Kimberley Brownlee
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- April 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198713258
- eISBN:
- 9780191781704
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198713258.003.0019
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
One putative test for human rights is feasibility. This chapter questions the merits of this test. First, it distinguishes two different notions of feasibility. One is that of in principle ...
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One putative test for human rights is feasibility. This chapter questions the merits of this test. First, it distinguishes two different notions of feasibility. One is that of in principle practicability. The other is that of easy present practicability. Both of these notions are distinct from the broader notion of in principle possibility. Second, the chapter argues that there are reasons to be sceptical about the easy-practicability notion of feasibility. Third, it shows that, to the extent that feasibility (i.e. in principle practicability) is a credible test for human rights, it must take a non-state-centred form that highlights the role that international institutions now play in human rights protection.Less
One putative test for human rights is feasibility. This chapter questions the merits of this test. First, it distinguishes two different notions of feasibility. One is that of in principle practicability. The other is that of easy present practicability. Both of these notions are distinct from the broader notion of in principle possibility. Second, the chapter argues that there are reasons to be sceptical about the easy-practicability notion of feasibility. Third, it shows that, to the extent that feasibility (i.e. in principle practicability) is a credible test for human rights, it must take a non-state-centred form that highlights the role that international institutions now play in human rights protection.
Rowan Cruft
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- April 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198713258
- eISBN:
- 9780191781704
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198713258.003.0020
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter initially disputes Brownlee’s claim that because human rights are ideals, they cannot be subject to feasibility requirements. The chapter goes on to consider an alternative, more complex ...
More
This chapter initially disputes Brownlee’s claim that because human rights are ideals, they cannot be subject to feasibility requirements. The chapter goes on to consider an alternative, more complex interpretation of Brownlee’s claim: that because human rights’ ideality is compatible with human rights guiding action and bearing practical importance, there is no reason for the theorist to commit herself to feasibility conditions on human rights. Assessing the plausibility of this claim draws the chapter into methodological debates relevant to the evaluation of the rival ‘political’ and ‘orthodox’ views of human rights. It shows that the ‘orthodox’ approach best supports Brownlee’s complex argument against feasibility conditions.Less
This chapter initially disputes Brownlee’s claim that because human rights are ideals, they cannot be subject to feasibility requirements. The chapter goes on to consider an alternative, more complex interpretation of Brownlee’s claim: that because human rights’ ideality is compatible with human rights guiding action and bearing practical importance, there is no reason for the theorist to commit herself to feasibility conditions on human rights. Assessing the plausibility of this claim draws the chapter into methodological debates relevant to the evaluation of the rival ‘political’ and ‘orthodox’ views of human rights. It shows that the ‘orthodox’ approach best supports Brownlee’s complex argument against feasibility conditions.
