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Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law

H.L.A. Hart

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199534777
eISBN:
9780191720703
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534777.001.0001
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology

This classic collection of essays, first published in 1968, has had an enduring impact on academic and public debates about criminal responsibility and criminal punishment. Forty years on, its ... More


The Freedom of Decisions and Other Actions

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195159875
eISBN:
9780199835010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515987X.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Libertarian accounts commonly hold that only certain acts of will, such as decisions (or choices), can be directly free, with the freedom of actions of other types—whether mental or overt, bodily ... More


Bodies and Wills

Bryan Magee

in The Philosophy of Schopenhauer

Published in print:
1997
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198237228
eISBN:
9780191706233
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198237227.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

To the proposition that I can know objects only from outside, and through the forms of sense and intellect that my personal equipment makes available, there is a single exception and that is my own ... More


Norms which are not the Meaning of Acts of Will? Mally's Theory

Hans Kelsen

in General Theory of Norms

Published in print:
1991
Published Online:
March 2012
ISBN:
9780198252177
eISBN:
9780191681363
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0039
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

The failure to distinguish between a norm (an Ought) and a statement about the validity of a norm (of an Ought) leads to the view that norms, especially the norms of morality, are not the meaning of ... More


Thinking and Willing: Their Inter-relationship

Hans Kelsen

in General Theory of Norms

Published in print:
1991
Published Online:
March 2012
ISBN:
9780198252177
eISBN:
9780191681363
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0042
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

Thinking and willing are indeed two different functions, but they can be connected. This is possible in different ways. One can make a statement (in the sense of the expression of the meaning of an ... More


The Applicability of the Principle of Contradiction to Norms

Hans Kelsen

in General Theory of Norms

Published in print:
1991
Published Online:
March 2012
ISBN:
9780198252177
eISBN:
9780191681363
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0057
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

The basic presupposition of the principles of traditional logic concerning the truth of statements is that there are true and false statements, that is, there are statements which have the property ... More


Logical Problems about Grounding the Validity of Norms

Hans Kelsen

in General Theory of Norms

Published in print:
1991
Published Online:
March 2012
ISBN:
9780198252177
eISBN:
9780191681363
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0059
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

The validity of a general norm and that of an individual norm can be represented in a syllogism in another way. In order to do so, one must begin by accepting that it is not the meaning of every act ... More


The Principle of Autonomy—Conscience as Moral Authority

Hans Kelsen

in General Theory of Norms

Published in print:
1991
Published Online:
March 2012
ISBN:
9780198252177
eISBN:
9780191681363
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0019
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

The theory that conscience is the moral legislator fails for the basic reason that conscience — either as feeling or as knowledge — is unable to posit norms, since norms prescribing how we ought to ... More


Analysis of the Act of Will, of its Meaning and of its Expression

Hans Kelsen

in General Theory of Norms

Published in print:
1991
Published Online:
March 2012
ISBN:
9780198252177
eISBN:
9780191681363
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0009
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

The meaning of the act of thought which precedes the act of will representing an act of commanding is not a statement. If the speaker's goal in performing an act of thought is a statement, then the ... More


Norm-positing Acts: Content and Description—Norms: Validity and Content

Hans Kelsen

in General Theory of Norms

Published in print:
1991
Published Online:
March 2012
ISBN:
9780198252177
eISBN:
9780191681363
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0008
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

Whoever posits a norm, i.e. commands or prescribes a certain behaviour, wills that a person (or persons) is to behave in a certain way. Such is the meaning of the act of will we call a ‘command’. But ... More


Sigwart's Theory of the Assertion Contained in an Imperative

Hans Kelsen

in General Theory of Norms

Published in print:
1991
Published Online:
March 2012
ISBN:
9780198252177
eISBN:
9780191681363
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0053
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

No fact can ever contain an assertion, and so neither does the fact of speaking or uttering an imperative. An assertion — i.e. a statement — is the meaning of an act of thought, and to speak or utter ... More


The Validity of a Norm and its Observance or Violation

Hans Kelsen

in General Theory of Norms

Published in print:
1991
Published Online:
March 2012
ISBN:
9780198252177
eISBN:
9780191681363
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0012
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

Immediate observance or violation is possible only with a categorically valid individual norm, and not with a general norm (whether categorically or hypothetically valid). If an individual ... More


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