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This chapter on the national co-ordination of European Union (EU) policy in the United Kingdom has four sections. The first considers the UK’s interpretation of the co-ordination need generated by EC/EU membership; the co-ordination ambition is outlined in relation to the UK political system and explanatory factors are discussed. The organization, structure, and procedural operation of the co-ordination system are discussed in the second section of the chapter, which examines in detail the relationship between central actors and the line ministries, the division of labour and responsibility, and the formal and informal channels of communication. The third section assesses the effectiveness of UK co-ordination within the wider context of the relationship between administrative efficiency and policy success. The final part concludes that the UK’s system for co-ordinating EU policy has been shaped more profoundly by pre-existing institutional structures and values that characterize the domestic polity than by the demands generated by membership of the EU, but that the influence of both imperatives is apparent.

This chapter examines the co-ordination of UK policy in Brussels, starting by putting the institutions, procedures, and policies that the UK has put in place at the European level in the context of the UK’s strategic or ‘positive’ co-ordination ambition. It then focuses on the role of the UK permanent representation (UKREP) in the system. After briefly outlining its history, the internal organization of UKREP is described, with accounts of its policies relating to personnel (composition, recruitment), its internal processes and working methods, and its responsibilities, roles, and functions. An assessment is then made of the capacity and effectiveness both of UKREP specifically and of the UK co-ordination arrangements more generally. Two arguments are advanced: the first is that the factors that account for the UK’s exacting co-ordination ambition—principally, the centralized nature of its political system, scepticism towards the European project, and a preference for intergovernmentalism over supranationalism—also largely explain why it has been administratively efficient, but not politically effective, at the European level; the second argument relates to devolution, and makes the point that, on the present evidence, the creation of devolved governments in Scotland and Wales does not threaten the co-ordination strategy pursued by the UK since its accession to the European Communities, since despite institutional adjustments made by the devolved authorities, in Brussels UKREP retains its primacy.

While several economic issues are brought about by the various developments of pension funds, it is important to consider that issues similar to these also emerge for least developed countries (LDCs). Thus, traditional methods for providing the elderly with care are disintegrating because of the rapidly ageing population, industrialization, and ill-conceived social-security systems. The successful development of private pension schemes entails a prior level of development in the financial sector, the absence of political interference, the availability of skilled employees and the economy's administrative efficiency. Private pensions would often require free-market orientation as well as capital markets and administrative development that would further regulation. This chapter attempts to examine the social security issues in LDCs and the development of the securities markets.

This chapter examines the deferential approach, regarded as orthodox. It is divided into two sections. The first explains the main arguments upon which this cautious approach, based on the Wednesbury case, is founded. In particular, these arguments point towards two important features of modern administration—expertise and institutional autonomy--which indicate that regulators are far better equipped than the courts to deal fairly and impartially with technical issues arising from the relevant context. Moreover, it is argued that a less strict standard of review would be consistent with the notion of regulatory effectiveness, which demands decisiveness and certainty on the part of executive bodies. The second section provides an account of the relevant cases. These cases consider different aspects of the contended order which have required the supervision of the courts: factual findings, substantive choices, and interpretation of vague or self-regulatory rules.