding agency and intentionality that underlie spirit beliefs. The Buddhist doctrine of soullessness was originally a denial of the self as a separate spiritual entity, not a denial of personal agency. God and buddhas differ from ordinary agents in that they are believed to have open access to all minds. Therefore, they can serve as means of representing what persons believe others to believe. Such divine minds are also used as an explanation for the fact that the whole of reality is intuitively experienced as if intentionally directed by a personal will. The book ends with a discussion of the future of religion and atheism.
Simon J. Evnine
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239948
- eISBN:
- 9780191716898
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239948.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book discusses various epistemic aspects of what it is to be a person. Persons are defined as finite beings that have beliefs, including second‐order beliefs about their own and others' beliefs, ...
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This book discusses various epistemic aspects of what it is to be a person. Persons are defined as finite beings that have beliefs, including second‐order beliefs about their own and others' beliefs, and engage in agency, including the making of long‐term plans. It is argued that for any being meeting these conditions, a number of epistemic consequences obtain. First, all such beings must have certain logical concepts and be able to use them in certain ways. Secondly, there are at least two principles governing belief that it is rational for persons to satisfy and are such that nothing can be a person at all unless it satisfies them to a large extent. These principles are that one believe the conjunction of one's beliefs and that one treat one's future beliefs as, by and large, better than one's current beliefs. Thirdly, persons both occupy epistemic points of view on the world and show up within those views. This makes it impossible for them to be completely objective about their own beliefs. This ‘aspectual dualism’ is characteristic of treatments of persons in the Kantian tradition. In sum, these epistemic consequences add up to a fairly traditional view of the nature of persons, one in opposition to much recent theorizing.Less
This book discusses various epistemic aspects of what it is to be a person. Persons are defined as finite beings that have beliefs, including second‐order beliefs about their own and others' beliefs, and engage in agency, including the making of long‐term plans. It is argued that for any being meeting these conditions, a number of epistemic consequences obtain. First, all such beings must have certain logical concepts and be able to use them in certain ways. Secondly, there are at least two principles governing belief that it is rational for persons to satisfy and are such that nothing can be a person at all unless it satisfies them to a large extent. These principles are that one believe the conjunction of one's beliefs and that one treat one's future beliefs as, by and large, better than one's current beliefs. Thirdly, persons both occupy epistemic points of view on the world and show up within those views. This makes it impossible for them to be completely objective about their own beliefs. This ‘aspectual dualism’ is characteristic of treatments of persons in the Kantian tradition. In sum, these epistemic consequences add up to a fairly traditional view of the nature of persons, one in opposition to much recent theorizing.
Bennett W. Helm
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199567898
- eISBN:
- 9780191722387
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567898.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Recent Western thought has consistently emphasized the individualistic strand in our understanding of persons at the expense of the social strand. Thus, it is generally thought that persons are ...
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Recent Western thought has consistently emphasized the individualistic strand in our understanding of persons at the expense of the social strand. Thus, it is generally thought that persons are self-determining and autonomous, where these are understood to be capacities we exercise most fully on our own, apart from others, whose influence on us tends to undermine that autonomy. This book argues that we must reject a strongly individualistic conception of persons if we are to make sense of significant interpersonal relationships and the importance they can have in our lives. It presents a new account of love as intimate identification and of friendship as a kind of plural agency, in each case grounding and analyzing these notions in terms of interpersonal emotions. At the centre of this account is an analysis of how our emotional connectedness with others is essential to our very capacities for autonomy and self-determination: we are rational and autonomous only because of and through our inherently social nature. By focusing on the role that relationships of love and friendship have, both in the initial formation of our selves and in the on-going development and maturation of adult persons, the book significantly alters our understanding of persons and the kind of psychology we persons have as moral and social beings.Less
Recent Western thought has consistently emphasized the individualistic strand in our understanding of persons at the expense of the social strand. Thus, it is generally thought that persons are self-determining and autonomous, where these are understood to be capacities we exercise most fully on our own, apart from others, whose influence on us tends to undermine that autonomy. This book argues that we must reject a strongly individualistic conception of persons if we are to make sense of significant interpersonal relationships and the importance they can have in our lives. It presents a new account of love as intimate identification and of friendship as a kind of plural agency, in each case grounding and analyzing these notions in terms of interpersonal emotions. At the centre of this account is an analysis of how our emotional connectedness with others is essential to our very capacities for autonomy and self-determination: we are rational and autonomous only because of and through our inherently social nature. By focusing on the role that relationships of love and friendship have, both in the initial formation of our selves and in the on-going development and maturation of adult persons, the book significantly alters our understanding of persons and the kind of psychology we persons have as moral and social beings.
Arad Reisberg
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199204892
- eISBN:
- 9780191709487
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199204892.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Company and Commercial Law
This chapter is concerned with an indefinite but fundamental: what purpose lies at the heart of the company's cause of action which justifies the use of derivative actions? Section 1.2 firstly ...
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This chapter is concerned with an indefinite but fundamental: what purpose lies at the heart of the company's cause of action which justifies the use of derivative actions? Section 1.2 firstly identifies the limitations of the traditional view of the derivative action. Subsequently it explicates the relation between the derivative action and two concepts, namely ‘control’ and ‘agency costs’. Section 1.3 outlines some major techniques of accountability, which share the goal of reducing agency costs. Section 1.4 focuses on one such major alternative as it examines whether it is true that the market for corporate control may constitute an effective functional substitute for litigation. As will be seen, from a governance perspective (as opposed to a narrowly legal one), the interaction of the derivative action with the market for corporate control raises some interesting issues.Less
This chapter is concerned with an indefinite but fundamental: what purpose lies at the heart of the company's cause of action which justifies the use of derivative actions? Section 1.2 firstly identifies the limitations of the traditional view of the derivative action. Subsequently it explicates the relation between the derivative action and two concepts, namely ‘control’ and ‘agency costs’. Section 1.3 outlines some major techniques of accountability, which share the goal of reducing agency costs. Section 1.4 focuses on one such major alternative as it examines whether it is true that the market for corporate control may constitute an effective functional substitute for litigation. As will be seen, from a governance perspective (as opposed to a narrowly legal one), the interaction of the derivative action with the market for corporate control raises some interesting issues.
Sharon Erickson Nepstad
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195169232
- eISBN:
- 9780199835195
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169239.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This book examines the Central American solidarity movement based on the cultural-agency approach. It also explores the challenges of organizing at the transnational level. People of faith were at ...
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This book examines the Central American solidarity movement based on the cultural-agency approach. It also explores the challenges of organizing at the transnational level. People of faith were at the center of this movement, determined to change President Reagan’s foreign policy towards Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. To achieve this goal, some petitioned Congress to stop aid to those responsible for human rights violations in the region. Many attended protests, marches and commemorative vigils.Less
This book examines the Central American solidarity movement based on the cultural-agency approach. It also explores the challenges of organizing at the transnational level. People of faith were at the center of this movement, determined to change President Reagan’s foreign policy towards Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. To achieve this goal, some petitioned Congress to stop aid to those responsible for human rights violations in the region. Many attended protests, marches and commemorative vigils.
Monique Deveaux
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199289790
- eISBN:
- 9780191711022
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289790.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter introduces the main problem of the book: the tensions that exist between cultural rights, and accommodation and formal protection for sexual equality in liberal constitutional ...
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This chapter introduces the main problem of the book: the tensions that exist between cultural rights, and accommodation and formal protection for sexual equality in liberal constitutional democracies. It also discusses the unsatisfactory treatment of this problem within much recent mainstream political philosophy, especially liberal theories of multiculturalism and deliberative democracy theory.Less
This chapter introduces the main problem of the book: the tensions that exist between cultural rights, and accommodation and formal protection for sexual equality in liberal constitutional democracies. It also discusses the unsatisfactory treatment of this problem within much recent mainstream political philosophy, especially liberal theories of multiculturalism and deliberative democracy theory.
Monique Deveaux
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199289790
- eISBN:
- 9780191711022
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289790.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
In this concluding chapter, the main arguments of the book are briefly recapped and extended. Democratic legitimacy is defended as a core norm for plural, liberal democratic societies, one which ...
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In this concluding chapter, the main arguments of the book are briefly recapped and extended. Democratic legitimacy is defended as a core norm for plural, liberal democratic societies, one which should also guide deliberations about contested cultural practices. This chapter also makes the case for expanding the scope of what we understand as (legitimating) democratic activity, so as to include not only formal, institutionalized democratic practices and spaces, but also informal, everyday expressions of democratic agency. Such a shift should enable us to better see and foster women’s capacities and opportunities to resist, affirm, transform, and reinvent their cultural traditions and arrangements, which speak directly to the issue of the legitimacy of those traditions.Less
In this concluding chapter, the main arguments of the book are briefly recapped and extended. Democratic legitimacy is defended as a core norm for plural, liberal democratic societies, one which should also guide deliberations about contested cultural practices. This chapter also makes the case for expanding the scope of what we understand as (legitimating) democratic activity, so as to include not only formal, institutionalized democratic practices and spaces, but also informal, everyday expressions of democratic agency. Such a shift should enable us to better see and foster women’s capacities and opportunities to resist, affirm, transform, and reinvent their cultural traditions and arrangements, which speak directly to the issue of the legitimacy of those traditions.
Katerina Deligiorgi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199646159
- eISBN:
- 9780191741142
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646159.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Autonomy is a key concept in contemporary moral philosophy with deep roots in the history of the subject. However, there is still no agreed view about the correct way to formulate an account of ...
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Autonomy is a key concept in contemporary moral philosophy with deep roots in the history of the subject. However, there is still no agreed view about the correct way to formulate an account of autonomy that adequately captures both our capacity for self-determination and our responsiveness to reasons. This book develops a theory of autonomy that is Kantian in orientation but which engages closely with recent arguments about agency, morality, and practical reasoning. There are two aspects in which the theory defended in this book is distinctive. First, whereas autonomy has primarily been understood in terms of our relation to ourselves, the theory defended here shows that it also centrally involves our relation to others. Identifying the intersubjective dimension of autonomy is crucial for the defence of autonomy as a morality of freedom. Second, autonomy must be treated as a composite concept and hence not capturable in simple definitions such as acting on one’s higher order desires or on principles one endorses. One of the virtues of the composite picture is that it shows autonomy at the intersection of concerns with morality, practical rationality, and freedom. Autonomy pertains to all these areas, though it does not exactly coincide with any of them. Showing this, and so tracing the scope of autonomy, is an essential part of the project. The aim is to show that autonomy is theoretically plausible, psychologically realistic, and morally attractive.Less
Autonomy is a key concept in contemporary moral philosophy with deep roots in the history of the subject. However, there is still no agreed view about the correct way to formulate an account of autonomy that adequately captures both our capacity for self-determination and our responsiveness to reasons. This book develops a theory of autonomy that is Kantian in orientation but which engages closely with recent arguments about agency, morality, and practical reasoning. There are two aspects in which the theory defended in this book is distinctive. First, whereas autonomy has primarily been understood in terms of our relation to ourselves, the theory defended here shows that it also centrally involves our relation to others. Identifying the intersubjective dimension of autonomy is crucial for the defence of autonomy as a morality of freedom. Second, autonomy must be treated as a composite concept and hence not capturable in simple definitions such as acting on one’s higher order desires or on principles one endorses. One of the virtues of the composite picture is that it shows autonomy at the intersection of concerns with morality, practical rationality, and freedom. Autonomy pertains to all these areas, though it does not exactly coincide with any of them. Showing this, and so tracing the scope of autonomy, is an essential part of the project. The aim is to show that autonomy is theoretically plausible, psychologically realistic, and morally attractive.
Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199269679
- eISBN:
- 9780191604096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926967X.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter introduces the notion of Public Service Bargain (PSB) and points to variations in its three dimensions: reward, competency, and loyalty and responsibility. Based on these variations, it ...
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This chapter introduces the notion of Public Service Bargain (PSB) and points to variations in its three dimensions: reward, competency, and loyalty and responsibility. Based on these variations, it discusses the centrality of PSBs for politics and points to the intellectual origins of the idea. The distinction between trustee- and agency-bargains is introduced.Less
This chapter introduces the notion of Public Service Bargain (PSB) and points to variations in its three dimensions: reward, competency, and loyalty and responsibility. Based on these variations, it discusses the centrality of PSBs for politics and points to the intellectual origins of the idea. The distinction between trustee- and agency-bargains is introduced.
Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199269679
- eISBN:
- 9780191604096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926967X.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter explores how public service bargains can weaken or collapse, focusing on the ways in which different types of bargain provide incentives for different ways of cheating and strategic ...
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This chapter explores how public service bargains can weaken or collapse, focusing on the ways in which different types of bargain provide incentives for different ways of cheating and strategic behaviour. Varieties of cheating behaviour across different trustee and agency bargains are considered, while highlighting the various forces and strategies that can keep cheating in check. It is argued that making any PSB cheat-proof requires particular and demanding social conditions.Less
This chapter explores how public service bargains can weaken or collapse, focusing on the ways in which different types of bargain provide incentives for different ways of cheating and strategic behaviour. Varieties of cheating behaviour across different trustee and agency bargains are considered, while highlighting the various forces and strategies that can keep cheating in check. It is argued that making any PSB cheat-proof requires particular and demanding social conditions.
Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199269679
- eISBN:
- 9780191604096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926967X.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter uses the public service bargain perspective to analyze the contemporary theme of managerialism and demands for changing controls over public services. It shows what managerialism means ...
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This chapter uses the public service bargain perspective to analyze the contemporary theme of managerialism and demands for changing controls over public services. It shows what managerialism means for public service bargains and points to the demanding conditions of such a bargain, given the incentives to cheat that affect the various parties to this type of bargain. Given its vulnerability to cheating, the managerialist type of bargain seems likely to emerge and ‘stick’ only in some traditions and cultures.Less
This chapter uses the public service bargain perspective to analyze the contemporary theme of managerialism and demands for changing controls over public services. It shows what managerialism means for public service bargains and points to the demanding conditions of such a bargain, given the incentives to cheat that affect the various parties to this type of bargain. Given its vulnerability to cheating, the managerialist type of bargain seems likely to emerge and ‘stick’ only in some traditions and cultures.
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199247493
- eISBN:
- 9780191594830
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247493.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
There are many senses in which we can be said to be free agents, and to be morally responsible. There is also, however, a strong, fundamental, and natural sense in which these things are impossible. ...
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There are many senses in which we can be said to be free agents, and to be morally responsible. There is also, however, a strong, fundamental, and natural sense in which these things are impossible. Very briefly: we cannot be ultimately responsible for how we act. Why not? Because when we act, we do what we do because of the way we are, all things considered, and we cannot be ultimately responsible for the way we are. Suppose this is right: ultimate responsibility is impossible. Can we nevertheless state what would be necessary and sufficient for someone to possess ultimate responsibility (as we can state the necessary and sufficiently conditions of being a round square)? One proposal is that one would have to be causa sui, truly, ultimately the cause or source of oneself, at least in fundamental mental or characteral respects. Another proposal considered in this book is that one could not really count as a free agent (even if one was somehow causa sui) unless one also experienced oneself as, or believed oneself to be, a free agent. This raises the question whether believing something to be the case could ever be a condition of its actually being the case (the idea is highly paradoxical). It also leads to a sustained discussion of the experience of agency, and of being a free agent. Generally speaking, the metaphysical possibilities seem fairly clear when it comes to the question of free will. The remaining questions of interest may have more to do with the phenomenology of freedom, and more generally, moral psychology.Less
There are many senses in which we can be said to be free agents, and to be morally responsible. There is also, however, a strong, fundamental, and natural sense in which these things are impossible. Very briefly: we cannot be ultimately responsible for how we act. Why not? Because when we act, we do what we do because of the way we are, all things considered, and we cannot be ultimately responsible for the way we are. Suppose this is right: ultimate responsibility is impossible. Can we nevertheless state what would be necessary and sufficient for someone to possess ultimate responsibility (as we can state the necessary and sufficiently conditions of being a round square)? One proposal is that one would have to be causa sui, truly, ultimately the cause or source of oneself, at least in fundamental mental or characteral respects. Another proposal considered in this book is that one could not really count as a free agent (even if one was somehow causa sui) unless one also experienced oneself as, or believed oneself to be, a free agent. This raises the question whether believing something to be the case could ever be a condition of its actually being the case (the idea is highly paradoxical). It also leads to a sustained discussion of the experience of agency, and of being a free agent. Generally speaking, the metaphysical possibilities seem fairly clear when it comes to the question of free will. The remaining questions of interest may have more to do with the phenomenology of freedom, and more generally, moral psychology.
Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199261185
- eISBN:
- 9780191601507
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199261180.003.0018
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
Executive and regulatory agencies are decentralized state organizations that implement policies. When the law clearly defines the policy, we have a state policy; when it leaves the precise definition ...
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Executive and regulatory agencies are decentralized state organizations that implement policies. When the law clearly defines the policy, we have a state policy; when it leaves the precise definition to the incumbent administration, we have a government policy. Regulatory agencies are supposed to execute state policies and be more autonomous from the administration, whereas executive agencies will be less autonomous politically but equally independent in administrative terms. Policies introduced by executive agencies are supposed to change the moment that the opposition political party or political coalition wins an election and a new administration begins, whereas the policies introduced by regulatory policies do not change so easily. Government policies may be changed either by the parliament or by the executive, whereas state policies may be changed only by the parliament. Executive agencies are supposed to have administrative autonomy, regulatory agencies, decision autonomy, but policies are not or should not be their responsibility.Less
Executive and regulatory agencies are decentralized state organizations that implement policies. When the law clearly defines the policy, we have a state policy; when it leaves the precise definition to the incumbent administration, we have a government policy. Regulatory agencies are supposed to execute state policies and be more autonomous from the administration, whereas executive agencies will be less autonomous politically but equally independent in administrative terms. Policies introduced by executive agencies are supposed to change the moment that the opposition political party or political coalition wins an election and a new administration begins, whereas the policies introduced by regulatory policies do not change so easily. Government policies may be changed either by the parliament or by the executive, whereas state policies may be changed only by the parliament. Executive agencies are supposed to have administrative autonomy, regulatory agencies, decision autonomy, but policies are not or should not be their responsibility.
Julian Le Grand
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199266999
- eISBN:
- 9780191600869
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199266999.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
Can we rely on the public service ethos to deliver high quality public services? Are professionals such as doctors and teachers really public‐spirited altruists—knights—or self‐interested ...
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Can we rely on the public service ethos to deliver high quality public services? Are professionals such as doctors and teachers really public‐spirited altruists—knights—or self‐interested egoists—knaves? And how should the recipients of those services, patients, parents, and pupils, be treated? As passive recipients—pawns—or as active consumers—queens?This book offers answers to these questions. It argues that the original welfare state was designed on the assumptions that those who worked within it were basically altruists or knights and that the beneficiaries were passive recipients or pawns. In consequence, services were often of low quality, delivered in a patronising fashion and inequitable in outcome. However, services designed on an opposite set of assumptions—that public service professionals are knaves and that users should be queens—also face problems: exploitation by unscrupulous professionals, and overuse by demanding consumers, especially middle class ones.The book draws on evidence from Britain and abroad to show that, in fact, public policies designed on the basis that professionals are a mixture of knight and knave and recipients a mixture of pawn and queen deliver better quality and greater equity than policies based on more simplistic assumptions about motivation and agency. In particular, contrary to popular mythology, the book shows that policies that offer choice and competition within public services such as education and health care can deliver both excellence and equity. And policies aimed at building up individual assets and wealth ownership can empower the poor and powerless more effectively than those aimed simply at bolstering their current income.Less
Can we rely on the public service ethos to deliver high quality public services? Are professionals such as doctors and teachers really public‐spirited altruists—knights—or self‐interested egoists—knaves? And how should the recipients of those services, patients, parents, and pupils, be treated? As passive recipients—pawns—or as active consumers—queens?
This book offers answers to these questions. It argues that the original welfare state was designed on the assumptions that those who worked within it were basically altruists or knights and that the beneficiaries were passive recipients or pawns. In consequence, services were often of low quality, delivered in a patronising fashion and inequitable in outcome. However, services designed on an opposite set of assumptions—that public service professionals are knaves and that users should be queens—also face problems: exploitation by unscrupulous professionals, and overuse by demanding consumers, especially middle class ones.
The book draws on evidence from Britain and abroad to show that, in fact, public policies designed on the basis that professionals are a mixture of knight and knave and recipients a mixture of pawn and queen deliver better quality and greater equity than policies based on more simplistic assumptions about motivation and agency. In particular, contrary to popular mythology, the book shows that policies that offer choice and competition within public services such as education and health care can deliver both excellence and equity. And policies aimed at building up individual assets and wealth ownership can empower the poor and powerless more effectively than those aimed simply at bolstering their current income.
