Nino B. Cocchiarella and Max A. Freund
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195366587
- eISBN:
- 9780199851898
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195366587.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
In this text, a variety of modal logics at the sentential, first-order, and second-order levels are developed with clarity, precision, and philosophical insight. All of the S1-S5 modal logics of ...
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In this text, a variety of modal logics at the sentential, first-order, and second-order levels are developed with clarity, precision, and philosophical insight. All of the S1-S5 modal logics of Lewis and Langford, among others, are constructed. A matrix, or many-valued semantics, for sentential modal logic is formalized, and an important result that no finite matrix can characterize any of the standard modal logics is proven. Exercises, some of which show independence results, help to develop logical skills. A separate sentential modal logic of logical necessity in logical atomism is also constructed and shown to be complete and decidable. On the first-order level of the logic of logical necessity, the modal thesis of anti-essentialism is valid and every de re sentence is provably equivalent to a de dicto sentence. An elegant extension of the standard sentential modal logics into several first-order modal logics is developed. Both a first-order modal logic for possibilism containing actualism as a proper part as well as a separate modal logic for actualism alone are constructed for a variety of modal systems. Exercises on this level show the connections between modal laws and quantifier logic regarding generalization into, or out of, modal contexts and the conditions required for the necessity of identity and non-identity. Two types of second-order modal logics, one possibilist and the other actualist, are developed based on a distinction between existence-entailing concepts and concepts in general. The result is a deeper second-order analysis of possibilism and actualism as ontological frameworks. Exercises regarding second-order predicate quantifiers clarify the distinction between existence-entailing concepts and concepts in general.Less
In this text, a variety of modal logics at the sentential, first-order, and second-order levels are developed with clarity, precision, and philosophical insight. All of the S1-S5 modal logics of Lewis and Langford, among others, are constructed. A matrix, or many-valued semantics, for sentential modal logic is formalized, and an important result that no finite matrix can characterize any of the standard modal logics is proven. Exercises, some of which show independence results, help to develop logical skills. A separate sentential modal logic of logical necessity in logical atomism is also constructed and shown to be complete and decidable. On the first-order level of the logic of logical necessity, the modal thesis of anti-essentialism is valid and every de re sentence is provably equivalent to a de dicto sentence. An elegant extension of the standard sentential modal logics into several first-order modal logics is developed. Both a first-order modal logic for possibilism containing actualism as a proper part as well as a separate modal logic for actualism alone are constructed for a variety of modal systems. Exercises on this level show the connections between modal laws and quantifier logic regarding generalization into, or out of, modal contexts and the conditions required for the necessity of identity and non-identity. Two types of second-order modal logics, one possibilist and the other actualist, are developed based on a distinction between existence-entailing concepts and concepts in general. The result is a deeper second-order analysis of possibilism and actualism as ontological frameworks. Exercises regarding second-order predicate quantifiers clarify the distinction between existence-entailing concepts and concepts in general.
Alvin Plantinga
Matthew Davidson (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195103762
- eISBN:
- 9780199833573
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195103769.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William ...
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This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William Kneale and W. V. Quine, and an elaboration on the notions of possible worlds and essences. In the third chapter, I conclude that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals is false, even when fortified with Counterpart Theory. Chapter 4 contains an argument for the conclusion that there neither are, nor could have been, possible but nonexistent objects. In the next chapter, I develop this theme in greater detail and argue for the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. Both Chs. 6 and 7 contain an account of the relationship between proper names and essences, my view being that proper names express essences and that sometimes different proper names for the same object express different essences of that object. The end of Ch. 7 and all of Ch. 8 are an examination of existentialism (the theory that propositions and states of affairs ontologically depend on their subjects) and arguments against it. In Ch. 9, I defend my theory of modality against objections raised by John Pollock. In Ch. 10, I sketch out what the commitments of modal realism are, and argue that David Lewis's modal theory is not a modal realist theory. Finally, in the concluding chapter I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects.Less
This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William Kneale and W. V. Quine, and an elaboration on the notions of possible worlds and essences. In the third chapter, I conclude that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals is false, even when fortified with Counterpart Theory. Chapter 4 contains an argument for the conclusion that there neither are, nor could have been, possible but nonexistent objects. In the next chapter, I develop this theme in greater detail and argue for the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. Both Chs. 6 and 7 contain an account of the relationship between proper names and essences, my view being that proper names express essences and that sometimes different proper names for the same object express different essences of that object. The end of Ch. 7 and all of Ch. 8 are an examination of existentialism (the theory that propositions and states of affairs ontologically depend on their subjects) and arguments against it. In Ch. 9, I defend my theory of modality against objections raised by John Pollock. In Ch. 10, I sketch out what the commitments of modal realism are, and argue that David Lewis's modal theory is not a modal realist theory. Finally, in the concluding chapter I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects.
Adam Morton
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199658534
- eISBN:
- 9780191746192
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658534.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
The book describes virtues of limitation management, intellectual virtues of adapting to the fact that we cannot solve many problems that we can easily describe. How to be profitably stupid. It ...
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The book describes virtues of limitation management, intellectual virtues of adapting to the fact that we cannot solve many problems that we can easily describe. How to be profitably stupid. It argues that we do give one another guidance on managing our limitations, but that this has to be in terms of virtues and not of rules, and in terms of success—knowledge and accomplishment—rather than rationality. So there is the beginning of a taxonomy of intellectual virtues. These include ‘paradoxical virtues’, that sound like vices, such as the virtue of ignoring evidence and the virtue of not thinking too hard. There are also virtues of not planning ahead, ‘possibilist virtues’, in that some forms of such planning require present knowledge of one’s future knowledge that is arguably impossible. A person’s best response to many problems depends not on the most rationally promising solution to solving them but on the most likely route to success given the person’s profile of intellectual virtues and failings. This is illustrated with a discussion of several paradoxes and conundra. At the end of the book there is a discussion of intelligence and rationality that argues that both have very limited usefulness as evaluations of who will make progress on which problems.Less
The book describes virtues of limitation management, intellectual virtues of adapting to the fact that we cannot solve many problems that we can easily describe. How to be profitably stupid. It argues that we do give one another guidance on managing our limitations, but that this has to be in terms of virtues and not of rules, and in terms of success—knowledge and accomplishment—rather than rationality. So there is the beginning of a taxonomy of intellectual virtues. These include ‘paradoxical virtues’, that sound like vices, such as the virtue of ignoring evidence and the virtue of not thinking too hard. There are also virtues of not planning ahead, ‘possibilist virtues’, in that some forms of such planning require present knowledge of one’s future knowledge that is arguably impossible. A person’s best response to many problems depends not on the most rationally promising solution to solving them but on the most likely route to success given the person’s profile of intellectual virtues and failings. This is illustrated with a discussion of several paradoxes and conundra. At the end of the book there is a discussion of intelligence and rationality that argues that both have very limited usefulness as evaluations of who will make progress on which problems.
Alexander Bird
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199227013
- eISBN:
- 9780191711121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter analyzes the relationship of dispositional essentialism to questions of modality and to intentionality. Armstrong criticizes dispositional essentialism on the ground that it leads to a ...
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This chapter analyzes the relationship of dispositional essentialism to questions of modality and to intentionality. Armstrong criticizes dispositional essentialism on the ground that it leads to a Meinongian commitment to non-actual possibilia. It is shown that Armstrong's view is likewise committed to such entities; consequently any sensible view (i.e., not modal realism nor Megarian actualism) must accept them. Armstrong gives a similar criticism to the effect that dispositional essentialism takes properties to possess something very like intentionality, while Ellis and Place are happy to accept this. It is argued that dispositionally essential properties do not have any kind of intentionality.Less
This chapter analyzes the relationship of dispositional essentialism to questions of modality and to intentionality. Armstrong criticizes dispositional essentialism on the ground that it leads to a Meinongian commitment to non-actual possibilia. It is shown that Armstrong's view is likewise committed to such entities; consequently any sensible view (i.e., not modal realism nor Megarian actualism) must accept them. Armstrong gives a similar criticism to the effect that dispositional essentialism takes properties to possess something very like intentionality, while Ellis and Place are happy to accept this. It is argued that dispositionally essential properties do not have any kind of intentionality.
Trenton Merricks
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199766864
- eISBN:
- 9780199932184
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766864.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Let a “singular proposition” be any proposition expressed by a sentence that uses a rigid designator or directly referring term. Thus, plausibly, “Lincoln was tall” expresses a singular proposition. ...
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Let a “singular proposition” be any proposition expressed by a sentence that uses a rigid designator or directly referring term. Thus, plausibly, “Lincoln was tall” expresses a singular proposition. The received view is that singular propositions have the relevant individual (in this case, Lincoln) as a constituent, which is something like a part. I argue that the received view is false, and that singular propositions do not have the relevant individuals as constituents. I then offer my own account of singular propositions. I then reflect on what all of this means for the metaphysics of propositions in generalLess
Let a “singular proposition” be any proposition expressed by a sentence that uses a rigid designator or directly referring term. Thus, plausibly, “Lincoln was tall” expresses a singular proposition. The received view is that singular propositions have the relevant individual (in this case, Lincoln) as a constituent, which is something like a part. I argue that the received view is false, and that singular propositions do not have the relevant individuals as constituents. I then offer my own account of singular propositions. I then reflect on what all of this means for the metaphysics of propositions in general
Terence Cuneo
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199218837
- eISBN:
- 9780191711749
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter engages with the second version of epistemic expressivism, the so-called non-traditional epistemic expressivism. This view is distinguished from traditional expressivism inasmuch as it ...
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This chapter engages with the second version of epistemic expressivism, the so-called non-traditional epistemic expressivism. This view is distinguished from traditional expressivism inasmuch as it holds that epistemic discourse is assertoric, that there are epistemic truths, and that there are epistemic facts — albeit in deflationary senses of these terms. After having explicated what it is for there to be deflationary truths and facts, the chapter argues that non-traditional epistemic expressivism is vulnerable to serious objections. These objections charge that for all its sophistication, non-traditional epistemic expressivism is not much more plausible than its traditional cousin.Less
This chapter engages with the second version of epistemic expressivism, the so-called non-traditional epistemic expressivism. This view is distinguished from traditional expressivism inasmuch as it holds that epistemic discourse is assertoric, that there are epistemic truths, and that there are epistemic facts — albeit in deflationary senses of these terms. After having explicated what it is for there to be deflationary truths and facts, the chapter argues that non-traditional epistemic expressivism is vulnerable to serious objections. These objections charge that for all its sophistication, non-traditional epistemic expressivism is not much more plausible than its traditional cousin.
Brian Leftow
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199263356
- eISBN:
- 9780191741777
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263356.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Because it is useful to speak as if there were divine concepts, this chapter discusses God’s mental content in concept language. It provides an account of concepts simple in content. It then takes up ...
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Because it is useful to speak as if there were divine concepts, this chapter discusses God’s mental content in concept language. It provides an account of concepts simple in content. It then takes up ways concepts combine. It suggests that God invents His creature-concepts’ modes of combination, rather than finding them innate in Himself. It also argues that God actually makes all possible combinations of His concepts. This helps secure actualism — the metaphysical thesis that all that is is actual — for the book’s overall theory.Less
Because it is useful to speak as if there were divine concepts, this chapter discusses God’s mental content in concept language. It provides an account of concepts simple in content. It then takes up ways concepts combine. It suggests that God invents His creature-concepts’ modes of combination, rather than finding them innate in Himself. It also argues that God actually makes all possible combinations of His concepts. This helps secure actualism — the metaphysical thesis that all that is is actual — for the book’s overall theory.
Julia Driver
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199267989
- eISBN:
- 9780191708268
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The work of Frank Jackson has been important to at least two central debates in consequentialist ethical theory: (1) between possibilism and actualism and (2) between objective consequentialism and ...
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The work of Frank Jackson has been important to at least two central debates in consequentialist ethical theory: (1) between possibilism and actualism and (2) between objective consequentialism and expectabilism (or a variety of subjective consequentialism). Suppose that we define the right action as that action which maximizes the good. Some writers, such as Michael Slote, have argued that this straightforward criterion is underdetermined. Are we to maximize ‘actual’ good or ‘expected’ good? That is the debate between the objective consequentialist and the subjective consequentialist. There is also the issue of whether or not the agent who is deliberating considers what would be best given what will happen as opposed to what could or can happen. That is the debate between the actualist and the possibilist in determining relevant options for the moral agent to consider in deliberation. This chapter explores differing answers to both of these questions, and then explores one strategy for answering both — a strategy which has been very much influenced by the work of Frank Jackson. Though the author agrees with Jackson on actualism, it disagrees with him on expectabilism. It is argued that the definition of ‘right action’ is clear and not at all underdetermined — the right action just is the action that maximizes the good, the actual good. But what is often confusing is that the semantics of right is confused with an issue in the epistemology of right — that is the issue of determining how we are to go about doing the best that we can properly.Less
The work of Frank Jackson has been important to at least two central debates in consequentialist ethical theory: (1) between possibilism and actualism and (2) between objective consequentialism and expectabilism (or a variety of subjective consequentialism). Suppose that we define the right action as that action which maximizes the good. Some writers, such as Michael Slote, have argued that this straightforward criterion is underdetermined. Are we to maximize ‘actual’ good or ‘expected’ good? That is the debate between the objective consequentialist and the subjective consequentialist. There is also the issue of whether or not the agent who is deliberating considers what would be best given what will happen as opposed to what could or can happen. That is the debate between the actualist and the possibilist in determining relevant options for the moral agent to consider in deliberation. This chapter explores differing answers to both of these questions, and then explores one strategy for answering both — a strategy which has been very much influenced by the work of Frank Jackson. Though the author agrees with Jackson on actualism, it disagrees with him on expectabilism. It is argued that the definition of ‘right action’ is clear and not at all underdetermined — the right action just is the action that maximizes the good, the actual good. But what is often confusing is that the semantics of right is confused with an issue in the epistemology of right — that is the issue of determining how we are to go about doing the best that we can properly.
Takashi Yagisawa
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199576890
- eISBN:
- 9780191722301
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576890.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
Alethic indices are relativizers of truth. Metaphysical indices are alethic indices which permeate the universe, and they include times, spatial points, and worlds. The conception of a possible world ...
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Alethic indices are relativizers of truth. Metaphysical indices are alethic indices which permeate the universe, and they include times, spatial points, and worlds. The conception of a possible world to be defended is contrasted with the actualist and Lewis's conceptions.Less
Alethic indices are relativizers of truth. Metaphysical indices are alethic indices which permeate the universe, and they include times, spatial points, and worlds. The conception of a possible world to be defended is contrasted with the actualist and Lewis's conceptions.
Ori Simchen
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199608515
- eISBN:
- 9780191738241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608515.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
This chapter completes the requisite modal metaphysical background to the book’s overall argument. It is argued that general possibilities such as the possibility that there be someone or other ...
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This chapter completes the requisite modal metaphysical background to the book’s overall argument. It is argued that general possibilities such as the possibility that there be someone or other typing at some point or other in time, are no less determined by what particular things there are and what they are like than particular possibilities such as the possibility that I should be typing right now. The approach is then brought to bear on a prima facie problem for the position: namely, properties that cannot be had contingently but that happen not to be instantiated by anything.Less
This chapter completes the requisite modal metaphysical background to the book’s overall argument. It is argued that general possibilities such as the possibility that there be someone or other typing at some point or other in time, are no less determined by what particular things there are and what they are like than particular possibilities such as the possibility that I should be typing right now. The approach is then brought to bear on a prima facie problem for the position: namely, properties that cannot be had contingently but that happen not to be instantiated by anything.
Charles S. Chihara
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199246557
- eISBN:
- 9780191697609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199246557.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter answers the question ‘what is the connections between the set theoretical structures studied in the model theory of modal logic and anything objective in virtue of which we can explain ...
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This chapter answers the question ‘what is the connections between the set theoretical structures studied in the model theory of modal logic and anything objective in virtue of which we can explain how a study of these structures can yield genuine insights into the principles and inferences of modal logic’. The answer is given by means of a statement and proof of a theorem of S5 Modal Quantificational Logic that is analogous to the ‘connecting’ theorem of Chapter 5 and Theorem 2 mentioned earlier. With such a theorem, this chapter provides the same sort of anti-Realist account of the semantics of this logic that was given earlier. As it becomes evident, the logical material discussed in this chapter is considerably more complicated than the material discussed in the two preceding chapters.Less
This chapter answers the question ‘what is the connections between the set theoretical structures studied in the model theory of modal logic and anything objective in virtue of which we can explain how a study of these structures can yield genuine insights into the principles and inferences of modal logic’. The answer is given by means of a statement and proof of a theorem of S5 Modal Quantificational Logic that is analogous to the ‘connecting’ theorem of Chapter 5 and Theorem 2 mentioned earlier. With such a theorem, this chapter provides the same sort of anti-Realist account of the semantics of this logic that was given earlier. As it becomes evident, the logical material discussed in this chapter is considerably more complicated than the material discussed in the two preceding chapters.
Nino B. Cocchiarella and Max A. Freund
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195366587
- eISBN:
- 9780199851898
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195366587.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter describes the syntax of first-order modal predicate logic and develops the first-order extensions of the different sentential modal logics constructed in Chapter 2. The authors ...
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This chapter describes the syntax of first-order modal predicate logic and develops the first-order extensions of the different sentential modal logics constructed in Chapter 2. The authors distinguish in this section between actualism, which is based on free logic, i.e. logic that is free of existential presuppositions for singular terms, and possibilism, which is based on standard logic. The Carnap–Barcan formula is provable in possibilism that are not provable in actualism.Less
This chapter describes the syntax of first-order modal predicate logic and develops the first-order extensions of the different sentential modal logics constructed in Chapter 2. The authors distinguish in this section between actualism, which is based on free logic, i.e. logic that is free of existential presuppositions for singular terms, and possibilism, which is based on standard logic. The Carnap–Barcan formula is provable in possibilism that are not provable in actualism.
Nino B. Cocchiarella and Max A. Freund
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195366587
- eISBN:
- 9780199851898
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195366587.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter extends the systems to the level of second-order modal predicate logic, where the notion of existence that is central to the actualism-possibilism distinction is given deeper and ...
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This chapter extends the systems to the level of second-order modal predicate logic, where the notion of existence that is central to the actualism-possibilism distinction is given deeper and finer-grained analysis in terms of existence-entailing concepts, as opposed to concepts that do not entail existence. By existence in this context means actual, or concrete, existence in the sense of being part of the material, causal order. In contrast, concepts such as being an ancestor of everyone now existing, etc. may have objects falling under them at a time when those objects do not exist. In possibilism, but not in actualism, there are concepts such as possibly being a physical object that moves faster than the speed of light, etc. that might have objects falling under them that do not exist in the actual world. These concepts do not entail (concrete) existence unlike e-concepts.Less
This chapter extends the systems to the level of second-order modal predicate logic, where the notion of existence that is central to the actualism-possibilism distinction is given deeper and finer-grained analysis in terms of existence-entailing concepts, as opposed to concepts that do not entail existence. By existence in this context means actual, or concrete, existence in the sense of being part of the material, causal order. In contrast, concepts such as being an ancestor of everyone now existing, etc. may have objects falling under them at a time when those objects do not exist. In possibilism, but not in actualism, there are concepts such as possibly being a physical object that moves faster than the speed of light, etc. that might have objects falling under them that do not exist in the actual world. These concepts do not entail (concrete) existence unlike e-concepts.
George Molnar
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199204175
- eISBN:
- 9780191695537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199204175.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter describes the manifestation of powers. It distinguishes between token-independence and type-independence, in which powers can be independent of their manifestations. It explains ...
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This chapter describes the manifestation of powers. It distinguishes between token-independence and type-independence, in which powers can be independent of their manifestations. It explains independence and the different conditional analyses of powers, and cites three types of conditions: naïve, causal and reformed. The chapter treats anti-realism about manifesting powers and it also discusses Megaric actualism and the case against it.Less
This chapter describes the manifestation of powers. It distinguishes between token-independence and type-independence, in which powers can be independent of their manifestations. It explains independence and the different conditional analyses of powers, and cites three types of conditions: naïve, causal and reformed. The chapter treats anti-realism about manifesting powers and it also discusses Megaric actualism and the case against it.
Michael Nelson
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199542680
- eISBN:
- 9780191715396
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542680.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Many of my features are intuitively contingent: I am contingently sitting, contingently typing at the computer, contingently thinking of necessity and contingency. It is only slightly less intuitive ...
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Many of my features are intuitively contingent: I am contingently sitting, contingently typing at the computer, contingently thinking of necessity and contingency. It is only slightly less intuitive that my very existence is equally contingent. The same is true of all of the ordinary objects we deal with. But there are a number of highly intuitive principles which suggest that, after all, existence is a necessary feature and that everything necessarily exists and necessarily, everything that could exist does exist. There are both technical and philosophical motivations for this. After laying those motivations out, this chapter goes on to distinguish six main ways of dealing with the problem of the apparent contingency of existence. It then argues that a view based on Robert Adams' work on actualism and individual thisness offers the best account.Less
Many of my features are intuitively contingent: I am contingently sitting, contingently typing at the computer, contingently thinking of necessity and contingency. It is only slightly less intuitive that my very existence is equally contingent. The same is true of all of the ordinary objects we deal with. But there are a number of highly intuitive principles which suggest that, after all, existence is a necessary feature and that everything necessarily exists and necessarily, everything that could exist does exist. There are both technical and philosophical motivations for this. After laying those motivations out, this chapter goes on to distinguish six main ways of dealing with the problem of the apparent contingency of existence. It then argues that a view based on Robert Adams' work on actualism and individual thisness offers the best account.
Kit Fine
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199278701
- eISBN:
- 9780191603105
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199278709.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter critically examines Plantinga’s version of modal actualism, and his arguments against Prior’s version of modal actualism.
This chapter critically examines Plantinga’s version of modal actualism, and his arguments against Prior’s version of modal actualism.
Kit Fine
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199278701
- eISBN:
- 9780191603105
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199278709.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
It is argued that actual objects are prior to possible objects, and that talk of possible objects may be understood as a way of talking of actual objects. An alternative approach to avoiding ...
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It is argued that actual objects are prior to possible objects, and that talk of possible objects may be understood as a way of talking of actual objects. An alternative approach to avoiding reference to possible objects, modal fictionalism, is found to be wanting.Less
It is argued that actual objects are prior to possible objects, and that talk of possible objects may be understood as a way of talking of actual objects. An alternative approach to avoiding reference to possible objects, modal fictionalism, is found to be wanting.
Robert C. Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199251483
- eISBN:
- 9780191602320
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251487.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This paper explores a different version of the counterpart theory - that the actualist can coherently combine a belief in primitive thisness and genuine identity across possible worlds with a version ...
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This paper explores a different version of the counterpart theory - that the actualist can coherently combine a belief in primitive thisness and genuine identity across possible worlds with a version of counterpart theory that permits one to make sense of contingent identity and distinctness, i.e., if the claims that one thing might have been two, and that distinct things might have been identical. The theses called haecceitism is analysed, and it is argued that this doctrine can be reconciled with a version of counterpart theory, and with the coherence of contingent identity. The impact of this account of counterparts and identity on the abstract semantics of quatified modal logic is considered.Less
This paper explores a different version of the counterpart theory - that the actualist can coherently combine a belief in primitive thisness and genuine identity across possible worlds with a version of counterpart theory that permits one to make sense of contingent identity and distinctness, i.e., if the claims that one thing might have been two, and that distinct things might have been identical. The theses called haecceitism is analysed, and it is argued that this doctrine can be reconciled with a version of counterpart theory, and with the coherence of contingent identity. The impact of this account of counterparts and identity on the abstract semantics of quatified modal logic is considered.
Adam Morton
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199658534
- eISBN:
- 9780191746192
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658534.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
To be prudent we have to know how hard the problems we expect to face are, and this is not at all simple. In order to plan sequences of actions we have to know in advance which problems we can solve. ...
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To be prudent we have to know how hard the problems we expect to face are, and this is not at all simple. In order to plan sequences of actions we have to know in advance which problems we can solve. But often we cannot know what we are going to know. This is connected with a general fact that it is often hard to know how hard a problem is. But we have other ways of succeeding at sequential problems. The chapter describes ‘possibilist virtues’, including capacities to change plans, backtrack, and re-think, which allow us to succeed in spite of frequent errors about how difficult problems will be. The chapter discusses the ‘trapdoor principle’ which explains why in retrospect the cases where we succeed seem more inevitable than they were.Less
To be prudent we have to know how hard the problems we expect to face are, and this is not at all simple. In order to plan sequences of actions we have to know in advance which problems we can solve. But often we cannot know what we are going to know. This is connected with a general fact that it is often hard to know how hard a problem is. But we have other ways of succeeding at sequential problems. The chapter describes ‘possibilist virtues’, including capacities to change plans, backtrack, and re-think, which allow us to succeed in spite of frequent errors about how difficult problems will be. The chapter discusses the ‘trapdoor principle’ which explains why in retrospect the cases where we succeed seem more inevitable than they were.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195103762
- eISBN:
- 9780199833573
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195103769.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this essay, I defend the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. I begin by demonstrating how on the ...
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In this essay, I defend the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. I begin by demonstrating how on the Canonical Conception of possible worlds one is committed to the idea that there are, or could have been, nonexistent objects. I then develop an actualist conception of possible worlds, properties, and essences. In particular, I deny that properties are set theoretical entities; something that the Canonical Conception endorses. Finally, I provide an actualist understanding of propositions such as there could have an object distinct from each object that actually exists – an understanding that does not commit one to belief in nonexistent objects.Less
In this essay, I defend the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. I begin by demonstrating how on the Canonical Conception of possible worlds one is committed to the idea that there are, or could have been, nonexistent objects. I then develop an actualist conception of possible worlds, properties, and essences. In particular, I deny that properties are set theoretical entities; something that the Canonical Conception endorses. Finally, I provide an actualist understanding of propositions such as there could have an object distinct from each object that actually exists – an understanding that does not commit one to belief in nonexistent objects.
