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Dispositional Essentialism, Modality, and Intentionality

Alexander Bird

in Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties

This chapter analyzes the relationship of dispositional essentialism to questions of modality and to intentionality. Armstrong criticizes dispositional essentialism on the ground that it leads to a ... More

This chapter analyzes the relationship of dispositional essentialism to questions of modality and to intentionality. Armstrong criticizes dispositional essentialism on the ground that it leads to a Meinongian commitment to non-actual possibilia. It is shown that Armstrong's view is likewise committed to such entities; consequently any sensible view (i.e., not modal realism nor Megarian actualism) must accept them. Armstrong gives a similar criticism to the effect that dispositional essentialism takes properties to possess something very like intentionality, while Ellis and Place are happy to accept this. It is argued that dispositionally essential properties do not have any kind of intentionality.Less

Singular Propositions *

Trenton Merricks

in Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga

Let a “singular proposition” be any proposition expressed by a sentence that uses a rigid designator or directly referring term. Thus, plausibly, “Lincoln was tall” expresses a singular proposition. ... More

Let a “singular proposition” be any proposition expressed by a sentence that uses a rigid designator or directly referring term. Thus, plausibly, “Lincoln was tall” expresses a singular proposition. The received view is that singular propositions have the relevant individual (in this case, Lincoln) as a constituent, which is something like a part. I argue that the received view is false, and that singular propositions do not have the relevant individuals as constituents. I then offer my own account of singular propositions. I then reflect on what all of this means for the metaphysics of propositions in generalLess

Epistemic Expressivism: Nontraditional Views

Terence Cuneo

in The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism

This chapter engages with the second version of epistemic expressivism, the so-called non-traditional epistemic expressivism. This view is distinguished from traditional expressivism inasmuch as it ... More

This chapter engages with the second version of epistemic expressivism, the so-called non-traditional epistemic expressivism. This view is distinguished from traditional expressivism inasmuch as it holds that epistemic discourse is assertoric, that there are epistemic truths, and that there are epistemic facts — albeit in deflationary senses of these terms. After having explicated what it is for there to be deflationary truths and facts, the chapter argues that non-traditional epistemic expressivism is vulnerable to serious objections. These objections charge that for all its sophistication, non-traditional epistemic expressivism is not much more plausible than its traditional cousin.Less

Concepts, syntax, and actualism

Brian Leftow

in God and Necessity

Because it is useful to speak as if there were divine concepts, this chapter discusses God’s mental content in concept language. It provides an account of concepts simple in content. It then takes up ... More

Because it is useful to speak as if there were divine concepts, this chapter discusses God’s mental content in concept language. It provides an account of concepts simple in content. It then takes up ways concepts combine. It suggests that God invents His creature-concepts’ modes of combination, rather than finding them innate in Himself. It also argues that God actually makes all possible combinations of His concepts. This helps secure actualism — the metaphysical thesis that all that is is actual — for the book’s overall theory.Less

The ‘Actual’ in Actualism 1

Julia Driver

in Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson

The work of Frank Jackson has been important to at least two central debates in consequentialist ethical theory: (1) between possibilism and actualism and (2) between objective consequentialism and ... More

The work of Frank Jackson has been important to at least two central debates in consequentialist ethical theory: (1) between possibilism and actualism and (2) between objective consequentialism and expectabilism (or a variety of subjective consequentialism). Suppose that we define the right action as that action which maximizes the good. Some writers, such as Michael Slote, have argued that this straightforward criterion is underdetermined. Are we to maximize ‘actual’ good or ‘expected’ good? That is the debate between the objective consequentialist and the subjective consequentialist. There is also the issue of whether or not the agent who is deliberating considers what would be best given what will happen as opposed to what could or can happen. That is the debate between the actualist and the possibilist in determining relevant options for the moral agent to consider in deliberation. This chapter explores differing answers to both of these questions, and then explores one strategy for answering both — a strategy which has been very much influenced by the work of Frank Jackson. Though the author agrees with Jackson on actualism, it disagrees with him on expectabilism. It is argued that the definition of ‘right action’ is clear and not at all underdetermined — the right action just is the action that maximizes the good, the actual good. But what is often confusing is that the semantics of right is confused with an issue in the epistemology of right — that is the issue of determining how we are to go about doing the best that we can properly.Less

Time, Space, World

Takashi Yagisawa

in Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise

Alethic indices are relativizers of truth. Metaphysical indices are alethic indices which permeate the universe, and they include times, spatial points, and worlds. The conception of a possible world ... More

Alethic indices are relativizers of truth. Metaphysical indices are alethic indices which permeate the universe, and they include times, spatial points, and worlds. The conception of a possible world to be defended is contrasted with the actualist and Lewis's conceptions.Less

General possibilities

Ori Simchen

in Necessary Intentionality: A Study in the Metaphysics of Aboutness

This chapter completes the requisite modal metaphysical background to the book’s overall argument. It is argued that general possibilities such as the possibility that there be someone or other ... More

This chapter completes the requisite modal metaphysical background to the book’s overall argument. It is argued that general possibilities such as the possibility that there be someone or other typing at some point or other in time, are no less determined by what particular things there are and what they are like than particular possibilities such as the possibility that I should be typing right now. The approach is then brought to bear on a prima facie problem for the position: namely, properties that cannot be had contingently but that happen not to be instantiated by anything.Less

Modality without Worlds II: The Semantics of Modal Quantificational Logic

Charles S. Chihara

in The Worlds of Possibility: Modal Realism and the Semantics of Modal Logic

This chapter answers the question ‘what is the connections between the set theoretical structures studied in the model theory of modal logic and anything objective in virtue of which we can explain ... More

This chapter answers the question ‘what is the connections between the set theoretical structures studied in the model theory of modal logic and anything objective in virtue of which we can explain how a study of these structures can yield genuine insights into the principles and inferences of modal logic’. The answer is given by means of a statement and proof of a theorem of S5 Modal Quantificational Logic that is analogous to the ‘connecting’ theorem of Chapter 5 and Theorem 2 mentioned earlier. With such a theorem, this chapter provides the same sort of anti-Realist account of the semantics of this logic that was given earlier. As it becomes evident, the logical material discussed in this chapter is considerably more complicated than the material discussed in the two preceding chapters.Less

The Contingency of Existence *

Michael Nelson

in Metaphysics and the Good: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams

Many of my features are intuitively contingent: I am contingently sitting, contingently typing at the computer, contingently thinking of necessity and contingency. It is only slightly less intuitive ... More

Many of my features are intuitively contingent: I am contingently sitting, contingently typing at the computer, contingently thinking of necessity and contingency. It is only slightly less intuitive that my very existence is equally contingent. The same is true of all of the ordinary objects we deal with. But there are a number of highly intuitive principles which suggest that, after all, existence is a necessary feature and that everything necessarily exists and necessarily, everything that could exist does exist. There are both technical and philosophical motivations for this. After laying those motivations out, this chapter goes on to distinguish six main ways of dealing with the problem of the apparent contingency of existence. It then argues that a view based on Robert Adams' work on actualism and individual thisness offers the best account.Less

: Independence

George Molnar

in Powers: A Study in Metaphysics

This chapter describes the manifestation of powers. It distinguishes between token-independence and type-independence, in which powers can be independent of their manifestations. It explains ... More

This chapter describes the manifestation of powers. It distinguishes between token-independence and type-independence, in which powers can be independent of their manifestations. It explains independence and the different conditional analyses of powers, and cites three types of conditions: naïve, causal and reformed. The chapter treats anti-realism about manifesting powers and it also discusses Megaric actualism and the case against it.Less

Plantinga on the Reduction of Possibilist Discourse

Kit Fine

in Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers

This chapter critically examines Plantinga’s version of modal actualism, and his arguments against Prior’s version of modal actualism.

The Problem of Possibilia

Kit Fine

in Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers

It is argued that actual objects are prior to possible objects, and that talk of possible objects may be understood as a way of talking of actual objects. An alternative approach to avoiding ... More

It is argued that actual objects are prior to possible objects, and that talk of possible objects may be understood as a way of talking of actual objects. An alternative approach to avoiding reference to possible objects, modal fictionalism, is found to be wanting.Less

Actualism and Possible Worlds

Alvin Plantinga

in Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality

In this essay, I defend the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. I begin by demonstrating how on the ... More

In this essay, I defend the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. I begin by demonstrating how on the Canonical Conception of possible worlds one is committed to the idea that there are, or could have been, nonexistent objects. I then develop an actualist conception of possible worlds, properties, and essences. In particular, I deny that properties are set theoretical entities; something that the Canonical Conception endorses. Finally, I provide an actualist understanding of propositions such as there could have an object distinct from each object that actually exists – an understanding that does not commit one to belief in nonexistent objects.Less

On Existentialism

Alvin Plantinga

in Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality

Existentialism is the claim that quidditative properties and singular propositions are ontologically dependent upon the individuals they involve. In this essay, I consider two arguments for ... More

Existentialism is the claim that quidditative properties and singular propositions are ontologically dependent upon the individuals they involve. In this essay, I consider two arguments for existentialism and find them both unconvincing. I then give an argument against the existential thesis that singular propositions are ontologically dependent on contingent objects. I conclude the essay by defending my argument against potential existentialist objections. In the process, I defend the claim that serious actualism – i.e., the view that no object could have had a property without existing – is true.Less

Replies to My Colleagues

Alvin Plantinga

in Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality

In this essay, I consider several objections raised by John Pollock against my account of modality. I define possibilism – i.e., the view that there is a property that does not entail existence, but ... More

In this essay, I consider several objections raised by John Pollock against my account of modality. I define possibilism – i.e., the view that there is a property that does not entail existence, but is entailed by every property – and then give a more adequate definition of actualism based on its disagreement with possibilism. Pollock argues that the property of nonexistence is such that objects exemplify it in worlds in which they do not exist and based on this fact concludes that serious actualism is false. I give an argument that nonexistence is necessarily unexemplified and a separate argument for the conclusion that serious actualism is true. I conclude the essay by arguing that it does make a difference whether we accept existentialism or essentialism.Less