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The distinction between automatic and controlled cognitive processes was imported into social psychology, and formed the basis for a new generation of “dual-process” theories of social cognition and behavior. However, some social psychologists have gone further to claim that automatic processes dominate social interaction, leaving little room for anything like free will. For these theorists, human beings are machines — automatons — after all. However, no empirical evidence supports such a strong claim about human nature. In part, the automaticity juggernaut appears to reflect a reaction to the cognitive revolution in social psychology, with its implication that social interactions are mediated by conscious, deliberate, rational thought; in part, it may be a reflection of the biologization of social psychology. But it also seems to be a reflection of an emerging “People Are Stupid” trend within social psychology, as well as a throwback to the historical alliance between situationism and radical behaviorism. Finally, the emphasis on automaticity appears to be based on the “epiphenomenalist suspicion” that consciousness plays no role in human behavior, as well as the allure of the pinball determinism of classical physics.

This chapter attempts to provide further motivation for the model of deontic constraint proposed in the previous chapter, by filling in some of the background that informs the way that philosophers use the terms “belief” and “desire.” The central difference between rational choice theorists and philosophers, in this regard, is that the latter think of beliefs and desires as propositional attitudes, and thus as fundamentally sentence-like in nature. Adopting this linguistically-informed perspective lends much greater plausibility to the introduction of principles as a third category of intentional state. Support for the view that all intentional states should be thought of as deontic statuses is presented.

A complement to the philosophical arguments of Chapter 5 is found in some recent lines of research in social and cognitive psychology. Chapter 6 begins by noting the presence of an interpretive cultural psychology, but declines its invitation to return to Geertz: rather interpretive political culture research is itself in need of support from psychology to identify causal mechanisms. Experimental research into ‘dual attitudes’ by Wilson and colleagues is examined: it suggests that the attitudes we invoke as explanation or justification of our actions are not necessarily those which cause it. The theory of dual attitudes is both a striking parallel to the dualistic ontology of culture advanced in Chapter 5 and a significant challenge to the positivist method of the attitude survey. Research that brings the very idea of the executive conscious will into question is also examined.