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This chapter describes how computers came into the automotive, steel, and aerospace manufacturing industries, all of which were traditional Second Industrial Revolution parts of the economy. It argues that computers fundamentally changed the nature of work in all three, and discusses how this came about. It also describes the extent of deployment and recent trends in each in the use of information technology.

This chapter revisits the Japanese case of by asking whether Japan can and should pursue economic nationalism in the twenty-first century, or whether it should commit itself to the liberal multilateralism that has been the foundation of the post-war international economic system. Using the latest round of Japanese policy debate as a case study, the chapter highlights the potential opportunity for a mature and advanced industrial economy such as Japan to pursue economic nationalism while at the same time embrace liberal multilateralism. The chapter examines Japan’s search for industrial and trade policy to cope with new competitive challenges emanating from multilateral agreements by exploring the intense debate between the Japanese government and the civil aircraft manufacturers. By embarking on a partnership with private business, the Japanese government demonstrates the institutional basis for international competitiveness and its continuing engagement with economic nationalism in multilateral global markets.

Industries, firms, and entrepreneurs in the Bay Area and Los Angeles did not plan the economic divergence of their regions. They faced challenges from the restructuring of the Old Economy and benefited from the opportunities of the New Economy. Their successes and failures widened the income gap between the two regions. This chapter presents comparative case studies of entertainment, aerospace, information technology, logistics, and biotechnology in San Francisco and Los Angeles, showing how they developed differently and shaped specialization, wages, and income divergence in the two regions.

This chapter shows how the triangular relationship among the lab, Caltech, and NASA—a central characteristic of JPL—was highlighted by Murray's political activity in the early 1980s. Like the previous directors of JPL, Murray came to the job from Caltech, and he took office with the explicit intention of building up relations with campus. As the only NASA center operated by a contractor, JPL maintained a delicate balance between the independence offered by the Caltech association and the accountability demanded of government programs. The maturation of the aerospace industry added a fourth leg to the triangle making it a square and introduced basic questions about JPL's identity. All the while, JPL itself was evolving in its internal organization and culture in response to changing contexts.

This chapter looks at the current state of physical systems controlled by an onboard computer. Typically this covers transportation systems such as cars, aircraft, railway systems, space systems, or even medical devices, all of them either for the expected harmfulness for people, or for the huge cost associated with their failure. The chapter shows how the increase of computer use in those systems has led to huge benefits, but also an exponential growth in complexity. Furthermore, the drawback of this massive introduction of computers to control systems is the lack of predictability for both computer and software. This chapter shows how the aerospace industry, and more generally critical embedded systems industries, is now facing a huge increase in the software size in their systems. This in turn creates a greater system complexity increase because of safety or performance objectives. Moreover, this complexity leads to the need to integrate even more advanced algorithms to sustain autonomy and energy efficiency.

This chapter discusses the reasons for Bruce Murray's resignation as director of JPL; he perceived a turning point in the history of the lab, from the Mariner-Voyager era of planetary exploration to the era of a combination NASA and military lab no longer sustained by planetary projects. This transition would entail changes in JPL's internal management, starting at the top, and also in the lab's relations with Caltech and NASA and with an increasingly mature aerospace industry. Murray, however, underestimated the prospects for the planetary program, and the subsequent revival of the primary mission on top of new programs made growth a key issue in the 1980s. When Lew Allen arrived at JPL in October 1982 he did not perceive any great mandate for change and undertook no sweeping reorganization. That itself represented a change from Murray's tenure, as did Allen's pragmatic management style, which departed from Murray's more visionary initiatives.