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This chapter reviews the literature on polarization during democratic transitions to highlight how polarization prevents the compromise and cooperation that is vital to successful transitions. It then discusses the timeline of events between 2011 and 2014 in Egypt and Tunisia to chart how these transitions progressed, and documents where affective and preference polarization contributed to the divergence. The chapter focuses on the debates and decisions related to drafting and approving a new constitution, holding the first elections, and creating a transitional justice initiative. High levels of polarization derailed Egypt's transition, while significantly more agreement in Tunisia facilitated cooperation and compromise in parallel processes. However, as with any social phenomenon, the divergence in these transitions is likely due to multiple causes. While affective and preference polarization among elite actors clearly played a major role in this divergence, the chapter also highlights other factors, such as structural predecessors, continued protests, the emergence of new political actors, and ongoing events in other countries, that were important for political developments.

This chapter articulates the impact of the populist logic on the type of movements and parties formed. It analyses the dynamics and impact of populist mobilization on competitive party systems in constitutional democracies. It argues that key elements of populist logic—the pars pro toto conception of political representation, the friend–enemy conception of politics, the anti-establishment/anti-elite posture even when in power, and the anti–status quo orientation of populist parties—foster factionalism, severe affective political polarization, the movementization of parties and the evisceration of democratic norms and institutions. Populists create a specific type of catch-all movement-party—one that blurs the distinct logics of social movements and political parties with deleterious effects on political competition. Populist logic prevents populists in government from deescalating their demands; from abandoning their movement style rhetoric, tactics, or posturing; from renouncing outbidding; and from ceasing to demonize the opposition. This makes compromise impossible and responsible governance very unlikely.

In a time of party polarization, citizens increasingly see the world in partisan terms. The animosities people feel for the opposing partisan side could threaten the prospects for compromise. This chapter considers degree to which partisan biases prevail over principled thinking when it comes to supporting compromise in politics. With experimental evidence and a set of surveys that span three presidential administrations, partisans are shown to be enthusiastic about the principle of compromise in politics, and are willing to call on their own party to nominate candidates who are willing to make compromises. Yet partisan thinking leaves its mark, as people are more likely to demand compromise from the opposing side than to call on their own party to do the same. People call for compromise among their own ranks as a result of their moderate preferences, while they think their opponents should make concessions as a matter of democratic principle.

In this introductory chapter, we highlight the distinctiveness of the campaign yard sign as a form of political participation that is public, communicative, and confrontational. In contrast with the received wisdom of campaign professionals who are altogether skeptical about signs and a political science literature that has focused somewhat narrowly on the effectiveness of signs, we believe that yard signs are much more than campaign tools. We make the case for a comprehensive examination of yard signs as a political phenomenon, pointing to three attributes of yard signs that are individually interesting, but particularly compelling in combination: the symbolic aspect of signs as markers of partisan identity, the social aspect of signs as messages to neighbors and other audiences, and the spatial aspect of signs as information in social contexts.

In this concluding chapter, we discuss some of the major takeaways of the book. We find that signs are an act of both communication and participation, and that the conventional wisdom that signs are primarily campaign tools is misguided. At the same time, displayers and non-displayers ascribe different meanings to signs, and the distinction between in-party and out-party signs is important in determining how signs spread throughout neighborhoods. In turn, once present, those signs can influence perceptions of social space and social interactions, especially in the most intimate social contexts. In addition, we discuss lessons learned with respect to spatial analysis and network analysis and their power, both individually, but especially jointly, to reinvigorate the community studies paradigm. We conclude by reflecting on the yard sign as a political symbol and considering how such symbols are especially powerful in an age of intensely salient and polarized partisan identities.

This chapter considers the problem of goodwill. According to this concern, productive public discourse requires more goodwill—and, in particular, more trust—than typically obtains in divided societies. The chapter offers a two-pronged response to this worry. First, once we appreciate the systemic character of public discourse, it becomes apparent that productive public discourse demands far less goodwill than one might think. Second, even when levels of mutual dislike are too high for people productively to engage with one another, we can use public discourse to regenerate the missing goodwill. More specifically, features of public discourse that are widespread in non-ideal conditions—namely hypocrisy, anger, and even the occurrence of hate speech—have properties that can be harnessed to rebuild goodwill in divided societies. This might seem counter-intuitive: prima facie, these features of public speech seem wholly at odds with trust and goodwill. The present chapter, however, challenges this common intuition.