David-Hillel Ruben
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198235880
- eISBN:
- 9780191679155
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235880.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This book pursues some novel and unusual standpoints in the philosophy of action. It rejects, for example, the most widely held view about how to count actions, and argues for what it calls a ...
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This book pursues some novel and unusual standpoints in the philosophy of action. It rejects, for example, the most widely held view about how to count actions, and argues for what it calls a ‘prolific theory’ of act individuation. It also describes and argues against the two leading theories of the nature of action, the causal theory and the agent causal theory. The causal theory cannot account for skilled activity, nor for mental action. The agent causalist theory unnecessarily reifies causings. The book identifies an assumption that they share, and that most action theorists have assumed to be unproblematic and uncontroversial, that an action is, or entails the existence of, an event. Several different meanings to that claim are disentangled and in the most interesting sense of that claim, the book denies that it is true. The book's own alternative is simple and unpretentious: nothing informative can be said about the nature of action that explicates action in any other terms. The book sketches a theory of causal explanation of action that eschews the requirement for laws or generalizations, and this effectively quashes one argument for the oft-repeated view that no explanations of action can be causal, on the grounds that there are no convincing cases of laws of human action. It addresses a number of questions about the knowledge an agent has of his own actions, looking particularly at examples of pathological cases of action in which, for one reason or another, the agent does not know what he is doing.Less
This book pursues some novel and unusual standpoints in the philosophy of action. It rejects, for example, the most widely held view about how to count actions, and argues for what it calls a ‘prolific theory’ of act individuation. It also describes and argues against the two leading theories of the nature of action, the causal theory and the agent causal theory. The causal theory cannot account for skilled activity, nor for mental action. The agent causalist theory unnecessarily reifies causings. The book identifies an assumption that they share, and that most action theorists have assumed to be unproblematic and uncontroversial, that an action is, or entails the existence of, an event. Several different meanings to that claim are disentangled and in the most interesting sense of that claim, the book denies that it is true. The book's own alternative is simple and unpretentious: nothing informative can be said about the nature of action that explicates action in any other terms. The book sketches a theory of causal explanation of action that eschews the requirement for laws or generalizations, and this effectively quashes one argument for the oft-repeated view that no explanations of action can be causal, on the grounds that there are no convincing cases of laws of human action. It addresses a number of questions about the knowledge an agent has of his own actions, looking particularly at examples of pathological cases of action in which, for one reason or another, the agent does not know what he is doing.
Berent Enç
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256020
- eISBN:
- 9780191602238
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256020.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Develops further the foundationalist causal theory of action introduced in Ch. 2. In particular, Enç develops an account of act individuation ingenious to his reductive view of action, which at the ...
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Develops further the foundationalist causal theory of action introduced in Ch. 2. In particular, Enç develops an account of act individuation ingenious to his reductive view of action, which at the same time renders its main competitors, the family of theories that regards action as an irreducible part of rational action, implausible.Less
Develops further the foundationalist causal theory of action introduced in Ch. 2. In particular, Enç develops an account of act individuation ingenious to his reductive view of action, which at the same time renders its main competitors, the family of theories that regards action as an irreducible part of rational action, implausible.
Ruben David-Hillel
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198235880
- eISBN:
- 9780191679155
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235880.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This introductory chapter sets out the purpose of the book, which is to articulate a view of action and its explanation that most closely fits the author's conception. It also dismisses some ...
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This introductory chapter sets out the purpose of the book, which is to articulate a view of action and its explanation that most closely fits the author's conception. It also dismisses some alternatives to the author's view. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.Less
This introductory chapter sets out the purpose of the book, which is to articulate a view of action and its explanation that most closely fits the author's conception. It also dismisses some alternatives to the author's view. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199874187
- eISBN:
- 9780190267674
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199874187.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter explains the theory of act individuation initially through G. E. M. Anscombe's interpretation, which states that there is a natural ordering of the descriptions of actions. However, this ...
More
This chapter explains the theory of act individuation initially through G. E. M. Anscombe's interpretation, which states that there is a natural ordering of the descriptions of actions. However, this idea is problematic since the ordering only applies to descriptions pertaining to specific acts. The chapter then looks at Donald Davidson's insight through his workThe Individuation of Events, which is similar to Anscombe's except he suggested a criterion of act individuation. It also addresses the so-called temporal problem, initiated by Lawrence Davis and Judith Jarvis Thomson, of the Anscombe-Davidson concept which calls for a deeper understanding of the ontological condition of an act. The chapter then presents an analysis of action sentences, citing the works of Romane Clark and Terence Parsons in the discussion of act type and act property.Less
This chapter explains the theory of act individuation initially through G. E. M. Anscombe's interpretation, which states that there is a natural ordering of the descriptions of actions. However, this idea is problematic since the ordering only applies to descriptions pertaining to specific acts. The chapter then looks at Donald Davidson's insight through his workThe Individuation of Events, which is similar to Anscombe's except he suggested a criterion of act individuation. It also addresses the so-called temporal problem, initiated by Lawrence Davis and Judith Jarvis Thomson, of the Anscombe-Davidson concept which calls for a deeper understanding of the ontological condition of an act. The chapter then presents an analysis of action sentences, citing the works of Romane Clark and Terence Parsons in the discussion of act type and act property.
